JUDGMENT S.S. Dhavan, J. - This is a tenant's second appeal from the decision of the Civil Judge of Bareilly reversing that of the trial Court and decreeing the landlord's suit for his ejectment from a shop. It involves a question of law of general importance namely, whether Section 1-A of the U. P Control of Rent and Eviction Act, which excepts from the operation of the Act all buildings erected on or after 1st January, 1951, extends to a building constructed by the tenant at his own expense (with the permission of the landlord). In other words, whether a tenant who constructed a building at his cost after 1st January, 1951, is not entitled to the protection of the Act against eviction. 2. The facts are these: the defendant-appellant Jai Narain Tandon is a tenant of two adjacent shops situate in Bara Bazar, Bareilly. These shops are owned by two different landlords, but the appellant converted them into a single shop by pulling down the common wall separating them with the consent of both the landlords. For ready reference, the western shop will be called shop 'X' and the eastern shop Y. Shop 'X' is Waqf property under the management of a Mutwalli. Shop 'Y' was previously owned by one Aziz Uddin, who sold it to the plaintiff in 1957. The appellant's tenancy of each shop commenced in 1956, the allotment order of shop 'Y' being issued in his favour on 27-9-1956 and of shop 'X' on 24-11-1956. The latter allotment was in the name of the appellant's son, but it is common ground that the appellant is the virtual tenant. There is no dispute with regard to shop 'X' and its landlord is neither interested nor a party in these proceedings. The suit for ejectment has been filed by the landlord of shop 'Y' and is confined to that shop. 3. It appears that in 1956 shop 'Y' was damaged by an earth-quake and required extensive repairs and reconstructions. The appellant's case is that under an agreement with the then landlord these repairs and constructions were made by him at his own expense. About the same time the appellant acquired the tenancy of the adjacent shop 'X', and converted the two shops into one by removing the separating wall, with the permission of both the landlords. The appellant's case is that under an agreement with the then landlord these repairs and constructions were made by him at his own expense. About the same time the appellant acquired the tenancy of the adjacent shop 'X', and converted the two shops into one by removing the separating wall, with the permission of both the landlords. After this the appellant used the accommodation as a single shop, though in law and in fact he remained a tenant of two different landlords under two separate tenancies. On 7-1-1957 shop 'Y' was sold to the plaintiff-respondent Ram Kishan Das. Within a few days of the purchase, on 31-1-1957, the plaintiff served on the defendant a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating his tenancy of shop 'Y', and asking him to quit. As the appellant refused to vacate the shop, the plaintiff filed two suits against him, one for his ejectment from shop 'Y' and the other for a permanent injunction to restrain him from preventing the plaintiff from erecting another wall to separate his shop from shop `X'. 4. The plaintiff in his plaint contended that as this shop was newly constructed after 1-1-1951 the appellant's tenancy was not governed by the U. P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act in view of Section I-A of the Act. He also charged the appellant with having materially altered the accommodation and caused substantial damage to it by demolishing the wall which separated it from shop `X'. The defendant in his written statement denied that the shop had been constructed anew and alleged that it had merely been repaired by him in 1956 with the per mission of, and under an agreement with, the then landlord after it had been damaged by an earth-quake. He contended that Section 1-A of the U. P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act did not apply to this shop and his tenancy was subject to the provisions of the Act, and he could not be ejected without the permission of the District Magistrate or on any of the grounds specified in Section 3 of the Act. He denied that he had made any unauthorised constructions and stated that he had demolished the dividing wall between the two shops with the permission of the then landlord. He denied that he had made any unauthorised constructions and stated that he had demolished the dividing wall between the two shops with the permission of the then landlord. He further contended that as he had made extensive repairs in the shop at his own cost under an agreement with the precious landlord, he had acquired an interest in the property and could not be ejected by the present landlord who was bound by that agreement. 5. The two suits were connected and consolidated, and disposed of by a single judgment. In the suit for ejectment (suit No. 191 of 1951) two main questions before the trial court were: (1) whether after the repairs and constructions made by the appellant the shop could be regarded in law as having been constructed after Ist January, 1951; secondly, whether Section 1-A of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act applied to a building which was constructed not by the landlord but by the tenant at his own cost. These are the only questions raised in this appeal. 