JUDGMENT-This is a defendants application. Her husband was a tenant of a block in the building belonging to respondent No. 1. The latter served a notice on him dated December 22, 1956, demanding rent which was in arrears for more than six months and terminating the tenancy. He died on January 11, 1957. Her allegation that rent was tendered on January 22, 1957 has not accepted. She then sent the amount by money order on February, 1967, I which was refused by respondent No. 1. She on her part, instituted. It for eviction of the petitioner on the ground of six months arrears having been paid. The plaint appears to be lodged on February 5, 1957, with the Clerk who received the same, though endorsement for postal services been obtained from the Registrar of the Small Causes Court on February, 1957. The trial Court passed a decree of eviction against the petitioner, and the Appellate Bench has confirmed it. 2. Mr. Nariman contends that respondent No.1 has sold the building to respondent No.2 and as she is willing to have the petitioner as a tenant, the decree should be vacated. She has filed the affidavit of respondent No. 2 to this effect. Respondent No.2 was a party before the Appellate Bench but no such willingness was shown by her to continue the petitioner as a tenant. If the contention were raised before the Bench, it could have been investigated by that Court. Apart from this, respondent No. 1 has produced the agreement between her and respondent No.2 which shows that she was entitled to keep this flat as a tenant on its being vacated by the petitioner for her personal use. It is not possible, therefore, to vacate the decree on this ground. 3. It is accepted on behalf of the petitioner that there was no dispute regarding the standard rent and the permitted increases. It is however contended that the petitioner had sent the arrears of rent by money order on February 2, 1957, before the suit was filed, and therefore, though the amount was not paid within one month of the notice, the suit must fail. As I have said, the plaint is presented on February 5, 1957, though it purports to have been signed on February 4, 1957, and the endorsement of the Registrar for postal service is of the same date. As I have said, the plaint is presented on February 5, 1957, though it purports to have been signed on February 4, 1957, and the endorsement of the Registrar for postal service is of the same date. This is borne out by the initials of the clerk who received the plaint on February 5, 1957. It must, therefore, be taken that the rent was tendered on February 4, 1957, before the suit was filed, but one month after the notice. The legal contention now falls to be examined. 4. Section 12 (1) defines the disabilities of the landlord and gives the tenant the right of irremovability commonly called statutory tenancy, "so long as the tenant pays, or is ready and willing to pay, the amount of" the standard rent and permitted increases if any, and observes and performs the other conditions of the tenancy." Mr. Nariman relying on the decision in Mohanlal v. Maheshwari Mills Ltd.1 contends that this is the dominant part of the section, and if the tenant satisfies the condition at the date of the suit, no decree can be passed. 5. The scheme of the section has come up for consideration before the Courts often. Section 12 (1) of the said Act is a general provision which makes the tenant irremovable, under certain circumstances, and the other sub-sections define the conditions which enable the landlord to file a suit for possession and in some cases recover possession from the tenant. Consistently with the scheme, s. 12 (2) requires the landlord desiring to recover possession on the ground of non-payment of rent to give a months notice demanding the standard rent or permitted increases. Section 12 (3) then proceeds to define the powers of the Court in the suit. Section 12 (3) (a) provides for a case where there is no dispute about the standard rent and the permitted increases and the tenant neglects" to pay the same until the expiration of one month after the notice under s. 12 (2). The words originally used were "the Court may pass a decree". Until in Kurban Hussen v. Ratikant,1 where a Division Bench of this Court held that Court was bound to pass a decree if the condition is satisfied, Courts refused to make a decree. This decision has since been confirmed by the Supreme Court and the Legislature has by an amendment substituted "shall" for "may". Until in Kurban Hussen v. Ratikant,1 where a Division Bench of this Court held that Court was bound to pass a decree if the condition is satisfied, Courts refused to make a decree. This decision has since been confirmed by the Supreme Court and the Legislature has by an amendment substituted "shall" for "may". Section 12 (3) (b) provides for cases other than those falling within s. 12 (3) (a) and gives a discretion to the Court to pass a decree or not, according to the circumstances of a case on certain conditions being satisfied. Explanation to the section says when a presumption that the tenant is willing to pay the standard rent and the permitted increases can be raised. 6. Mr. Parikh relies on the rules of construction of statutes in support of his contention that decree ought to be passed. He referred to Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. The State of Bombay,3 where it was said (p. 470): "If the language of the enactment is clear and unambiguous it would not be legitimate for the Courts to add any words thereto and evolve therefrom Some sense which may be said to carry out the supposed intentions of the legislature. The intention of the Legislature is to be gathered only from the words used by it and no such liberties can be taken by the Courts for effectuating a Supposed intention of the Legislature." It is also well settled that where the language is clear the Court is not entitled to speculate as to the intention of the Legislature and refuse to construe the section according to its ordinary grammatical meaning. 