KHACHERU RAM v. DISTRIC MAGISTRATE — 1965 DIGILAW 21 (DEL)

Gurdev Singh, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner Khacheru R am is being detained in the Central Jail, Tehar (New Delhi) in the custody of respondent No. 2, the Superintendent of that under the orders of the District Magistrate, Delhi (respondent No. 1) purporting to have been made under rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, on 23rd September, 1964. He has now approched this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code seeking a writ in the nature of habeas corpus on the plea that the order of his) detention is illegal and mala fide. In support of the latter contention it is asserted that no activity of the petitioner attracts applicability of rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, and the order of his detention was passed by the District Magistrate on extraneous consideration arising from the fact that the petitioner had the misfortune of having been previously pros cuted for several criminal offences, in most of which he was acquitted by the Courts concerned. ( 2 ) THE order of the petitioner s detention is in the usual cyclosty- led form in which the District Magistrate has stated from the information received he is satisfied that it is necessary to detain the petitioner Khacheru Ram "with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of Public order. " In this order there is no reference to the petitioner s activities on the basis of which the District Magistrate had come to the conclusion that it was necessary to detain him, but in the affidavit filed by him by way of return in these proceedings it is brought out that since the year 1946 the petitioner had been leading a life of crime and was prosecuted in Do less than 24 cases for various offences; including those under sections 308, 397, 302, 457 of the Indian Penal Code, and proceeded against under section 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Though in his original affidavit furnished by the District Magistrate on 6th Feburary, 1965, he had not indicated the result of the various cases in which the petitioner was prosecued, the further affidavits filed on 15th February and 18th February 1 65, make it clear that the petitioner was acquitted or discharged in 19c ses, and his conviction was recorded only in five cases. His earliest co vi tion was on 15th July 1946 under section 308 of the Indian Penal acode when he was sentenced to three months rigorous imprisonment. Tnhere- after he was convicted in two cases under the Arms Act in the year 1950 and 1953, and the year 1954 he was further colivicted under section 394 of the Indian Penal Code. On 13th November, 1961, be was convicted along with some others onder sections 147, 148/149 of the Indian Penal Code, and his last conviction was recorded on 18th December, 1960, under the Madras Habitual Offenders Act. 1948, when he was sentenced to three months rigorous imprisonment by the Sub- Divisional Magistrate, Delhi, Thereafter be was bound down on 31st January, 1963, under section 110 of the Criminal Procedure Code. " ( 3 ) IT is on the basis of this history of the petitioner s criminal prosecutions that the District Magistrate Claims to have been satisfied that it was necessary to detain him with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to maintenance of Public order, and he has attempted to defend the impugned order with the following assertion in para No. 12 of his affidavit, dated 4th March, J 965 :- "the petitioner, as is clear, is dangerous and desperate character, and although he has been convicted in a number of cases, his being at large is hazardous to community, and his criminal activities are prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order. " Shri Sher Narain, appearing for the petitioner, besides complaining that the impugned order of detention was made by the District Magis- trate with the ulterior object of punishing him for the offences of which (he petitioner had been previously acquitted after due trial by different Courts of law, has urged :- (1) That cases in which the petitioner was acquitted could not be considered as furnishing any basis for an order of detention under rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules as the presumption of innocence, which attaches to every individual unless he is proved to be guilty, stood reinforced by his acquittal after due trial, and (2) That none of the offices for which the petitioner was convicted in the five cases referred to above has any rational connection with the objects of rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules and his past activities having reference to those offences could thus furnish no ground for an order of his detention under the said rule. Accordingly he argues the District Magistrate having acted beyond the ambit of the provisions of the said rule, his order was mala fide in law even if he was not actuated by malice against the petitioner in making that order. ( 4 ) IN support of the later contention, Mr. Sher Narain, besides referring to the decision of Grover J. in Ravinder Kumar v. District Magistate and of Bedi J in Criminal Writ No. 79-D of 1964 Shanti Devi v. The District Magistate"-, decided on 10th November, 1964, has relied strongly on the recent Division Bench decision of this Court in Criminal Writ No. 94-D of 1964 Shanti Devi v. Shri S. G. Bose Mullick and another3, dated 20th January, 1965 ). In that case the learned Chief Justice, with whom Mehar Singh J concurred, after going into the meaning of the expression "public order" approved of the observations of Grover J in Ravinder Kumar v. The State1 (supra) wherein it has been ruled that merely because a person is a dangrous character or is breaking the law in one manner or the other it does not mean that maintenance of public order is being threa. ened unless the activities are of such a nature and the situation prevailing in a particular part of the country is such that if he is not detained the maintenance of the public order cannot be maintained. Grover J had further observed in that case :- "if ths local police is helpless in securing the convicton successfully with regard to a person who is committing thefts and is indulging in gambling, drinking, assaults etc. , it does not mean that resort can be had to the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act in normal conditions unless some special circumstances exist which show that the maintenance of tranquility in the community would be prejudiced or endangered unless that person is detained. " The learned Chief Justice after due consideration of the matter - expressed himself in these words :- "if the idea of public order is thus linked with public safety, it is obvious that something more is needed to justify detention on this ground under the Defence of India Rules than the activities of a petty criminal working on his own. and it is a misuse of rule 30 to detain such a petty criminal merely because the police are lable or linwiiling to proceed against him for the crimes he is alleged io be committing under due process of Jaw. " ( 5 ) TIS is direct authority on the point, and Shri Dilbagh Rai Sethi, who appears for the State, concedes that it certainly supports the petitioner s contention and may invalidate the impugned order of his detention. He has, however, urged that the expression "public order" for the maintenance of which the inrugned order was made by the District Magistrate has been too narrowly constined by their Lordships, and the effect of the amendment of Article 19 (2) of the Constitution. (First Amendr ent) Act has been ignored. He has also drawn my attention to an earlier derision of another Division Bench of this Court (Dulat and Capoor, JJ. in Harivnsh v. The Superintendent Jai *. Cr. Writ. (First Amendr ent) Act has been ignored. He has also drawn my attention to an earlier derision of another Division Bench of this Court (Dulat and Capoor, JJ. in Harivnsh v. The Superintendent Jai *. Cr. Writ. No. 1o-D of 1963, dated 9th December, 963) where an order ofdetention based on the past criminal activities of a person, for some of which he was convicted on various charges under the Indian Penal Code and other Acts was upheld, and the contention that the criminal acts of the detenus relating to commission of offences against certain individuals were utterly irrelevant to the maintenance of public order was rejected. On reference to this earlier decision of Dulat and Capoor JJ, I find that the allegations before their Lordships were. "the detenue has taken to crime as a career and has been living on boot legging and extortion of money from law-abiding citizens. His criminal history dates back to the year 1951 and his activities have since then continued unabated. Through his persistent criminal acts. Sham Lal established that his remaining at large would be highly prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. " Capoor J with whom * Dulat J concurred, repelled the contention that the activity of a certain individual could not be a menace to public order, and after referring "to the "observations *" Patanjali Sastri J in Romesh Thappar v. The State" of Madras* regarding the meaning to be attached to the expression "public order" held that the concept of public order is certainly not re str a large number of individuals. Thereafter the learned Judge observed :- "the suggestion, therefore, that a person, who has adopted crime as a carrer or goes about extorting money from people is