6. Both sides led evidence, oral and documentary and the trial Court made an inspection of the accommodation. The plaintiff and the defendant both gave evidence, and the appellant also examined the previous landlord and his agent, both of whom testified that after the earth quake of 1956 the shop had been repaired by the appellant at his cost, but it was not constructed anew. The trial court held that the repairs made by the appellant did not have the effect of making the shop a new construction, and therefore it could not be regarded as having been constructed after 1-1-1951; accordingly, the appellant's tenancy was governed by the provisions of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act. It also held that the appellant had not made any alterations without the permission of the landlord and had removed the dividing wall with the latter's permission. and as this alteration had been made under an agreement between the tenant and the then landlord, the plaintiff was bound by it and was not entitled to reconstruct the dividing wall against the wishes of the tenant. On these findings trial court dismissed both the suits for ejectment and for injunction. 7. and as this alteration had been made under an agreement between the tenant and the then landlord, the plaintiff was bound by it and was not entitled to reconstruct the dividing wall against the wishes of the tenant. On these findings trial court dismissed both the suits for ejectment and for injunction. 7. On appeal the learned Civil Judge disagreed with the trial Court and held that the shop was constructed as a new shop in 1956 arid therefore, by virtue of Section 1-A of the Control and Rent and Eviction Act. the tenancy was not subject to the controls and restrictions imposed by that Act. 8. He rejected the appellant's contention that Sec, 1-A of the Act applied only to constructions made by the landlord and not to those made by the tenant at his own expense, and held that it applied to every building which was under erection or was constructed on or after Ist January, 1961, irrespective of whether it was constructed by the landlord or the tenant. Accordingly, he held that the plaintiff's rights under the lease were not restricted by the Control of Rent and Eviction Act and lie was entitled to terminate the appellant's tenancy and eject him. He allowed the landlord's appeal and decreed his suit for ejectment. The tenant, Jai Narain Tandon, has come to this Court in second appeal: 9. The case for the appellant and the respondent was argued with great ability by Mr. Jagdish Sarup and Mr. Ambika Prasad respectively. Ali, Jagdish Sarup urged the following arguments in support of this appeal: first, Section 1-A of the U. P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act is confined to buildings constructed by a landlord and the view of the lower appellate court that it also extends to constructions made by a tenant at his cost is erroneous; secondly, the finding of the appellate Judge that the plaintiff had proved that in 1956 a new shop had been constructed is vitiated by several errors of law; thirdly, in any case, the High Court can review this finding as it relates to a jurisdictional fact-that is, a fact on the existence of which depended the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the suit. 10. In reply Mr. 10. In reply Mr. Ambika Prasad contended that Section 1-A of the U. P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act applies to any building which was under erection or was constructed on or after Ist January, 1951, irrespective of whether it was constructed by the landlord or the tenant or any other person; secondly the finding that the shop had been reconstructed in the year 1956 and as such is exempt from the operation of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act is sound, thirdly, in any case, this being a finding of fact cannot be reviewed in second appeal except on grounds specified in Section 100 C. P. C., and no such ground has been made out. 11. Mr. Jagdish Sarup's first argument involves an interpretation of Section 1-A of the U. P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act, which was added by an amending Act of 1951. It runs thus: "1-A. Nothing in this Act shall apply to a building or a part of a building which was under erection or was constructed on or after Ist January, 1951." 12. Mr. Jagdish Sarup argued that this Section contemplates a construction made by the landlord and not one by the tenant at his own cost with the permission of the landlord. He relied on the aims and objects of the amending Act and the general scheme and purpose of the present Act. His argument may be summarised thus. The Control of Rent and Eviction Act was passed, as indicated by its preamble, to provide safeguards against the arbitrary eviction of the tenants and to control the letting of accommodation, and to control rent. These safeguards restrict the right of the landlord to increase rent or eject the tenant. But one result of these restrictions was a slump in the building industry. Very few new houses for letting were being constructed because of these controls, and the already acute shortage became acuter. The very purpose of the Act was in danger of being defeated. To meet this situation, the amending Act, No. 1X of 1951, was passed, adding Section 1-A to the Act. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons it was explained; "Under the existing provisions of the U. P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act the letting of buildings is controlled. The control over buildings has retarded the constructions of new buildings. To meet this situation, the amending Act, No. 1X of 1951, was passed, adding Section 1-A to the Act. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons it was explained; "Under the existing provisions of the U. P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act the letting of buildings is controlled. The control over buildings has retarded the constructions of new buildings. It has been decided to exclude buildings erected or constructed on or after Ist January, 1951, from the operation of the Act." Thus Sec, 1-A was passed to encourage the construction of new accommodation for letting purposes by removing the existing controls over new buildings. But as these controls were over the rights of the landlord, and their removal was for his benefit, it is obvious that he could benefit only if the new building was constructed by hint and not the tenant. The intention of the legislature was to encourage landlords to make new constructions, not to enable them to make unfair arrangements With the tenants under which a tenant was persuaded to construct an accommodation at his cost only to find himself deprived of the protection already given under the Act. This in brief was Mr. Jagdish Sarup's argument. 13. Learned counsel conceded that the words "any building" in Section 1-A are wide enough to include a construction made by the tenant at his cost, but he contended that a literal construction will defeat the very object of the Act and must be discarded. A literal construction, counsel argued, has a prima facie preference, but it does not mean that it must be followed in every case in disregard of the purpose and scheme of the Act and other considerations. Counsel relied on several decisions of the Supreme Court in which the literal or ordinary meaning of a phrase was rejected in favour of a special meaning as being consistent with the intention of the legislature. In Commissioner of Income Tax v. S. Teja Singh, A.I.R. 1959 S. C. 353 (355), it was enjoined that a construction which would defeat the object of the legislature must, if possible, be avoided. In Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pipraich Sugar Mills Mazdoor Union, A.I.R. 1957 S. C. 95, the word "retrenchment" was given a special meaning. In Commissioner of Income Tax v. S. Teja Singh, A.I.R. 1959 S. C. 353 (355), it was enjoined that a construction which would defeat the object of the legislature must, if possible, be avoided. In Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pipraich Sugar Mills Mazdoor Union, A.I.R. 1957 S. C. 95, the word "retrenchment" was given a special meaning. Learned counsel argued that in the present case the language of the statute is ambiguous, as it refers to a building "which was under erection or was constructed," but does not state by w,-lions. Therefore, the Court is entitled to remove this ambiguity in the light of the purpose and scheme of the Act and interpret the word "was under erection or was constructed" in accordance with the probable intention of legislature. Accordingly, they should be constructed as "was made erection or was constructed by the landlord." 14. In reply Ainbika Prasad argued that there was no reason to depart from what is called the "golden rule of construction" namely. that a statute must be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning. He pointed out that the vital words in Section 1-A are "any building", and not a "building constructed by the landlord." Learned counsel relied on a large number of authorities and also quoted passages from Maxwell. He denied that a literal meaning of the words will defeat the purpose of the Act, and argued that a tenant who constructs an accommodation at his cost under an agreement with the landlord can always stipulate for safeguards against eviction. 15. I have to consider whether the words "any building" should be given a special meaning which will restrict it to buildings constructed by the landlord. It is quite true that "the golden rule is that the words of a statute must be given their ordinary meaning"-Maxwell, interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edition, P. 6. This rule was evolved by the Courts of England where English is not only the official language of statutes, but a living language spoken by every Englishman. It is not difficult for English Judges to ascertain the ordinary meaning of words and phrases which are in daily use. This rule was evolved by the Courts of England where English is not only the official language of statutes, but a living language spoken by every Englishman. It is not difficult for English Judges to ascertain the ordinary meaning of words and phrases which are in daily use. But it may not always be so easy for an, Indian Judge to ascertain the ordinary meaning of words and phrases of a foreign language not spoken by the mass of the people, particularly when the standards of proficiency in this language are rapidly falling. Even in England, the so-called golden rule of adopting the ordinary meaning is subject to modification in suitable cases. Its rigid application to Indian statutes drafted in English may render the task of ascertaining the intention of the legislature more difficult. 