Judgment :- 1. The properties in A schedule of the plaint belonged to the 3rd defendant, a Muslim woman, and to her daughter Nafissa Beevi. The 3rd defendant, acting also as the guardian of the latter, conveyed the properties to the plaintiff-appellant: by Ext. P-7, in the year 1119. On the same day, item 2 in B schedule of the plaint was purchased in their names by Ext. P-4 with part of the sale consideration, and a few; months later in the same year, item 1 of B schedule also was purchased similarly by Ext. P-5. In the year 1124, both items 1 and 2 of B schedule were sold by the 3rd defendant to defendants 1 and 2, who are the contesting respondents in this second appeal. Nafissa Beevi sued in O.S. 327 of 1962 for cancellation of Ext. P-7 to the extent of her share and succeeded in obtaining a decree. Relying on the provision for indemnity in Ext. P7, the plaintiff commenced this suit for partition of the share of the 3rd defendant in B schedule properties in the possession of defendants 1 and 2, and in the alternative for damages charged on such share. The first court gave him a charge as prayed for, but on appeal the Additional District Judge disallowed the charge. 2. The only question for decision is whether the plaintiff is entitled to at charge or not. It was contended on his behalf, that by the provision for indemnity in Ext. P-7, a charge was created on all the properties of the 3rd defendant and that therefore her share in B schedule properties was subject to such charge and was enforceable against defendants 1 and 2. According to defendants 1 and 2, no, charge arose under the clause for indemnity in Ext. P-7, the parties had no intention to create a charge, and the properties sought to be made liable being unspecified and unascertainable, the charge, if any, was void for uncertainty. It was on the last ground that the District Judge relied principally, for vacating the charge decreed by the Munsiff. I am of the opinion, that the plaintiff has to fail. 3. The relevant, part of the indemnity clause in Ext. It was on the last ground that the District Judge relied principally, for vacating the charge decreed by the Munsiff. I am of the opinion, that the plaintiff has to fail. 3. The relevant, part of the indemnity clause in Ext. P-7 is as follows: In my experience, however limited it may be, of the area from which this case arises, words like these are meant to denote the fullness and extent of personal liability, and I am not able to recall one instance in which they were meant to create a charge. Such words are so familiar in the language of conveyancers and document writers in that area, that they have almost become a term of art to denote personal liability. An intention to create a charge is generally made manifest by the use of apt words such as OmV*p in that area, in other areas. I .'am of the view, that the words in the indemnity clause in Ext. P-7 do not point to an intention of the parties to create a charge, on any property whatever. 4. The properties are also not specified. To say that the loss may be recouped from all the properties, moveable and immovable of both the executants, is not to say that any specified property was charged; as to what are the properties of the executants can be ascertained only after a roving enquiry, which after all, may not yield results which are conclusive. It is true that to create a charge on immoveable property, it need not be specified by its boundaries, or extent, or survey number, but there must be some expression to signify what the property is or how it can be ascertained. A general description as the properties moveable and immoveable of the executants two in number, would hardly suffice to meet this requirement, and the charge if any, on such properties is void for uncertainty. 5. There are decided cases which support this view. In Deojit v. Pitambar, I.L.R.1 Allahabad 275, a charge on the properties of the executants was held not to create a charge. In Bheri Dorayya v. Maddinatu Ramayya I.L.R. 3 Madras 35 a direction to pay out of the debtor's property indefinitely or an indefinite order for the satisfaction of a decree out of the assets of a deceased person, was held not to amount to a charge on specific property. In Bheri Dorayya v. Maddinatu Ramayya I.L.R. 3 Madras 35 a direction to pay out of the debtor's property indefinitely or an indefinite order for the satisfaction of a decree out of the assets of a deceased person, was held not to amount to a charge on specific property. In Manickam Pillai V. Audinarayana Pillai I.L.R. 34 Madras 47 a clause in a partition deed for owelty, to be met from the properties of the sharers, was construed to apply to the properties allotted to them in schedules A and B of the document. In Govindan Kochukunju Pillai v. Idikkula Nina 15 T.L.J. 245 words of similar import were held to be void for uncertainty. The court observed in Mohini Debi v. Purna Sashi Gupta A.I.R. 1932 Calcutta 451 that "in order to make the property security for payment of money, there should be some expression to signify that the property is liable for such payment and for that purpose the property must be specified and not described in such general terms as in the present case." It was held in Vyasyaraju Venkataratnam Raju v. Damodar Sahu A.I.R. 1957 Orissa 32 that specific immoveable property must be made security for the payment of money and must be so made in unambiguous terms. 6. As against these, learned counsel relied on the bench decision in Mittinti Narasimhamurthi v. Pandiri Satyanandam A.I.R. 1941 Madras 794 holding that a charge created by a decree over all the property of the judgment-debtor both moveable and immoveable is valid, on the ground that the property charged by the decree could be ascertained at any moment. Speaking with respect, I cannot find my way to agree with this decision. I am of the opinion, that unless an intention is evinced by the parties concerned to create a security upon property by the use of apt words or expressions and unless the properties are themselves specified or can be ascertained with definiteness, a charge cannot be held to arise under S.100 of the Transfer of Property Act. 7. In any view, though item 2 of B schedule was purchased on the same day on which A schedule property was sold, item 1 of B schedule was purchased only a few months later and it could certainly not have been the intention of the 3rd defendant to create a charge upon that item by Ext. P-7. 7. In any view, though item 2 of B schedule was purchased on the same day on which A schedule property was sold, item 1 of B schedule was purchased only a few months later and it could certainly not have been the intention of the 3rd defendant to create a charge upon that item by Ext. P-7. Even item 2 of B schedule was not specifically charged under Ext. P-7. In the result, I dismiss this Second Appeal with costs.