Judgment :- 1. In these 10 revision petitions the petitioners (accused 1 to 4) were tried by the Munsiff-Magistrate of Kalpetta for an offence under S.123 read with S.42 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for having plied their spare buses on different dates along the Meppady-Ootty route without having a permit. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners these spare buses need not separately take out a permit under S.42(1) for use in case of break down of a route bus and in any view of the case accused 2 to 4 cannot be found guilty as they have not 'caused' or 'allowed' the drivers to use these vehicles. The question of law raised being the same and as these cases were argued together they can be disposed of conveniently in one common judgment. 2. There are two buses involved K.L.D. 270 and M.D.N. 2284, both belonging to the Rajalekshmi Motor Service. The first accused in each of the cases is the driver of the respective buses and accused 2 to 4 are said to be the owners. Pw.1 is the Sub Inspector of Police, Meppadi who has proved that these two buses were plying between Ootty and Meppady on the different dates and that it had no permit to run on those routes. That these buses were, in fact, run on these routes on the different dates is admitted. S. 42 of the Act reads: "No owner of a transport vehicle shall use or permit the use of the vehicle in any public place, save in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted or countersigned by a regional or state transport authority authorising the use of the vehicle in that place in the manner in which the vehicle is being used. xxxxxx S. 123 of the Act says: "Whoever drives a motor vehicle or causes or allows a motor vehicle to be used in contravention of the provisions of S.22 or without the permit required by sub-S. (1) of S.42 or in contravention of any conditions of such permit relating to the route on which or the area in which or the purpose for which the vehicle may be used, shall be punishable " S. 2 (33) defines 'transport vehicle' as a public service vehicle or a goods vehicle. S. 2 (25) says a 'public service vehicle' means any motor vehicle used or adapted to be used for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward, and includes a motor cab, contract carriage and stage carriage. S. 2 (29) gives the definition of 'stage carriage'. Stage carriage means a motor vehicle carrying or adapted to carry more than 6 persons excluding the driver which carries passengers for hire or reward at separate fares paid by or for individual passengers either for the whole journey or for stages of the journey. These buses come within the meaning of the term'transport vehicle'. So S.42 provides that a person should not use or permit a motor vehicle to be used on any road as stage carriage unless he is the holder of a public service vehicle licence to use it as a vehicle of that class in accordance with the statutory provisions. An application for the grant of a stage carriage permit has to be made under S.46 specifying inter alia the routes or the area on which the vehicle is intended to be run and in the permit so granted the routes permitted would be entered and it is one of the conditions subject to which a permit is granted. Under S.48 (2) every stage carriage permit shall be expressed to be valid only for a specified route or routes or for a specified area. S.62 deals with the grant of a temporary permit to meet a particular temporary need. 3. Rajalekshmi motor service runs a route bus from Ootty to Meppady, but on account of the temporary break down of that bus these two spare buses were used on the different dates. The registration certificate of these buses were produced for scrutiny before the court below, but it was not marked. The permit of the two buses have been produced now, by the defence counsel, in this court with a petition Crl. M.P. 315/65 to receive the same as additional evidence under S.428 Crl. P.C, Notice was given and the reception is not opposed by the learned State Prosecutor. For a just decision of the case they are received in evidence, and marked as Exts. D-1 and D-2 in these cases. In Ext. M.P. 315/65 to receive the same as additional evidence under S.428 Crl. P.C, Notice was given and the reception is not opposed by the learned State Prosecutor. For a just decision of the case they are received in evidence, and marked as Exts. D-1 and D-2 in these cases. In Ext. D-1 under the heading'Routes for which the permit is valid', it is stated: "spare Bus - All the routes on which the operator is running buses in Nilgiris District in the event of temporary break downs." Similarly in Ext. D-2 under the heading "Route for which the permit is valid" it is stated "Spare bus to ply in place of the route bus of the operator having valid permits issued by the Regional Transport Authority, Nilgiris in the event of breakdown of route buses". This would show that these spare buses were authorised to run only within the Nilgiris district and not within the Kerala State. 4. Pw. 2 is the clerk of the R.T.A. office, Kozhikode in charge of the bus permits section. He has proved that no permit was granted to these two buses of the Rajalekshmi motor service for running on the Ootty and Meppadi route on these dates. He has given evidence that on the 14th September the managing partner of the Rajalekshmi motor service had given an application for a temporary permit for KLD-270 to run in the place of the route bus MDN. 4817 for a period of 7 days from 14-9-62 to 20-9-62, but no such permit had been granted. Without obtaining the permit the buses did ply between 12-9-62 and 20-9-62 which would clearly be a contravention of the provisions of S.42. The argument of the learned counsel that spare buses need not have the required permit under S.42 is not tenable. Clause.3 to S.42 refers to cases where no permit as provided in S.42(1) need be taken and none of the clauses make mention of such spare buses. Maintenance of service by spare buses is no doubt a condition of the permit, but that would mean spare bus which holds a permit to ply on that route and not any vehicles which have no permit to ply on that route. The first accused in these cases having driven the vehicle without the necessary permit has clearly contravened S.42 (1) which will be an offence under S.123. The first accused in these cases having driven the vehicle without the necessary permit has clearly contravened S.42 (1) which will be an offence under S.123. The conviction of the first accused in these cases is thus unassailable. 