not engaged in any activity prejudicial to public order, seems to ire futile for he certainly disturbs the State of tranquility prevailing in the society as*a result of internal regulations. Muchless can it be seriously"maintained that a consideration of such activities is utterly irrelevant to the satisfaction of the detaining authority. It seems on the other hand. perfectly relevant to the matter. The further question whether such grounds were sufficient for the satisfaction of the detaining authority is, of course, not for us to determine. Muchless can it be seriously"maintained that a consideration of such activities is utterly irrelevant to the satisfaction of the detaining authority. It seems on the other hand. perfectly relevant to the matter. The further question whether such grounds were sufficient for the satisfaction of the detaining authority is, of course, not for us to determine. " ( 6 ) IT may be noted here that the judgment of Patanjali Sastri J. in Romesh trappar s cose on which Capoor J based his conclusions was also noticed by Falshaw C. J in the later Division Bench case of Shantidevi;criminal Writ No. 94-D of 1965 (Sup order" held) but the learned Chief Justice while dealing with the expression "public that the public order is linked with public safety. The validity of the contention raised or; behalf of the petitioner that the order of his deten- tion is mala fi e in law turns upon the interpretations of the expression "public order" Apart from Romesh Thappar s case, to which reference has already been made and on which bo h the Divisions Benche of this Court have drawn insupport of their respective opinions, this expression came up for consideration before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in several other cases, some of which are Brij bhushan and another v. The State of India State cf Bihar v. Shrimati Shai ahala Deli" Sodhi Shamsher Singh and others v. The State of Pepsu and other and the Superiniendent Central Prison Faiehgarh and another v. Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiu. In the first three cases the expression public order" was interpreted with reference to Article 19 of the constitution, while in A. 1. R. 1960 SC. 633 their Lordships took into account the effect of the first Amendment of Articles 19 (2) effected in the year 1951. After considering he various cases and the position as amerged after the amendment of Article 19 (2) of the Constitution, Subba Rao J" speaking for the Count observed as follows :- "in India under Article 19 (1) this wide concept of public order is split up under different heads. After considering he various cases and the position as amerged after the amendment of Article 19 (2) of the Constitution, Subba Rao J" speaking for the Count observed as follows :- "in India under Article 19 (1) this wide concept of public order is split up under different heads. It enables the imposition of reason- able restrictions on the exercise of the right to fieedom of speech and expression in the interests of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to an offence. All the grounds mentioned thereon can be brought under the general head public order in its most comprehensive so. But the juxta position of the different grounds indicates that though sometimes they tend to overlap, they must be oridinarily intended to exclude each other. Public order is, therefore, something which is demarcated from the other. In that limited sense particularly in view of the history of the Amendment, it can be postulated that public order is symonymous with public peace, safety and tranquility. " In summing up the discussion, the learned Judge later said : - Public order is synonymous with public safety and tranquility it is the absence of disorder involving breaches of local significance in contradiction to national upheavals, such as revolution, civil strife, war affecting the security of the State. " None of these decisions appears to have been cited before any of the two Division Benches in the cases referred to earlier. Supporting the view taken by Capoor and Dulat JJ in Harivansh s case (supra lear- ned counsel for the State relied upon the recent case of Rameshwar Shaw v. district Magistrate Burdwan and others where dealing with acase of detention under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, it was ruled that in deciding the question as to wheather it is necessary to detain a person the authority has to be satisfied that if the said person is not detained he may act in a prejudicial manner, and this conclusion can be reasonably urged by the authority in the light of the evidence about the past pre- judicial activities of the said person. The learned Chief Justice speaking for the Court, however, held out a warning and observed :- "in this connection it is, however, necessary to bear in mind that the past conduct or antecedent history of the person on which the authority purports to act, should ordinarily be proximate in point of time and should have a rational connection with the conclusion that the detention of the person is necessary. It would, for instance, be irrational to take into account the conduct of the person which took place ten years before the date of his detention and say that even though after the said incident took place nothing is known against the person indicting his tendency to act in a prejudicial manner, even so the strength of the said incident which is ten years old, the authority is satisfied what his detention is necessary. " Proceeding further his Lordship said :- "in other words, where an authority is acting bona fide and con- sidering the question as to whether a person should be detained, he would naturally expcet that evidence on which the said conclusion is "" ultimately going to rest must be evidence of his past conduct or antecedent history which reasonably and rationally justifies the concl- usion that if the said person is not detained he may indulge inpre- judicial activities. We ought to add that it is both inexpedient and undesirable to lay down any inflexible test. The question about the validity of the satisfaction of the authority will have to be considered on the facts of each case. The detention of a person without a trial is a very serious encroachment on his personal freedom, and so, at very stage, all questions in relation to the said detention must be (. are- fully and solemnly considered. " From this it is apparent that as an abstract proposition of law the past activity of a person cannot bo ruled out while considering whether his. are- fully and solemnly considered. " From this it is apparent that as an abstract proposition of law the past activity of a person cannot bo ruled out while considering whether his. detention should or should not be ordered under rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, but at the same time his activity must be recent and of such a character as would have some rational connection with the object for which his detention is being -ordered in shanti devi s case the learned Judges of the Division Bench held that conviction of a person for pretty offences under the Excise Act, Opium Act, or conviction ** for hurt etc. , did not have any rational connection with the maintenance of public order. Their Lordships were obviously of the view that it is not each and every offence the commission of which leads to the conclusion that the person concerned is a menace to public peace or order and there must be some proximate connection between his activity and public order. In this context, stress is laid on the word "public" and breaches of peace of purely local character or concerning an individual are not in any way connected with the maintenancs of public order and cannot be taken into account. In the earlier Division Bench case, the other two learned Judges took up a different view and held that even breaches of local character were included in the term "public order", which was wide enough to cover them and in some cases even a person who is suspected of smuggling can be detained under the Defence of India Rules or the Preventive Detention Act in order to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. A different view so far as the activities of a smuggler are concerned was, however taken by another Division Bench of this Court (Falshaw and Soni JJ) in Bakhtawar Singh v. The State Fashaw J (as he then was), while delivering the Judgment of the Court observed : - "it is difficult to see any connection whatever between smuggling. which is essentially a secret operation, and the maintenance of public order, in which the operative world is public . " Proceeding further, his. which is essentially a secret operation, and the maintenance of public order, in which the operative world is public . " Proceeding further, his. Lordship said : - "in order to justify orders of detention on the ground of smuggling alone, it was necessary not only to allege that through the smuggling the economy of (his country has been. adversely affected, but also to point to some facts from which such an inference could be drawn. " ( 7 ) IN Vimlabai Deshpande v. Emperor^ a Division Een"h of Nagpur Court held that under rules 26 and 129 of the Defence of India Rules, 1939, it was not open to the authorities to detain a person to facilitate investigation into an offence alleged to have been committed by him, and an order of detention made for such a purpose was had in law and had to be quashed. It may be observed here that Vivian Bose J (as he wl. en was) was a