ORDER D.S. Mathur, J. - This is a revision u/s 115 CPC by Sri Krishna Sharma and another, Plaintiffs, against the order of the Additional District Judge of Moradabad dismissing their appeal u/s 6A. of the Court Fees Act and thereby confirming the order of the Munsif of Moradabad with regard to the court fee payable on the amended plaint. The finding recorded by the subordinate courts is that court fee was payable on a valuation of Rs. l,390/ for the land and Rs. 1974/-for the materials of the building. 2 The facts of the case, in brief, are as below: The Plaintiffs had instituted the present suit against Ram Bharosey and three others for the recovery of arrears of rent and damages and also for ejectment, with the allegations that they (Defendants) were occupying the building as tenants. The Defendants, however, claimed to be the owners thereof whereupon the Plaintiffs had the plaint amended and claimed possession as permanent lessees and asserting the Defendants to be trespassers. On the amended relief the Plaintiffs wanted to pay court fee calculating the valuation of building and land separately, for the building on the market value of the materials of the constructions and for the land on the annual rental paid by them as permanent lessees. In substance, their claim was that for the land, court fee was payable under Clause (v-B) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act and not under Clause (II) of Section 7(v) of the Act. 3. The point for consideration is whether the term "building" as used in sub-section (v) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act includes land, or the building has reference to standing constructions only. In case "building" does not include land, it shall be necessary to lay down how the valuation of the land "or purpose of court fee shall have to be determined. 4. Whether "building" includes and shall depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case. In case "building" does not include land, it shall be necessary to lay down how the valuation of the land "or purpose of court fee shall have to be determined. 4. Whether "building" includes and shall depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case. Where the and is an agricultural one, but some instructions had been made thereupon, he whole of the agricultural land cannot be deemed to appertain to or form (sic)art of the building and, in such a case the land would be distinct from (sic)e building and valuation for purposes (sic)f court fee shall be determined separately for the land, though the market value of the building may include the value of land appurtenant to the building. In such circumstances, the valuation of the whole of the land may be determined separately from the building. But where the land is not an agricultural land and appertains to or forms part of the building, the land must be deemed to be a part of the building and both, the building and the land shall, for purposes of Section 7(v) of the Court Fees Act, be building and court fee shall be payable on the subject matter, i.e. the rights which the Plaintiffs have in such building including land. Incorporation of the City of Victoria v. Bishop of Vocouver Island (1) [(1921) 2 AC 384] the word "building" was held to include fabric and the ground on which it stands. 5. The learned advocate for the Plaintiffs, however, invited my attention to a few decisions of this Court on which I shall now make my comments. The present question was not directly in issue in Mst. Kulsumunnisaft v. Khushnudi Begum and Anr. (2) ( 1953 AWR 617 ), wherein the Defendant had unauthorized occupied the land and made constructions on a part thereon and the Plaintiff had asked for possession after the demolition of the constructions Thus the two acts were distinct, one was of unauthorized occupation of the land and the other of making unauthorized constructions thereon. It was consequently held that the relief for possession of land was governed by Section 7(v)(I)(c) of the Court Fees Act while the relief for demolition under Article 17(iv) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act. In the instant case, however, the Defendants had not made unauthorized constructions. It was consequently held that the relief for possession of land was governed by Section 7(v)(I)(c) of the Court Fees Act while the relief for demolition under Article 17(iv) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act. In the instant case, however, the Defendants had not made unauthorized constructions. What they are alleged to have done is to have unlawfully occupied the building which also includes land. The only act committed by the Defendants was to unlawfully occupy the building and along with the building the land had been taken possession of. The Full Bench case of Shanti Prasad and Ors. v. Mahabir Singh and Ors. (3) ( 1957 AWR 346 FB) applies to valuation of a suit for possession and demolition for purposes of jurisdiction, i.e. under the Suits Valuation Act. Valuation for purposes of the court fee can be different from valuation for purposes of jurisdiction. Further, u/s 4 of the Suits Valuation Act the courts have to determine what property was affected by the relief sought and not what reliefs were actually prayed for in the suit. Consequently, if the Plaintiff merely asked for possession of the land without an additional prayer for demo litiun of the building, court fee shall be payable on the valuation of the land though jurisdiction shall be determined not only by the valuation of the land but also of the building. 6. To sum up, in the instant case land formed part of the building and valuation for purposes of court fee was to be determined under Clause (II) of Section 7(v) of the Court Fees Act. The valuation would be the market value of the building as according to the Plaintiffs, they are the owners thereof and also the market value of the rights of a permanent lessees in the land. The Munsif acted wrongly by fixing the valuation of the building at the value of the materials thereof. Building invariably costs much more than the value of the materials. However, in view of the fact that the State has not challenged the Munsif's order, this part of the order cannot be interfered with in revision. On the market value of the land no evidence had been adduced, and the amin submitted his report on the basis of information received by him at the spot. The Munsif accepted the amin's report and fixed the market value of land at Rs. On the market value of the land no evidence had been adduced, and the amin submitted his report on the basis of information received by him at the spot. The Munsif accepted the amin's report and fixed the market value of land at Rs. 10/- per square yard. This figure being reasonable, the finding with regard to the market value of land, namely, the Plaintiff's interest therein, cannot be questioned in revision. 7. The subordinate courts have thus not committed any material irregularity and their finding is not one which can be interfered with in revision. 8. The revision has no force and is hereby dismissed with costs. Stay order in vacated.