JUDGMENT V. Bhargava, J. - We have heard learned. counsel for the petitioner and find no force in this petition. The main point urged by the learned counsel was that in the order passed by the State Government under Section 7-F of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, the reasons have not been given by the Government for coming to the view that the precondition to interference by the Government did exist. In other words, what is urged is that this order should have been a speaking order and should have on its lace indicated the grounds on which the Government held that the precondition for making the order as laid down by Section 7-F existed. This point has no force at all because Section 7-F does not require any finding as to the existence of the precondition before the State Government can exercise its power under Section 7-F. The provision is that the Government can make such orders as appears to it necessary for the ends of justice. In the circumstances, what the Government has to find out is whether it appears to it that some order is required for the ends of justice. The use of the word "appears" makes it clear that though the Government has to act in a quasi- judicial manner before passing orders under Section 7-F, the Government is not required to arrive at any specific finding as to the existence of any condition and can exercise its powers whenever it appears to it necessary for the ends of justice. It may also be added that it is not always necessary for a quasi-judicial authority that it must give its full reasons for every order made; as an example, even criminal revisions heard by the High Court or criminal appeals heard summarily are dismissed without giving reasons and it cannot be said that in such cases orders are vitiated for want of reasons. 2. The second point urged by the learned counsel was that a proper opportunity of hearing required to be given by the Government when acting in a quasi-judicial capacity was not afforded to the petitioner. 2. The second point urged by the learned counsel was that a proper opportunity of hearing required to be given by the Government when acting in a quasi-judicial capacity was not afforded to the petitioner. The order itself shows that the Government, in arriving at its opinion that it appeared to it to be necessary for the ends of justice to make the order, took into account the representation made by the opposite party, the reply given by the petitioner and the entire record of the proceedings that have taken place up to the time of the revision before the Commissioner. The affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner shows that the contents of the representation made by the opposite party were communicated to him and that he was given an opportunity to give his own reply. We consider that the requirements of procedure for a quasi judicial tribunal were satisfied when the petitioner was informed of the entire material which the State Government wanted to take into account and afforded an opportunity to the petitioner to make a written report against all that material. There is no positive assertion that any material not brought to the notice of the petitioner was taken into consideration by the Government. We do not think that a right of personal hearing need have been granted. 3. The petition has no force and is dismissed.