JUDGMENT D.P. Uniyal, J. - The suit out of which this appeal has arisen was for injunction restraining the defendant Municipal Board, Firozabad from dispossessing the plaintiff after removal of the stall erected by him. It was alleged by the plaintiff that he was a monthly tenant at Rs. 11 /- p.m. of a plot of land near the bus station. It was asserted that the plaintiff had 1t been regularly paying the rent to the defendant and had raised the stall at considerable expenses. The Board by a resolution dated 22-4-1957 directed the removal of the said stall, hence the suit. 2. The defence of the Municipal Board was that the plaintiff was not a lessee of the land but was merely a lessee. It was said that the plaintiff had been permitted to put up a stall on payment of fee in the nature of tahbazari at the rate of Rs. 11 p.m. It was said that the land on which the stall stood vested in the Board and the plaintiff had no right to continue in possession of the structure. It was pleaded that the stall was obstructing the public street and the defendant was justified in asking for its removal. 3. The Munsif decreed the suit on the finding that in view of Sec, 265 (4) of the Municipalities Act the defendant Board had no power to remove the stall put up by the plaintiff with their permission. In appeal the learned Civil Judge disagreed with the finding of the Munsif and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. He held that the plaintiff was a mere licensee. So long as the licence subsisted he had a right to continue the use of the stall. But the Municipal Board had power to revoke the licence at any time, and it having revoked the licence by means of a resolution dated 22-4-1957 the plaintiff ceased to have any right to maintain the stall by the road side. 4. The Municipal Board, framed a bye-law under section 298 (E) (B) to the effect that no person shall set up any stall or booth, etc. in any public street or place except in the places specified and on payment of the fee set forth in the schedule attached to the bye-laws. The permission granted to the appellant to put up the stall was under this bye-law. in any public street or place except in the places specified and on payment of the fee set forth in the schedule attached to the bye-laws. The permission granted to the appellant to put up the stall was under this bye-law. It is not disputed that the Board withdrew that permission and revoked the licence by the resolution dated 22-4-1957. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, however, was that once Board had directed the appellant put up a stall it had no power to the draw the permission or revoke licence. Learned counsel refer-to the provisions of Section 265 which provides that a person doing acts or omissions mentioned in Cls. (a) to (f) of sub-Sec. (1) shall be able upon conviction to a fine which may extend to fifty rupees. Sub-Sec. (4) of that section says that nothing contained in this section all apply to any obstruction of a street permitted by the Board under y section of this Act, or any rule or bye law made or licence granted thereunder." 5. The submission is that once permission is granted by the Board to put up a structure the provisions of Sec, 265 are not attracted and, therefore, the Board has no power to order the removal of the stall or structure. This contention, in my opinion, is wholly unfounded. Sub-Sec. (4) of Section 265 merely lays down the circumstances in which provisions of Section 265 will not apply. If under the provisions of the Act or rule or bye-law framed by the Municipal Board a licence is granted to a person to put up a structure the Board has no power to order its removal so long as the permission or licence lasts. It follows that if the Board decides to withdraw the permission or revoke the licence the right to maintain the structure or to use it ceases. The consequence mould be as if there was no permission to keep the structure on the street and, as such, the provisions of Section 265 (1) would come into play. 6. In the instant case the finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate court is that the appellant had been granted a licence to put up a stall on the roadside by the Municipal Board. 6. In the instant case the finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate court is that the appellant had been granted a licence to put up a stall on the roadside by the Municipal Board. This licence was revoked by the Board by means of a resolution and thereupon the plaintiff was called upon to remove the said stall. It cannot be disputed that if Section 265 applies to the case then under sub Section (2) of that section the Boar has power to remove any obstruction from the public street. After the revocation of the licence by the Board the plaintiff has no right to keep the structure any longer and the Board has full authority and power to order its removal. 7. It was next contended that the notice determining the licence was served on the plaintiff-appellant on 4-5-1957, that is, nearly one month after the institution of the suit, and, as such, the revocation of the licence was illegal. Although the order revoking the licence was passed on 22-4-1957 the notice calling upon the plaintiff to remove the structure was served much later. That, however, in my opinion is of little consequence as far as the merits of the case are concerned. The court had to determine the status of the plaintiff on the date of the decree and if it was found that the licence in favour of the plaintiff had been revoked, the suit was bound to fail. 8. Learned counsel prays for four months' time to remove the structure and. to put up a stall at another place in accordance with the permission of the Board. The plaintiff is allowed four months' time to remove the disputed construction. 9. The result is that this appeal fails and is dismissed, but I make no E order as to costs.