JUDGMENT : Ahmad, C.J. - This is an appeal by the State u/s 417, Code of Criminal Procedure directed against an order of acquittal passed on 7-9-1964 by Mr. J.N. Acharya, Assistant Sessions Judge of Sundargarh. 2. The Respondents are ten in number. At the trial they were all charged-firstly u/s 148, Indian Penal Code for being members of an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons, viz., Dhanus, Farsias, Lathis, etc. and in section of the common object of such assembly, (viz., to set fire to the dwelling house of Adbul Rashid in village Katang), for having committed the offence of rioting on 23-3-1964 at midnight; and secondly, u/s 435/149, Indian Penal Code for having caused, in prosecution of the same common object, and at the same time and place, the offence of chief by setting fire to, and intentionally destroying, the house of the said Abdul Rashid used as a human dwelling and as a place for custody of property. 3. Further, four of these Respondents, viz., Chaitu Kisan (Respondent No. 1), Naik Kisan (elder) Respondent No. 2), Aita Kisan (Respondent No. 3) and Jithu Kisan (Respondent No. 9) were also charged u/s 436, Indian Penal Code for having, in prosecution of the same common object and at the same time and place, set fire to the said house of Abdul Rashid. 4. In support of the charges, the prosecution amongst others, examined five eye-witnesses, viz., p.w.1 (Lita Tirkey), p.w.2 (Mangara Oram), p.w.3 (Kashi Oram), p.w.4 Biras Oram and p.w.5 (Noas Oram). The learned Assistant Sessions Judge has branded all of them as "Liars or men like accomplices" and has further observed that "in case they are treated as liars their evidence is of no moment to the prosecution". If they are to be taken to be men like accomplices, independent corroboration, as a common rule of practice, is absolutely necessary, to bring home the charges to the accused persons. Here independent corroboration is totally lacking. Rather it is in evidence that p.ws. 1 to 4 are more or less related to each other". Finally the Assistant Sessions Judge has come to the conclusion that the evidence of the prosecution does not carry with it an air of conviction and no guilt on the basis of such evidence can be brought home to the accused persons for any of the offences" and has accordingly acquitted all the Respondents. 5. Finally the Assistant Sessions Judge has come to the conclusion that the evidence of the prosecution does not carry with it an air of conviction and no guilt on the basis of such evidence can be brought home to the accused persons for any of the offences" and has accordingly acquitted all the Respondents. 5. This is one of those cases which arose out of the communal disturbances at Rourkela and its suburbs in the district of Sundargarh. That was sometime in the last part of arch 1964. 6. It is not disputed that Abdul Rashid had a house in Turitolla, one of the hamlets of village Katang, and that p W8. 1 to 5 also reside in that hamlet. The prosecution case is that Rashid left his house on 22-3-1964 out of fear due to the communal disturbances, and during his absence, on 23-3-l964 at about midnight a mob of about 20 to 25 persons, including the Respondents armed with lathis, bows and arrows, etc. came to that house and set fire to it. At that time, four of the prosecution witnesses Nos. 1 to 4 along with one more person named Kabad Turi (not examined) were sitting in an open space little distance away from the house of Rashid and were keeping watch over the village to avoid any communal trouble. Respondent No. 1 (Chaitu Kisan) came straight to that open space followed by Respondent No. 2 (Naik Kisan elder). There Respondent No. 1 gave out that they would set fire to the house of Abdul Rashid. These persons sitting there protested, but the Respondents and the party paid no heed to it. On the other hand the other members of the mob who were then standing under a mango tree in front of the house of Abdul Rashid shouted that the house should be set to fire. Thereupon Jitu Kisan (Respondent No. 9) and Aita Kisan (Respondent No. 3) pulled out Rome straw from the stack of Kashi Oram (p.w 3) and put the same on the tiles of the house while Respondent No. 1. Chaitu Kisan brought out a match-box and I Respondent No. 2 Naik Kisan (elder) set fire to it. In all the mob was there for about half an hour. Chaitu Kisan brought out a match-box and I Respondent No. 2 Naik Kisan (elder) set fire to it. In all the mob was there for about half an hour. But none of the residents of the village or those who happened to be there during the occurrence or thereafter took any trouble to bring the matter to the notice of the authorities concerned. It was Shri Akrura Champati (p.w.7), the A.S.I. of Police who for the first time on 24-3-1965 at about 8.30 p.m. noticed that the house was burnt, and on the same day at 10 p.m. recorded this fact in the station diary. At the trial this p.w.7 stated that While I was moving within my area to maintain law and order, I came to Katang on 24-3-1964 at about 8. 