member of that Bench. In Rex v. Easudeva" vhile observing that it was true the black-marketing in essential conmodi ies may at time lead to a disturbance of public order, it was held that activities such as these were so i emote in the chain of relation to the inaintenace of public order, that preventive retention on account of them could not fall within the purview of entry I of list II, Schedule VII of the Government of India Act, 1935, and thus it was not within the purview of the provincial legislature to enact. None of these decisions was considered in any of the two Division Bench cases of this Court to which reference has been made and in which conflicting opinions with regard to the relevancy of the past criminal acts of a detenu were expressed. ( 8 ) THE view expressed by Grover J in Ravinder Kumar v. District Magistrate with regard to the validity of a person detained because of his past criminal history has since been followed by this Court in a number of cases. ( 8 ) THE view expressed by Grover J in Ravinder Kumar v. District Magistrate with regard to the validity of a person detained because of his past criminal history has since been followed by this Court in a number of cases. One of such cases is Nand Lal v. The Superintendent, Central Jail, Tehar, (nd another (Criminal Writ No. 18-D of 1961, decided on 18th January, 1962,) and another is the recent decision in Shanti Devi v. The District Magistrate and others (Criminal Writ No. 79-D of 1964, decided bybedi J on 10th November, 1964,) In the former case it was observed by Harbans Singh J :- "reading the grounds and this paragraph as a whole, it is obvious that the reason of the "detention only was that the detenu had been involved in a number of cases, some of which were yet pending. These included even cases of theft and gambling which have admittedly no relevance so far as the maintenance of public order is concerned, and I am inclined to agree with the view taken by Mr. Justice Grover that the mere fact that the local police canrot secure conviction successfully with regard to a person who is indulging in gambling, assaults and is committing thefts, would not mean that resort can be had to the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act. " Proceeding further his Lordships said : - "as the idea is to prevent imminent breach of public order, there must be particular circumstances showing that if the detenue is allowed to remain at large, there was such an imminent danger. "i would repeat what was stated by Mr. Justice Grover in the abovementioned case, that some effective legislation is necessary for preventing goondas from indulging in antisocial and criminal activities but that does not mean that resort can be had to the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act in circumstances similar to those present in this case . "i would repeat what was stated by Mr. Justice Grover in the abovementioned case, that some effective legislation is necessary for preventing goondas from indulging in antisocial and criminal activities but that does not mean that resort can be had to the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act in circumstances similar to those present in this case . " ( 9 ) IN Shanti Devi s case* Bedi J after review of several cases bearing on the point endorsed the opinion of Grover J and held that where the allegation against detenue was that he was engaged in cheating innocent persons and some of the cases under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code were pending against him, resort could not be had to the provisions of rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, to detain him. The learned Judge in this connection referred to Dilbagh Singh v. Emperor a case decided by Harries C. J. and M. C. Mahajan, J (as he then was), and Kamala Kant Azad v. Emperor. Dilbagh Sin, h s case. related to the detention of a person under rules 26 and 129 of the Defence of India Rules, 1939, on the allegation that during the Second World War the detenue had cheated the Burma Government of the huge sums of money. Harriesc. J. ,spsaking for the Court observed that if the conduct attributed to the detenue in cheating the Burma Government was an act prejudicial to the efficient execution of the war, then it could easily be urged that practically any act would have a similar prejudicial effect on war, and cited more examples to indicate the ridiculous result such a. proposition would yield. ( 10 ) HERE a reference may be made to the judgment of Mehar Singh J in Madan Lal v. The District Magistrate and another" (Criminal Writ No. 2-D of 1962, dated 14th February, 19 2 ). ( 10 ) HERE a reference may be made to the judgment of Mehar Singh J in Madan Lal v. The District Magistrate and another" (Criminal Writ No. 2-D of 1962, dated 14th February, 19 2 ). While dealing with ttie case of a person who had been detained under sections 3 and 7 of the PSreventi Detention Act (No. IV of 1950) on the allegations inter alia that- was a very dangerous and desperate character, belonging to a notorious gang of smugglers was engaged in smugling, gold and opium and had been prosecuted in a number of cases including one under section 302 and 307/34 of the Indian Penal Code, in most of which he was acquitted or discharged, and some cases were still pending against him. The learned Judge held that the past conduct of a detenu could be the basis of an order of his detention. In this connection reliance was placed upon the following observations of Jagannadhas J in Rattanlal Gupta v. The District Magistrate of Ganjam- I would hestitate to accept as correct the broad proposition that the power of detention cannot be exercised as against a person who is being prosecuted on the same facts which constitute the grounds of the detention and thit an order of detention in such cases without making a choice between the two courses is ipso facto and without more, abuse of power of detention. " ( 11 ) A similar view has recently been expressed by Mehar Singh J while sitting with Falshaw C. J. in Shri Giorano Bencich v. Shri Gajinder Singh and another^ (Criminal Writ No. 66-D of 1964, decided on 18th Jan ary. 1965 ). While dealing with the case of a foreigner who had been detained under section 3 (2) (g) of the Foreigners Act, the learned Judge said: - "there is, however, nothing indicated in the return which makes the detention of the petitioner mala fide except the one argument just referred to above that the petitioner is involved in a number of criminal cases and the object of his arrest and detention under section 3 (2) (g)ofthea :t is to facilitate investigation of those cases. This, however, is not the correct appraisal of the situation in which the petitioner has been arrested and detained. This, however, is not the correct appraisal of the situation in which the petitioner has been arrested and detained. While investigation of criminal cases against the petitioner and his consequent prosecution can proceed, the Central Government has still the duty under the provisions of the Act to make orders with regard to a foreigner as the petitioner on the question whether or not he is an undersireable alien and should stay in this country. " ( 12 ) LEARNED counsel for the State has contended that the observ- ations would apply even to the case of an Indian national whose deten- tion is ordered under the Preventive Detention Act, Defence of India Act, 1962. The various cases referred to above also bring out differences of approach to the cases of detention and the difficul. y that the Courts are likely to experience in dealing with individual cases relating to persons detained under the Preventive Detention Act and the Defence of India Act. Where as it is well-recognized that the satisfaction under rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules is that of the detaining authority and the Courts cannot substitute their judgment on the question, it is equally settled that the detention made for the ulterior purpose of punish- ing a person for his past alleged misdeed or for facilitating investigation into a crimel or for an object wholly alien to the provisions of law under which detention is ordered is an abuse of the power and mala fide in law rendering the order of detention invalid and of no effect. Deal- ing with a number of such petitions during the past couple of months, I found that in most of the cases the detentions have been justified by reference to the past activities of the detenus concerned for which they were unsuccessfully prosecuted and in some cases merely because investi- gation into some pretty offences were pending against them. I am reluctant to believe that the Defence of India Act 1962 and the Rules framed thereunder, which came into force on the declaration of the emergency consequent upon the Chinese aggression, and it is by its very nature a temporary piece of legislation, is intended to clothe the authori- ties with unbriddled discertion to detain whomsoever they like merely because he could not be successfully brought to book for some of his alleged past misdeeds. The object of the detention is preventive and not punitive, and it requires consideration if rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules, under which most of the detention orders are at present being made, can be invoked against any and every person who has the misfortune of being accused of commiting a crime under any law of the land, however, minor it may beand notwithstanding the effect that it may have no effect on public safety. ( 13 ) IN view of what has been said above, I am of the opinion what the several questions arising in this ca -. e, the main one being about the scope of rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules, require consideration an authoritative pronouncement. I, accordingly, consider that a reference to a larger Bench is necessary, and direct that the papers be placed before my lord the Chief Justice for necessary orders I may observe here that it may be expedient to place this case before the bench constituted for hearing the case of Ram Kumar v. The District Magistrate and another (Criminal Writ No. 1o-D of 1965) that has been refered by me to a larger Bench by my order, dated 9th March. 