Judgment :- 1. This petition challenges the validity of sub-section (4) of S.19 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961. The contention is that the said sub-section violates Art.14 and 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. 2. S.19 deals with the special powers available in cases where the need for the land is urgent. Sub-section (1) of that section says: "In cases of urgency, whenever the Government or the District Collector, for reasons to be recorded in writing, so direct or directs, the Collector may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in sub-section (1) of S.9, take possession of any land needed for a public purpose though no award has been made. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances: Provided that the Collector shall not take possession of any building or part of a building under this sub-section without giving to the occupier thereof at least three days' notice of his intention so to do, or such longer notice as may be reasonably sufficient to enable such occupier to remove his movable property from such building without unnecessary inconvenience;" and sub-section (4): "In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the Government or the District Collector, the provisions of sub-section (1) are applicable, the Government or the District Collector, as the case may be, may direct that the provisions of S.5 shall not apply, and, if they or be so direct or directs a declaration may be made under S.6 in respect of the land at any time after the publication of the notification under sub-section (1) of S.Y. 3. The normal procedure for land acquisition is to publish a preliminary notification under S.3, hear and decide the objections under S.5, declare that the land is required for a public purpose under S.6, give notice to the persons interested under S.9, pass an award under S.11 or S.16 and then take possession of the land under S.18 of the Act. In cases coming under sub-section (1) of S.19 possession can be taken though no award has been made. All the other requirements, however, have to be fulfilled. 4. Sub-section (4) of S.19 makes a more drastic inroad into the rights of the citizen. It enables the Government or the District Collector to direct that the provisions of S.5 shall not apply. All the other requirements, however, have to be fulfilled. 4. Sub-section (4) of S.19 makes a more drastic inroad into the rights of the citizen. It enables the Government or the District Collector to direct that the provisions of S.5 shall not apply. S.5 reads as follows: "(1) Any person interested in any land which has been notified under sub-section (1) of S.3 as being needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose may, within thirty days after the issue of the notification, object to the acquisition of the land or of any land in the locality, as the case may be. (2) Every objection under sub-section (1) shall be made to the Collector in writing and the Collector shall give the objector an opportunity of being heard either in person or by counsel and shall, after hearing all such objections and after making such further enquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, submit the case, (i) Where the preliminary notification under sub-section (1) of S.3 was published by the Government, to the Government; (ii) Where the preliminary notification under sub-section (1) of S.3 was published by himself, to the Board of Revenue; for the decision of the Government or the Board of Revenue, as the case may be together with the record of the proceedings held by him and a report containing his recommendations on the objections. The decision of the Government or the Board of Revenue, as the case may be, shall be final." 5. There is no doubt that the right conferred by S.5 is a very valuable right, ensuring as it does the compliance with an important canon of natural justice. Sub-section (4) of S.19 authorises the abrogation of such an essential and salutory provision and it may be possible to say that the sub-section violates the fundamental right to hold, acquire and dispose of property guaranteed by Art.19 (1)(f) of the Constitution and that it is not salvaged by clause (5) of that article on the basis that it embodies only a reasonable restriction on the exercise of the fundamental right in the interests of the general public. 6. This question however, does not arise for determination in view of the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Sitabati Devi v. State of West Bengal (66 C.W.N. 423) which has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in C.A. No. 22 of 1961. 6. This question however, does not arise for determination in view of the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Sitabati Devi v. State of West Bengal (66 C.W.N. 423) which has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in C.A. No. 22 of 1961. In that case the petitioners contended before the Calcutta High Court that the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948, was ultra vires in so far as it violated the fundamental right of the petitioners under Art.19(1)(f) of the Constitution, and that the provisions of that Act constituted an unreasonable restriction on that fundamental right inasmuch as no opportunity was afforded by any provision in the Act to the person whose property was sought to be requisitioned or acquired to make representations against the orders made under the Act. Bose, J. dealt with the contention as follows: "It appears that the question of the vires of this very Act came up for consideration before D.N. Sinha, J. in 63 C.W.N. 101 and the learned judge was inclined to hold that the provisions of the impugned Act constitute an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental rights guaranteed under Art.19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. But in view of several decisions of the Supreme Court referred to in his judgment, the learned judge came to the conclusion that as the impugned statute was a legislation which came within the purview of Art.31 of the Constitution, there was no scope for the applicability of Art.19 of the Constitution and the