JUDGMENT This Special Appeal is filed by the tenant of certain premises, in Pondicherry against the order of eviction passed against him by the Tribunal of First Instance in summary proceedings (Ordonance de refere), and which, order of eviction was confirmed by the Court of Appeal at Pondicherry. The Court of First Instance gave eight months to the tenant to vacate, and the appellate Court while confirming the order of eviction, gave a period of ten months to the tenant to vacate the premises. It is common ground that the tenancy was originally fixed by a written instrument for one year from 5th February, 1959 up to 5th February, 1960, stipulating a rent of Rs. 62 per month. The tenant also paid Rs. 200 as advance. Subsequent to the one year's period, the lease was extended orally under a tacit arrangement on the same terms as before. Before resorting to the Court for eviction by the summary procedure, the landlord gave to the tenant a notice to quit, giving fifteen day's time, and this notice was served on 27th November, 1962, on the tenant. It is common ground that the law which prescribes the procedure for eviction. In such cases is given in Articles 1736 and 1738 of the Code Civil Procedure which read thus: “Article 1736 : If the lease has been made without written document, one of the parties could only give (quit) notice to the other by observing the times fixed by the local custom. Article 1738 : If, at the expiry of the written leases, the lessee remains and is left in possession, it will operate as a new lease, the effect of which is settled by the Article relating to the lease made without written document.” It becomes, therefore, necessary in such cases to decide whether the landlord had given to the tenant, before he filed the suit, a notice to quit, giving the time fixed by the local custom. Learned Counsel, Sri Arunachalam, appearing for the appellant before us, urged, as his principal ground for relief before this Court, the argument, that the Courts below did not apply their mind to the question whether the period of fifteen days to quit given in the notice in the present case, was the one recognized by the local custom, in the area in question, namely, Pondicherry. Per contra learned Counsel for the respondent (landlord) urged that this particular point was not raised in the Pondicherry Courts, and that it was being urged for the first time in this Court. Sri Arunachalam thereupon filed before us a true copy of the grounds of appeal filed by the appellant before the appellate Court at Pondicherry, where the appellant had stated that he had protested from the beginning itself against the notice to quit. It would, therefore, appear that the tenant at all material times had also taken the stand that the notice to quit in this case was not in order. But it might be that he did not put forward the argument in the form in which it is now advanced before us, about the period stipulated in the notice being not in conformity with the period recognised by local custom. It appears to us that this ground about the existence of valid notice to quit, goes to the very root of the jurisdiction of the Court to pass an order of eviction, whether remedy is sought by way of a regular suit or by summary procedure. The law applicable in both cases is the one laid down in the two Articles of the Code Civil aforesaid, and if it is discovered in any particular case that the prescribed law had not been strictly followed, this Court has got jurisdiction to interfere in its special appellate jurisdiction for setting the matter a right. Learned Counsel for the respondent, filed before us a copy of the judgment of the Superior Court of Appeal in Pondicherry in some other case where the parties were Nataraia Mudaliar and Palaniswamy Mudaliar (dated 8th December 1964) where the Superior Court of Appeal has referred to the circumstance that the practice even in great centres of population is to give notice to quit for periods not exceeding three or six months for leases at commercial use for shop or store”. This observation is fastened on by the learned Counsel for the appellant before us, for reinforcing his argument that the appellate Court at Pondicherry in the present case has not applied its mind for deciding what the customary period for notice to quit in Pondicherry is, and it might very well happen, if the proper enquiry is made that the period in the case, will be longer than fifteen days seeing that the lease was for a commercial purpose. On this point, however we are not expressing any opinion. It will be for the Courts at Pondicherry to consider the matter carefully, if necessary after taking evidence, and decide as to what the custmory period for the notice to quit in such cases will be. Before parting with the case, we wish to point out that the Courts below, apparently considered that the grant of further time for giving vacant possession of the premises after the order of eviction whether it be eight months as given by the trial Court or ten months as given by the appellate Court-would remedy any defect in the proper period to be given in the notice to quit. We wish to point out that this is not the law. It is the service of a prior notice to quit, giving the prescribed time therefor under the statute, that gives the party, namely, the landlord, the right to approach the Court for an order of eviction, and, as already mentioned, that fact also gives jurisdiction to the Court to pass an order for eviction, if it holds the notice to be valid. We apprehend that the Subordinate Courts at Pondicherry have not kept this principle in mind, and this is therefore one other reason why the matter has to be disposed of afresh, in the light of the observations in this judgment. Before parting with this case, we would refer to one other argument urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant, namely, that, where the tenant has not committed any default, the procedure for eviction under the summary or Ordonance de refere procedure will not apply. This point does not appear to have been raised in the lower Courts and, therefore, we do not express any opinion upon it. But it will be open to the appellant to urge this point in the Court below, if he is so advised. This point does not appear to have been raised in the lower Courts and, therefore, we do not express any opinion upon it. But it will be open to the appellant to urge this point in the Court below, if he is so advised. In view of the above, we allow the appeal and set aside the decree of the Superior Court of Appeal at Pondicherry, and remand the case to that Court for fresh disposal according to law. No costs. V.K.-----Appeal allowed and case remanded.