JUDGMENT S.N. Katju, J. - This is a plaintiff's appeal arising out of a suit for declaration that he is a co-bhumidhar and co-sirdar of the plots mentioned in the plaint. It was alleged that the plots in dispute belonged to Gauji and after his death they were inherited by his two sons the plaintiff Jaggu and the first defendant Basantu and both of them were co-bhumidhars and co-sirdars of the plot in dispute. Smt. Sudhni was the wife of Gauji. It was contended on behalf of the first defendant that Jaggu was not the son of Gauji. Sudhni had married one Nepal and Jaggu was his son, and after the death of Nepal, Sudhni had contracted a second marriage with Gauji and Basantu was the son of Gauji. The first defendant, therefore, contested the Jaggu had no interest whatsoever in the plots in dispute and was not entitled to the reliefs claimed by him. The trial court decreed the plaintiffs suit. The first defendant had relied on a statement made by Smt. Sudhni in an earlier suit instituted under Sec. 59 of the U.P. Tenancy Act in which she had stated that she was first married to one Nepal and Jaggu was born of that union and after the death of Nepal she had married Gauji and Basantu was born after her marriage with Gauji. Admittedly the revenue court in which the aforesaid suit had been instituted had returned the plaint for presentation to the proper court. The trial court expressed the view that the aforesaid statement of Sudhni was not admissible in evidence under Sec. 32(5) of the Evidence Act because the statement was made after the question in dispute between the parties had been raised. The trial court did not consider the admissibility of the statement under Sec. 33 of the Evidence Act. It considered the oral and documentary evidence on the record and held that Jaggu was the son of Gauji and was entitled to the reliefs claimed by him. On appeal the lower appellate court set aside the decree of the trial court and dismissed the suit. It expressed the view that the statement of Sudhni before the revenue court was admissible. It further expressed the view that the documents relied on by the plaintiff did not support the case and placing reliance on the aforesaid statement of Sudhni dismissed the plaintiffs suit. It expressed the view that the statement of Sudhni before the revenue court was admissible. It further expressed the view that the documents relied on by the plaintiff did not support the case and placing reliance on the aforesaid statement of Sudhni dismissed the plaintiffs suit. It was contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff appellant that the statement of Sudhni as not admissible under Sec. 32(5) of the Evidence Act because it had been made before the revenue court after the dispute between Jaggu and Basantu had arisen. The question raised before the revenue court was the same which was subsequently raised in the suit in appeal before me. Evidently the statement of Sudhni would not be admissible under Sec. 32(5) of the Act because it had been made after the dispute between the parties had arisen. Learned counsel further contended that the statement would not be admissible under Sec. 33 of the Evidence Act because the statement of Sudhni was not made in a judicial proceedings, since the court in which it had been made, had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It was contended that proceedings before a court which has no jurisdiction would not amount to judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sec. 33 of the Evidence Act. Consequently the statement of Sudhni would not be admissible in evidence in the present suit. Learned counsel relied on Bimaraz v. Panaya, ILR III Mad. 48, Sankappa Rai v. Koraga Pujary, ILR 54 Mad. 561, Hardasmal Kubchand Kernalani v. Jagan Nath Jauhrimal, ILR 7 Lahore 582, Sudhindra Nath v. State, AIR 1953 Calcutta 339. In Sankappa Rai v. Koraga Pujary, ILR 54 Mad. 561, it was observed that: "a proceeding before a Judge or Magistrate who has no jurisdiction is not a judicial proceeding and the evidence of a witness given in such a proceeding cannot be used under Sec. 33 of the Evidence Act on a retrial before a competent court, the particular kind of jurisdiction involved in that case being territorial. For an expression of the general proposition that if a Court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the litigation its proceedings are mere nullifiers, reference may be made to Rajalakshmi Dasee v. Kotvavani Dasee, 1910 ILR 38 Cal. 639. 2. For an expression of the general proposition that if a Court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the litigation its proceedings are mere nullifiers, reference may be made to Rajalakshmi Dasee v. Kotvavani Dasee, 1910 ILR 38 Cal. 639. 2. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Sudhindra Nath v. State, AIR 1953 Calcutta 339 expressed its agreement with the aforesaid observations made in Sankappa Rai's case, ILR 54 Mad. 561 and observed:- "The matter seems to us to be beyond all question. If the proceeding had taken place without jurisdiction, it cannot by any means be said that the evidence given in those proceedings was given in a judicial proceedings. It was admitted in the present case that the plaint in the earlier suit had not been instituted in the proper court. It would mean that the revenue court had expressed the view that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Once it is found that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit it would follow that all proceedings before it were not proceeding before a competent court and could not be said to be judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sec. 33 of the Evidence Act. 3. The expression `Judicial Proceeding' has not been interpreted in any decision of this court and I would not like to take a different view than the view taken by the Calcutta, Madras and Lahore High Courts. If a court has no jurisdiction to try a suit then obviously it has no jurisdiction to record statement of witnesses and if any such statement has been recorded it could not be said to be a part of judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sec. 33 of the Evidence Act. I have, therefore, no hesitation in saying that the statement of Sudhni recorded before the revenue court which had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, would not be admissible in evidence. It was contended on behalf of the learned counsel for the respondent that there is a distinction between a court which has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and a court which had jurisdiction to entertain it at the time when it was instituted and subsequently that jurisdiction was taken away. It was contended on behalf of the learned counsel for the respondent that there is a distinction between a court which has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and a court which had jurisdiction to entertain it at the time when it was instituted and subsequently that jurisdiction was taken away. It was contended that at the time when the earlier suit was filed all the suits under the U.P. Tenancy Act had to be instituted in revenue courts and the revenue court had jurisdiction to try the earlier. Subsequently the jurisdiction was taken away. He further contended that at the time when the statement of Sudhni was recorded the revenue court had full jurisdiction to try the suit and therefore the aforesaid statement was made in a proper judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sec. 33 of the Evidence Act. There is nothing on record to indicate as to how and when the revenue court lost its jurisdiction, if initially it had, in entertaining the aforesaid suit. If the court has no jurisdiction to decide a suit, all proceedings before it would be without jurisdiction and will have no legal force. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on Sir Kameshwar Singh v. The Province of Bihar, A.I.R. 1950 Patna 392. It was observed "A court must have jurisdiction throughout the proceedings until termination of those proceedings by the judgment of the Court." In Shiv Bhagwan v. Onkarmal, AIR 1952 Bombay 365, the Court observed: "Now, I think it may be stated as a general principle that no party has a vested right to a particular proceeding or to a particular forum, and it is also well settled that all procedural laws are retrospective unless the legislature expressly states to the contrary. Therefore, procedural laws in force must be applied at the date when a suit or proceeding comes on for trial or disposal." 4. Thus there is no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that Sudhnis statement was admissible because it was made at the time when the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit before it. Even assuming that at the particular time when the statement was recorded the court had jurisdiction it cannot be denied that the Court was subsequently deprived of the jurisdiction which it had and had to return the plaint for presentation to the proper court. Even assuming that at the particular time when the statement was recorded the court had jurisdiction it cannot be denied that the Court was subsequently deprived of the jurisdiction which it had and had to return the plaint for presentation to the proper court. Once it was found that the court had no jurisdiction to try the suit the statement of Sudhni made before it lost its value as a statement made before a competent court and thus it could not be said to have been made in a proper judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sec. 33 of the Evidence Act. 5. I would, therefore, hold that the statement of Sudhni was not admissible under Sec. 33 of the Evidence Act in the present suit. The lower appellate court reversed the finding of the trial court relying only on the aforesaid statement of Sudhni. Once it is found that the statement of Sudhni is not admissible in evidence then no evidence of any value is left on the record to substantiate the case of the defendant that the plaintiff Jaggu was ,not the son of Gauji. The lower appellate court itself referred to the deed of exchange Ex. 1 in which Jaggu and Basantu were described as the sons of Gauji. Sudhni was herself a party to the deed of exchange. In Ex. 2 both Jaggu and Basantu were described as the sons of Gauji. The trial court had considered the oral evidence adduced by the plaintiff and taking the consideration the oral and documentary evidence on record it found that the plaintiff had proved his contention that he is the son of Gauji. The lower appellate court was in error in relying on the statement of Smt. Sudhni made before the revenue court which was not admissible in evidence in the present case. I, therefore, set aside the decree of the lower appellate court and decree the suit in terms of the decree passed by the trial court. The parties will bear their own costs in the courts below but the plaintiff-appellant will have his costs in this Court. 6. The appeal is allowed with costs in this Court only. Appeal allowed.