30 p. m. and found the house of Abdul Rashid burning. On enquiring from the village Choukidar who stays at a distance of under one mile from the place, I returned to the outpost and made the station diary entry at 10 p. m.. As it was late in the night I could not do anything at the spot. Ext, 4 is the station diary entry to Rajgangpur Police Station. On 25-3-1964- I was busy in maintaining law and order. On 26-3-1964 I started preliminary investigation. Thus on the basis of his station diary there was subsequently formal F.I.R. drawn on 28-3-1964 and chargesheet submitted on 24-5-1961. 7. The simple plea taken in defence is that the allegations made against the accused persons are false. 8. In this Court Mr. S. Acharya appearing for the Respondents has, apart from supporting judgment under appeal, further contended that it being a judgment one of acquittal should not be interfered with as it further fortifies the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, now as a result thereof stands further fortified. 9. It is true that the trial Court has the great advantage which is denied to the Court of appeal-of seeing the witnesses and watching their demeanour; but at the same time it cannot be disputed that, in law, vide Harbans Singh and Another Vs. State of Punjab, and Radhakishan Vs. 9. It is true that the trial Court has the great advantage which is denied to the Court of appeal-of seeing the witnesses and watching their demeanour; but at the same time it cannot be disputed that, in law, vide Harbans Singh and Another Vs. State of Punjab, and Radhakishan Vs. State of U.P. the powers bestowed on appellate Courts u/s 423, Code of Criminal Procedure in hearing appeals against acquittal are not in any way different to the powers bestowed on them in hearing appeals against orders of conviction. Nor can it be claimed that the Judge of first instance is the possessor of infallibility. Like other tribunals there may be occasions when he goes wrong on a question of fact; therefore, all that it comes to is, as observed by the Supreme Court in Harbans Singh and Another Vs. State of Punjab that: In deciding appeals against acquittal the Court of appeal must examine the evidence with particular care, must examine also the reasons on which the order of acquittal was passed and interfere with the order only when satisfied that the view taken by the acquitting Judge is clearly an unreasonable one that itself is a compelling reason for interference; for it is the Court's duty to convict a guilty person when the guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt, no less than it is to acquit the accused person if the guilt is not so Established. 10. We have therefore carefully gone through the entire materials on the record, and more particularly the depositions of the five eye-witnesses (p. ws. 1 to 5) and the judgment under appeal as placed before us both by the learned Government Advocate appearing for the State and Shri Acharya. In our opinion, the evidence of the eye-witnesses, substantially and broadly speaking, is uniformly consistent and cogent and the contradictions, if any, which have weighed with the trial Court in not acting on their evidence are trivial and unimportant as compared with the main essential points involved in the case. Further the conclusion drawn by it on the basis of these contradictions and other materials on the record are wholly perverde and unreasonable and at places influenced by statements which are not admissible in law. 11. Further the conclusion drawn by it on the basis of these contradictions and other materials on the record are wholly perverde and unreasonable and at places influenced by statements which are not admissible in law. 11. The grounds given by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge in coming to the conclusion that the eye-witnesses are "liars or men who are like accomplices" have been mainly discussed in paragraphs 6 to 8 of the judgment under appeal. The first of them is that p. ws. 1 to 4 are not consistent in their evidence as to the exact place where they were sitting at the time when the accused persons are said to have arrived there. P.w.1 stated that his party was sitting in an open place 20 to 20 cutis away from the house of Rashid. P.w.2 stated that they were sitting near a well close to the house of Rashid. P.w.3 deposed that they were sitting at a place in front of his house at a. distance of about 50 yards from the house of Rashid. And p.w.4 claimed that they were sitting near the house of Rashid. In the opinion of the learned trial Court therefore "p. ws. 1 to i are quite discrepant regarding