ORDER K.B. Asthana, J. - By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the Petitioner has impugned certain orders passed by the Consolidation Authorities in purported exercise of their power under the provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter called the Act). In the statement of proposals published u/s 19 of the Act the area and the valuation of the Chak which was proposed to be allotted to the Petitioner was published. Apparently the Petitioner had no objection to the entries in the statement of proposals. Some other tenure holders filed objections. The Consolidation Officer while considering the objections of the other tenure holders visited the village and proposed certain modifications. The modifications so proposed by the Consolidation Officer resulted in the change in the total area of land allotted to the Petitioner as compared to the total area of his original plots. It is not disputed before me in this writ petition that the change in the area of land allotted to the Petitioner as a result of the said modification by the Consolidation Officer differed by more than 20 per cent from the area of his original plots. The matter was, therefore, submitted by the Consolidation Officer to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) for grant of permission by the Director of Consolidation under the proviso to Section 15(1)(a) of the Act. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) referred the matter to the Deputy Director of Consolidation. It appears that before the requisite permission had been obtained from the Director of Consolidation, the Consolidation Officer passed the final order. The Petitioner went up in appeal from the said order of the Consolidation Officer to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) which was dismissed. The Petitioner then filed a revision u/s 48 of the Act against the appellate order. This revision application was filed by the Petitioner some time in January, 1960. It is averred in the affidavit filed by the Petitioner that upto that stage there was no permission of the Director of Consolidation u/s 15(1)(a) of the Act on the record of the case. This revision application was filed by the Petitioner some time in January, 1960. It is averred in the affidavit filed by the Petitioner that upto that stage there was no permission of the Director of Consolidation u/s 15(1)(a) of the Act on the record of the case. Though in the counter affidavit filed by the opposite parties on behalf of opposite parties 4 to 7 this assertion has been denied, but that denial is not convincing for the simple reason that the Deputy Director of Consolidation in the impugned order passed by him in revision himself has observed that the Consolidation Officer produced the permission before him and that presumably would have been done when the revision was being heard by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The permission is dated 12.12.1959 and is signed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. It is again not disputed that the officer as the Deputy Director who heard the revision and one who grant ed permission on 12.12.1959 were not the same. However, on the consideration that the requisite permission u/s 15(1)(a) of the Act had been obtained for the modification the Dy. Director dismissed the revision. The Petitioner has now come up to this Court impugning all these proceedings and the orders passed thereon. 2. When the petition was heard by me at an earlier stage Sri. G.N. Verma, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, sought to raise a question regarding the validity of the permission dated 12.12.1959 accorded by the Dy. Director of Consolidation, Mathura purported to be u/s 15(1)(a) of the Act then it was pointed out by Sri. G.P. Tandon learned Counsel for the opposite parties Nos. 4 to 7, that such a ground had not been raised in the writ petition. As the question raised by Sri Verma for the Petitioner went to the root of the matter and did not require elucidation of any further fact I thought it proper that an application be made for raising this ground. I also called upon Sri. K.B. Garg, learned Junior Standing Counsel, who usually appears for the Consociation authorities in this Court, to be ready to assist the Court on the question raised, as it was of some importance. I also called upon Sri. K.B. Garg, learned Junior Standing Counsel, who usually appears for the Consociation authorities in this Court, to be ready to assist the Court on the question raised, as it was of some importance. As the learned Counsel for the Petitioner had not specifically raised the ground in his petition and a formal application had to be made, the hearing had to be adjourned on payment of costs by the Petitioner. The requisite application has been filed and the case has been again put up. 3. An objection was raised by the learned junior standing counsel and by Shri G.P. Tandon for the opposite parties 4 to 7 that this ground should not be allowed to be raised for the first time in the writ petition. Sri Garg drew my attention to certain cases decided by this Court that a question which has not been agitated before the subordinate court or the authorities whose orders arc subject of challenge in the writ petition, that question should not be allowed to be raised for the first time in a petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution. I do not think the cases, relied upon by the learned Counsel for the