1965, as both these cases ielute to detentions under rule 30 of the Deferce of India Rules, 1962. ( 14 ) IF his is a petition under Article 2. 6 of the Constitution and section 491, Criminal Procedure Code, for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus for the production of the petitioner and for his relaease from detention. ( 15 ) BY an order dated 23rd September 1964, which appears to be on the usual cyclostyled form, the District Magistrate of Delhi directed the detention of the petitioner in the Central Jail, Tehar, New Delhi under rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962. In the order it was stated that the District Magistrate was satisfied from information received that i twas neccesary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the mainienance of public order. In the order it was stated that the District Magistrate was satisfied from information received that i twas neccesary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the mainienance of public order. In the pitition as originally filed in January 1965, all that was stated by the petitioner was that he was being detained by the District Magistrate without any reasons having been given for his detention and that the usual procedure for the trial and punishment of offences had not been followed. This petition was admitted on 27th January 1965 by Falshaw C,j. and Mehr Singh J. and the detenu was ordered to be produced on 8th February 1965. The District Magistrate filed an affida- vit dated 6th February 1965 saying that the petitioner had figured din as many as 24 cases since 1946 and had been convicted in a number of them. In paragraph 2 of that affidavit, it was stated :- "although there is usual procedure in law for the trial and puni- shment of offences committed by a man yet the petitioner s detention is justified in view of rule 30-A of the Defence of India Rules. 1962. " It was further stated that if the petitioner remained at large, it would be hazardous to the community and his criminal activities were pre- judicial to the maintenance of Law and order. On 8th February 1965 Gurdev Singh J. in view of the denial of the petitioner that he had been prosecuted in 24 cases directed that the District Magistrate should supply details of the cases in which he had been convicted indicating the result of any appeal of Revision filed in those cases. The District Magistrate supplied the detail by an affidavit dated 15th February 1965 without comp ying with the order of this Court in the matter of stating the result of any appeal or revision preferred in those cases. On 16th February 1965 the learned Judge made another order asking for the necessary information. On l8- th February l965 the District Magistrate gave the information abut the result of the appeals and the revision petit on filed in item Nos. 1,5. 9,10, 13, and. 8 in his affidavit dated 15th February 1965. On 16th February 1965 the learned Judge made another order asking for the necessary information. On l8- th February l965 the District Magistrate gave the information abut the result of the appeals and the revision petit on filed in item Nos. 1,5. 9,10, 13, and. 8 in his affidavit dated 15th February 1965. The petitioner also filed another affidavit dated 3rd March 1965 saying that out of 23 cases, he was convicted only in five and in all the remaining cases he was either acquilted or discharged. The last order convicting him was passed in 1960 in a case in which he was sentenced to three months rigorus imprisonment under section 12 of the Madras. Habitual Offenders Act. It was further alleged in this affidavit that the order of the district Magistrate was Mala fide and based on extraneous considerations and there was no connection between the petitioner s previous conviction and the objert of rule 30 of the Defen -e of India Rules. The reply of the District Magis rate contained in para- graph 7 of his affidavit dated 4th March 1965 was as follows : "paragraph 7 as stated does not give complete picture though it is correct that the petitioner was convicted in 5 cases one under section 308 Indian Penal Code and the other under the Arms Act, and in the third he was convicted under section 394 Indian Penal Code and his conviction has been up held by this Hon ble Court. In the fourth case, he was convicted under section 147/148/149/32 Indian Penal Code and the revision was dismissed by this Hon ble court on 19-4- 1963 and, in the last case, he was convicted under section 12 of the Madrass Habitual Offenders Act, and the appeal of the petitioner was dismissed on 29 10-1963 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi After the last conviction, the petitioner was proceeded against under section 1 10 Criminial Procedure Code on 25-5- 961. He was bound down under section 110 Criminal Procedur Code on 31-1-1963 and was ordered to furnish a personal bond and a surety bond in the sum of Rs. 5,000. 00 each from the Court of Shri Balbir Singh, Sub Divisional Magistrate, Delhi (D. D. No 5 dated 25-5-1961 under section 110 Criminal Procedure Code, P. S. Roshanara ). He was bound down under section 110 Criminal Procedur Code on 31-1-1963 and was ordered to furnish a personal bond and a surety bond in the sum of Rs. 5,000. 00 each from the Court of Shri Balbir Singh, Sub Divisional Magistrate, Delhi (D. D. No 5 dated 25-5-1961 under section 110 Criminal Procedure Code, P. S. Roshanara ). On 27-12-1991, he along with his two associates, assaulted Bishamber Math, Traffic Constable, on duty outside Kashmere Ga e. but was discharged. Thereater, the petitioner was involved in three cases, but was acquitted. " ( 16 ) THE facts which emerged out of the various affidavits thus filed by the District Magistrate have been staled by the learned Single Judge in his order of reference to Full B nch dated 10 March IS. 65 and may be reported in his own words - * * * The petitioner was acquitted or discharged in 19 cases, and his conviction was recorded only in five cases. His earliest conviction was on 5th July 1946 under section 308 of the Indian Pe nal Code when he was sentenced to three months origorous imprisonment. Thereafter he was convicied in two cases under the Arms Act in the year 1 60 and 1933, and in the year 1954 he was further convicted under section 394 of the Indian Penal code. On 13th November, 1960, he was convicted along with some others undersections 147. 148/149 of the Indian Penal Code, and his last conviction was recorded on 18th December, 1960, under the Madras Habitual Offenders Act. 1948, when he was sentenced to three months rigorous imprisionment by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Delhi. Thereafter he was bound down on 31st January, 1963, under section 110 of the Criminal Procedure Code. " It is, however, clear from the affidavit dated 15th February 1965 of the District Magistrate that the petitioner had quite an impressive record of the cases in which he was tried since the year 1946, their total number upto 1964 being 24 and in most of those cases in which he had been discharged or acquitted it was stated that the petitioner appeared to have prevailed upon the witnesses either not to give evidence or not to depose against him. Gurdev Singh J. referrel to the previous decisions of this court as also the prouncernents of the Supreme Court and considered that the points arising in this petition should be decided by a larger Bench and that is how it has been placed before us for disposal. ( 17 ) THE main point which was argued before the learned Single Judge and which has been debated before us relates to the question whether the activities of the petitioner for which he was tried in Courts of law and was either acquitted or convicted could furnish any basis for an order of detention under rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules and whether the order of the District Magistrate was mila fide in law and was based on ulterior and extraneous considerations. ( 18 ) NOW. under rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules a person can be detained if the detaining authority is satisfied that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of India and Civil Defence, the public safety, the maintenance of public order etc. , it is necessary so to do. Since the order of the District Magistrate was made under the head "maintenance of public. order" it is necessary to first discuss the meaning of the expression "public order" which now appears to have been settled by the pronoun- cements of the Supreme Court, !n Brij Bhushan v. The Stat of Delhi question raised related to the validity of section 7 (i) (c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, as extended to the Province of Delhi. That section contained the words "public safety or the maintenance of public order" Fazl Ali J. was of