the place where they were sitting in the night of occurrence when the accused Chaitu and Naik came to them". In our opinion, the discrepancy if any made in the statements of these witnesses in regard to the place where they were sitting is nothing but verbal and superficial. When Carefully examined it would appear that the place pointed out by all of them is the same but only that has been described by them differently. Unfortunately the trial Court has failed to notice two important facts in that connection, (1) that the house of p.w.3, as stated by him, is very near to the house of Rashid, and that no other house intervenes between them: and (2) as deposed to by p.w.4 that close to the house of Rashid there is well and a mango tree. Therefore, the mere fact that one witness says that the party was sitting close to the house of Rashid and the other says that the party was sitting near a well close to the house of Rashid cannot reasonably lead to the conclusion that there is any discrepancy in their statements. Therefore, the mere fact that one witness says that the party was sitting close to the house of Rashid and the other says that the party was sitting near a well close to the house of Rashid cannot reasonably lead to the conclusion that there is any discrepancy in their statements. It is quite understandable that because there is a common open space in front of the houses of p.w.3 and Rashid and in that open space is a well, the witnesses could describe the place either with reference to the house of Rashid or p.w.3, or with reference to the well in front of both those houses. Rightly, therefore, it has been argued by the learned Government Advocate that these different modes of dewribing the same place can be valid ground for holding that their statements were discrepant. 12. Secondly it has been pointed out by the trial Court that these witnesses are not consistent on the point 'as to who set fire to the house and how. P.w.1 stated that hay was put on the tiles, p.w.2 deposed that hay was kept under the roof over the wall. P.w.3 claimed that the hay was thrust inside the roof. But all three witnesses have infirmly and clandestinely asserted in their evidence and if at least on this point there is no inconsistency, that Respondent Jitu and Respondent pulled out straw from the stack of p. w. and put the same either on or under the tiles of Rashid's house, and that Respondent Chaitu brought out a match box and Respondent Naik (elder) set fire to it. Therefore, the mere fact that there is some discrepancy on the point as to whether the straw brought was placed on the tile or under the tile of Rashid's house, cannot reasonably belie the main part of the occurrence. After all, it was night time and if they did see the occurrence as claimed by them they must have seen it in its broader aspects and not the relation to its minutest details. Therefore, there shall discrepancies which have no bearing on the main part of the occurrence cannot make them either 'liars' or 'accomplices'. 13. After all, it was night time and if they did see the occurrence as claimed by them they must have seen it in its broader aspects and not the relation to its minutest details. Therefore, there shall discrepancies which have no bearing on the main part of the occurrence cannot make them either 'liars' or 'accomplices'. 13. In this connection, it has also been pointed out by the trial Court that in cross-examination there is a positive statement made by the prosecution witness No. 3 that when the Respondents and Chaitu and Naika (elder) came towards the house of Rashid they (witnesses and others) were sitting in front of his house and when the house was set on fire "they moved to see it". In the opinion of the trial Court this statement suggests that p.w.3 and his party did not see as to who set the house to fire and how. But here again the trial Court has altogether sed to note the distance between the place where these witnesses were sitting and the house of Rashid. The mango tree is just on the south of the house of Rashid and spreads over its roof. 'The mob originally stood under the three. On the west of the house of Rashid is the house of p.w.1 at a distance not exceeding 100 yards and the open space where he and p. ws. 2 to 4 were sitting was according to him only 20 to 25 cubits away from the house of Rashid. Therefore, the mere fact that at the time when the house was set on fire by the accused persons the witnesses were sitting in an open space at a small distance away or the fact that thereafter they came near the house when it was on fire cannot belie the positive statements made by the prosecution witnesses as to bow the occurrence took place and who did what it is true that p.w.4 in the course of his cross-examined from admitted that he did "not know the persons who set fire to