16. All rules governing the interpretation of statutes are not technical rules, but intended to serve as guides for ascertaining the intention of the authority making the law which today means the legislature. A statute is the will of the legislature and the fundamental rule of interpretation is very simple: a statute is to be expounded "according to the intent of theta that made it" (Coke, quoted by : Maxwell). But its simplicity is deceptive, for discovering the will of the legislature may not always be a simple matter. As Sutherland has pointed out, even a statute whose language is supposed to be "clear and unambiguous" requires interpretation before it is declared to be so. Difficulties may arise when it is applied to unusual cases or in unusual situations which were not foreseen by the legislature---as the one before me. There is no such thing as a perfectly "clear and unambiguous" statute-that is, one whose meaning is so clear as to need no interpretation in any situation, however unexpected. Moreover, in interpreting a statute the Court has to ascertain the intention not of a living person but a body corporate to whom a "will" to make laws is attributed by fiction. This will is expressed through human agencies in the same manner as that of a natural person--by words. But in human intercourse, for various reasons, words sometimes fail to express the intention of the person who utters them. One reason is that the linguistic capacity to "hit the nail on the head" is not a common virtue. This will is expressed through human agencies in the same manner as that of a natural person--by words. But in human intercourse, for various reasons, words sometimes fail to express the intention of the person who utters them. One reason is that the linguistic capacity to "hit the nail on the head" is not a common virtue. On the contrary, the common failings of human beings while communicating their intention to other are lack of clarity, ambiguity, and the tendency to omit a vital word or use a wrong one. Statutes are drafted and passed by groups of human beings liable to suffer from any or all of these failings. 17. But statutes create rights and obligations which frequently lead to disputes in which one party claims that the legislature "intended" to create a right in its favour and the other denies this claim. In all such disputes the Courts endeavour to find out the true intention of the legislature, and in the process have created an enormous mass of rules under the subject of "interpretation of Statutes." "A good many thousands of pages have been written on the subject of legislative interpretation" Sutherland: Statutory Construction, 3rd Edition, Vol. 2, page 314. The art of judicial interpretation of the written text of the law is of great antiquity. It was developed to a high degree by the jurists of ancient India, who understood the salutary principle that rules of interpretation can be good servants but bad masters. Narada enunciated the principle that if the texts of two Smrities are in conflict that which is consistent with reason supersedes the other. /keZ'kkL= fojks/ks rq ;qfDr ;qDrks fof/k% Le`r%A O;ogkjks fd cyoku~ /keZLrsuk ogh;rsAA Vyavahara Chintamani prescribes, on the authority of Bhavishya Purana, that when Smriti and Artha-Shastra are inconsistent, the former prevails, but when the rules of Smriti are mutually inconsistent, whichever rule is in accordance with equity must prevail Le`R;FkZ;ksa fojks/ks rq vFkZ'kkL=L; ck/kuaA ijLij fojks/ks rq U;k; ;qDra izek.k or~AA Brihaspati goes so far as to condemn a judge who follows the letter of the text without considering its reasonableness, and enjoins that "a decision should not be pronounced by merely relying on the text of the law for such a decision being void of reason leads to injustice. dsoya 'kkL= ekfJR; u dRrZO;ksa fg fu.kZ;%A ;qfDr gksus fopkjs rq /keZ gkfu% iztkirsAA 18. dsoya 'kkL= ekfJR; u dRrZO;ksa fg fu.kZ;%A ;qfDr gksus fopkjs rq /keZ gkfu% iztkirsAA 18. Every rule of interpretation is designed to help the Court to find the true intent of the legislature. Literal construction is the general rule, but it has many exceptions. In Maxwell, illustrations of these exceptions take up several pages and they are numerous enough to give' the impression of the tail wagging the dog. 19. Coming to Sec 1-A of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act the words "airy building or part of a building which was under erection or was constructed," are in passive voice. They do not expressly state by whom the constructions are to be made. Mr. Jagdish Swarup's argument at first sight appears plausible. Learned counsel contended vehemently that it is unjust that a tenant who has constructed an accommodation at his Cost should as a result of this very act, be deprived of all protection against arbitrary eviction or increase in rent. But the question before me is whether the words any building should be given a restricted meaning and whether the legislature intended that Section I-A should apply only to buildings constructed by the landlord. I think not. 20. In my opinion, the use of the passive voice-and the omission to specify the matter of the construction were deliberate. The words "any building" are very wide and indicate that the section is not concerned with the agency which made the construction whether the land lord, or any one else with his consent. If the building was constructed on or after 1st January 1951, the Act will not apply. 