JUDGMENT T.C. Raghavan, J. 1. These Original Petitions are by the Revenue under section 66 (2) of the Indian Income Tax Act of Commissioner of 1922 for directing the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras to refer the following question, claimed to be a question of law, to this Court: "Whether the Appellate Tribunal was correct in holding that the value of the perquisite as fixed in previous assessments together with Rs. 600 added represented the fair rental value of the building occupied by the assessee and as such the value of the perquisite as contemplated in rule 24-A of the Income-tax Rules." 2. All the ten cases involved the same question with the only difference that the amount to be added in some cases is Rs. 600 and in others Rs. 1,000. The Tribunal rejected the applications of the revenue under section 66 (1) as the question involved, in the opinion of the tribunal, was only a question of fact, because it involved essentially the estimating of the value of the rent-free quarters on the materials before it. The assessees are employees of plantations on the hills of the Western Ghats ; and they are provided rent-free furnished quarters, hire-free furniture, free electricity, etc., by the employers. Until 1951-52 the annual rental values of the building occupied by the Managers were fixed at Rs. 420 and of the buildings occupied by the Assistant Managers at Rs. 180. In 1952, after some correspondence between the revenue and the Planters' Association, the rental values were raised. Again, in 1954 there were further discussions; and the annual rental values were fixed at Rs. 600 and Rs. 492 respectively. Assessment thereafter proceeded on that basis until disputes arose in these cases for the accounting years ending 31st March 1959 and 31st March I960. The Income-tax Officer felt that these estimates of the annual rental values were too low, and therefore, he assessed the rental values at higher figures. On appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner raised the values still further. On further appeal by the assessees, the Appellate Tribunal held that there was no reason for enhancing the rental values of the buildings: but, it held that the extent of the furniture was not taken into account in arriving at the rental values in 1954, and therefore, such values of the furniture should also be considered. On further appeal by the assessees, the Appellate Tribunal held that there was no reason for enhancing the rental values of the buildings: but, it held that the extent of the furniture was not taken into account in arriving at the rental values in 1954, and therefore, such values of the furniture should also be considered. Finally, taking into consideration this factor as well, the Tribunal held that the figures should be increased by Rs. 1,000 and Rs. 600 respectively. The question for us to consider is whether there is any question of law to be referred for decision by this Court arising out of these orders. 3. Regarding the powers under section 66 (1) and (2) there cannot be any doubt. Only questions of law arising out of the order of the Tribunal can be referred to this Court. What is a question of law is also not open to doubt. The Supreme Court has held in Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd., Madurai v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras 31 I.T.R. 28 that (1) when the point for determination is a pure question of law such as the construction of a statute or a document of title, the decision of the Tribunal is open to . reference; (2) when the point for determination is a mixed question of law and fact, the finding of the Tribunal on the facts found is final, but its decision as to the legal effect of those findings is a question of law (3) a finding on a question of fact is open to attack as erroneous in law, when there is no evidence to support it or if it is perverse and (4) when the finding is one of fact, the fact that it is itself an inference from other basic facts will not alter its character as one of fact. This decision has been followed by the Supreme Court in the recent decision in Commissioner of Income-tax (Central), Calcutta v. Daulatram Rawatmull 53 I.T.R. 574. Again, the Supreme Court has indicated the meaning of the expression 'arising out of the order of the Tribunal' in Kale Khan Mohammed Hanif v. Commissioner of Incometax, Madhya Pradesh and Bhopal 50 I.T.R. 1. This decision has been followed by the Supreme Court in the recent decision in Commissioner of Income-tax (Central), Calcutta v. Daulatram Rawatmull 53 I.T.R. 574. Again, the Supreme Court has indicated the meaning of the expression 'arising out of the order of the Tribunal' in Kale Khan Mohammed Hanif v. Commissioner of Incometax, Madhya Pradesh and Bhopal 50 I.T.R. 1. Their Lordships have held that on questions of fact the Tribunal is the final authority, and such questions cannot be referred to a High Court; that if the inference made by the Tribunal is one of law, the question whether the inference could in law be drawn may be referred; that if the inference is one of fact, no question with regard to it can be referred; and that if the question is whether the inference drawn by the Tribunal is one of law or of fact, the question is one which does not arise out of the decision of the Tribunal. 