the house" but that statement is quite understandable. He is admittedly not a permanent resident of Katang. It is only his wife who belongs to that place and at that time he was there in the house of his father-in-law only since last Magh. Further it was his first visit. He is admittedly not a permanent resident of Katang. It is only his wife who belongs to that place and at that time he was there in the house of his father-in-law only since last Magh. Further it was his first visit. Therefore be could not know all the inhabitants of Katang. But p. ws. 1, 2, 3, and 5 who are the local people of the village have all uniformly and consistently deposed as to who did what and bow the occurrence took place these circumstances the conclusion drawn by the learned trial Court that the statement of the eye-witnesses materially differed on the point as to who set fire to the house and how is just contrary to the positive evidence of those witnesses. 14. The third ground given by the trial Court for not believing the evidence of the eye-witnesses p. ws. 1 to 4 is that they are all more or less related to each other and had some malice against the accused persons. Therefore, they cannot be safely relied on. Further, it has been pointed out that if, in fact, they were interested and anxious to maintain peace and amity in the village, they should have promptly brought this matter to the notice of the Choukidar or Gountia of the village or the Police, who were all at a distance of one or two mile should have at least brought this matter to the notice of the other villagers. But admittedly they did nothing of the sort. Therefore the trial Court seems to think that this conduct on the part of p. ws. 1 to 4 is unnatural and not consistent with their claim. In our opinion the Court below in assessing the evidence of these prosecution witnesses on this point has lost sight of the fact that the, conditions then. prevailing were not normal. The entire atmosphere was then surcharged with communal hatred and even if there were persons who were sober enough to maintain balance of mind they could not, in that hostile attitude, of the locality, have dared to go much beyond their way. It was a dark night and it was difficult for them to know who was there to help them in this matter. It was a dark night and it was difficult for them to know who was there to help them in this matter. They therefore, having done whatever they could at the spot left the matter there, once they found that the house had already been put to fire and burnt. Under those circumstances mere inaction on the part of p. ws. 1 to 4 can be no valid ground for holding that they are liars or are unreliable. It is true that all these witnesses belong to the community of Santhals and, in a way, they may be said to be related to each other, but there is no evidence on record that they bad any malice against the accused persons. It appears that sometime back-may be two or three years, or may be more-the brother-in-law of Rashid married the sister of p.w.1. All the same they had, all along since then been living peacefully and there is no material on the record to suggest that this incident had led to any controversy between the prosecution witnesses on the one side and the villager son the other. On the contrary, the indications, if any, that are there, suggest that the relationship between them was nothing but cordial. At the trial no doubt three of the accused persons, viz. (i) Dala Kissan, (ii) Jatha Kisan, (iii) Fagu Kisan did, in their statements under -'1 Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure claim that- "when Abdul"kept the sister of p.w.1 the caste people protested. P.W.1 is our enemy since then". But no such claim was made by any of them in the committing Court, nor any such case was at the trial, suggested on their behalf to any of the p. ws. 1 to 4 or got supported through any defence witness. Therefore, barring the solitary and belated testimony of the aforesaid accused persons, made at the trial for the first time in their statements u/s 342, Code of Criminal Procedure there is no other material on the record to support the finding given by the trial Court that is highly probable that the accused persons have been falsely implicated by the aforesaid witnesses with a view to feed fat their grudge". 15. Further, in coming to this conclusion no consideration has been given by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge to the evidence of p.w.5. 15. Further, in coming to this conclusion no consideration has been given by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge to the evidence of p.w.5. P.w.5 is not claimed to be in any way related to any of the p. ws. 1 to 4. The criticisms made against this witness are only two: 0) that he was examined by the Sub-inspector of Police-p.w.7 long after the occurrence for the -most time on 8-6-1964 and on that his name is not mentioned by p.ws. 1 to 4 as one of the persons present at the spot when the occurrence took place. 