the view that public order" might will be paraphrased in the context as public tranquollity and the words public safety" and "public order" night be read as equivalent to "security of the State" and public tranquillity". Patanjali Sastri J. (as he then was) who delivered the majority judgment, endorsed the view expressed in Romesh Th ppar v. The State of Madras". In that case section 9 (I A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949. Patanjali Sastri J. (as he then was) who delivered the majority judgment, endorsed the view expressed in Romesh Th ppar v. The State of Madras". In that case section 9 (I A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949. was struck down on the ground that it was not covered by the reservation contained in clause (2) of Article 19 of the Constitution as it authorised imposition of restrictions for the wider purpose of securing public safety or the maintenance of public order which fell outside the scope of authorised restrictions under clause (2 ). The following observa- tions of Patanjali Sastri J. at page 128 may be reproduced : - "the Constitution thus requires a line to be drawn in the field of public order or tranquillity marking off, more or less roughly, the boundry between those serious and aggravated forms of public disorder which are calculated to endanger the security of the State and the relatively minor breaches of the peace of a purely local significance treating for this purpose differences in degree as if they were differences in kind. Article 19 2) of the Constitution was amended by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 95 , which came into force on 18th June 1951 and the words "public order" which were not to be found in that provision before the amendment appeared therein after the amendment. In Sodhi Shomsher Singh v. The State of Pepsu, detenus were alleged to have published and distributed pamphlets which were couched in the most filthy and abusive language and amounted to a Vitriolic attack upon the charactar and integrity of the then Chief Justice of Pepsu. The question arose whether the order of detention made under section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 should be held to be illagal on the ground that those pamphlefs could not have any rational connection with the maintenance of law and order in the State. B. K. Mukerjea J. (as he then was) observed that the publication and distribution of the pamphlets in question could not have any rational connection with the maintenance of law and order in the State or prevention of acts leading to disorder or disturbance of public tranquillity. It may be mentioned that the words "maintenance of public order" occu- insection 3 (1) of the Preventive Detention Act also. In The Superintendent, Centraal Prison v. Dr. It may be mentioned that the words "maintenance of public order" occu- insection 3 (1) of the Preventive Detention Act also. In The Superintendent, Centraal Prison v. Dr. Run Monohir Lohi, the -main question raised was of interpretation of the words "in the interest of public order in Article 19 (2) of the Constitution. After considering the positionbefore the amenment of Article 19 (2) as also after the amendment, Subba Rao. J. speaking for the Court said that in order to get over the effect of the decisions in the cases of R mesh Th ippar and Brij Bhushan (supra) the expression "public order" was inserted in Article 19 (2) of the Constitution by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 with a view to bring an offence involving breach of purely local significance within the scope of permissible restrictions underclause (2) of Article 19. In view of the history of the amendment it could be postulated that public order" was synonymous with public peace, safety and tranquillity. In paragraph 18 while giving the summary of the discussion, Subba Rao J. said.- "public order is synonymous with public safety and tranquillity : it is the absence of disorder involving breaches of local signifiicance in contradistinction to national upheavals, such as revolution, civil strife war affecting the security of the State". He further followed the vie v expressed by the Federal Court in Rex v. Basudeva that limitation imposed in the interest of pub ic order should be one which has a proximate connection or nexus with public ord -. er and that it should not be one which is far hypothetical or problematical or too romete in the chain of its relation with the public order. In the presence of the above authoritative pronouncements it is altogether unnecessary to elaborate further the content and amplitude of the expre ssion "public order ( 19 ) BEFORE adverting to the decisions of this Court relating to preventive detention it is essential to consider the principles laid down by the Federal Court and the Supreme Court about the scops of interference by the High Courts in such matters. In Machinder Shivaji v. The King the detention of one Machinder Shivaji had been ordered by the Provin cial Government under section 2 (1) (a) of the C. P. and Berar Public Safety Act, 1948, that provision authorised the detention of any person if the Provincial Government was satisfied that he was acting or was likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the public safety, or tranqui- llity. Patanjali Sastri J. (as he then was) delivering the judgment of the Court observed as follows :- "the language clearly shows that the responsibility for making a detention order rests on the provincial executive, (. as they alone are entrusted with ths duty of maintaining public peace, and it would be a serious derogation from that responsibility if the Court were to substitute its judgment for the satisfaction of the executive authority and to that end, undertake an investigation of the sufficiency of the materials on which such satisfaction was grounded. " It was, however, laid dowa that the Court could examine the grounds disclosed by the Government to see if they were relevant to the object which the legislation had in view, namely, the prevention of acts prejudicial to public safety and tranquillity, for satisfaction" must be grounded on material which was of rationally probative value. In the State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Shridh trvaidy the detention which had been challenged had been made under the Preventive Detention Act. Kania C. J. delivering the majority judgment of the Court stated the true legal position thus: "if, therefore, the grounds on which it is stated that the Central Government or the State Government was satisfied are such as a rational human being can consider connected in some manner with objects which were to be prevented from being attained, the question of satisfaction except on the ground of mala fide cannot be challenged in a Court. Whether in a particular case the grounds are sufficient or not, according to the opinion of any person or body other than the Central Government or the State Government, is ruled out by the wording of the section. It is not for the Court to sit in the place of the Central Government or the Stale Government and try to determine if it would have come to the same conclusion as the Central or the State Government. It is not for the Court to sit in the place of the Central Government or the Stale Government and try to determine if it would have come to the same conclusion as the Central or the State Government. As has been generally observed, this is a matter for the subjective decision of the Government and that cannot be substituted by an objective test in a court of law. Such detention orders are passed on information and materials which may not be strictly admissible as evidence under the Evidence Act in a Court, But which the law, taking into consideration the needs and exigencies of administration, has allowed to be considered sufficicnt for the subjective decision of the Government. Patanjali Sastri J. (as he then was), who dissented from the view expressed in the majority judgment on certain other matters which were different from the question which is being discussed, said that preventive detetion was a form of precautionary police action to be employed on the sole of responsibility of the executive Government whose discretion was final, no recourse being permitted to a Court of Law by way of review or justification of such action except on allegations of male fide or irrational conduct. In Ashutosh Lahiry v. The state of Delhi Das J. (as he then was) observed that the satisfaction of the authority making the order as to the matters specified in the Preventive Detention Act was the only condition for the exercise of its powers and that the Court could not substitute its own satisfaction for that of the authorityit, was, however, open to the detenu to es ablish, if he could, that the order was made mala fide and in abuse of powers Mukerjeaj. (ashethen was) said that the order of detention could be declared invalid if it could be proved to have been made by the authority concerned in mala fide exercise of its power. But the burden of proving the absence of good faith was upon the petitioner. (ashethen was) said that the order of detention could be declared invalid if it could be proved to have been made by the authority concerned in mala fide exercise of its power. But the burden of proving the absence of good faith was upon the petitioner. The decision in Sodhi Shamsher Singh s case has already been noticed it was laid down in clear terms therein that the propriety or reasonableness of the