21. It must be kept in mind that a building can be lawfully erected on any person's land only with his consent, otherwise the construction will be unauthorised. Ordinarily the construction will be under an agreement with the landlord, and a tenant who makes such an agreement can insist on terms and conditions providing effective safeguards against arbitrary eviction. Hence, no injustice is done to any tenant if the words "any building". are given their. literal meaning. On the other hand the purpose of the amendment is not promoted, and may be impeded, if Section 1-A is confined to constructions made by the landlord. Hence, no injustice is done to any tenant if the words "any building". are given their. literal meaning. On the other hand the purpose of the amendment is not promoted, and may be impeded, if Section 1-A is confined to constructions made by the landlord. of every landlord has ready cash available for a new building, and agreements with prospective tenants for financing constructions are fairly common, and they promote the construction of new buildings. Suppose a new building is constructed by the tenant under an agreement creating a lease on a nominal rent for a fixed period-say 20 years-at the end of which he is to vacate the accommodation. After the tenant who constructed the building vacates it for any reason, the landlord is in possession of a building "constructed after 1st January 1951." Will the next tenancy be controlled by the Act or exempted under Sec, 1-A? Mr. Jagdish Sarup conceded that it would not be fair or just that a tenant who did not construct the building should take advantage of constructions made by a previous tenant? He attempted to get round the difficulty by suggesting that after the words "constructed" in Section 1-A, the words "by the landlord or on his behalf" should be added. But this will not be removing any ambiguity in the section but making a material addition to it. The Court cannot alter a statute under the guise of removing ambiguities. 22. Furthermore if the word "constructed" is interpreted so as to include constructions made with the consent of the landlord, it will include every authorised construction made by the tenant. I have pointed out that whenever a tenant lawfully erects a new building on the landlord's land, he does it with the permission of the landlord. Therefore, in a sense, he erects it on behalf of the landlord, who is responsible to the Municipal and other authorities that the constructions are in accordance with the prescribed rules and regulations. Moreover, though the tenant constructs the building at his costs, he does not erect it gratis, but for valuable consideration-such as the right to occupy the building for a specified period. His rights can be fully protected by a stipulation that he shall not be evicted at the will of the landlord. Moreover, though the tenant constructs the building at his costs, he does not erect it gratis, but for valuable consideration-such as the right to occupy the building for a specified period. His rights can be fully protected by a stipulation that he shall not be evicted at the will of the landlord. Therefore, I see no reason to restrict the scope of Section 1-A and see nothing unjust or unfair in applying it to any building whatsoever, regardless of who constructed it. I am of the opinion that the words, "any building or part of building which was under erection or was constructed on or after the 1st January 1951" were intended to include any building which was constructed on or after this date irrespective of whether it was constructed by the landlord, or the tenant, or any one else with the landlord's permission. Mr. Jagdish Sarup's first argument fails. 23. I shall now consider the second argument of Mr. Jagdish Sarup. He contended that the finding of the appellate Judge that the shop was constructed or reconstructed in 1956 is vitiated because the learned Judge misread important part of the evidence, considered matters which were irrelevant, and ignored those which were relevant. After hearing both counsel at considerable length on this point and reading the entire evidence, oral and documentary, I am of opinion that this objection is well founded. I shall endeavour to point out the errors of the learned appellate Judge while assessing the evidence. The first relates to the testimony of the plaintiff-respondent, Ram Kishan Das. He had deposed that a new shop was constructed in the place of old in the year 1956. But this part of his testimony was hearsay and inadmissible. It is common ground that he purchased the shop in 1957, and he admitted in cross-examination he had no interest in the shop before November or December, 1956, when for the first time he commenced negotiations for its purchase. The repairs and constructions were completed before that. Therefore, the onus was on him to show how he had personal