S. K. Kapur, J. ( 1 ). THE dispute in" this civil writ relates to a plot of land in block No. 56. Western Extension Area. Karol Bagh, New Delhi, measuring about 1585. 3 Sq. yards. ( 2 ) IN 1948 the Resettlement of Displaced Persons (Land Acquisition) Act 1948 (Act 60 of 1943) was enacted with the object of providing for speedy acquisition of land for the resettlement of displaced persons.- Notification under section 3 of the Act and dated the 24th November 1953 was published in the Gazette on 3rd December, 1953, with respect to the total area of 15725. 05 Sq. Yds. In the said notification it was inter alia stated that the land specified therein shall be acquired for the construction of shops for displaced persons, on the seventh day after the date of this notification. The notification included the land in question as well. Compensation proceedings took place thereafter and the petitioner was paid a sum of Rs. 34,855. 00 which ths petitioner accepted. It appears that thereafter some plots of land comprised in the same notification were. returned to the owners who paid back the money received by them. The petiiier s plot of land was allotted to ths Ministry of Education for the construction of a School building and this has given rise to the grievance on ths part of the petitioner who has refiled this petition contending that (1) that the respondents cannot use the land for any parpose (other than the resettlement of displaced persons an. i the allotment to the Ministry of Education for construction of a school building is not such a purpose; (2) even if the land can ba allotted to the Ministry of Education it cannot be used for non-displaced persons (3) the nature of user shows that the acquisition was nude with a mala fide intention and (4) the petitioner has been legally discriminated in as much as plots belonging to some other land owners and comprised in the same notification have been returned to them while the petitioner s plot has not been returned. ( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the patitionar draws my attention to the preamable and section 3 of the act and contends that the land could be acquired under the special Act only for the resettlement of the displaced persons. ( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the patitionar draws my attention to the preamable and section 3 of the act and contends that the land could be acquired under the special Act only for the resettlement of the displaced persons. He then refers to rule 9 and submits that the proviso to the said rule is ultra vires the Act and cannot authorise the respondents to utlise the land for construction of school being contrary to the express provisions of the Act. The learned counsel further draws my attention to paragraph 4 of the affidavit filed by Shri M. J. Srivastava, Settlement Commissioner dated the 25th August 1964 and submits that the respondents are under a wrong impression about the legal position when they contend that the property having vested absolutely in the Government it is entitled to deal with it as it likes and that under rule 9 the land acquired can be used for construction of school building. According to the submission of the learred counsel utilisation for the construction of a school building is not utilisation of land for resottlment of displaced persons. ( 4 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents has drawn my attention to the lay out plan of block Nos. 54, 56 and 57 Western Extention Area, Karol Bagh, New Delhi, prepared by Mr. Madan Gopal and filed in this Court with his affidavit dated 31st October 1964 and points out that the various plots besides the plots covered by the said notification have been utilised for establishing a market and the shops have been constructed thereon. He further points out that several shops have been constructed on plots Nos. 9 and 10 which were acquired under the impungned notification and that there are shops also on plots Nos. 13, 14, 15 and 16. It is not disputed that all these shops have been allotted to the displaced persons in the submission of the learned counsel utilisation of the land for the construction of a school building would be covered by section 3 of the said Act in as much as construction of school is necessary for and incidental to the resettlement of displaced persons. The said allotment according to the learned counsel is not hit by section 3 of the said Act. Mr. The said allotment according to the learned counsel is not hit by section 3 of the said Act. Mr. Parkash Narain, the learned counsel for the respondents further submits that if large number of displaced persons are resettled by construction of shops it may be necessary to provide facilities for the occupants of those shops. For instance construction of dispensaries, hospitals and schools would in that context be utilisation for resettlement of displaced persons because such schools and dispensaries can be utilised by displaced persons as well. He draws my attention to section 10 and particularly emphasis the words "deal with any land acquired" that the language of section precludes narrowness and shows that the words "settlement of displaced persons" are not restricted to the physical use and occupation of the land itself hut indude provision for facilities by establishment of schools and dispensaries. I am in agrerment with the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents the very object of the Act is to resettle displaced persons. When colonies are established and plots of land alloted for residence of displaced persons it would be far fetched to suggest that no part of the land acquired under the Act can be used for establishing schools, hospitals and dispensaries for providing necessary amenities and facilities to the residents of the locality and yet if the rigid construction sought to be placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted the whole object of the Act may be frustrated. So long as the utilisation for construction of schools and buildings is ancillary to or intented for the furtherance of the primary object of the Act, namely resettlement of the displaced persons, no exception can be taken to the same. Regarding the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that rule 9 travels beyoud the statute and is therefore ultra vires the Act I do not agree. At first sight some. sort of conflict may appear to exist between the Act and the proviso to the said rule but it must be remembered that Act and the rules have to be read together and the rules and bye-laws must always take their colour from the statute under which they are framed. At first sight some. sort of conflict may appear to exist between the Act and the proviso to the said rule but it must be remembered that Act and the rules have to be read together and the rules and bye-laws must always take their colour from the statute under which they are framed. Tested in this light I would hold that the proviso must be restricted to allotment by Government to non-displaced persons for achieving the object of the Act through the instrumentality of such non-displaced persons. It is argued that the Government may utilise the land for allotting it to non-displaced persons for the construction of the schools etc. for persons other than displaced persons. If an allotment is made contrary to the avowed object of the Act it may be open to obiection but as the facts of present case stand the utilisation seems to be unexceptional. Market has been established for displaced persons and it is not disputed that large number of shops have been constructed and allotted to displaced persons. It is not the case of the petitioner that any one of those shops has been allotted to non- displaced persons. In these circumstances it would not only be legitimate bat expedient to provide necessary amenities and facilities which could be utiised by displaced persons as well. It is un-imaginable to visualise markets and residential colonies without the necessary amenities. It may at times be even necessary amenities to provide recreation grounds, and yet the strict constraction sought to be laid at the bar would exclude such user altogether. So read rule 9 would not be ultra vires the Act. By referring to Exhibit R. I and affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent an attempt was made on the part of the petitioner s learned counsel to contend that the land in question could not be thrown into the compensation pool as is stated in Exhibit R. 1. It is unnecessary to resolve that controversy for in this petition the challenge is only to the utilisation of the land and whether the same is authorised by the Act or not. In view of what I have sail abovethat question need not detain me at all. The words "deal with any land acquired" in section 10 and the language of section 14 (2) (a) supplies further support to the view that I have taken. In view of what I have sail abovethat question need not detain me at all. The words "deal with any land acquired" in section 10 and the language of section 14 (2) (a) supplies further support to the view that I have taken. ( 5 ) THAT leaves the question of discrimination. The fact that some of the plots have been returned to owners because they were not required by the Government cannot constitute violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. In such matters the necessary latitude has to be given to the authorities as to how best the object of the Act is to be achieved. In case the authorities bona fide come to the conclusion that the petitioner s plot be utilised for construction of school building and other plots which are not capable of being utilised by them should be returned to the owners, the guaranteed right of equality or equal protection laws is not infringed. The legislature has laid down the principles for the guidance of the agencies to-whom the power to administer the Act has been committed. Some amount of discretion has to be left with the agencies in the matter of execution of laws. If land turns out to be surplus, it has to be returned and there is no violation of any right involved in leaving to the authorities concerned as to which plots would be utilised and which plots returned. So far as the allegations of mala fide are concerned I find no material on this record for coming to that conclusion. In the result the petition fails and is dismissed with costs.