16. In my opinion, there is no substance in either of these two criticisms. It is true that out of the five eye-witnesses two namely p. W8. 4 and 5 were examined not immediately after the occurrence but a fortnight or so thereafter. P.W.4 was examined on the 17th April, 1964, but unfortunately there was no question put to any of these witnesses or to the Investigating officer p.w.7 as to why there was this long delay in their examination by the Police. It may be that neither of them could be available earlier when the Police went to the village for investigation. Therefore, III the absence of any proper probe into the matter it is now too late for the defence to take any advantage of the delay in their examination, by the police. Then, so far as the other criticalness against p.w.5 is concerned that also is without any significance. P.w.5 arrived at the place of occurrence after hearing the hulla and was not there from before. Secondly his house is situated as it appears from his evidence, on the north of the house of Rashid while p. ws. 1 to 4 were standing at that time somewhere on the west or south west of his house. Therefore, in the course of the occurrence those witnesses may not have noticed the presence of p.w.5 at that place. Thus we find no reason to disbelieve his evidence and if his evidence is accepted as it ought to be, that gives us the testimony of a person completely independent both of Rashid and p. ws. 1 to 4. Therefore, in that view of the matter also the aforesaid finding given by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge can be sustained. 17. 1 to 4. Therefore, in that view of the matter also the aforesaid finding given by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge can be sustained. 17. The last criticism made by the trial Court relates to the question of identification of the accused persons.. It is true that the night was dark but the claim made by the witnesses is that these accused persons were standing at a very short distance, and both the parties being mostly residents of the same village, must have been well known to each other. Therefore apart from face they could also identify them by their voice. Again, there is also the claim made by the witnesses that when the house was put to fire there was sufficient light at that place and therefore there was no difficulty about identification. The only person among these witnesses who was not a permanent resident of the village was p.w.4. In these circumstances the identification claimed to have been made at least by p.ws. 1, 2, 3 and 5 cannot be held to be unreliable. No doubt in the statement made before the Police there is no mention made by p.w.5 of the fact that he saw the other accused persons with the aid of the light of fire. But that is at best only an omission; and is not available, in law, to be used as a substantive piece of evidence to belie his positive statement made at the trial. See Tahsildar Singh and Another Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh, . 18. In dealing with the evidence of p.w.3 the learned Assistant Sessions Judge has referred to a statement made by him at the trial. That was to the effect that: I was not examined by the Police... I did not state to the Police that the accused persons set fire to the house of Rashid. This again has been used by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, as a very material piece of contradiction and on the basis of this statement it has been observed that "it indicates that he had not actually seen the accused persons taking part in the crime". This again has been used by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, as a very material piece of contradiction and on the basis of this statement it has been observed that "it indicates that he had not actually seen the accused persons taking part in the crime". This conclusion suffers from two fallacies: (i) that the learned Judge has used omission as contradiction which is not permissible in law and (ii) that he has failed to take into consideration the evidence of the Investigating Officer (p.w.7) who has deposed that - I examined... Kashi Oram (p.w.3) at 7 p.m. on 27-3-1964. It seems therefore that the aforesaid statement of p.w.3 has been made under Rome confusion. As such his evidence given at the trial cannot be disbelieved on that ground. 