Order:- This revision petition has been filed by the landlord whose application lor eviction of the respondent under the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act has been rejected by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Coimbatore. The petition was filed under section 3, sub-section (4)(a) of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act on the allegation that there were arrears of rent tor three Faslis from 1958. It was stated that the respondent took possession of ‘the property as tenant in April, 1954 on an agreement to pay Rs. 300 and 40 kalams of paddy per annum. In the counter statement the respondent admitted that the relationship of landlord and tenant subsisted between her and the petitioner between 1954 and 1958. She alleged that thereafter she surrendered the land in April 1958. Sububsequent to that date, according to her, she had neither possession, nor did she assume the status of a cultivating tenant vis-a-vis the petitioner. In the enquiry on this application the Revenue Divisional Officer adopted a wholly illegal procedure in directing the Revenue Inspector to report about who the real tenant was. I am unable to find any provision under the Cultivating tenants Protection Act enabling the Revenue Court to call for such a report from the Revenue Inspector. Under the Rules framed, rule 8 provides that the proceeding of the Revenue Divisional Officer shall be summary and shall be governed as far as possible by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, having regard to the issue of service of summons, examination of parties and witnesses, the production of documents. Under Rule 4, the Court or the Revenue Divisional Officer is empowered to enter upon any land and inspect and do any act which in its or his opinion may be necessary for the purpose of carrying out of the functions entrusted to it or him by or under the Act and to summon witnesses and call for the production of documents. This rule certainly does not empower the Revenue Divisional Officer to call upon the Revenue Inspector to submit to him a report on a matter which he has to decide. Further, the Revenue Inspector has gone about gathering materials as to who the tenant on the land was, recording statements from villagers and others and these statements have gone into the records as exhibits. Further, the Revenue Inspector has gone about gathering materials as to who the tenant on the land was, recording statements from villagers and others and these statements have gone into the records as exhibits. No doubt the petitioner-landlord himself does not seriously object to this procedure as some of the statements are favourable to him. But the Tribunal like any other Judicial Tribunal is governed by the Evidence Act, and cannot take statements of parties behind their back and bring them into the record. Admittedly he has not been appointed as a Commissioner under the Code. No doubt, the Revenue Inspector has been examined as a Court witness. But he would be competent only to speak to things he has seen for what they are worth but what he heard would be hearsay and equally the record of the information gathered by the Revenue Inspector will not be legal evidence for decision of the matters in controversy before the Tribunal. This practice if prevalent cannot be too strongly condemned. Evidently the Revenue Divisional Officer had in his mind the enabling provision under the Madras Act XXIV of 1956, which by rule 8 provides that when hearing an application under the Act, the Rent Court shall have also power to depute any Officer of the Revenue Department not lower in rank than a Revenue Inspector to make a local enquiry and inspection and to collect relevant data. That power has been given to the Revenue Court for the fixation of fair rent in respect of which local information may be necessary. Certainly that power cannot be utilised and an officer deputed to gather evidence on the question whether a particular person was a ‘cultivating tenant or not when functioning under a different jurisdiction. The agent of the petitioner has gone into the witnesses box and given evidence. In chief examination he has stated that the respondent, continued in possession. He further stated that Periasawmi is her son and she with him form members of a joint family. There was no cross-examination of this witness on the question of the plea of surrender of the land, which the respondent had set up in her counter statement. There was not even a suggestion of any surrender. He further stated that Periasawmi is her son and she with him form members of a joint family. There was no cross-examination of this witness on the question of the plea of surrender of the land, which the respondent had set up in her counter statement. There was not even a suggestion of any surrender. The only question put to this witness which may be taken as relevant to the issue of surrender is whether it was not correct to say that the kist was being paid by Periaswami after 1958. The respondent herself has gone into the witness box and given evidence. Payment of kist by Periaswami would be neither here nor there he being the son. All that she has stated in chief examination is that she left the land in 1958. It must be noted that she has simply left the land according to her version. It was followed up by the further statement that her son is looking after the land since 1958. She also stated that the landlord and P.W. 1 (that is landlord’s agent) knew that her son is in possession of the land. It must be noted that there is no plea of surrender of the tenancy in the chief-examination. Curiously, in cross-examination she had stated that she had nothing to do with the land and Periaswami is her only son. No doubt to a question from the Court she stated that she told the landlord to take charge of the land when she left it. As pointed out earlier, this suggestion must have been made to the landlord’s agent when he was in the box. It has not been so made and the answer is given only to a question from the Court. There is no suggestion of any surrender or intimation to the landlord of the surrender in the chief examination. There has been a re-cross on behalf of the petitioner, who elicited that the respondent did not get any receipt for having given possession. It is also elicited that she had not taken back Exhibit P-1 which she had executed in favour of the present petitioner. Now on this evidence the Revenue Divisional Officer has not given any specific finding that the respondent had surrendered possession of the land. It