ORDER : P.T. Raman Nayar, J. 1. This report by the liquidator brought under sub- section (2) of section 45-C of the Banking Companies Act raises a question of considerable difficulty to which I cannot preten to have found a satisfactory answer. The proceeding in respect of which this report is made is a suit instituted by the banking company in liquidation before the winding-up order was made. The suit is still pending. But, when the winding-up order was made, it was pending in this court in appeal. Subsequently, the appeal was allowed and the suit was remanded by this court to the trial court for fresh disposal. The question is whether section 45-C applies at all; if not how best the further trial of the suit is to be secured having regard to section 45-B of the Act, which, subject to the provisions of section 45-C, vests exclusive jurisdiction in this court. 2. The registered office of the banking company in question was situate within the jurisdiction of this High Court, and, therefore, under section 45-B read with section 36-B of the Act, this court has, save as otherwise expressly provided in section 45-C, exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and decide the claim made in the suit. It follows then that, save as otherwise expressly provided in section 45-C, the subordinate court before which the suit is now pending by reason of the order of remand made by this court in the appeal has no jurisdiction to entertain or decide the suit. (The words "entertain" and "decide " have to he read disjunctively—the section itself makes it clear that it applies to suits instituted, and, in that sense, entertained, before the winding-up order, but pending at the time of the order.) If we turn now to section 45-C we find that sub-section (1) thereof applies only to suits or other legal proceedings pending in any court other than the High Court having jurisdiction, in this case this High Bank Court, immediately before the date of the winding-up order. But on the day of winding-up order, the suit was, as we have seen, pending in appeal in this High Court and no proceeding in relation to the suit was pending in any other court. But on the day of winding-up order, the suit was, as we have seen, pending in appeal in this High Court and no proceeding in relation to the suit was pending in any other court. Therefore, on a purely literal construction of the sub-section without reference to the intendment of the statute, it would seem that sub-section (1) of section 45-C has no application. And, since sub-section (2) applies only to cases to which sub-section (1) applies what the liquidator is required to do is to submit a " report containing a list of all such pending proceedings'', namely, proceedings to which sub-section (1) applies—it would follow that sub-section (2) has no application and this court can make no order under sub-section (3) either transferring the suit to itself or declining to do so, so that, in the latter event, the continuance of the suit in the subordinate court would by reason of sub-section (4) [which again, it may be noted, can apply only to proceedings to which sub-section (1) applies] come within the saving, "save as otherwise expressly provided in section 45-C", in section 45-B. True, the prohibition in sub-section (1) of section 45-C. would not be attracted since the suit was pending in this High Court when the winding-up order, was made; but that would not be express provision for the continuance of the suit in any other court so as to exclude the operation of section 45-B. The result then would be that the subordinate court before which the suit is now pending would have no jurisdiction to try it, section 45-C having no application so as to bring it within the saving clause in section 45-B.There would appear to be no provision by which the subordinate court can return the plaint for presentation to the proper court—that court was undoubtedly the court in which the suit should have been instituted when it was instituted, and Order VII, rule 10 of the Code scarcely applies, and one wonders what would happen to the adjudication so far made in the suit by courts competent to hear it if the plaint is returned —and a withdrawal to this court under section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code will not, it might be contended serve to remedy the defect in jurisdiction if the court from which the suit is withdrawn has no jurisdiction to try it. That court can perhaps only reject the suit on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to try it, and the effect of statutory provisions specially designed to protect the interests of banking companies in liquidation would have been to deprive this banking company of the remedy it had under the ordinary law for the enforcement of its claim. The proceedings so far had in the suit up to and inclusive of the order of remand are perfectly valid and it is more than doubtful whether a fresh suit can be brought in this court—the particular claim cannot be included in a list under section 45-D of the Banking Companies Act, third party interests being involved—even if section 14 of the Limitation Act can rescue it from the bar of time. 3. That I do not think should be permitted if it is at all possible to avoid it. This High Court had undoubtedly jurisdiction to hear the appeal not so much by reason of sub-section (5) of section 45-C (which, it is to be remarked, by excluding the application of that section, but not, be it noted, of section 45-B, to a proceeding pending in appeal before the Supreme Court or a High Court cannot, strictly construed, serve to bring such a proceeding within the saving in section 45-B, there being nothing provided in section 45-C in respect of such a proceeding) but by reason of the fact that it is the High Court having jurisdiction under section 45-B. (The expression defined in section 36-B without even the usual escape valve of "unless the context otherwise requires" is,." High Court " and not, "the High Court " so that it can even be contended that the use of the indefinite article in sub-section (5) of section 45-C in the clause, "or a ' High Court" has not the meaning which was probably intended, namely, or any High Court".) Under section 107 of the' Civil Procedure Code its power to remand is subject to the conditions and limitations prescribed in the First Schedule. Under rule 23 of Order XLI it has to remand the case to the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred so that it would seem that it could not have remanded ,the case to any other court or sent it to the company court for fresh disposal. Under rule 23 of Order XLI it has to remand the case to the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred so that it would seem that it could not have remanded ,the case to any other court or sent it to the company court for fresh disposal. The only court to which it could have remanded the case had ceased to have jurisdiction, and, if that had been brought to its notice, it would perhaps have heard and finally disposed of the case itself and not exercised the power of remand. But, all this notwithstanding, I do not think its order of remand can be said to be without jurisdiction and therefore void so that the plaintiff banking company could, treating the appeal as still pending before this Court, ask it to proceed with the hearing thereof. 4. One solution which I can think of to the problem is this. The suit was instituted in a court of competent jurisdiction. It was pending on the date of the winding-up order although in appeal. It is now pending before the court where it was first instituted, a court other than the High Court having jurisdiction, namely, this High Court. The pendency in this High Court in appeal must, by a fiction, be deemed to have been vacated by the order of remand, and, therefore by the same fiction, the suit must be deemed to have been pending in the subordinate court throughout so as to make section 45-C applicable. 5. Another solution would be to withdraw the suit to this court under section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code. The suit was instituted in a court of competent jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction ceased to exist only when the winding-up order was made so that a withdrawal to the court now having jurisdiction for trial from the stage when the court of institution ceased to have jurisdiction cannot perhaps be assailed on the score of original lack of jurisdiction. 6. A third solution might be for this court to set aside its order of remand in the very special circumstances of the case in exercise of its inherent power if the power of review is unavailable, and re-hear and finally decide the appeal. But, that is a matter which is not in my hands and I must leave it to the liquidator to exploit that possibility if he is so advised. But, that is a matter which is not in my hands and I must leave it to the liquidator to exploit that possibility if he is so advised. 7. I withdraw the suit to this' court under section 45-C (3) of the Banking Companies Act and section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code.