opposite parties, lay down any hard and fast rule that a new ground of attack is not permissible in the writ petitions. It depends on facts and circumstances of each case. There is good authority for the proposition that a ground raising a question which goes to the root of the matter as to jurisdiction nr power of an authority, whose acts or orders have been brought up before the High court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution can be allowed to be raised if it otherwise: does not require any further enquiry and no prejudice is caused to the opposite parties at the hearing. I had adjourned the case and had warned Mr. K.B. Garg, learned junior standing counsel to be ready to meet the ground. Since then enough time has elapsed and neither of the opposite parties have made any complaint that they have been taken by surprise or that they had not been afforded sufficient time to meet the new ground of attack. K.B. Garg, learned junior standing counsel to be ready to meet the ground. Since then enough time has elapsed and neither of the opposite parties have made any complaint that they have been taken by surprise or that they had not been afforded sufficient time to meet the new ground of attack. Moreover, as it appears to me, it cannot be said that it is a new ground of attack for I find that such a question must have been raised before the Deputy Director of Consolidation when he was hearing the revision, otherwise there would not have been any necessity for an observation by him that the requisite permission u/s 15(1)(a) of the Act had been produced. That question may not have been raised in the specific form in which Sri. G.N. Verma, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, has raised before me, but it appears that on behalf of the Petitioner, it must have been argued before the Deputy Director of Consolidation that no permission was granted by the Director of Consolidation u/s 15(1)(a) of the Act. As the permission was for the first time produced before the Deputy Director of Consolidation and presumably at the hearing I cannot blame the Petitioner, if he could not before the Deputy Director of Consolidation argue that the permission itself was invalid not having been granted by the proper authority, for such a ground could only be raised after careful scrutiny of that permission and the examination of the relevant law and the notifications. I agree with the submission of Sri G.N. Verma, for the Petitioner, that the permission having been produced by the Consolidation Authorities at the fag end of the proceedings the Petitioner had no proper opportunity before the Deputy Director of Consolidation to challenge its validity. I think that the reasons given by me above and the circumstances in which the so called new ground has been raised by Sri G.N. Verma, counsel for the Petitioner, are enough justification to allow the ground to be raised and entertained particularly when the costs paid have been accepted by the learned Counsel for the opposite parties. 4. I think that the reasons given by me above and the circumstances in which the so called new ground has been raised by Sri G.N. Verma, counsel for the Petitioner, are enough justification to allow the ground to be raised and entertained particularly when the costs paid have been accepted by the learned Counsel for the opposite parties. 4. Sri G.N. Verma learned Counsel for the Petitioner has mainly pressed that under the provisions of Clause (a) of Sub-section (i) of Section 15 of the Act it is the Director of Consolidation who is authorized to grant per-mission and since the permission on question was granted by the Deputy Director of Consolidation it had (sic)o validity and would not be a per-mission as required by law. It is not disputed by the learned Counsel for the opposite parties that the permission is signed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation Mathura. Despite my directions to the learned Junior Standing Counsel no material has been placed before me which would show that the matter was ever submitted to the Director of Consolidation and it was on his direction that the Deputy Director of Consolidation recorded the permission. I will, therefore, proceed on the basis that it was the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Mathura who considered the matter and accorded the permission. 5. The question now arises is whether the Deputy Director of Consolidation posted at Mathura was authorized u/s 15(1)(a) of the Act to accord permission or that be would be a Director of Consolidation for the purpose of that section? Sri. K.B. Garg, relied on a notification issued by the, Government in the exercise of his power u/s 42(4) of the Act, dated 28,7.1955. by which the Governor was pleased to confer on the Assistant Director of Consolidation, Mathura all the powers exercisable by the Director of Consolidation u/s 15(i)(a) of the Act. It. appears that the provision of Section 42(1)(a) of the Act as it stood at the relevant time included the Assistant. Director of Consolidation as one of the Authority which could be appointed by the State Government under the Act. There was no mention of a Deputy Director of Consolidation. In 1956 an Act amending some of the provisions of the parent Act was passed which was U.P. Act 24 of 1956. It came into force from 3rd of July, 1956. Director of Consolidation as one of the Authority which could be appointed by the State Government under the Act. There was