is observed that the evidence showed that the respondent’s son was in actual possession of the land. Now on this evidence the Revenue Divisional Officer has not given any specific finding that the respondent had surrendered possession of the land. It is observed that the evidence showed that the respondent’s son was in actual possession of the land. If at all there can be said to be any finding in the order about the termination of the tenancy it is the remark that there is not sufficient evidence to show that the respondent continued to be a tenant. With this observation the petition was dismissed. Mr. A.K. Sreeraman, learned Counsel for the petitioner, contends here is a case of failure to exercise a jurisdiction which admittedly on the record is quite apparent added to irregularity in procedure, and failure to determine the relevant questions. Learned Counsel draws my attention to the definition of a ‘cultivating tenant’ given in Madras Act XXV of 1955. The definition runs thus: “Section 2 (a): Cultivating tenant in relation to any land means a person who carries on a personal cultivation of such land under a tenancy agreement, express or implied, and includes any such person who continues in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement......” Section 3 provides that subject to the next succeeding sub-sections, no cultivating tenant shall be evicted from his holding or any part thereof during the continuance of the Act, by or at the instance of the landlord, whether in execution of a decree or order of a Court or otherwise. Sub-clause (2)(b) of section 3 runs thus: “who has done any act or has been guilty of any negligence which is destructive of, or injurious, to the land or any crop thereon or has altogether ceased to cultivate the land.” Learned Counsel contends that the entire evidence if read at the most can lead to the conclusion that the respondent had ceased to cultivate the land. In fact,, that is the effect of her evidence in her chief-examination. Her case is that her son Periaswami is cultivating the land. We are not concerned here with the question whether Periaswami by being permitted by the respondent to take up possession of the land and cultivating it can get the status of a cultivating tenant. In fact,, that is the effect of her evidence in her chief-examination. Her case is that her son Periaswami is cultivating the land. We are not concerned here with the question whether Periaswami by being permitted by the respondent to take up possession of the land and cultivating it can get the status of a cultivating tenant. The question is whether, when a person impleaded as a party respondent in an application for eviction admittedly originally as a tenant sets up the plea that’ she was no more cultivating the land, the petition should be dismissed. Section 3, itself entitles a landlord to get an eviction order where the tenant had altogether ceased to cultivate the land. But it must be noted that a person will be a cultivating tenant who continues in possession of the land after termination of the tenancy agreement. As only a cultivating tenant can be evicted under the Act for ceasing, to cultivate it follows that a person can cease to cultivate and still continue in possession. In this case in the absence of proof of surrender the possession must be deemed to continue in the erstwhile tenant. The alleged possession of Periaswami has not been made out to be on any independent right. Learned Counsel points out that if such an interpretation is not given to the section, the landlord will be put to extreme difficulty and harassment. A cultivating tenant has only to come up to the Court in an application for eviction by the landlord and state that he is not in possession of the land and plead that therefore he is not a cultivating tenant and get the petition dismissed. Learned Counsel also pointed out the numerous cases which have come up before Court where Courts have refused to accept the plea of surrender often relied on by landlords. Assume for a moment in this case that the landlord has pleaded surrender and sought to enter into possession. In the absence of specific and convincing evidence the Court will not accept the landlord’s plea of surrender. That being so, the mere statement by a tenant that she is no longer in possession cannot by itself be relied upon as establishing the fact that the tenant had ceased to be a cultivating tenant. In the absence of specific and convincing evidence the Court will not accept the landlord’s plea of surrender. That being so, the mere statement by a tenant that she is no longer in possession cannot by itself be relied upon as establishing the fact that the tenant had ceased to be a cultivating tenant. Learned Counsel submits that if a tenant can be permitted to deny that he is a cultivating tenant, by a mere denial of possession, the process can go on endlessly, the plea made a ruse and the landlord defeated even of his just and attenuated rights. I see the force in this contention. Unless the Court can on the evidence placed before it come to a definite conclusion that there has been surrender of the tenancy a tenant placed in possession even though his tenancy period had expired must be deemed to continue as cultivating tenant subject to the right, liabilities and obligations under the Act. Of course, if the tenant establishes the plea of surrender and the Court is satisfied that he is no longer a cultivating tenant the landlord’s petition will have to be dismissed. In this case, it will be noticed that the plea of surrender has not been made out at all. All that one finds is the tenant saying that she has left the land and her son is in possession. In the circumstances, the Revenue Divisional Officer erred in rejecting the petition for eviction. If in fact the tenant is no longer in possession she will not be in the least prejudiced by an order of eviction against her. It is unnecessary in this case to pass an order of eviction on the basis of arrears of rent being established. Order can be passed on the admission of the tenant that she has ceased to cultivate the land. There is therefore no necessity to find any arrears and default in the payment of arrears. On the very admission of the tenant the petitioner-landlord is entitled to an order for eviction. There will be an order accordingly. The revision is allowed. No costs. I thank Mr. K. Alagiriswamy, who appeared amicus curiae, for his valuable assistance in looking into the records and placing before the Court the legal position in the matter. R.M. ----- Order accordingly.