satisfaction of the Central or the State Government upon which an order for detention under section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act was based, could not be raised and the Supreme Court could not be invited in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution to undertake an investigation into sufficiency of the matters upon which such satisfaction purported to be grounded. The Supreme Court could, however, examine the grounds disclosed by the Goviernment to see if they were relevant to the object which the legisla- tion had in view, namely, the prevention of objects prejudicial to the defence of India or to the fecurity of State and maintenance of law and order therein. In Shibbon Lal Saksena v. ^tate of Uttar Pradesh^ their Lordships wh ie reaffirming the principles already laid down again said that the sufficiency of the grounds upon which such satisfaction puported to be based, provided they had a rational probative value andwere not extraneous to the scope or purpose of the provision could not be challenged in a Court of law except on the ground of malafide. ( 20 ) IN Dwarka Das Bhatiav. The State ofjommu end Kashmir" an order of detention under section 3 (1) of the J and K Preventive Detention Act, 2011 was made on the ground that the petitioner was engaged in unlawful smuggling activities relating to three commodities, cloth, zari and mercury. The detenu in that case had been detained with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and service essential to the community. The detenu in that case had been detained with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and service essential to the community. Their Lordships while striking down the order said that the principle which was deduced from various decisions of the Federal Court and the Supreme Court was that where power was vested in a statutory authority to deprive the liberty of a subject on its subjective satisfaction with reference to specifics matters, if that statisfaction was stated to be based on a number e f grounds or for a variety of reasons, all taken to- gether, and if some out of 'hem were found to be non-existent or irrelevant, the very exercise of that power was bad. In Ramshwar ^haw v. District Magistrate^" an order of detention under section 3 (lj of the Preventive Detention Act had been made by the District Magistrate of Burdwan against one Rameshwar Shaw. Gajendragadkar J. 'as he then was) delivering the judgment of the Court reiterated the following principles with -egard to the scope of interference by the Courts in such matters :- (1) The reasonableness of the satisfaction of the detaining authoi- ity cannot be questioned. in a Court of law nor can the Court examine the adequacy of the material on which the said satis faction purports to rest. (2) If any of the grounds furnished to the detenu are found to be irrelevant and in that sense are foreign to the Act, the satis- faction of the detaining authority on which the order of detention is based is open to challenge and the detention order can be quashed. (3) Though the satisfaction of the detaining authority contemplated by section 3 (l) (a) is the subjective satisfaction of the said authority, cases may arise where the detenu may challenge the validity of his detention on the ground of malafides and in support of the said plea urge that along with othci facts which show mala fides the Courts may also consider his grievance that the grounds served on him cannot possibly or rationally support the conclusion drawn against him by the detaining authority. It is only in this incidental manner and in support of the plea of mala fides that this question can become justi- ciable ; otherwise the reasonableness or propriety of the said satisfaction contemplated by section 3 (l) (a) cannot be question- ed before the Courts. (4) The past conduct or antecedent history of a person can be taken into account by the detaining authority as it is largely from prior events showing tendencies or inclinations of a man that an inference could be drawn whether he is likely even in the future to act in a manner prejudicial to the mainenance of public order. The past conduct or antecedant hisory of the person on which the authority purports to act, should ordinarily be proximate in point of time and should have a rational connection with the conclusion that the detention of the person is necessary. (5) It is both inexpedient and unreasonable to law down any inflexible test. The question about the validity of the satisfaction of the authority will have to be considered on the facts of each case. (6) The detention of a person without a trial is a very serious encroachment on his personal freedom, and so, at every stagey all questions in relation to the said detention must be carefully solemnly considered. Any doubt which was sought to be created during the course of arguments before us whether the aforesaid principles laid down in cases under various preventive detention enactments would or would not be applicable to cases of detention under the Defence of India Rules has been set a rest by the decision of the Supreme Court in Makhan Singh Tariskha v. The State of Punjab in which Gajenderagadkar J. (as he then was has considered what are the pleas which are now open to the citizens to take in callenging the legality or the properiety of their detentions made under the Defence of India Rules by means of an application under section 491 (b) of the Criminal. Procedure Code or Article 22 of the Constitution. This is what has been said :- "take also a case where the detenu moves the court for a writ of Habeas corpus on the ground that his detention has been ordered mala fide. Procedure Code or Article 22 of the Constitution. This is what has been said :- "take also a case where the detenu moves the court for a writ of Habeas corpus on the ground that his detention has been ordered mala fide. It is hardly necessary to emphasise that the exercise of a power mala fide is wholly outside the scope of the Act conferring the power and can always be successfully challenged. It is t ue that a mere allegation that the detention is malafide could not be enough ; the detenu will have to prove the mala fide. But if the malafide are alleged, the detenu cannot be "precluded from substantiating his plea on the giound of the bar created by Article 359 and the Presidential Order. That is another Kind of Plea which is outside the purview of Article 359. Section 491deals with the power of the High Court to issue directions in the nature of the Habeas Corpus, and it covers six categories of cases in which such a direction can be issued. It is only inregard to that class of cases falling under section 491 (b) where the legality of the detention is challenged on grounds which fell under Article 359 and the Presidential Order that the bar would operate. In all other cases falling under section 491 the bar would be in applicable and proceedings taken on behalf of the detenu will have to be tried in accordance with law. We ought to add that these categories of pleas have been mentioned by us by way of illustration, and so, they should not be read as exhausting all the pleas which do not fall within the purview of the Presidential Order. " ( 21 ) THE net result, therefore, is that a detention order made under rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules can be challenged either under section 491 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure or Article 226 of the Constitution on all such grounds on which its validity or legality could always be challenged except for the enforcement of such rights as are conferred by Part III of the Constitution which may be mentioned in the Presidential Order declaring an emergency under that provision. As has been stated in Rameshwar Shaw's case it is inexpedient and unreasonable to lay down any inflexible test about the validity of the satisfaction of the detaining authority as that will have to be considered on the facts of each case in the light of the principles laid down in the various decisions referred to above. It will not be out of place to mention at this stage the latest decision of the Madras Court in K. T. K, Thangamani v. The Chief Secretary, Government of Madras" in which the scope of interference by the High Courts in orders made under rule 30 or 30-A of the Defence of India Rules was considered at length and the view that has expressed is that although ordinarily there is no justiciable right of a detenu to question either his order of detention or the terms or restrictions imposed under the Defence of India Rules by virtue of any alleged violation of section 44 of the Defence of India Act which is directory but the validity of the detention can becanvassed on two main bases or grounds. The first of these is that the authority concerned has exceeded the ambit of its power conferred by the legislature i. e. where the particular authority has no such power or the power is not given in respect of certain classes of persons or categories of property and it is purported to be exercised. Secondly, there is always the saving clause of a colourable exercise of the power or an exercise of lacking bona fides, and animated bysome ulterior object, shown to he satisfaction of the Court. ( 22 ) COMING now to the decisions of this Court, in Bakhtawar Stngh v. The State detention orders had been made under the Preventive Detention Act and the allegations contained in the grounds applied to the detenus inter alia were that they were