no mention of a Deputy Director of Consolidation. In 1956 an Act amending some of the provisions of the parent Act was passed which was U.P. Act 24 of 1956. It came into force from 3rd of July, 1956. In Section 42 of the Principal Act for the words 'Assistant Director" wherever they occurred the words "Deputy Director" were substituted. The effect of this amendment was that from July, 1956 onwards under the Act the Government had power to appoint Deputy Director of Consolidation and the Authority bearing designation of Assistant Director vanished. Then on 21.9.1956 by a notification issued by the Government in exercise of its power under Sub-section (1) of Section 42, the Assistant Director of Consolidation, Mathura was appointed "ex officio" as Deputy Director of Consolidation. It would also be proper to refer to the addition of Sub-Section 4A to Section 3 of the Principal Act by the U.P. Amending. Act XXXVIII of 1958. It was provided by this addition that the Deputy Director shall include an Assistant Director of Consolidation. 6. Sri. K.B. Garg, learned Junior Standing Counsel, submitted that by virtue of the notification dated 28.7. 1955 the Assistant Director of Consolidation, Mathura, was duly authorized under Sub-section (4) of Section 42 of the Art to exercise the power of Director of Consolidation u/s 15(1)(a) of the Act and since by the latter notification dated 21.9.1956 above referred to, he exofficio became the Deputy Director of Consolidation, carried along with him all the powers which he has as an Assistant Director and when the requisite permission was granted by that officer u/s 15(1)(a) of the Act on 12.12.1959 he was com patent to exercise that power. Sri. G.P. Tandon, learned Counsel for the opposite parties 4 to 7 submitted that the word 'ex officio' was purposely used in the notification by the Government as the intention was that apart from the powers of the Deputy Director which that officer could exercise under the Act he would continue to exercise at the same time all those powers which were conferred upon him previously as an Assistant Director Consolidation. I have, with certain amount of reluctance, come to the conclusion that the submissions made by the learned Counsel for either set of the opposite parties are not sound. 7. It appears to me that the Governor seems to have been advised that after the amending Act XXIV of 1956 had come into force the notification u/s (1) of Section 42 issued under his name on 21.9.1956 would be sufficient to bestow upon the Deputy Director of Consolidation of Mathura the power of Director of Consolidation u/s 15(1)(a) of the Act. But I do not think that it has any such effect. It would be noticed that the notification dated 21.9.1956 issued by the Governor is not in exercise of the power under Sub-section (4) of Section 42 but only refers to Sub-section. (l) of that Section. Sub-section (1) of Section 42 only in powers the State Government or the Governor for making appointments. Sub-section (2) provides that the Director of Consolidation and the Deputy Director, of Consolidation under Sub-section (1) would perform such duties and exercise such power of supervision and superintendence over the work of subordinate officers as may be prescribed. That is to say as prescribed by the Act and the Rules made thereunder. We are not concerned here with Sub-section (3) which deals with other class of Officers. Then sub Section (4) provides that the State Government may by notification in the official gazette empower the Deputy Director of Consolidation to discharge all or such of the functions of the Director of Consolidation as may be specified in the notification. The office of the Deputy Director of Consolidation was undoubtedly created for the first time from 3rd of July, 1956 and Sub-section (4) of Section 42, as it stood on 3rd of July 1956, specifically provided that if any function of the Director of Consolidation had to be discharged by the Deputy Director of Consolidation than it was to be conferred by a notification of the Government. It is admitted by the learned Junior Standing Counsel that no notification under Sub-section (4) of Section 42 was issued by the State Government or the Governor conferring any power or function on the newly appointed Deputy Director to perform or discharge the functions of the Director of Consolidation u/s 15(1)(a) of the Act. It is admitted by the learned Junior Standing Counsel that no notification under Sub-section (4) of Section 42 was issued by the State Government or the Governor conferring any power or function on the newly appointed Deputy Director to perform or discharge the functions of the Director of Consolidation u/s 15(1)(a) of the Act. Bat he submitted that the Governor having appointed the Assistant Consolidation Officer, Mathura as the Deputy Director, Consolidation, Mathura by the notification dated 21.9.1956 it only brought about a change in the designation without effecting the powers which that officer had enjoyed under the previous notification under Sub-section (4) of Section 42 of the Act dated 28.7.1953. The submission seemed to be that the powers and functions of the erstwhile Assistant Consolidation Officer continued and could be exercised by the Deputy Director, Consolidation, Mathura, without any fresh delegation of power upon him by a notification under Sub-section (4) of Section 42 of the Act. The submission so made does not commend itself to me. The amendment brought about by Act