JUDGMENT D.P. Uniyal, J. - The plots in dispute were recorded as sir plots of Khata Khewat N o. 2. In 1945 Shambhu Lal, husband of the respondent, let out the disputed plots to the appellants who came to be recorded as tenants of Sir in the revenue papers. After the coming into force of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and load Reforms Act draft compensation assessment roll was prepared in respect of khota Khewat No. 2 of Mohal Shambhu Lal. The respondent filed objection under Section 46(2) on the allegation that the plots in question were her Sir and had been wrongly recorded as tenant's Sir The objection was dismissed by the Compensation Officer who held that the plots were Sir of the appellants, and that the respondent was 1101 entitled to the benefit of Section 10(2) of the Act. 2. In appeal the learned Civil Judge set aside the order of the Compensation Officer and declared that the respondent. had become Sirdar of these plots on the date of vesting and as as entitled to the benefit of Section 10(2)(v). 3. Learned counsel for the appellant made two submissions : first, that the land being recorded as tenant's Sir on the date of vesting the appellants became Sirdars under Section 18, and secondly, that the land revenue of the Sir plots being more than Rs. 250/- the respondent was not entitled to the benefit of Sec 10 (2) as she as not a disabled person. 4. It is no doubt true that on the date of vesting the plots were recorded as tenants' Sir that, however, would not by itself disentitle the respondent from claiming relief under Section 10(2) because if she belonged to one of the classes mentioned in his, (i) to (vi) of Section 10(2) the provisions of sub-Sec. (1) of Sec, 10 would not be attracted. The important question, therefore, that falls to be determined is whether on the date of commencement of the tenancy, as well as on the date of vesting, the land-holder was a person who fell within one of the classes mentioned in sub-Sec. (2). Reliance on behalf of the respondent was placed on Cl, (v) of sub-Sec. (2) of Section 10. The important question, therefore, that falls to be determined is whether on the date of commencement of the tenancy, as well as on the date of vesting, the land-holder was a person who fell within one of the classes mentioned in sub-Sec. (2). Reliance on behalf of the respondent was placed on Cl, (v) of sub-Sec. (2) of Section 10. It was said that the husband of the respondent who let out the Sir plots to the appellants was too fat and was, therefore, incapable of doing cultivation by reason of physical infirmity. In the second place, it was said that on the date of vesting Suit, Deep Kunwar, widow of Shambhu Lal, was also a disabled person, being a woman. and, there fore, the respondent was entitled to the benefit of sub-Sec. (2) of Sec 10. 5. The court below has recorded a Finding that Shambhu Lal was too fat to be able to cultivate the land himself and that the evidence in the case was that he was incapable of doing any physical work. This finding is a finding' of fact and it must, therefore, be held that Shambhu Lal. was a person incapable of cultivation by reason of physical infirmity. 6. Another argument advanced by the learned counsel was that the disqualification mentioned in sub-Sec. (2) of Section 10 must relate to one and the same person. It was said that both on the date of the commencement of the tenancy as well as the date of vesting the disabled person must be one and the same. I am unable to accede to this contention for that would make nonsense of the provisions of sub-Sec. (2) of Sec 10. It may swell be that on the elate of commencement of the tenancy the person concerned may be a minor while on the (late of vesting the intermediary concerned may be a woman. So that on both the relevant dates the land-holder may be under a disability to personally cultivate the land. What is contemplated by the Act is that on the date of letting the land-holder must be a person incapable of cultivating the land himself; and further that on the date of vesting the said disability must have continued in the sense that the person then occupying the position of the landholder belonged to one of the classes described in Section 10. I am therefore, clearly of the opinion that if the landholder letting out the land was incapable of cultivation both on the date of the commencement of the tenancy as also on the date of vesting, he is entitled to the benefit of sub-Sec. (2) of Section 10. 7. I therefore. uphold the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court and dismiss this appeal with costs.