7. The words of s. 12 (3) (a) are clear enough when they say, neglects to make payment "until the expiration of the period of one month after notice”. If the argument of Mr. Nariman were to be accepted, many of the words would be rendered meaningless and will involve substitution of some other words. Section 12 (1) lays down the general principle while s. 12 (3) (a) provides for the special case of a defaulting tenant there provided and a case which fal13 within it must be dealt with according to its tenor. 8. Mr. Nariman referred me to Mohanlal v. Maheshwari Mills Ltd. and Ambalal v. Babaldas. Section 12 (1) lays down the general principle while s. 12 (3) (a) provides for the special case of a defaulting tenant there provided and a case which fal13 within it must be dealt with according to its tenor. 8. Mr. Nariman referred me to Mohanlal v. Maheshwari Mills Ltd. and Ambalal v. Babaldas. The latter case was decided by a Division Bench of that High Court and the observation is at p. 19. The Court did not decide the question as now admitted by Mr. Nariman since the Court said:- “But even where a case falls under sub-section (3) (a) but the tenant pays the arrears due or shows readiness and willingness to pay the standard rent and permitted increases before the date of the institution of the suit he can conceivably under sub-section (1) [of section 12]." In the first case, however, Mr. Justice P. N. Bhagwati does say (p. 618): “If, however, the tenant does not make payment of the entire arrears of rent or increases within the period of one month but clears off all such arrears after the expiration of the period of one month but before the filing of the suit, the tenant would be able to bring his case within the protection of sub-section (1) of sec. 12 and in that event notwithstanding the fulfilment of the condition specified in sub-section (3) (a) of sec. 12, the landlord would not be able to secure a decree for eviction against the tenant." 9. The effect of this is to render s. 12 (3) (a) practically nugatory in some cases and not applicable at all and adding words to the statute. I may refer to The J. K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co., Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh.5 The Supreme Court said, “when there is a conflict between a specific provision and a general provision the specific provision prevails over the general provision and the general provision applies only to such cases which are not covered by the special provision. The rule applies to resolve conflict between different provi8ions in different statutes as well as in the same statute." (The italics are mine). The reason for the construction adopted by Mr. Justice Bhagwati is the apparent conflict between s. 12 (1) and s. 12 (3) (a). The rule applies to resolve conflict between different provi8ions in different statutes as well as in the same statute." (The italics are mine). The reason for the construction adopted by Mr. Justice Bhagwati is the apparent conflict between s. 12 (1) and s. 12 (3) (a). With respect, I think the same ought to be resolved by the above rule of construction and not by changing the very wording of s. 12 (3) (a) on the ground that s. 12 (1) is the dominant part. Even beneficient rule of construction has limited application as pointed out in M. P. Mineral Industry Assocn. v. R. L. Commr.,6 where the Supreme Court said: "It is true that the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act are intended to achieve the object of doing social justice to workmen employed in the scheduled employments by prescribing minimum rates of wages for them, and so in construing the said provisions, the Court should adopt what is sometimes described as a beneficial rule of construction. Thus where the relevant words are capable of two constructions preference may be given to that construction which helps to sustain the validity of the impugned notification; but that an occasion for showing preference for one construction rather than the other can legitimately arise only when two constructions are reasonably possible, not otherwise". 10. With respect, I cannot, therefore, accept the said statement of the law in Mohanlals case as correct. To accept it, would mean that I should rewrite the section thus "neglected to make payment thereof until the date, the suit is filed", which I have no business to do. I would also have to disregard the prior history of the legislation. Prior to the present s. 12 (3) (a) even in oases of defaulting and recalcitrant tenants who had not paid rent for long periods, Courts refused to pass decrees and much injustice was done to landlords, many of whom were poorer than the tenants. The injustice of it was felt as very often sympathies of the Courts were misplaced. The Legislature, therefore, made a clear-cut provision by s. 12 (3) (a) requiring the Court to pass a decree if the condition is satisfied and I would not be justified in disregarding the language of the sub-section, because in some rare case, injustice may be caused to one tenant, in a thousand. The Legislature, therefore, made a clear-cut provision by s. 12 (3) (a) requiring the Court to pass a decree if the condition is satisfied and I would not be justified in disregarding the language of the sub-section, because in some rare case, injustice may be caused to one tenant, in a thousand. The Courts were, therefore, right in passing the decree against the petitioner as the tender was made after a months period after notice expired. 11. Mr. Nariman says that in any event, I should give the petitioner fair a long time to vacate. On the other hand, Mr. Parikh contends that the suit was filed in 1957 and we are now in 1965, and at best only a very short -time could and ought to be given. It is unfortunate that litigation here should take such a long time and I cannot help it. Ordinarily, I would not have granted time, but having regard to all the circumstances, including the fact that the plaintiff and her husband generally reside in Dharwar and come here occasionally, I am inclined to grant the petitioner one year from the date of judgment. But this can be on condition that she does not introduce new persons on the premises and all those who stay in it undertake to Court to deliver possession on or before December 15, 1966 to the plaintiff. Adjourned to next date to enable the parties to decide whether or not to give the undertaking. 12. As the petitioner is not prepared to give the undertaking decree will follow. Rule discharged with costs. Rule discharged