19. Likewise, what has been observed by the Assistant Sessions Judge about the evidence of p.w.5 is equally without substance. It is based exclusively on the assumption as if this witness was standing all along on the north of the house of Rashid, while the accused were standing all along at one fixed place on the south; and therefore the two being on the opposite sides of the house could not see each other. But this assumption is neither supported by the materials on the record, nor is persistent with the usual conduct of man in the ordinary course of nature. The house of Rashid does not appear to be very big, nor it can be reasonably supposed that inspite of the fact that p.w.5 came there in his anxiety to know what was happening, he, on arrival at that place, keep himself permanently standing at one place without moving about to know as to who were the persons there who had at that unearthly hour assembled near that house, and what had led them to come to that place in a mob. Lastly, it has to be noted that it was the western portion of the house of Rashid that bad been put on fire. Therefore, p.w.5 could easily see what was happening at that place. The very assumption, therefore, being erroneous the conclusion based on it cannot be sustained. 20. The remaining witness whose evidence on the point of identification needs consideration is p.w.4. Therefore, p.w.5 could easily see what was happening at that place. The very assumption, therefore, being erroneous the conclusion based on it cannot be sustained. 20. The remaining witness whose evidence on the point of identification needs consideration is p.w.4. But I think in view of what has already been stated about him, the identification claimed to have been made by this witness cannot be relied upon. No doubt, in his chief he has claimed to have identified two of the accused persons, namely, Chaitu and Naika, as the persons who set fire to the house, but in cross-examination admitted that I did not know the persons who set fire to the house. It may be that in making this statement what he meant to say was that he himself did not see as to who was the persons who actually set fire to the house though he had seen Chaitu and Naika coming to the place of occurrence and talking to them about it. But in view of the doubtful nature of the reply give in cross-examination his evidence on the point of identification cannot be safely acted upon. 21. But there is no valid reason why, on the question of identification the evidence of the remaining eye-witnesses, namely, p.ws. 1, 2, 3 and 5 should not be believed and acted upon. There is no flaw in their evidence. Three of them, namely p. ws. 1, 2 and 5 claimed to have identified all the member's of the accused party as the persons present in the mob. It is true that p.w.3 did not identify Naik (younger) (Respondent No. 7) and Fagu (Respondent No. 8). But in view of the consistent evidence of p.ws. 1, 2 and 5 as to their presence at the place of occurrence it cannot be held that these two accused persons were not there. 22. In view of their consistent evidence therefore which in my opinion is truthful and worthy of reliance-there can be no doubt that the mob on that night had come there with the common intention of setting fire to the dwelling house of Rashid and as such all the persons who constituted that mob were members of an unlawful assembly. It is true that in a situation like this some innocent persons may also be implicated falsely, may it be for malice or enmity. It is true that in a situation like this some innocent persons may also be implicated falsely, may it be for malice or enmity. But, in the circumstances of the present case it is difficult to believe that any of these persons who were present along with the mob were not members of the unlawful assembly. In rural areas people generally retire early at night. Therefore, if any of them is found present in the mob at midnight the reasonable inference could be that he had joined it not for nothing, but to aid and assist the mob in its common object. Secondly, there is the positive evidence on the record that all these accused persons were armed with some weapon or other. P.w.1 has stated that: accused Chaitu had bow and arrow, Naika Kissan (elder) had bow and arrow and others had some weapons which I did not mark The statement of p.w.2 is that: they were armed with lathis, bows and arrows. Accused Chaitu had bow and arrow, Naika Kissan (elder) had bow and arrow, and others had axes (Falsia) and lathis. The claim of p.w.3 is that: Accused Chaitu and Naika had bow and others had lathis and axes (Falsia). I could not see which accused persons, except Chaitu (older) had which particular weapons. 'Pw. 4 stated: the entire mob was .armed with lathis, bows and arrows. The last witness p.w.5 has deposed that: They were all armed with lathis, bows and falsias. Therefore, the evidence of these witnesses clearly establishes that Respondent No. 1 Chaitu and Respondent No. 2 Naika (elder) were armed with bows and arrows, while the other Respondents were armed with some weapons though without any specification as to the exact nature of the weapons in their hands. Therefore, it cannot be said that they had come there innocently just to see what was happening there. 