Judgment :- 1. The petitioner in this writ petition was respondent No.1 in Election Petition No. 8 of 1963 before the District Munsiff, Kanjirappally. The 2nd respondent here, was the petitioner therein. The petitioner and respondents 2 and 3 were candidates for election from Ward No. 2 of Kuttikkal Panchayat at the election held on 27-11-1963. Respondent No. 3 withdrew his candidature within the time allowed by the rule. In the election the petitioner secured 226 votes and the 2nd respondent 225 votes. The petitioner was therefore declared to be the duly elected member of the panchayat from Ward No. 2. The 2nd respondent filed the election petition questioning the validity of the election of the petitioner on various grounds. That petition was heard and disposed of by the impugned order. By that order it was declared that the election of the Petitioner was invalid, and that the 2nd respondent was duly elected from Ward No. 2 of the Kuttikkal Panchayat as he was found to have secured the majority of votes. Ext. P1 is a copy of the order. The petitioner challenges the validity of this order for the reason that the Tribunal committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record incoming to the conclusion that the 2nd respondent got the majority of the votes. The Tribunal found that two of the votes cast in favour of the 2nd respondent and rejected by the Returning Officer as invalid, were valid votes in his favour and therefore he secured the majority of votes. The reason why the Returning Officer rejected the two votes as invalid was that the voters had affixed the mark on the back of the ballot papers. The Tribunal, on the other hand, found that the two voters really intended to vote for the 2nd respondent as they had made the marks on the symbol of the 2nd respondent even though the marks were made on the back of the ballot papers. 2. The point for consideration is whether the Tribunal committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record in holding that the two votes were validly cast in favour of the 2nd respondent. It is seen from the two ballot papers that the voters had affixed the marks on the back of the ballot papers. 2. The point for consideration is whether the Tribunal committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record in holding that the two votes were validly cast in favour of the 2nd respondent. It is seen from the two ballot papers that the voters had affixed the marks on the back of the ballot papers. The symbol of the 2nd respondent in the election was 'horse', and the ballot papers being transparent that symbol is quite visible on the back of the ballot papers. According to the Tribunal, as the voters affixed the marks even though on the back of the ballot papers but against the symbol of the 2nd respondent, that was clear evidence to show that the voters intended to cast the votes in favour of the 2nd respondent. Mr. Velayudhan Nair, appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the view is erroneous in law. He drew my attention to R.41 of the Kerala Panchayats (Election of Members) Rules, 1962. R.41 (1) reads: "(1) That elector ob receiving the ballot paper shall forthwith (a) proceed to one of the voting compartments, (b) there make a mark or marks on the ballot paper with the instrument supplied for the purpose on or near the symbol of the candidate for whom he intends to vote, (c) fold the ballot paper so as to conceal his vote,..." Mr. Velayudhan Nair said that a voter has to make the mark on or near the symbol and that making the mark on the back of the ballot paper against the symbol, although the symbol is visible on the back of it, is not a sufficient compliance with R.41 (1) (b), and therefore the Returning Officer was right in rejecting these votes. In support of this contention he drew my attention to a passage occurring in Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 14, 3rd Edition, page 140. The passage is as follows: "A ballot paper marked on the back only should not be counted, even though the mark shows through the paper on to the front, A ballot paper marked both on the back and on the front may, however, be counted". On the other hand, Mr. Easwara Iyer, appearing for the 2nd respondent relied on Swaran Singh v. Election Tribunal (AIR. 1960 Allahabad 66). In that case the voter made the mark on the back of the ballot paper. On the other hand, Mr. Easwara Iyer, appearing for the 2nd respondent relied on Swaran Singh v. Election Tribunal (AIR. 1960 Allahabad 66). In that case the voter made the mark on the back of the ballot paper. It was held that making the mark on the back of the ballot paper was sufficient to indicate the intention of the voter to vote for the candidate against whose symbol the mark was made. In that case also, the symbol was clearly visible on the back of the ballot paper. In discussing the question Raghubar Dayal, J., as he then was, made the following observations: "I do not consider such marking in this particular case, to be marking against the provisions of Para.43. This paragraph directs the voter to make a mark on the ballot paper opposite the name of the candidate for whom he intends to vote. To ascertain the candidate the ballot paper mentions the name and also depicts the symbol allotted to that particular candidate. The symbol was clearly visible on the back of the ballot paper. The name was not. In the circumstances marking on the back of the ballot paper cannot be said to be against this direction I do not agree with the contention for the petitioner that the direction to mark on the ballot paper amounts to a direction to mark on the face of the ballot paper and that it is the face of the ballot paper alone which is really the ballot paper. The entire sheet of paper is the ballot paper, of course one side of it is the face of the ballot paper and the other is the back side of the ballot paper." As two views are possible and as the error is not self evident it cannot be said that the Tribunal in coming to the conclusion that these two votes were validly cast in favour of the 2nd respondent committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record. 