JUDGMENT N.U. Beg,J. - The petitioner in this writ petition was an assessee under the U. P. Large Land Holdings Tax Act. The proceedings of assessment which have culminated in the present writ petition relate to the year 1366 Fasli. The case of the petitioner before the Assessing Authority was that his holding was separate from that of his sons and grand-sons. This case was accepted by the Assessing. Authority in respect of the previous year, i.e. 1365 Fasli. It was, however, rejected by the Assessing Authority in respect of 1366 Fasli by its order dated the 29th of April, 1959. (Learned counsel for the petitioner states that the date "19-4-1959" given in the relief clause (a) is a mistake for "29-4-1959" which is the correct date as indicated by Annexure 2). The petitioner appealed against the order of the Assessing Authority to the Commissioner. The main ground of appeal by the petitioner was that the Assessing Authority had no jurisdiction to make inquiry behind the back of the petitioner without giving any notice of the same to the petitioner. The appeal of the petitioner was fixed for hearing before the Commissioner on the 16th of October, 1959. It appears that on that date the petitioner's counsel could not reach the Court. The Commissioner could, therefore, have dismissed the appeal on that date for default. He did not do so. When, however, the pairokar of the petitioner reached the Court he was informed that the appeal had already been dismissed in default. The petitioner, accordingly, put in an application for restoration on the 17th of October, 1959. This application was dismissed by the Commissioner on the ground that there was no sufficient reason for restoration. In fact there was no question of restoration on that date as the appeal was still pending and had not been dismissed. The appeal itself was not dismissed by the Commissioner until the 21st of October, 1959. On that date the Commissioner dismissed the appeal on merits holding that the grounds of appeal have no force. If the Commissioner wanted to dispose of the appeal on merits he should have dealt with the main point raised by the petitioner in appeal viz, that the Assessing Authority had no jurisdiction to institute inquiries into the matter behind his back. The Commissioner further ordered that the appeal was dismissed in default. If the Commissioner wanted to dispose of the appeal on merits he should have dealt with the main point raised by the petitioner in appeal viz, that the Assessing Authority had no jurisdiction to institute inquiries into the matter behind his back. The Commissioner further ordered that the appeal was dismissed in default. In fact the petitioner had put in appearance before the dismissal of the appeal. The Commissioner should, therefore, have heard him before disposing of the same. Subsequently the petitioner filed a revision application before the Board. In the revision application again the petitioner took up the plea that the order of the Assessing Authority was bad in law on the ground that the Assessing Authority had no jurisdiction to make personal inquiries without issuing notice to the petitioner. The petitioner also challenged the validity of the proceedings before the Commissioner. The Board also did not deal with the merits of the petitioner's plea which related to the importation of evidence based on personal inquiry made by the Assessing Authority, although this point was argued before it by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. When this application came up for hearing on an earlier date, I called for an affidavit on that point from the counsel who appeared before the Board. That affidavit has now been filed and there is no counter-affidavit on behalf of the opposite-parties controverting the allegation made by the counsel in the said affidavit to the effect that the case was fully argued before the Board on merits. The learned counsel has also specified in the affidavit cases which were referred to by him before the Board. The Board dismissed the revision application by its order dated the 16th of October, 1961. In this order again the Board did not deal with the main point raised by the petitioner, namely that the Assessing Authority had no jurisdiction to rely on the information obtained by her on personal inquiries made behind his back. Thereafter the petitioner filed the present writ petition seeking to quash the order of the Assessing Authority dated the 29th of April, 1959, the order of the Commissioner dated the 21st of October, 1959 and I the order of the Board dated the 16th of October, 1961. 2. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner I am of the opinion that this petition should be allowed. 2. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner I am of the opinion that this petition should be allowed. So far as the order of the Assessing Authority is concerned learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to the contents of the order itself. The order shows that the Assessing Authority did make local inquiries into the matter behind the back of the petitioner. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the opposite-party it is admitted that the arguments were heard by the Assessing Authority on the 25th of February, 1959, and thereafter the case was fixed for orders on the 4th of March, 1959. On the 4th of March the Assessing Authority, instead of passing the final order, re-opened the case on merits by making up her mind to institute personal inquiries into the case by going on the spot. On behalf of the opposite-parties it is argued that the petitioner was not present on the 4th of March, 1959, and hence the Assessing Authority was justified in importing fresh evidence into the case by making personal inquiries without notice to the petitioner. I am unable to accept this argument. The case was fixed on the 4th of March, 1959, for passing orders. There is a provision in Section 10 of the U. P. Large Land Holdings Tax Act directing that a copy of the order of assessment should be sent to the petitioner along with the notice of demand. In this situation the petitioner was not bound to attend the Court on the 4th of March, 1959. That was not the date fixed for evidence in the case. The arguments in the case had already been closed on the 25th of February, 1959. The Court, therefore, had no jurisdiction to import fresh evidence into the case without issuing notice of it to the petitioner. The conduct of the Assessing Authority, therefore, in this regard constitutes a breach of the principles of natural justice and the order of the Assessing Authority is, on the face of it, ultra vires, null and void for that reason. It must, therefore, be quashed. The order of the Commissioner also is bad in law as he has not dealt with this point at all although it was taken in the grounds of appeal. The order of the Board also is illegal for the same reason. It must, therefore, be quashed. The order of the Commissioner also is bad in law as he has not dealt with this point at all although it was taken in the grounds of appeal. The order of the Board also is illegal for the same reason. In fact before the Board the learned counsel for the petitioner had appeared and argued this matter. In spite of it the Board did not deal with it in its order. The orders of all the three authorities are, therefore, bad in law and deserve to be quashed. 3. On behalf of the opposite party the learned counsel has argued that the order of the lower authorities subsequently merged in the order of the Board and therefore the only order that can now be quashed is the order of the Board of Revenue and not the orders of the two lower authorities. If all the three orders passed by the three authorities are bad in law I find it difficult,to understand how the merger of the one in the other can restrict the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash all of them. In issuing a writ of certiorari it is well known that the High Court is entitled to summon the entire record for the purpose of examining the regularity or legality of the proceedings in the case as a whole. The jurisdiction exercised by the High Court in writ proceedings is quite different from the jurisdiction of a Court acting as an appellate or a revisional Court. Learned counsel for the opposite party has been unable to cite any case in support, of his contention. 4. I accordingly allow this writ petition and quash the orders of the Assessing Authority dated the 29th of April, 1959, the order of the Commissioner dated the 21st of October, 1959 and the order of the Board of Revenue dated the 16th of October, 1961 with the result that the assessment proceedings shall be deemed to be pending before the Assessing Authority which shall dispose of it according to law. The petitioner will be entitled to his costs.