engaged in the smuggling of cloth and other supplies, the maintenance of which was essential to the community and in furtherance of that object they had induged in activities prejudicial to the security of the State and the maintenance of public order. Falshaw J. (as he then was) found it difficult to see prima facie any connection whatever between smuggling which wa essentially a secret operation and the maintenance of "public order" in which the operative word was "public. Falshaw J. (as he then was) found it difficult to see prima facie any connection whatever between smuggling which wa essentially a secret operation and the maintenance of "public order" in which the operative word was "public. " He found a good deal of force in the allegations made in the petition that the detentions were malafide not on account of any spite of any individual police officer but for the reason that all the detenus had been accused of persistently committing the offence of smuggling which was one that could be and could ordinarily be expected to be dealt with by the ordinary Criminal Courts. The learned Judge proceeded to say that in cases where offences like smuggling were involved with which the maintenance of public order and the safety of the State were very remotely connected, recourse to preventive detention appeared to be a complete confession of inefficiency on the part of the local authorities. Soni J. while concurring in the order of release delivered a separate judgment in which be adverted to the question whether the grounds of detention were relevant to the maintenance of public order. He examined the import of the words "maintenance of Public order" anrd said that the breaking out of civil commotion cr of ricts or apprehension that riots would break out to such an extent that maintenance of peace would be threatened, was the kind of thing that had to be safeguarded and that is what was meant by the legislature when the aforesaid words were used. In Ravinder Kumar v. District Magistrate the grounds which were supplied to the detenu showed that he had been detained because he was indulging in activities like thievirg, gambling, excessive drinking, assaulting people etc. After considering the meaning of the words "maintenance of public order", I said that merely because a person is of a dangerous character or is breaking the law in one marner or the other it does not mean that the maintenance of public order is being threatened unless the activities are of such a nature and the situation prevailing in a particular part ofthe country is such that if he is not detained, public order cannot be maintained or it would be endangered. I further said that the activities such as committing thefts, indulging in gambling, excessive drinking, etc. I further said that the activities such as committing thefts, indulging in gambling, excessive drinking, etc. , could possibly have no relevancy so far as the maintenance of public order was concerned. It is noteworthy that in Bakhtawar Singh's case" and in n y previous decision, the real reason for striking down the detention order was that the activities alleged against the detenu were not considered rational to the object of detention, namely, the maintenance of public order, for instance, smuggling in the first case and drinking, garbling, etc. in the second, case could rot properly be considered as having a proximate connection or nexus with public order and, therefore, the detention orders were rightly quashed according to the law laid down in various decisions of the Supreme Court. It is true that in Ravinder Kumar's case. I expressed my view about the meaning of "maintenance of public order" according to what has been said by the Rajsthan Court Umraomal v. State of Rajsthan and the Patna Court in Lalu Gope v. The King but now the law has been settled by the Supreme Court in The Superintendent, Central Prison v. Dr. Rom Manohar Lohia and what has been laid down there about the meaning and content of "public order" will have to be kept in the forefront while disposing of the present petition. ( 23 ) IN Hartvansh v. The Superintendent Central Jail (Criminal Writ No. 10-D of 1963 decided on 9th December 1963) the petitioners had been detained under rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules. It was admitted by the counsel for the petitioner that it was not necessary for the District Magistrate to say anything more in the order except that he was satisfied from information received that it was necessary to detain the particular individual witha view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The argument proceeded on the footing that the grounds considered by the Administrator when reviewing the detention orders were much the same RS those which the District Magistrate had in mind. A sample of those grounds was like this- "sham Lal has taken to crime as a career and has been living on bottlegging and extortion of money from law-abiding citizens. His criminal history dates back to the year 1951 and his activities have since then continued unabated. A sample of those grounds was like this- "sham Lal has taken to crime as a career and has been living on bottlegging and extortion of money from law-abiding citizens. His criminal history dates back to the year 1951 and his activities have since then continued unabated. Through his persistent criminal acts. Sham Lal established that his remaining at large would be highly prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. " A Bench consisting of Dulat and Capoor, JJ. felt that the suggestion that a person who had adopted crime as a career or went about extorting money from people was not engaged in any activity prejudicial to public order, was futile for that individual certainly "disturbs the state of internal regulations. " Moreover, such activities were perfectly, relevant to the question of public order. The Bench, therefore, did not agree that in law the detention order was mala fide. It is apparent, however, that before the learned judges the argument was directed more towards inadequacy of the grounds than to their irrelevancy. In Shanti Devi v. The District Magistrate Criminal Writ No. 79-D of 1964) decided by Bedi, J. on 10th November 1964, the allegations in the affidavits before the Court against the datenu were that he had taken to life of crime in 1961 under the garb of a share-broker. He had no ostensible means of livelihood and lived on cheating alone. In 1961 he had cheated Lt. J. V. Nagareth of Indian Navy of Rs. 1,180. 00 for which he was standing trial in a case under section 420 and 401 of the Indian Penal Code. There were other allegations of cheating against him of various persons for which he was standing trial in some of the cases. It was, therefore, alleged that his activities were a standing menace to the society and were highly prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The learned judge held that the allegations against the detenu were only of cheating for which he could bs punished by the criminal Courts under the Penal Code and his detention under the Defence of India Rules was not justified apparently on the ground that it was mala fide in law. The learned judge held that the allegations against the detenu were only of cheating for which he could bs punished by the criminal Courts under the Penal Code and his detention under the Defence of India Rules was not justified apparently on the ground that it was mala fide in law. ( 24 ) IN Smt. Shanti Devi v. S. G. Base Mullick, District Magistrate (Criminal Writ No. 94-D of 19641 decided by Falshaw, C. J. and Mehar Singh,j. on 20th January 1965), it appeared from the. orderofthe administrator passed on review that the detenu who was detained under the Defence of India Rules was alleged to be a person of dangerous and desperate character who had no ostensible means of subsistence and thrived on the sale of tincture and extortions and who had taken to crime as a career. The details given about his criminal record dated back to 1956 when he was convicted under section 394, Indian Penal Code, for snatching away a sum of Rs. 2,570. 