question whether the provisions of the Act constitute an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right to acquire, hold and dispose of property was not a relevant consideration at all. At page 118, the learned judge after referring to several decisions of the Supreme Court proceeded to observe as follows: 'Summarising the above decisions, we find that the right to hold property is guaranteed under the Constitution. Any reasonable restriction upon the right which is in the public interest would be valid. But the decisions lay down that there must be certain safeguards. Firstly, the person whose property is being taken away must have an opportunity of making representations. The person responsible for making the order must be a qualified person and he should not be a law unto himself and there should be an appeal. The power should not be naked and arbitrary. Firstly, the person whose property is being taken away must have an opportunity of making representations. The person responsible for making the order must be a qualified person and he should not be a law unto himself and there should be an appeal. The power should not be naked and arbitrary. Such being the limitations, if they are to be applied to the impugned Act, then there is little doubt that it must be struck down. Firstly, there is no provision for representation. Second, the order may be made by a person whose qualifications are not mentioned. Thirdly there is no right of appeal. On the other hand, the power of the courts are taken away and any infringement of an order made under the Act is subject to penalties which may amount even to imprisonment. But the next question that arises in this case is as to whether the guarantee under Art.19 is at all applicable to the facts of the case and whether it is available to the petitioner. This aspect of the case I have discussed in my decision in 57 C.W.N. 397 at page 406. The question is as to whether in the case of compulsory acquisition or requisition of property, the guarantee under Art.19(1)(f) or (g) is at all available.' Then in a later part of the judgment, the learned judge after dealing with certain other decisions made the following further observations: 'It seems to me that the result of the decisions above-mentioned can be stated to be as follows: Where property is acquired out and out, there is of course, a complete deprivation of property. Where property is acquired by the State, then it must be held that Art.31 applies and not Art.19. Art.19 applies when the citizen has a right to property. Once it is compulsorily acquired, the right to property is gone and there can be no question of invoking the fundamental right to hold property which is guaranteed by the Constitution. A much more difficult position accrues where it is not a case of acquisition but a case of requisition. In such cases, there is only a partial acquisition of property and consequently what State acquires is only some of the bundle of rights which go to constitute the 'property' of the citizen. A much more difficult position accrues where it is not a case of acquisition but a case of requisition. In such cases, there is only a partial acquisition of property and consequently what State acquires is only some of the bundle of rights which go to constitute the 'property' of the citizen. The question is as to whether in such circumstances Art.19 has any application.' The conclusion which the learned judge recorded on this point is to be found at page 126 and is in these words: "In my view, therefore, requisition under the impugned Act amounts to substantial deprivation of property, and therefore what applies is Art.31 and not Art.19. So far as Art.31 is concerned, the only question is about the right of compensation. The question of unreasonable restriction does not come into the picture.' So this was the ground on which the learned judge upheld the validity of the Act and the order of requisition which was challenged before him. This decision was given on the 25th August 1958. The Supreme Court, however, in the recent case, AIR. 1960 SC. 1080, has held by a majority judgment that after the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, Art.31 (1) and (2) cannot be held as dealing with the same subject matter but they deal with two different subjects: Art.31 (2) and (2A) with acquisition and requisition, Art.31 (1) with deprivation of property by authority of law and that the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR. 1955 S. C. 41 no longer holds the field after the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955. It has been further held by the Supreme Court in this case that the law depriving a person of his property will be invalid if it infringes Art.19 (1) (f) unless it imposes a reasonable restriction on the persons's fundamental rights. The State can however establish that a law, though it purports to deprive a person of his fundamental right, in certain circumstances, amounts to a reasonable restriction within the meaning of Art.19 (5). It has been argued relying on this decision that the ground on which Sinha, J. refused to declare the West Bengal Act II of 1948 as ultra vires has been found by the Supreme Court to be an unsustainable ground. It has been argued relying on this decision that the ground on which Sinha, J. refused to declare the West Bengal Act II of 1948 as ultra vires has been found by the Supreme Court to be an unsustainable ground. It appears to me that this argument on behalf of the petitioners is based on a misconception of the true scope and implications of the judgment of the Supreme Court In AIR. 1960 SC. 1080 the Supreme Court had to consider the question of the validity of the Madras Marumakkathayam (Removal of Doubts) Act, 1955 (Act No. II of 1955) which in the guise of dispelling doubts abolished a class of sthanams and converted them into Tarwad properties and deprived the sthanees of their right to their property. The Act had nothing to do with requisition or acquisition of property as contemplated in Art.31(2) of the Constitution. Para.8 of the judgment (page 1084) makes it clear that the validity of the Madras Act was challenged on