4. In these cases, the claim tor enhancement or the rental values is made under r. 24-A of the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922. The said rule, as far as is relevant for the cases before us, provides in sub-rule (1) (a) that the value of rent-free residential accommodation shall ordinarily be estimated at a sum equal to 12.5 per cent of the salary due to the assessee. Sub-clause (i) then adds a proviso that where the fair rental value of the accommodation is in excess of 25 per cent of the employees salary, the value of the perquisite shall be taken to be 12.5 per cent of the salary increased by a sum equal to the amount by which the fair rental value exceeds 25 per cent of the salary, provided that the Income-tax Officer may, having in view the nature of the accommodation, determine the sum by which the 12.5 per cent of the salary is to be increased as a percentage (not exceeding 100 per cent) of the amount by which the fair rental value exceeds 25 per cent of the salary. Sub-clause (ii) provides that where the assessee claims, and the Income-tax Officer is satisfied, that the sum arrived at under clause (a) exceeds the fair rental value of the accommodation, the value of the perquisite shall be limited to such fair rental value. Sub-clause (ii) provides that where the assessee claims, and the Income-tax Officer is satisfied, that the sum arrived at under clause (a) exceeds the fair rental value of the accommodation, the value of the perquisite shall be limited to such fair rental value. There is an Explanation to this sub-rule and we are concerned only with clause (1) (ii) thereof, which lays down that where the accommodation is furnished, the fair rental value of the accommodation should be its rental value as if it were not furnished plus the fair rent for the furniture calculated at 10 per cent per annum on the original cost of the furniture, or if the furniture is hired from a third party, the actual hire charges payable therefor. This clause also provides that where the accommodation is not furnished, the rent which similar accommodation would realise in the same locality or the municipal valuation in respect of the accommodation, whichever is higher, should be the fair rental value. 5. From these provisions of r. 24-A it is clear that ordinarily the value of rent-free furnished accommodation shall be calculated at 12.5 per cent of the salary; but if the fair rental value of the accommodation is less than the 12.5 per cent, and if the Income-tax Officer is satisfied about it, the value of the accommodation shall be limited to such fair rental value. If the fair rental value is in excess of 25 per cent of the salary, then the value of the accommodation shall be 12.5 per cent of the salary increased by a sum equal to the amount by which the fair rental value exceeds 25 per cent of the salary. In this last case, the Income-tax Officer is given a discretion to add the entire amount by which the fair rental value exceeds 25 per cent of the salary or only a portion thereof depending upon the nature of the accommodation provided. 6. As we have already pointed out, there cannot be any dispute regarding the above interpretation of r. 24-A in these cases. What is really in dispute is as to what should be the rental values of the furnished buildings allotted to the assessees whether the values should be the amounts claimed by the Revenue or the amounts fixed by the Tribunal. What is really in dispute is as to what should be the rental values of the furnished buildings allotted to the assessees whether the values should be the amounts claimed by the Revenue or the amounts fixed by the Tribunal. This is essentially a question of fact; and can, at the most, be only an inference to be drawn from the materials available to the Tribunal. This is not an inference of law, but is only an inference of fact from facts. 7. We may point out another circumstance. Under clause (1) (ii) of the Explanation, the rental value of the accommodation has to be fixed with reference to the rent which similar accommodation would realise in the same locality, or the municipal valuation in respect of the accommodation. In the cases before us, both such data are not available and the rental values have perforce to be fixed on other materials. Such fixation of the fair rental values was done in 1954 after considerable investigation and correspondence; and the Tribunal has enhanced those figures after considering the extent and the list of the furniture provided to the assessee. This cannot be said to be based on any inference of law ; nor can it be said that there is no evidence to support it or it is perverse. 8. We may, in conclusion, refer to the Division Bench decision of the Madras High Court in The Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. Mr. R. E. Maclaine Clarke T.C.P. Nos.16 and 17 of 1964, wherein a similar question (though not framed exactly in the same form) was sought to be brought up to the High Court under section 66 (2). The High Court rejected the applications holding that the question was only a question of fact. From the foregoing discussion it clearly emerges that the question posed is only a question of fact, which cannot be directed to be referred to this Court under section 66 (2). The petitions are therefore dismissed. However, we pass no orders regarding costs.