23. Lastly each of them is alleged to have committed some overt act or other. According to p.ws. 1, 2, 3 and 5, Respondent Jitu (Respondent No. 9) and Respondent Aita (Respondent No. 3) had pulled out straw from the stack of Kashi Oram and arrows could not and Naika and used the same for the purpose of setting fire to the house of Rashid while Respondent Chaitu (Respondent No. 1) and Respondent. Naika (elder) (Respondent No.) set fire to it. Naika (elder) (Respondent No.) set fire to it. As against the remaining Respondents their consistent version is that they were all shouting in support of the common cause. Therefore, in the face of these overt acts and other circumstances on the record the conclusion is irresistible that all of them were member of the unlawful assembly with this difference that Respondent Chaitu (Respondent No. 1) and Respondent Naika elder (Respondent No. 2) were armed with weapons which are specifically named-namely bows and arrows while the other Respondent were armed either with lath is, bows and arrows or falsias. But all these weapons whether they may have been in the hands of the one or the other, if used as weapons of offence, were likely to cause death and as such deadly weapons. 24. Therefore, the evidence on the record unequivocally establishes that all these Respondents were the members of an unlawful assembly and some of them had used violence by putting fire to the house of Rashid. It is the consistent evidence of p. ws. 1, 2, 3 and 5 that Respondent Aita Kissan (Respondents No. 3) and Respondent Jitu Kisan (Respondent No. 9) brought hay from the haystack of Kashi Oram and the fire had been kindled with the help of that hay by putting the same either on or under the roof of the house. There is however, some discrepancy as to who actually set fire to the roof. P. Ws. 3 and 5 have deposed that it was done by both the Respondents Chaitu and Naik (elder) but p. ws. 1 and 2 have, on this point, given a slightly of different version. The evidence of p.w.1 is that Respondent No. 1 Chaitu brought the match box and Respondent Naika (elder) set fire to the house; while p.w.2 has deposed that it was Respondent No. 1 Chaitu who actually set fire to the house. It is quite understandable that in the midst of that conflagration every minute detail could not have been carefully noticed. But even if these variations are eliminated, this much is, in any case, left undemolisbed-that of the two Respondents Chaitu was definitely the one who set fire to the house. Therefore the case against him u/s 436, Indian Penal Code is fully proved. But even if these variations are eliminated, this much is, in any case, left undemolisbed-that of the two Respondents Chaitu was definitely the one who set fire to the house. Therefore the case against him u/s 436, Indian Penal Code is fully proved. Further, in the circumstances of the case there can be no doubt that it was done in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly of which all the Respondents were in the know. Therefore, all the remaining Respondents are liable for the offence under sit-in 436/149, Indian Penal Code. 25. Accordingly, Respondent No. 1 Chaitu Kisan is convicted u/s 436, Indian Penal Code and is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 100/ - (one hundred) in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of four months, while the remaining Respondents 2 to 10 are convicted u/s 4:36/149, Indian Penal Code and each of them is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 100/ - (one hundred) in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of four months. 26. There is also a specific charge framed against all the Respondents u/s 148, Indian Penal Code. In that regard the submission by Mr. Acharya appearing on their behalf is that as there is no positive evidence on record to prove as to who held which specific weapon they can be held liable for the offence of rioting, if at all, u/s 147, Indian Penal Code and not u/s 148, Indian Penal Code. In my opinion there is no substance in this contention. This much is uniformly deposed to by all the witnesses that they had, all of them, one or the other weapon-may it be lathi, bow and arrow falsia. Therefore, for the offence of rioting they are all held guilty u/s 141, Indian Penal Code. But no separate sentence is awarded to any of them under that section. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, the order of acquittal passed by the Court of Sessions is set aside and the Respondents are convicted and sentenced as just stated. They should surrender to their bail bonds and should be recommitted to jail to serve out their aforesaid sentences. Misraa, J. 27. I agree. Final Result : Allowed