knowledge of the nature and details of repairs made before he became interested in the shop. As he failed to establish this, his entire testimony regarding the details of the repairs and constructions in 1956 was hearsay. The repairs and constructions were completed before that. Therefore, the onus was on him to show how he had personal knowledge of the nature and details of repairs made before he became interested in the shop. As he failed to establish this, his entire testimony regarding the details of the repairs and constructions in 1956 was hearsay. The trial court rejected it, but the learned Civil Judge accepted it on the ground that "it could not be ruled out that the appellant-plaintiff had an opportunity to look out the construction of the foundations and the plynth." This was nothing but speculation in favour of one party based on no evidence. If the lower appellate court accepts the statement of a witness which is prima facie hearsay by assuming on pure speculation that he may have personal knowledge of the facts related by him, its findings is illegal and not binding on the High Court in second appeal. 24. The learned judge committed a similar error in accepting the statement of one Balraj, P. W. 2, who was a servant employed in an adjacent shop till August 1956, but left his service before the repairs and constructions in the shop in dispute began. He attempted to give details of the repairs and constructions and deposed that a new shop had been constructed in 1956. The appellate judge accepted his testimony and rejected the defendant's objection that it was hearsay with the observation, "There is nothing on the record to suggest that the witness had no reasons to go near the shop after August 1956." The learned judge shifted the onus of proof erroneously in my opinion. The record showed that this witness had left his service in the adjacent shops before the repairs began, and therefore, he could not have any knowledge of the details of the constructions. His testimony was inadmissible as hearsay, unless he proved that he had reasons to go near the shop after August 1956 and had knowledge of these details. 25. Then again the Civil Judge accepted the report of the Court Amin who had given his opinion that "the shop appeared to be newly constructed." But the Amin did nor appear before the Court as an expert on the age of buildings and his opinion was inadmissible. 26. 25. Then again the Civil Judge accepted the report of the Court Amin who had given his opinion that "the shop appeared to be newly constructed." But the Amin did nor appear before the Court as an expert on the age of buildings and his opinion was inadmissible. 26. Then again, the learned Judge committed an error while interpreting the meaning of the word 'nau Tamir' (newly constructed) in the sale deed by which the plaintiff purchased the shop in dispute. In the preamble to this document the shop is described thus: "kul dukan pukhta shumal ruyai mai zamin wa diwarat, wa arazi wa tamami hakuq asaishi chhat haai nau tamir dukan haza ka pani barsati hamesha dawam say Mohammad Alam ki dukan per hota huua jata hai." 27. (a pukka built shop with the land appertinent to it and with all rights of easement and the right to discharge water from the roof. The water from the newly built roof of the aforesaid shop alternative meanings "from the roof of the aforesaid newly built shop"). The controversy between the parties centred round the adjective 'nau tamir'. Was it to be read "chhat nau tamir" or "nau tamir dukan" that is, did it mean "new roof of the shop," or "roof of the new shop"? The trial court was of the opinion that the word "Nau tainir" described the roof and' not the shop. The learned judge disagreed and thought that it applied to the shop. But in coming to this conclusion he observed: "The stand of the respondent-defdt. was contradicted by his own admissions on record. It was admitted by him that the flooring and one pillar of the shop in suit were reconstruction (sic reconstruced). Apart from it the other fittings and the door were also new. Why at all the word 'newly constructed' should be held as applied to the roof when there were other new constructions was not explained by the respondent defendant. To my mind the word 'Nautamir' applied to the shop transferred through the sale deed ex. 11 and not to its roof only." The learned judge made a wrong approach to the problem of ascertaining the meaning of an ambiguous word. Whether 'Nautamir' described the roof or the shop depended on the intention of the person who had executed the document and used the word 'nautamir'. 11 and not to its roof only." The learned judge made a wrong approach to the problem of ascertaining the meaning of an ambiguous word. Whether 'Nautamir' described the roof or the shop depended on the intention of the person who had executed the document and used the word 'nautamir'. The best person to explain any ambiguity in a document is its author, if he is available. The Court should consider his explanation in the first place and decide whether it can be accepted. But if it gives its own interpretation without even applying its mind to his explanation, its finding is vitiated by a vital error. In this case, the sale deed Ex, 11 was executed by the previous owner, Azizuddin. He deposed that by the word 'Nautamir' he meant 'new roof' and not 'new shop'. But the learned appellate judge gave his own interpretation without even considering Azizuddin's explanation. Therefore its finding that 'nautamir' described the shop is vitiated, and can be reversed in second appeal. 