three points, namely, (i) the impugned Act is constitutionally void because it offends against Art.14 of the Constitution, (ii) it is also void because it deprives the sthanee of his fundamental right to hold and dispose of property and thereby offends against Art.19(1)(f) of the Constitution and is not saved by Clause.5 of Art.19 and (iii) the impugned Act is further bad because it has been made by the Legislature not in exercise of its legislative power but in exercise of judicial power. In answer to the second point raised by the learned Attorney General challenging the validity of the Act, the learned Counsel for the Respondent argued that as the impugned Act purported to deprive the petitioner of his sthanam properties by authority of law within the meaning of Art.31(1) of the Constitution and as he was legally deprived of his property, Art.19(1)(f) of the Constitution had no application inasmuch as Art.19(1)(f) pre-supposed the existence of the petitioner's title to the sthanams and its properties and as he was deprived of his title therein by the impugned Act, he could no longer rely upon his fundamental right under Art.19 (1)(f). In Para.20 and 21 of the judgment, the Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear as to what was the true nature and scope of the argument before them with regard to the second point raised by the learned Attorney General challenging the validity of the Madras Act. Then in Para.25 of the judgment after dealing with AIR. 1950 S.C. 27 in some details Subba Rao, J. who delivered the judgment of the Supreme Court held that by reason of the Fourth Amendment Act, 1955, Art.31(1) of the Constitution ceased to be part of the guarantee against acquisition or requisition of property without the authority of law and must therefore be construed on its own terms; and in Para.27 it was pointed out that the decision in AIR. 1955 S. C. 41 on which reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the respondent in support of their contention that Art.31 (1) excluded the operation of Art.19 (1) was one which was based on the pre-existing law before the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, but in view of the amendment of 1955, the position had been considerably altered and Art.31(1) and Art.31(2) dealt with different subjects, but Art.31(1) and Art.19(1)(f) must be held to be dealing with the same subject and so there was no question now of Art.31(1) excluding the operation of Art.19(1)(f). It was further, in this context, that the Supreme Court made the observations that the decision in AIR. 1955 SC. 41 no longer holds the field after the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955. Therefore it is abundantly clear that all that the Supreme Court has decided in AIR. 1960 SC. 1080 is that after the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, Art. 31(1) of the Constitution cannot be construed as excluding the operation of Art.19(1)(f) of the Constitution. But it is no authority for the proposition that Art.31(2) of the Constitution does not exclude the applicability of Art.19(1)(f) of the Constitution. The learned Advocate for the respondents has drawn the attention of the Court to a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR. 1960 SC. 1203 where the learned Chief Justice who was a party to the decision in AIR. 1960 SC. 1080 had to consider the question of the validity of certain acquisition proceedings initiated under S.4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 1960 SC. 1203 where the learned Chief Justice who was a party to the decision in AIR. 1960 SC. 1080 had to consider the question of the validity of certain acquisition proceedings initiated under S.4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In repelling the contention that the land acquisition proceedings violated the fundamental right under Art.19(1)(f) of the Constitution, the learned Chief Justice relied on and followed AIR. 1955 SC. 41 and the case in AIR. 1957 SC. 521 which have direct bearing on the question whether Art.31 (2) of the Constitution excludes the operation of Art.19(1)(f). Although the observations of the learned Chief Justice are very cryptic on the point there can be hardly any room for doubt that Sinha, C.J. intended to hold that a legislation dealing with acquisition or requisition as contemplated by Art.31 (2) read with (2A) has the effect of excluding the operation of Art.19(1)(f). If Para.6 (page 1205), 10 (page 1206) and 13 (page 1208) are read together that appears to be the net effect of the decision. In my view, therefore, West Bengal Act II of 1948 which deals with requisition and acquisition as contemplated in Art.31(2) of the Constitution cannot be held to be ultra vires on the ground that it violates Art.19(1)(f) of the Constitution." To the same effect is Sm. Kamala Bala Dasi v. State of West Bengal (AIR. 1962 Calcutta 269). 7. In Sachindra Mohan v. State of West Bengal (AIR. 1963 Calcutta 373) P.B. Mukharji, J. said: "Mr. Dutta then entered the still more difficult realm of constitutional law by challenging the order of requisition on the ground that this requisition is bad because the Act itself is bad as it does not answer the test of reasonableness under Art.19 of the Constitution which, he contends, still regulates cases of requisition under Art.31 (2) of the Constitution. He makes an attempt to say that, what he calls the Second Kochunni's case (AIR. 1960 SC. 1080) supports his argument. Before discussing that case it will be useful to briefly formulate the constitutional point. The Act impugned is an Act dealing with requisition and acquisition. Mr. Dutta contends that Art.31 (1) of the Constitution by which no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law is still regulated by Art.19 and the doctrine of reasonableness thereunder. That proposition is accepted now and is no longer debatable. The Act impugned is an Act dealing with requisition and acquisition. Mr. Dutta contends that Art.31 (1) of the Constitution by which no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law is still regulated by Art.19 and the doctrine of reasonableness thereunder. That proposition is accepted