JUDGMENT This is an appeal by the husband against the judgment of the district judge confirming the order of the trial court granting a decree of divorce in favour of his wife. The respondent wife filed a petition for a decree of divorce under section 13(2)(i) of the hindu marriage act, the husband married one kannammai achi about 40 years ago, it is admitted that kannammai achi is still alive and her marital relationship with the appellant is still subsisting, the husband (appellant) subsequently married the respondent herein in 1942 as his second wife, the facts are not in dispute, and under section 13(2)(i) of the act the wife is entitled to a decree for divorce, the petition was opposed by the husband on two grounds. Firstly, it was contended that it was filed five years after the coming into force of the act and that there was unnecessary and improper delay on the part of the wife in filing the petition. Secondly, it was contended that the wife was taking advantage of her own wrong for the purpose of the relief asked for. Both the Courts below found that there was no unnecessary or improper delay in filing the petition. I do not see any ground for not accepting the conclusion arrived at by the Courts below. The mere fact that the petition was filed five years after the coming into force of the Act will not disentitle the wife from getting the relief. There are no materials on record to show that there was unnecessary or improper delay in filing the petition. It was next contended that the petitioner herself was living in adultery and that she was taking advantage of her own wrong for the purpose of obtaining the divorce. Before dealing with this question, a point of law relating to the maintainability of this Second Appeal that was raised by the learned Counsel for the respondent may be considered. Mr. A.V. Narayanaswami Iyer, learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that while an appeal is provided against a decree or order of a Court under the Hindu Marriage Act, there is no provision for a Second Appeal. He submitted that an order passed under the Hindu Marriage Act is not a decree as defined in the Civil Procedure Code and an appeal is provided only under section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act. He submitted that an order passed under the Hindu Marriage Act is not a decree as defined in the Civil Procedure Code and an appeal is provided only under section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act. As the orders made under the Act are not decrees as defined under the Civil Procedure Code it was contended that section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code is not applicable. Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act may be extracted : “All decrees and orders made by the Court in any proceeding under this Act shall be enforced in like manner as the decrees and orders of the Court made in the exercise of the Original Civil Jurisdiction are enforced, and may be appealed from under any law for the time being in force : Provided that there shall be no appeal on the subject of costs only.” Thus, all decrees and orders made by the Court may be appealed from under any law for the time being in force, as if they were passed in the exercise of the Original Civil Jurisdiction. An appeal is provided against any decree or order. By virtue of this section a decree or order of the Court is deemed to be a decree or order passed by a Civil Court. Against a decree passed by a civil Court there is not only an appeal but a second appeal provided. The construction put forward by the learned Counsel for the respondent that there is only one appeal, because of the specific provision under section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act and that it cannot be treated as a decree for the purpose of a Second Appeal cannot be accepted, section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act provides that appeals will lie as if they were decrees or orders of a Civil Court. It was held in National Telephone Co., Ltd. v. Postmaster-General, L.R. (1913) A.C. 546 at 552., as follows : “When a question is stated to be referred to an established Court without more, it, in my opinion, imports that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court are to attach, and also that any general right of appeal from its decisions likewise attaches.” In Secretary of State for India v. Chellikani Rama Rao, (1910) 31 MLJ. 324 : I.L.R. 39 Mad. 324 : I.L.R. 39 Mad. 617 : L.R. 43 I.A. 192., it was observed : “……………….when proceedings of this character reach the District Court, that Court is appealed to as one of the ordinary Courts of the country, with regard to whose procedure, orders and decrees the ordinary rules of Civil Procedure Code apply.” To the same effect is the view held in Adaikappa Chettiar v. Chandrasekhara Thevar, (1948) 1 MLJ. 41 : I.L.R. 1948 Mad.505: L.R. 74 I.A. 264., where their Lordships observed that where a legal right was in dispute and the ordinary Courts of the country were seized of such dispute the Courts were governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto and an appeal could lie if authorised by such rules notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises under a special statute which did not in turn confer a right of appeal. Dealing with the same question Ramachandra Iyer, J., (as he then was) in Pichai v. Mariappa, (1959) 2 MLJ. 152 : I.L.R. (1939) Mad. 969., stated the position thus at page 973 : “Under the Hindu Marriage Act, the statute does give a right of appeal, but it does not prescribe the forum to which such appeals would lie. A question would also arise whether there would be only one appeal, or there would be a right of further appeal from a decree or order of the appellate Court…. It follows that both under the provisions of section 28 of the Act, as well as the general principles of law an appeal would lie against a decree in a matrimonial cause to that Court, to which appeals generally lie from a decree or order of the Court to which jurisdiction is granted…………….As the decision in the matrimonial disputes under sections 9, 10, 11, 12 or 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act should be deemed to be a decree, a further appeal would lie from the decision of the District Judge on appeal.” I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the learned Judge. It has to be held that by virtue of the provisions of section 28 and the general principles of law an appeal would lie against an order in a matrimonial cause, as if the order or decree is passed by an ordinary civil Court. This objection of the learned Counsel has got to be rejected. It has to be held that by virtue of the provisions of section 28 and the general principles of law an appeal would lie against an order in a matrimonial cause, as if the order or decree is passed by an ordinary civil Court. This objection of the learned Counsel has got to be rejected. It was next contended by Mr. Parthasarathy, learned Counsel for the appellant, that the wife was taking advantage of her own wrong for the purpose of obtaining the divorce. It was submitted on behalf of the husband that the wife was living an adulterous life and that taking advantage of that life she had filed the present petition for divorce. On this, a preliminary finding was recorded by the trial Court that adulterous life could not amount to a wrong, which is said to have been taken advantage by the wife in filing the petition. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that an opportunity ought to have been given to the husband to substantiate his case that the respondent (wife) was living an adulterous, life and adulterous conduct if proved would disentitled the respondent from getting any relief. Section 23(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act provides that the Court shall grant a decree for divorce if it is satisfied that the petitioner is not in any way taking advantage of her own wrong or disability for obtaining the relief. The petition by the wife is for divorce on the ground that the husband has a first wife living and that he married the respondent-wife before the commencement of the Hindu Marriage Act. If, for the purpose of argument, it is conceded that the wife was living in adultery, the question that would arise then is, is she taking advantage of her adulterous conduct in obtaining a divorce. The adulterous conduct has no relation whatsoever with the relief claimed. The relief claimed is for a divorce on the ground that the first wife is living, and that has not even the remotest connection with the adulterous conduct of the wife. The rule in section 23(1) is based on the principles of justice that a wrong-doer should not be permitted to take advantage of her own wrong, while seeking relief at the hands of the Court. The rule in section 23(1) is based on the principles of justice that a wrong-doer should not be permitted to take advantage of her own wrong, while seeking relief at the hands of the Court. In a petition for relief on the ground of adultery of the respondent no relief can be granted to the petitioner, whose own adultery or desertion had contributed to the misconduct of the respondent. So also a petition for relief on the ground of adultery or unsoundness of mind or desertion will not be allowed, if the petitioner has been guilty of such wilful neglect or misconduct as has conduced to the adultery or unsoundness of mind or desertion on the part of the respondent. In Parrock v. Parrock, (1956) 1 All. E.R. 555 at page 559, the learned Judge summed up the position as follows : “In my view the present is a case where the wife, perhaps because she was tired of her marriage and of her husband, and perhaps because she had a good deal of affection for Mr. Horbacz, decided to leave the husband and to set up home in this caravan. Once she decided to do that I do not think that the wife really cared at all whether Mrs. Mepham, originally a house-keeper, subsequently became the husband's mistress. In my view the wife was quite indifferent to what went on in the husband's home or what the husband did with other women once she had gone to set up house with Mr. Horbacz.” In the circumstances of the case it was held that the Court's discretion should be exercised in the husband's favour. Though it was established that the husband was living in adultery, he was given relief as he was not taking advantage of his own wrong, as his misconduct was not the cause for the wife living in adultery. In Jenkins v. Jenkins, (1956) 2 All. E.R. 596, the facts are as follows. The parties were married in 1932. On 1st January, 1952, the wife expelled the husband from the matrimonial home. At that date she had no ground for suspecting him of adulterous conduct or that he would commit adultery if she deserted him. In about August, 1952, the husband met a Mrs. S. In about March, 1953 he committed adultery with her and since then had been living with her in adultery. At that date she had no ground for suspecting him of adulterous conduct or that he would commit adultery if she deserted him. In about August, 1952, the husband met a Mrs. S. In about March, 1953 he committed adultery with her and since then had been living with her in adultery. The wife applied for an order under the Summary Jurisdiction (Separation and Maintenance) Act, 1895 to 1949 on the ground that the husband had committed adultery. The Court held that the act of the wife expelling the husband on 1st January, 1952, did not in fact cause the husband to commit adultery fourteen months later and did not therefore amount to conduct conducing to that adultery and that she was entitled to the order sought. The conduct of the wife in expelling the husband was not taken as a wrong which she was taking advantage of for the purpose of the petition. In Day v. Day, (1957) 1 All. E.R.848., the husband left the wife in 1943. In 1944 he committed adultery and informed the wife, but she took no step to obtain a divorce. In 1953 the husband wrote to the wife making a bona fide offer to return and resume cohabitation with her. The wife's reply amounted to a refusal but she did not refer to the fact that the husband had committed adultery nor did she put that forward as a reason for not receiving him back. The husband petitioned for divorce on the ground of the wife's desertion as from 1953. It was held that the husband had proved that his adultery was not the cause of the wife's desertion since on the facts it was established that the wife had formed her intention not to resume cohabitation independently of his adultery. The adulterous conduct of the husband did not in any way lead to the desertion by the wife and therefore the husband was not taking advantage of his own wrong for the purpose of the petition for divorce. From a discussion of the cases cited above, it is clear that in order to disentitle the wife from the relief of divorce, it must be found that she was taking advantage of her own wrong for the purpose of obtaining a divorce. In other words her conduct must be in some way responsible for the matrimonial wrong committed by the husband. In other words her conduct must be in some way responsible for the matrimonial wrong committed by the husband. As already observed, it cannot be said that the adulterous conduct of the wife, even if admitted had anything to do with the relief asked for by the wife, for, the relief is based on the ground that the first wife is living in marital relationship with the respondent. The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant has therefore got to be rejected. In the result this Civil Miscellaneous Second Appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. No leave. V.K.-----Appeal dismissed.