28. Another serious error was the misreading of the evidence by the appellate judge. One of the plaintiffs witnesses was Kishan Lal, P W. 3, who was previously a tenant of the adjacent shop X. Ile deposed that after he had left, shop 'Y' was reconstructed. The learned judge believed this witness because, to quote his own words, "lie was related to the defendant," implying that as a relation of the defendant, he had no motive for siding with the plaintiff. I regret that the learnned judge wrongly described this witness as "related to the defendant," and this error was due to a misreading of a single sentence in his testimony. The witness had stated, "meri muddaleh se kuch rishtadari nahin hai" (I have no relationship with the defendant), but the learned.judge did not notice the word 'nahin' and thought that the witness had stated that he was related to the defendant. 29. Similarly the learned judge misread the evidence of another witness, A. P. Agarwal, D. W. 1, an engineer who gave evidence for the defendant. He had inspected the shop and stated that "it did not look new when viewed from outside" ("bahir se dekline se dukan nizai payee nahin malum hoti hai"). 29. Similarly the learned judge misread the evidence of another witness, A. P. Agarwal, D. W. 1, an engineer who gave evidence for the defendant. He had inspected the shop and stated that "it did not look new when viewed from outside" ("bahir se dekline se dukan nizai payee nahin malum hoti hai"). The learned judge ignored the word nahin, and observed, "At the top of it was the admission of Sri A. P. Agarwal, the own witness of the defendant that the shop looked new by appearance." 30. The learned judge also misread the inspection note of the trial court when he observed "Further, the report of the learned Munsif after local inspection dated 11-7-58 on the English Notes also indicated that the shop was a new construction." I have read the inspection note of the Munsif and found no such observation in it. He had described the condition of the various portions of the shop and given his opinion that some of them appeared new. This had no significance as it is common ground t ha extensive repairs had been done to the shop in 1956. But the Munsif nowhere observed that, "the shop was a new construction." The learned judge should not have been so careless in his reading of the evidence on the record. 31. If a finding of fact by the lower appellate Court is based on a misreading of evidence, or' consideration of irrelevant evidence, or on speculations in favour of one party based on no evidence, it is not binding on the High Court in second appeal. The finding of the learned judge suffers from all these defects, and must be set aside. 32. Furthermore, if a wrong finding relates to a jurisdictional fact-that is a fact on which depends the jurisdiction, or lack of jurisdiction, of the Court to entertain the suit, the High Court can interfere even in second appeal, for no Court can usurp jurisdiction or refuse to exercise jurisdiction by giving a wrong verdict on facts. Chaube Jagdish Prasad v. Ganga Prasad Chaturvedi, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 492. Chaube Jagdish Prasad v. Ganga Prasad Chaturvedi, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 492. In Khiya Ram v. Prabha Devi, S.A. No. 2239 of 1959, I held in a suit for ejectment that the finding that the accommodation was constructed after 1st January, 1951 is a finding on a jurisdictional fact, and the party aggrieved by it is entitled to show that the lower Court usurped a jurisdiction on the basis of an erroneous finding. That was a case in which the landlord alleged that he had demolished the old building and constructed a new one on its place, while the tenant asserted that the landlord had merely repaired the old house. On the evidence it was held by the High Court that the accommodation was constructed as a new building in 1952 and therefore the U. P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act did not apply and the suit was competent without the permission of the District Magistrate. The principle enunciated in that case will apply to the one before me. 33. For the reasons given above, I set aside the finding of the lower appellate Court that a new shop was constructed in 1956. 34. The next question is whether I should remand the case for a fresh finding or decide it myself. I do not think that a remand will be in the interests of justice. The suit for ejectment was filed in 1957 and this appeal in 1959, and a remand will prolong the delay. Moreover, the entire evidence has been read out before me. I therefore asked both counsel to address the Court on the question whether the shop was reconstructed as a new building in 1956. After hearing them at considerable length, I am of the view that no new shop was constructed in 1956. 