00 odd from one Hazari Lal. In 1961 one tola of charas and 50 ounces of illicit liquor with working still were recovered. In both these offences he was convicted under the Excise Act. He was suspected in a number of cases but had managed to subborn the witnesses. He was, therefore, of a dangerous character and a constant manace to the law-abiding citizens. Falshaw C. J. delivering the judgment of the Bench referred to certain orders of Bedi, J. in which in similar circumstances he had directed release of the detenu. He also referred to my decision in Ravinder Kumar's case and accorded approval to the view taken by me. It was considered that in the sense of the term "public order" as laid down in Romesh Thappar's case there was hardly any connection between the activities for which the detention had been ordered and the maintenance of public order. The detention order was struck down on the ground that rule 30 was being applied for a purpose for which it was never intended and mala fides had been establi- shed in that manner. Although this decision was based mainly on the narrower meaning of the words "public order" which had been laid down in Romesh Thappar's case but there could be little doubt, with respect, about the correstness of this decision. Although this decision was based mainly on the narrower meaning of the words "public order" which had been laid down in Romesh Thappar's case but there could be little doubt, with respect, about the correstness of this decision. The only offence which could nave some connection with "public order" was committed in 1956 for which the detenu had been punished and the offences from 1960 onwards which were more proximate in time were of a petty nature punishable under the Excise laws and they could not be regarded as having a rational connection with "public order". In Mool Chand v. District Magistrate (Criminal Writ No. 104-D of 1964) decided by Gurdev Singh J. On 25th January 1965,the detention of Sher Singh had been ordered under the Defence or India Rules. The learned Judge found from the affidavit filed by the District Magistrate that apart from the allegation of his prosecution under section 392, Indian Penal Code, in the year 1959 there was no detail of any other activities which justified his detention under rule 30 (1 ). Referring to a general verment made in the affidavit of the District Magistrate that from the report of the Superintendent of Police, C. I. D" it appeared that the detenu was not only a notorious gambler but also indulged in henious crime like robbery etc. The learned Judge observer. that since the details of the activities had not been given his detention could not be regarded as justified on the ground of any danger to public order or tranquillity and that it was in that sense mala fide having been made for a purpose for which it was never intended. The Banch decision in Smt. Shtnti Devi's case" as also my decision in Ravinder Kumar's case ware followed. This decision cannot be open to any criticism because the only specific activity which had been alleged against tha detenu dated back to 1959 which was not proximate in time to the date of the order of detention and nothing else was stated against him except the general allegations of being a notorious gambler etc. It will thus be seem that with the exception of the decision of Daulat and Capoor JJ. It will thus be seem that with the exception of the decision of Daulat and Capoor JJ. in Harivansh's case there is no difficulty in holding that all the other cases decided by this court, although they proceeded on the narrower meaning of the expression "public order" as laid down in Romesh Thappar's case, were, with respec correctly decided according to the principles applicable to such casfes which have been discussed before. It has been suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the only ground on which the detenus had been detained in Harvinsh's case, was that they had taken to crime as a career in bootlegging and extortion of money from law abiding citizens on giving intimidation. No details of their activities were given in those cases. In one of the writs (Criminal Writ No. 3-D of 1963) decided by the Bench, the allegation was that he was living on bootlegging and extortion of money from law-abiding citizens by intimidation. It is also suggested that those grounds were vague and no spacific activities of the detenus with regard to bootlegging and extortion of money on intimidation were mentioned. If bootlegging meant illicit smuggling, this decision was certainly in conflict with the earlier decision in Bakhtawar Singh's case which does not unfortunately appear to have been brought to the notice of the learned judges in that case. As regards the extortion of money and practising intimidation, they may or may not in certain circumstances become relevant to public order. That will depend on ths facts of each case and it is altogether unnecessary to express any pedantic view on the matter. Even in that case the decision in Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia's case does not appear to have been cited. Nothing need further be said about that case because now we can seek guidancr from the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the various decisions which have already been discussed. ( 25 ) ADVERTING to another aspect of the question which is being decided, there is good authority for the view that although a. person, had been acquitted of a certain offence, he could still be detained with regard to that very offence. ( 25 ) ADVERTING to another aspect of the question which is being decided, there is good authority for the view that although a. person, had been acquitted of a certain offence, he could still be detained with regard to that very offence. There may not be evidence which would, justify a conviction and yet there may be materials placed before the detaining authority which might satisfy it as to the prejudicial conduct of the detenu (see Gajanankrishna Yalgi v. Emperor, Chagla C. J. while delivering the judgment of the Full Bench in Maledath Bharathan Malyani v. The Commissioner of Poiice observed at page 205 :- "as we have already pointed out, it would be open to the detaining authority, even where an offence has been committed, to fall back upon his powers under the Security Act rather then prosecute the person for an offence under the ordinary law. It may be that, in that particular case, the legal evidence may not be sufficient and tile detaining authority may not like to risk the decision of the criminal Court, and the circumstances with regard to the security of the State may be so overpowering that the detaining authority might feel that the person should be detained notwithstanding the absence of legal evidence to warrant a conviction. " In that case, however, it was held that the police did not carry on investigation of the offence under the Criminal Procedure Code after the applicant was arrested under the criminal law and a secret investigation was carried on afterdetaining him under the Security Act. On these facts the Full Bench consisting of Chagia C. J. , Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) and Dixit J. said that the only irresistible inference was that the purpose of detaining the applicant was a collateral purpose and that was to deprive him of his rights and safeguards under the Criminal Procedure Code and to carry on an investigation without the supervision of the Court. It was, however, laid down that when the detaining authority had made up its mind to detain a person who was alleged to have committed an offence then the detaining authority had made its choice and it would not be permissible to it to investigate the offence while still keeping the person under detention and not complying with the provisions of the law with regard to investigation. If an extraneous circumstance influenced the making of the order, then that order could never be said to have been made bona fide and even if the detaining authority was satisfied, still, in the eye of law, it was an order which was made for a collateral purpose, it was made mala fide, and it could not be sustained. ( 26 ) LOOKING at the details supplied with regard to the activities of the present petitioner from 1946 onwards, they cover a wide range of offences of a veried character e. g. , crimes of violence, breaches of peace, dacoity, burglary, illicit possession of hand-grenades, treapass, murder and possession of unlicenced arms. From 1960 onwards the petitioner is stated to have threatened persons with dire consequences as a result of which breach of peace was apprehended and appropriate proceedings under sections 107 and 151 and section 110. Criminal Procedure Code were taken. In 1961 it is alleged that he assaulted Bishamber Nath, a Traffic Constable, on duty for which the petitioner was challaned. , In February 1962 he is alleged to have. committed an affray at Dina Ka Talab. Similarly in March 1962 he is stated to have at tacked a police party. Which had surprised him with an unlicenced dagger. In August 1964 he is alleged to have caught hold of Paras Ram, a resident of Chandrawal, and threatened him not to give evidence against him. It is true that in certain cases he was acquitted and in the others he was convicted, a resume of which has already been given in the earlier part of the judgment but the question is whether these activities are rational to and have a nexus with "public order". If that test is satisfied, then it is not for this Court to go into the question of reasonableness of the satisfaction of the detaining authority the adequacy of the material on which the said satisfaction purports 'to rest. The past conduct or antecedent history of a person can be taken into account by the detaining authority as it is largely from prior events showing tendencies of inclinations of a man that an inference could be drawn whether he is likely even in the future to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The past conduct or antecedent history of the person on which the authority purports to act. The past conduct or antecedent history of the person on which the authority purports to act. should ordinarily be proximate in point of time and should have a rational connection with the conclusion that the detention of the person is necessary (vide Rameshwar Shaw's case, supra) ( 27 ) IT is abundantly clear that such activities as have been alleged against the petitioner and on which his detention has been based, are rational to public peace, safety and tranquillity or the absence of disorder of local significance it cannot, therefore, be said that there is no proximate connection between them and public order" or, in other words, there is no proximate and reasonable nexus between the activities of the petitioner and "public order". The petition is, therefore, dismissed. ( 28 ) I agree. ( 29 ) I agree. ( 30 ) I agree. ( 31 ) I agree.