Judgment :- 1. On 19th January 1962, the petitioner was appointed as Organizer for the Southern Region, under the respondent, the Kerala Hindi Prachar Sabha, a Society registered under S.5 of the Travancore-Cochin Literary, Scientific and Charitable Societies Registration Act, 12 of 1955. The Society is governed by Rules and Bye-laws accepted by its General Body, a copy of which has been filed as Ex. P. On 10th November 1963, the petitioner was appointed Organizer for Kerala by a resolution, a copy of which has been filed as Ext. P-1. On 10th January 1964, by a communication evidenced by Ex. P-2 the petitioner was asked to state his "reaction" to a resolution of a representative body of Hindi Institutions. The petitioner asked for a clarification by a communication Ext. P-3. Ex. P-4 represents the clarification received. Thereupon the petitioner sent his reply which is evidenced by Ex. P-5 in which he stated that he had no views to offer regarding the resolution referred to in Ex. P-2. Thereafter the petitioner received a communication Ex. P-6, dated 4th May 1964 informing him that at a meeting of the Working Committee held on 3rd May 1964 it had been decided to suspend him on and from 4th May 1964, subject to the result of an enquiry into the charges. Ex.. P-7 of the same date is a copy of the charges against the petitioner. The petitioner submitted his explanation to the charges which is evidenced by Ex. P-8. Thereafter, by Ex. P-9, dated 27th September 1964, the petitioner was removed from service. This O. P. has been filed to quash Ex. P-9. The petitioner's counsel raised the following grounds: (1) That the Working Committee which issued Ex. P-9 had no jurisdiction to take proceedings against the petitioner, but only the General Body could do so. (2) The charges were vague, the petitioner had no adequate opportunity to defend himself, and the rules of natural justice had been contravened in passing Ext. P-9. 2. A preliminary objection has been raised by counsel for respondent that the O. P. is not maintainable as the respondent is a private institution against which a writ of certiorari cannot issue. Reliance was placed upon the decision of Velu Pillai, J. in Arumugam v. Kadalundi Co-operative Urban Bank Ltd., 1960 KLT. P-9. 2. A preliminary objection has been raised by counsel for respondent that the O. P. is not maintainable as the respondent is a private institution against which a writ of certiorari cannot issue. Reliance was placed upon the decision of Velu Pillai, J. in Arumugam v. Kadalundi Co-operative Urban Bank Ltd., 1960 KLT. 727 to the effect that a writ under Art.226 of the Constitution would not lie against a Co-operative Society formed under the provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act. The learned judge followed a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court reported in Ramnath Sharma v. The State of Madhya Pradesh AIR. 1959 M. P. 218. The said decision came in for some coment and was restrictively distinguished in a later decision of the same High Court in Dukhooram v. Cooperative Agricultural Association, Kawardha AIR. 1961 M. P. 289. For purposes of this case, it is unnecessary to decide whether a writ will lie against a Cooperative Society, as I am satisfied that quite apart from the principle of the above decision, this O. P. is not maintainable. 3. On behalf of the petitioner, reliance was placed on the decision in P. M. Brahmadathan Namboodiripad v. Cochin Devaswom Board 1955 KLT. 516 F. B., in which it was held that the Devaswom Board would certainly fall within the term "other authority" in Art.12 of the Constitution, as it had power to frame rules which had the force of law. The decision is unhelpful to the petitioner, as the statutory power to frame rules having the force of law, which could be exercised by the Devaswom Board in that case, and also the Co-operative Society in AIR. 1961 M. P. 289, is unavailable to the respondent in the present case. For the same reason, the decision of the Supreme Court in Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U.P., Allahabad v. Ghanshyam Das Gupta and others AIR. 1962 S. C.1110 is also distinguishable. 4. Petitioner's counsel next relied on the decision reported in Sekkilar's case AIR. 1952 Madras 151. The decision was rested on its special facts which have been pointed out in Para.11 of the report. It was found that the Principal of the College must be regarded as holding a quasi public office and functioning under the Madras Educational Rules and under the provisions of a scheme settled by the Madras High Court. 1952 Madras 151. The decision was rested on its special facts which have been pointed out in Para.11 of the report. It was found that the Principal of the College must be regarded as holding a quasi public office and functioning under the Madras Educational Rules and under the provisions of a scheme settled by the Madras High Court. Even so, the decision came in for some comment in Joseph Mundasseri's case 1953 KLT. 773 in which it was held that the mere fact that the educational institution was statutorily affiliated to an autonomous University, would not make it amenable to proceedings under Art.226 of the Constitution. The writ against a private institution was accordingly refused. The principle of Mundasseri's case was followed two years later, in Pappali's case 1956 KLT. 563. 