ORDER D.P. Uniyal, J. - This appeal arises out of a suit for injunction to restrain the Defendants from interfering with the Plaintiff's possession over plot No. 86/1. The Plaintiff added the relief of possession after removal of constructions by amendment of the plaint on the Allegation that after the institution of the suit the Defendants had put up certain constructions on the land. 2. The Plaintiff's case was that he was bhumidhar of the land which was sold to him by two brothers Ajit Kumar and Ranjit Kumar under a sale deed dated 16.11.1957. Originally one Up-endranath Basu was thekadar of certain lands including the plot in suit. On 15.7.1917 he executed a registered lease in favour of his brother Shivendra Nath Basu. It was provided in the lease that the lessee will have the same rights in and over the land as the lesser had; the lessee was given the right to put up a factory and make other constructions on the land which was lying, party. In 1950 Shivendra Nath Basu applied for and obtained bhumidhari rights u/s 6 of the UP Agricultural Tenants 'Acquisition of Privileges) Act, 1949 by depositing ten times the rent. Ajit Kumar and Ranjit Kumar and sons of Shivendra Nath Basu who inherited the property from their father and sold the plot in suit to the Plaintiff. 3. The Defendants contested the suit on the ground that the lease of 1917 was a mere paper transaction and that neither Shivendra Nath Basu nor his sons ever cultivated the land covered by the lease. The Defendants pleaded that the land was parti kadim and had been lving fallow. It was alleged that the Defendants had been tethering their cattle in the land and using it for similar purposes since over 20 years. 4. The Munsif dismissed the suit and held that the lease of 1917 was a fictitious document, that the plot in suit was recorded as parti kadim in 1307 F. as well as in Khartoum of 1366 F. and that there was no evidence that it was ever cultivated by the Plaintiff or his predecessors in title. He held that the declaration granted u/s 6 of Act X of 1949 to the lessee was of no legal effect. 5. The learned Civil Judge disagreed with the findings recorded by the Munsif and allowed the appeal and decreed the suit. He held that the declaration granted u/s 6 of Act X of 1949 to the lessee was of no legal effect. 5. The learned Civil Judge disagreed with the findings recorded by the Munsif and allowed the appeal and decreed the suit. He held that it was not necessary for the validation of the lease that the land should have been brought under cultivation. He further held that a mere declaration u/s 6 may not be sufficient for conferment of bhumidhari rights, but since the Plaintiff was recorded "as tenant of Zaman 9 in 1356 F. he must be treated as having acquired tenancy rights in the land Lastly, he held that the Defendants had not succeeded in proving that they exercised any acts of possession over the land in suit. On these findings the learned Civil Judge upheld the claim of the Plaintiff. 6. The learned Counsel for the Appellant contended that the lease being in respect of proprietary rights the lessee acquired rights of an under proprietor of the land and was, therefore, an intermediary within the meaning of Section 3(12) of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, and that he could not be described as a tenant within the meaning of Section 3(26) of the Act. The word 'tenant' in the Zamindari Abolition Act has the same meaning as is assigned to it in the UP Tenancy Act. Section 3(23) of the UP Tenancy Act, so far as material, defines 'tenant' as "a person by whom rent is payable and...includes a sub tenant but does not include... a permanent lessee or thekadar". There is not a single receipt of rent filed by the Plaintiff to show that he or his predecessors in title were tenants of the land. The Khasra and Khatauni entries from 1301 F. up to 1366 F. prove that the land was parti kadin and had been lying fallow. The finding of the lower appellate court also is to the effect that the land had never been cultivated by the lessees or the Plaintiff. It would thus be anomalous to describe the Plaintiff or his predecessors in title as 'tenants'. 7. The oral and documentary evidence in the case goes to establish that the predecessors in title of the Plaintiff were lessees of the rights in land of a proprietor and were, therefore, 'inter-me diaries' as defined in the Act. It would thus be anomalous to describe the Plaintiff or his predecessors in title as 'tenants'. 7. The oral and documentary evidence in the case goes to establish that the predecessors in title of the Plaintiff were lessees of the rights in land of a proprietor and were, therefore, 'inter-me diaries' as defined in the Act. The consequences of vesting of an estate was that all rights, title and interest of all the intermediaries in every estate ceased and vested in the State of UP. The Plaintiff's predecessors being intermediaries the land in suit vested in the State, with the result that the sale deed of 1957 in favour of the Plaintiff was of no legal effect and did not convey any right, title or interest in the said land to him. The observation of the learned Civil Judge that the predecessors in interest of the Plaintiff acquired bhumidhan rights in the land is untenable. Tenants of land belonging to the class mentioned in Section 3 of Act X of 1949 are alone entitled to apply u/s 6 for grant of a declaration of bhumidhari rights- The word 'land' has been defined in Section 3(10) of the UP Tenancy Act as land which is let or held for growing of crops or as grove land, or for pasturage. It is admitted that the land was never used for growing of crops or for purposes of agriculture or animal husbandry. The Plaintiff's predecessors were not therefore competent to apply u/s 6 of Act X of 1949, inasmuch as they were not tenants of the land within the meaning of Section 3. Therefore, the sanad granted to them was a nullity and unenforceable at law. 8. In Ballabh Das v. Murat Narain Singh and Ors. (1) (24 ALJR 489) the court had to consider whether a particular lease was a lease for agricultural purposes, or not. That was a case to which the provisions of Agra Tenancy Act were applicable. The court observed: If it was not a lease for agricultural purposes then it would be governed by the Transfer of Property Act and not by the Agra Tenancy Act. Land is defined in Section 4(2) as land which is let or held for agricultural purposes. That was a case to which the provisions of Agra Tenancy Act were applicable. The court observed: If it was not a lease for agricultural purposes then it would be governed by the Transfer of Property Act and not by the Agra Tenancy Act. Land is defined in Section 4(2) as land which is let or held for agricultural purposes. Sub-clause (6) defines 'thekadar' as farmer or other lessee of proprietary rights which must mean rights in land, otherwise a lessee of proprietary rights in house properties would come within the definition of a thekadar in the Agra Tenancy Act. That obviously could not have been the intention. The expression 'agricultural purposes' has not been defined anywhere but a lease cannot be called a lease for agricultural purposes unless the primary object of the lease is cultivation or agriculture." The above quoted observations apply with full force to the facts of the present case. Here also the lease of the land was for building purposes and not for agricultural purposes. Such a lease would be governed by the Transfer of Property Act and not by the UP Tenancy Act. This being so, the Plaintiff's predecessors in title could not be tenants of the land within the meaning of the U.P. Tenancy Act and, therefore, the Plaintiff could not acquire the rights of a bhumidhari in respect of the land. The lower appellate Court misconceived the purpose of the lease and the rights conferred there under It failed to appreciate that the land had never been brought under cultivation and had always been described as parti kadim. Even in the Khatauni of 1356F it was shown as banjar kadim. It did not occur to the court below as to how the land which had remained uncultivated up to 1949 could suddenly become land used for agricultural purposes. 9. The judgment of the lower appellate court is in the nature of special pleading and is not founded on sound reasoning. I, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court and restore that of the court of first instance, and dismiss the Plaintiff's suit with costs.