35. This is not a case of new building but an old one repaired and reconstructed on an extensive scale. The landlord claims that after the reconstruction it should be regarded as a building "constructed after 1st January 19-51", as contemplated under Section 1-A, and therefore not subject to the provisions of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act. In such cases it is neither possible nor desirable to enunciate any rigid formula for determining whether as a result of the reconstruction the. building must be regarded as a new building. In such cases it is neither possible nor desirable to enunciate any rigid formula for determining whether as a result of the reconstruction the. building must be regarded as a new building. The question is one of fact to be decided according to the circumstances of each case. But the Court should not, as the lower appellate Court appears to have done, count the different parts of the building which have been repaired or reconstructed and add up the total as a new construction. This is a wrong approach like mistaking the individual trees for the wood. I may state, as a working principle, that ordinarily repairs however extensive will not result in a new construction. Darrgah Khwaja Sahib v. Ram Gopal Mehra, A.I.R. 1953 Ajm. 54, Badri Das v. R.S. Singh Civil Rev. No. 756 of 1933, decided on 11-12-1957. In the present case the previous owner who permitted the appellant to make the constructions deposed that the old shop had been repaired but no new shop constructed. There is no reason why he should not have told the truth. He is corroborated by the engineer C. P. Agarwala D. W. 1, who inspected the building and deposed that the foundations, the plynth, and the southern wall up to a height of ten feet were old. I have been impressed with his testimony. The sale deed Exhibit 11 described the shop as purkhta but not as newly instructed. The word nautamir describes, in my opinion, the roof and not the shop. In Urdu idiom e adjective follows the verb, and therefore the word nautamir in chhat hain nautamir dukan haza describes chhat hai which precedes it, just as haza qualifies dukan. 36. If the landlord claims that his accommodation, though situate in an area which is governed by the Control of Rent and Eviction Act, is exempt from the provisions of the Act by virtue of Section I-A, the onus is on him to establish the facts which would make the Act inapplicable. this case the shop is situate in the of Bareilly to which the Act applies. Therefore the plaintiff in order to claim exemption under Section-A had to prove that the shop was constructed after 1st January 1951. In my opinion, he has not established this fact. this case the shop is situate in the of Bareilly to which the Act applies. Therefore the plaintiff in order to claim exemption under Section-A had to prove that the shop was constructed after 1st January 1951. In my opinion, he has not established this fact. Therefore the accommodation is governed by the Act and no suit for the ejectment of the tenant could have been filed without the permission of the District Magistrate except on grounds specified in Section 3 of the Act. It is admitted fiat no such permission was obtain and no such ground exists. The plaintiff's suit for ejectment must fail. 37. This appeal be allowed, the decide of the lower appellate Court set side and the plaintiff-respondent's suit for ejectment dismissed with costs throughout. 38. The connected Appeal (S. A. No. 2913 of 1962) is from the decree for a permanent injunction restraining the appellant from interfering with the landlord's construction of the wall which had been pulled down by the appellant for the purpose of converting the two shops into a single shop. The trial court held that the appellant had obtained the permission of the then landlord before puling clown the dividing wall and the present landlord was bound by the act of his predecessor; accordingly it dismissed the suit. But the appellate judge held that the appellant had not proved that he had obtained any permission from the landlord, and he allowed the plaintiff's appeal and decreed the suit. Mr. Anibika Prasad stated that if the suit for ejectment is dismissed, he would not seriously press the suit for injunction. In my opinion, the finding of the appellate judge that the appellant had not established that he had obtained the permission of the landlord before removing the dividing wall is erroneous. The landlord who owned the shop at the time testified that he had permitted the appellant to remove the dividing wall and make such other constructions at his own cost as he desired. The learned judge did not apply his mind to this evidence, for there is not a word about it in his judgment. If the lower appellate court ignores an important piece of evidence, its finding on a question of fact is illegal. In my opinion, the trial court rightly believed the testimony of Aziz Uddin, the previous landlord. The learned judge did not apply his mind to this evidence, for there is not a word about it in his judgment. If the lower appellate court ignores an important piece of evidence, its finding on a question of fact is illegal. In my opinion, the trial court rightly believed the testimony of Aziz Uddin, the previous landlord. This appeal must be allowed and the suit for injunction dismissed with costs throughout. 39. The formal orders allowing both these appeals,were passed immediately after the conclusion of the hearing of the appeals. This judgment gives,the reasons for that decision.