5. A decision very near to the facts of the present case is to be found in Vasudevan v. S. N. D. P. Yogam 1958 KLT. 48. This Court had there to consider whether a writ could issue to quash certain disciplinary proceedings taken against the petitioner by the S. N. D. P. Yogam which was a private body, registered under the provisions of the Travancore Regulation I of 1063. This Court observed: "3. We might observe at the very outset that we consider this to be a case where the petitioner, having an adequate remedy under the ordinary law, should have had resort to the ordinary courts instead of invoking our special jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution. His case, as we understand it, is that the order of disqualification passed against him by the Board is null and void and that he still continues to be the president of the second respondent Union. His case, as we understand it, is that the order of disqualification passed against him by the Board is null and void and that he still continues to be the president of the second respondent Union. "A suit for declaration to that effect, or in the event of any threat to his office by the respondents or by anybody else, for an injunction to uphold it, would have been a proper and an adequate remedy, and although we do not go to the extent of accepting the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the Yogam being a private body, and the proceedings of its Board the proceedings of a domestic tribunal we have no jurisdiction to interfere under Art.226 of the Constitution we are quite prepared to dismiss the petition on the preliminary ground that this is not a fit case for the exercise of that jurisdiction." I am in entire agreement with this view, and following the same would reject this O. P. on the preliminary ground that this is not a fit case for the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution. 6. Petitioner's counsel had the further argument that even if a writ cannot issue against the respondent, the petitioner is entitled to a declaration that the action complained of is null and void; and for this, he relied on the principle of the decision of this Court is Cochin Devaswom Board v. Akhileswara Iyer 1961 KLT. 290. To the same effect is also the decision in Thomas v. Industrial Tribunal 1961 KLT. 223. I do not think that the principle of these decisions would advance the petitioner's case any further. The relief, whether by way of a writ, or by way of a declaration, can only be had in a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution; and on my finding above, that this is not a fit case for exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction under Art.226, there is no room for invoking the principle of the above decisions. The relief, whether by way of a writ, or by way of a declaration, can only be had in a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution; and on my finding above, that this is not a fit case for exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction under Art.226, there is no room for invoking the principle of the above decisions. That apart, it has been strongly pressed before me that in view of the recent decisions in (1) Francis v. Municipal Commissioners of Kuala Lampur 1962 (3) A. E, R.683; (2) Ridge v. Baldwin 1963 (2) A. E. R.66 and (3) Vidyodaya University of Ceylon and others v. Silva 1964 (2) A. E. R.865, the principle of the above decisions of this Court might require reconsideration. 7. As I have heard arguments fully on the merits, I would, following what was done in Vamadevan v. S. N. D. P. Yogam 1958 KLT. 48, express myself as well on the merits of the petitioner's case. Reliance was placed on R.S, 9 (b) (x) and 18 of Ex. P-1. It is provided in R.9 (b) (x) that officers and servants could be appointed with the consent of the general body. R.18 provides that in all matters, the decision of the general body shall be final. T am unable to read from these provisions an exclusive power in the general body for taking disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. It seems to me that R.9 (b) (xi) of Ex. P.1 is wide enough to confer powers on the working committee. Further, in answer to the charge-sheet Ex. P-7, the petitioner submitted his explanation evidenced by Ex. P-8. He did not question the jurisdiction of the working committee, to take proceedings against him. For that reason also the contention of the petitioner that the working committee had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order Ex. P-9 must be rejected. 8. Regarding the contention that the charges were vague, that there was denial of adequate opportunity to the petitioner to defend himself and violation of the principles of natural justice, lam not satisfied that on the materials placed before me, the petitioner has made good his case. It it true, that Ex. P-7 did not in terms call upon the petitioner to offer his explanation to the charges. But the fact remains that he did send his explanation evidenced by Ex. P-8. It it true, that Ex. P-7 did not in terms call upon the petitioner to offer his explanation to the charges. But the fact remains that he did send his explanation evidenced by Ex. P-8. No complaint was made about the vagueness of the charges. The petitioner was certainly not entitled to an oral hearing, before the respondent. I reject this contention also. 9. In the result, the O. P. fails and is dismissed with costs. Dismissed.