JUDGMENT : Das, J. - The Petitioners have been convicted u/s 341, Indian Penal Code and each sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 40- in default to undergo S.I. for ten days. 2. Petitioner No. 1, A.R. Ghosh, is the Administrative Officer, Petitioner No. 2, A.K. Das, is the security inspector, and Petitioner No. 3, Jayaram Sahu is a security guard, of the Hindustan Steel Ltd., Rourkela. The prosecution case is that on 1-10-1961, p.w.1 Partha Krishna Mitra, a contractor, while going in a taxi ORN. 3188 towards sector No. 18, along the ring road, was stopped by the security-staff of Hindusthan Steel. Ltd., who put a rope across the road, diverted its direction and allowed his vehicle to go when his driver signed a book. He was also similarly restrained on the same day at about 5 p.m. at another place known as Ambagan crossing by the security staff. P.w.1 lodged F.I.R. (ext. 1) before the police and after investigation the Petitioners were prosecuted u/s 341, Indian Penal Code. 3. At the trial, the Petitioners pleaded not guilty. They however admitted the obstruction to p.w.1. But their case is that the road in question is the private road of the Hindusthan Steel Ltd. and they have a right to stop people passing on the said road. According to them with a view to prevent acquisition of a right of way of the public on the said road, they close the road for certain days in the year under the authority of the Company and after due publication of notice to that effect in different news papers. They had no criminal intention to cause any obstruction or restraint to p.w.1 or any member of the public. In support of their case they examined me witnesses and also produced certain documents. 4. In support of its case the prosecution examined five witnesses including p.w.1 who is said to have been restrained as a result of the action of the Petitioners. 5. The learned Magistrate on examination of the evidence found that the road in question was constructed by the Hindusthan Steel Ltd., on the land acquired by them. 4. In support of its case the prosecution examined five witnesses including p.w.1 who is said to have been restrained as a result of the action of the Petitioners. 5. The learned Magistrate on examination of the evidence found that the road in question was constructed by the Hindusthan Steel Ltd., on the land acquired by them. He, however, was of the view that it was a public road and never before the date of occurrence it was closed to traffic at any time and as such it could never be treated as a private road as the public were all along passing on the same without let or hindrance .He accepted the version of the prosecution and convicted the Petitioners as above. The short question for consideration is whether the conviction of the Petitioners u/s 341, Indian Penal Code can be sustained. 6. It is not disputed by the prosecution that the road in question was constructed at the cost of the Company. It is also not disputed by the defence that they closed the road and obstructed p.w.1 at a point on the ring-road while the latter was going towards sector No. 18. The question however is whether such stoppage of the vehicle would amount to an offence u/s 34l. 7. The main contention of Mr. Asok Das, learned Counsel for the Petitioners, is that the case is covered by the exception to Section 339, Indian Penal Code even though the he entire prosecution story is accepted. There appears to be some force in this contention. Section 339 lays down that whoever voluntarily obstructs any person so as to prevent that person from proceeding in any direction in which that person has a right to proceed, is said wrongfully to restrain that person. But the exception says that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of this section. I have already said that the Petitioners admit that they obstructed the pathway. The only question is whether the road is a private way and whether such obstruction was caused by the Petitioners in good faith believing that they had a lawful right to obstruct. 8. I have already said that the Petitioners admit that they obstructed the pathway. The only question is whether the road is a private way and whether such obstruction was caused by the Petitioners in good faith believing that they had a lawful right to obstruct. 8. The Petitioners are all employees of the Hindustan Steel Ltd. Some witnesses have been examined by the defence to show that the road in question belongs to the Company and was used to be closed to traffic under orders of the Company for certain days in a year after giving due notice of the same in newspapers, such as the Samaj, Ganatantra, the Statesman and the Amritbazar Patrika, etc. Cuttings from such published notices have been produced in Court. Exts. A and B series a the cuttings of such publication relating to the year 160 and ext. C serif's as similar cuttings for the year 1961. Ext. E is a notice signed by the Divisional Engineer in which it was notified that the roads mentioned therein were closed in 1962. Ext. F is a similar notice for the year 1963. We are, however, concerned only with the notice given in the year 1961, that being the year of occurrence. It appears from ext. C series as also from ext. 2 that such notices were published in different newspapers for the closure of the roads on 1-0-1961. These notices make it clear that the Company treated the said road as their private road. Of course the mere publication of such notices will not deprive the public of any such right of way if such a right exists with them. In respect of a private road, a right of way can be created by grant or dedication, either express or implied and such right may be inferred from the unequivocal conduct of the owner of the road. User as of right by the public may justify the inference of an intention by the owner to dedicate the road as a public highway, but it is always a question of fact whether such an intention can be inferred in a particular case. 9. In the present case it is asserted by the prosecution that the road was always being used as public way without any obstruction by anybody. 9. In the present case it is asserted by the prosecution that the road was always being used as public way without any obstruction by anybody. The accused persons, the employees on the other hand contend that it was the private road of the Company and at least once a year it is being closed to the public after prior notification, and on such occasions, the road was being used by the public with the specific permission of the authorities of the Company. Some applications submitted to the Company such permission have also been proved in this case. No doubt, on the limited materials available in the case, it is difficult to come to any conclusive finding as to whether the road was dedicated for public user or was being treated as a private road of the Company. It is, however, certain that on the materials on record it is reasonable to entertain a bona fide belief that it is the private road of the Company on which the public had only a limited right of permissible user. There is no doubt that the Petitioners diverted the direction of the vehicles in good faith and on the belief that it was a private road of the Company and as its employees they have a right to close the road for traffic which they did on the date of occurrence. Further, there does not seem to be any physical obstruction, but it was a mere verbal prohibition or remonstrance. It is manifest also that the Petitioners acted under the orders of the Company and without having the necessary mense rea, so as to be liable for an offence u/s 341 for which they have been convicted. The conviction and sentence passed on the Petitioners must accordingly be set aside and the revision allowed. Revision allowed. Final Result : Allowed