now and is no longer debatable. The second step in his argument is that under Art.31 (2) the word 'property' still remains and it is still provided that there can be no compulsory acquisition or requisition 'save for public purposes and save by authority of law.' He, therefore, contends that the expression 'authority of law' occurring in Art.31(1) and attracting Art.19 and the doctrine of reasonableness thereunder must equally be applicable to the same expression used in the same Art.31 under sub-article (2) notwithstanding the fact that this sub-article (2) specifically and exclusively refers to requisition or acquisition. To my mind, interesting as this point may be, it is too late in the day for Mr. Dutta to contend that it is so. The observations in AIR. 1960 SC. 1080 far from helping the petitioners are really against them. Mr. Dutta specially relied on the observations at p. 1094 to the following effect: 'But there is no scope for drawing such an analogy after the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, as thereafter they dealt with two different subjects: Art.31 (2) and (2A) with acquisition and requisition and Art.31 (1) with deprivation of property by authority of law. The decision of this Court in AIR. 1955 SC. 41 no longer holds the field after the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955'. I do not see how this observation helps the petitioners. Indeed at p. 1093 Subba Rao, J. makes it quite clear by saying 'On the other hand, Art.31 (1), by reason of amendment, ceases to be a part of the guarantee against acquisition and requisition of property without the authority of law and must therefore be construed on its own terms. But the more formidable opposition to the argument put forward by Mr. Dutta is to be found in the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR. 1960 SC. 1203 where at page 1208 it was laid down: The other attack under Art.19(1) (f) of the Constitution is equally futile in view of the decision of this Court in AIR. 1955 SC. 41 and AIR. 1957 SC. Dutta is to be found in the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR. 1960 SC. 1203 where at page 1208 it was laid down: The other attack under Art.19(1) (f) of the Constitution is equally futile in view of the decision of this Court in AIR. 1955 SC. 41 and AIR. 1957 SC. 521.' The principles laid down here were followed by the Supreme Court in a more recent case which is more appropriate on the point before me. That is a decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. Sitabati Devi v. State of West Bengal (C. W. No. 22 of 1961) decided on 1-12-61. This decision is on this very Act viz. the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948. The validity of this very Act was questioned in that case. This decision is not yet reported in any of the Reports but is available in Blue Print. It appears that the observation in AIR. 1960 SC. 1080 that AIR. 1955 SC. 41 'no longer holds the field,' has to be understood to mean that it no longer governs cases of deprivation of property by means other than requisition and acquisition by the State. This decision distinguishes AIR. 1960 SC. 1080 on the ground that the latter was not concerned with a law of requisition or acquisition. It was not directly concerned with the question whether AIR 1955 SC. 41 would not after the amendment apply even to a law of requisition or acquisition of property governed by Art 31 (2) as it now stands and it did not decide that question. Having regard to the fact that the Supreme Court in that case of Smt. Sitabati Devi v. The State of West Bengal decided that this very statute was valid, I do not think the point is any longer open to argument by Mr. Dutta. See also the observations in AIR. 1962 Calcutta 269 and the observations of the Special Bench decision of this Court in AIR. 1961 Calcutta 125. Dutta. See also the observations in AIR. 1962 Calcutta 269 and the observations of the Special Bench decision of this Court in AIR. 1961 Calcutta 125. The appeal which the Supreme Court dismissed in Sitabati Devi v. The State of West Bengal arose from the decision of the First Court reported in 66 C.W.N. 423 where it was held that this West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act II of 1948 dealing with requisition and acquisition as contemplated in Art.31 (2) of the Constitution could not be held to be ultra vires on the ground that it violated Art.19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. In this view of the matter it is not necessary to discuss whether this particular West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948, is unreasonable because of the absence of any right of representation for the aggrieved party and because of the absence of any right of appeal even after requisition or acquisition." 8. In the light of what is stated above we must hold that sub-section (4) of S.19 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961, is not liable to attack on the ground that it violates Art.19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. But this does not mean that the power under that sub-section can be exercised without due care and caution. 9. In this case the notification under S.3, Ext. P. 2, is dated 20-5-1963. The direction under sub-section (4) of S.19 was made on 23-6-1963. The notice under S.9, Ext. P4, however, was published in the Kerala Gazette as required by sub-section (5) of that section only on 21-1-1964. The dates are significant and belie the story of any extreme urgency as the foundation for the action under sub-section (4) of S.19. An order is vitiated by mala fides if it is passed by an authority without applying its mind at all, even though there is no evidence of any personal ill-will, corrupt motive, or other improper purpose. 10. Such is the direction impugned in this case; and we cannot but quash the same and all the proceedings subsequent thereto. Judgment accordingly; but without any order as to costs. 11. In the view we have taken it is unnecessary to consider the impact of Art.14 of the Constitution on S.19 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961, and it is not considered in this judgment.