5. Learned counsel then argued that the conviction of accused 2 to 4 cannot be maintained. The definition of the word 'owner' in S.2(19) is not an exhaustive definition and the word has, therefore, to be taken to mean what it ordinarily means, namely a person in whom the proprietory title vests. Accused 2 to 4 being partners would certainly come within the meaning of the term'owner'. Both in S.42 & 123 of the Act the use of the words 'permit', 'allow' and 'cause' clearly indicate that mens rea is not ruled out in respect of offences mentioned therein. The words 'causes or allows' in S.123 convey the idea that the legislature did not intend that the master of a motor vehicle should be vicariously liable for the action of his servant and that his liability arises only if by his act or illegal omission he permits the driver to contravene the section. Therefore, if there is no evidence to show that these accused knew or connived at the action of the driver in taking the vehicle through an unauthorised route they cannot be held guilty of the offence under S.123 of the Act. 6. Under S.127-A of the Act a special procedure is prescribed for the launching of a prosecution for contravening any provisions of the Act where the offences are by companies. It lays down: "(1) If the person contravening any provisions of this Act is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the contravention and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment provided in this Act, if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-s. (1) where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company, and it is proved that the offence was committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly." So to hold accused 2 to 4 guilty it has to be established that the offence viz., of plying the buses between Ootty and Meppady without a licence or permit was with the consent or connivance or is attributable to any negligence on the part of accused 2 to 4 whether he be a director, manager, secretary etc. Pw.1 the Sub Inspector of Police, Meppady has only stated that accused 2 to 4 among others are partners of the company. In examination-in-chief he made a vague statement that they allowed the bus to be driven by the first accused without a permit. But this statement was challenged in cross-examination and he had to admit that the fact that accused 2 to 4 were the persons who allowed the first accused to use the vehicle is not borne out by any records. He stated that he did not know whether there was any managing partner other than accused 2 to 4 and frankly confessed that he did not know who is the manager or managing partner of this company. Learned State Prosecutor submitted that the managing partner had applied for a temporary permit but who out of these three accused was the signatory to the application has not been proved. In fact that application itself has not been marked separately as an exhibit even though it is in the file produced by Pw. 2 from the R.T.A's office. Accused 2 to 4 when questioned have denied that they had authorised or permitted the running of the buses. It was incumbent upon the prosecution to have proved that these accused were in charge of and were responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company. 2 from the R.T.A's office. Accused 2 to 4 when questioned have denied that they had authorised or permitted the running of the buses. It was incumbent upon the prosecution to have proved that these accused were in charge of and were responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company. It is only when this initial onus is discharged by the prosecution that there is any onus upon the person concerned to prove that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence. This view finds support in the decision in Ahamed v. State of Kerala (1964 KLT. 686) and Agarwala v. State (AIR. 1959 Orissa 50) where the entire case-law has been reviewed. Similar view has been taken under analogous provisions contained in S.14A of the Employees Provident Funds Act - Vide the decisions in Momtaz Begum v. State (AIR. 1962 Cal. 202) & State v. Bhadani (AIR. 1959 Pat. 9) and under S.17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act - see Public Prosecutor v. Karuppian (AIR. 1958 Mad. 183). There is nothing in the evidence to show that accused 2 to 4 were in charge of or were responsible for the conduct of the business of the company. No case is therefore made out against accused 2 to 4 and I am constrained to quash the conviction as far as they are concerned. 7. S.123 (3) of the Act provides: "Where a person is convicted of an offence under this section, the court by which such person is convicted may in addition to any sentence which may be imposed under sub-s. (1) by order (a) (b) if the vehicle used in the commission of the offence is a transport vehicle suspend its permit for a period not exceeding 6 months or cancel it." By virtue of the provisions contained in this section the learned Magistrate has cancelled the permit of the buses for a period of three months. Learned Magistrate also directed that the suspension would run consecutively. Learned defence counsel has contended that there is no provision in the Act for a direction like this and under the section the maximum period for which the permit may be cancelled is only 6 months. Learned Magistrate also directed that the suspension would run consecutively. Learned defence counsel has contended that there is no provision in the Act for a direction like this and under the section the maximum period for which the permit may be cancelled is only 6 months. Learned State Prosecutor would contend that the section provides only the maximum period in any one case. It is unnecessary to decide this question. Having suspended the driving licence of the driver concerned in K.L.D. 270 and M.D.N. 2284 for three months and the permit of the two vehicles for a period of three months it seems to me unnecessary that such a direction should be made in all the cases separately when all these cases were disposed of on one and the same day. In the result, the conviction and sentence passed on accused 2 to 4 are set aside and they are ordered to be acquitted. Fine, if paid, would be refunded. The conviction and sentence passed on the first accused are confirmed. The direction that the disqualification of the drivers and the suspension of the permit of the two buses will run consecutively is set aside.