No. XXIV o; 19J6 resulted in the extinction of Assistant Consolidation Officer, Mathura as an authority under the Act. No office by that name existed after July 3, 1956. Unless it was provided to the contrary the power and functions which was exercised and performed by the Assistant Director would also cease. It would be seen that under the scheme of Section 42 it is by publication of a notification in exercise of powers under Sub-section (4) that the powers and functions of the Director of Consolidation can be conferred on the Deputy Director, Consolidation. Even if it be assumed that the use of the word 'ex officio' in the notification dated 21.9.1956 was intended to confer upon the Deputv Director, Consolidation of Mathura the powers of the Director u/s 15(1)(a) of the Act which hitherto were enjoyed by the Assistant Director, Consolidation, athura by virtue of the notification dated 28.7.1955, in my view it would fail to achieve that object for the simple reason that the notification dated 21.9.1956 was not a notification under Sub-section (4) of Section 42 of the Act. 8. 8. The argument raised by Sri G.P. Tandon, appearing for opposite parties numbers 4 to 7, that since by virtue of holding his post as Assistant Director of Consolidation that officer was appointed as Deputy Director of Consolidation, ex officio he would be deemed to have carried along with him all the powers hitherto exercised by him, is fallacious for the reason that this line of argument presupposes that the office or the post of Assistant Director of Consolidation was continued and remained in existence despite the amending Act of 1956. Sri Garg referred to Sub-Section 4A of Section 3 of the Act as amended in 1958 and pointed out that at least after 27th November, 1958 when the U.P. Act XXXVIII of 1958 came into force the term "Deputy Director of Consolidation" would be synonymous with the term "Assistant Director of Consolidation" and since the Assistant Director of Consolidation was designated as Deputy Director of Consolidation, the notification dated 27.8.1955 would continue to have force as it was never withdrawn or cancelled and for the term "Assistant Director of Consolidation" in that notification the term "Deputy Director of Consolidation" can properly be read. This approach of the learned Junior Standing Counsel assumes the continuity of the notification dated 28.7.1955 even though after 3rd July 1956 the post of the Assistant Director, Consolidation, ceased and there was no such Authority or office contemplated under the Act. The fallacy in the argument so made is obvious. By the amending Act of 1958 what was provided was that the term 'Deputy Director, Consolidation" includes the "Assistant Director of Consolidation". It was not vice versa, that is term 'Assistant Consolidation officer' included "Deputy Director, Consolidation''. It is clear to me that the two terms cannot be said to be synonymous and there is no warrant for holding that after the amending Act 1958 the notification dated 28.7.1956 was revived and for the word ''Assistant Director" the word 'Deputy Director' could be read into it. 9. To my mind there has been clear lacuna. After the amending Act No. XXIV of 1956 came into force it would have been desirable had a notification been issued under Sub-section (4) of Section 42, conferring upon the Deputy Director of Consolidation of Mathura the powers to grant permission u/s 15(1)(a) of the Act. 9. To my mind there has been clear lacuna. After the amending Act No. XXIV of 1956 came into force it would have been desirable had a notification been issued under Sub-section (4) of Section 42, conferring upon the Deputy Director of Consolidation of Mathura the powers to grant permission u/s 15(1)(a) of the Act. This commission of the State Government in my view, cannot be remedied by taking recourse to the arguments of the nature advanced by the learned Counsel for the opposite parties. The fact remains that the Deputy Director of Consolidation Mathura had no power on 12.12.19o9 to accord permission u/s 15(1)(a) of the Act which was the function of the Director of Consolidation under the Act. Thus I find that there is no valid permission u/s 15(1)(a) of the Act and the modification in the Chak of the Petitioner which brought about a difference of more than 20 percent in the area as compared to the area of his old plots is without authority of law and cannot be sustained. 10. It was next urged by Sri. K.B. Garg, learned Junior Standing Counsel that the Petitioner is not entitled to succeed in this petition in as much as he has not impleaded the remaining tenure holders of the village who may be affected by the order passed in this writ petition. On a perusal of the affidavit and counter affidavit filed in this petition it appears that the opposite parties Nos. 3 to 7 will be directly affected for the merits of the controversy as to the increase and decrease of the area in the Chak of the Petitioner would concern them only and not the whole body of tenure holders. The orders passed in this writ petition would not affect directly the right of the other tenure holders. The necessary and proper parties have been impleaded in this petition, and there is no defect in the petition on that score. 11. The result is that this petition succeeds. It is allowed. It is directed that the impugned orders of the consolidation authorities be quashed and not be given effect to In the circumstances of the case I make no order as to.