3. It was argued by Mr. Velayudhan Nair that the order of the Tribunal discloses an error of law and that it is immaterial whether it requires an elaborate argument to satisfy the court that such an error exists. 3. It was argued by Mr. Velayudhan Nair that the order of the Tribunal discloses an error of law and that it is immaterial whether it requires an elaborate argument to satisfy the court that such an error exists. In other words, the submission of counsel was that even if it requires long argument to convince the court that there is an error of law, it is nonetheless an error of law apparent on the face of the record and therefore can be corrected in certiorari. Counsel submitted that the proper distinction between an error of law apparent on the face of the record and one not so apparent is that in the one case the error of law can be detected on reading the order by a person instructed in law and that in the other it cannot be so detected because the order does not set forth either the primary facts or the proposition of law on the basis of which the order was passed. The proposition that there is no error of law apparent on the face of the order means either that the reasons stated in the order on the point of law are correct, or that since no reasons are given on the point of law, no error appears on the face of the order. It was submitted that the distinction between an error of law apparent on the face of the record and an error not apparent, is not founded on the distinction between an error which is self-evident and an error which requires an elaborate argument to expose it, but on the distinction between an error which can be detected in the order because it is expressed in the order, and one which cannot be detected because the materials for detecting such an error do not appear in the order. It is, no doubt, true that English decisions on certiorari make no distinction between an error of law which is self-evident and an error which requires an elaborate argument to detect it if the facts or the proposition of law are set out in the order. It is, no doubt, true that English decisions on certiorari make no distinction between an error of law which is self-evident and an error which requires an elaborate argument to detect it if the facts or the proposition of law are set out in the order. The distinction which they make is between a speaking order and an order which is not speaking, a speaking order being one which sets forth the reasons in point of law for supporting the order made, and an unspeaking order being one which contains no reasons in point of law for making it. No error can appear in an unspeaking order as there is no proposition of law set forth in the order of which it can be said that it is erroneous. This does not mean that the order may not, in fact be erroneous in law in the sense that the order may be based on an erroneous proposition of law in the mind of the Tribunal which made the order, but since the error is not expressed in the order itself it does not appear in the order or is not apparent on the face of the order. But an error of law can appear in a speaking order, or is apparent on the face of a speaking order because the order contains reasons in point of law for making it, and it is possible to examine those reasons and decide that they are wrong in law. Reference may be made in this connection to the observations of Lord Summer in R. v. Nat Bell Liquors Ltd. (1922-2 A.C. G.C) 128,156) to show that certiorari will issue when there is a failure to observe the law and that the issue of it is not dependent upon the complicated nature of the argument to detect it. "The answer to this argument, however, is that the Court of King's Bench has an inherent jurisdiction to control all inferior tribunals, not in an appellate capacity, but in a supervisory capacity. The control extends not only to seeing that the inferior tribunals keep within their jurisdiction, but also to seeing that they observe the law. "The answer to this argument, however, is that the Court of King's Bench has an inherent jurisdiction to control all inferior tribunals, not in an appellate capacity, but in a supervisory capacity. The control extends not only to seeing that the inferior tribunals keep within their jurisdiction, but also to seeing that they observe the law. The control is exercised by means of a power to quash any determination by the tribunal which, on the face of it, offends against the law." Lord Cairns in dealing with the question in Walsall Overseers v. London and North Western Ry. (1878-4 A.C. 30,40) said: "But supposing that the Court of Quarter Sessions did not adopt that course there was still another mode by which any question of law which appeared to the Court of Quarter Sessions doubtful might be left open to the judgment of a higher tribunal. All that was necessary was that the Court of Quarter Sessions in making its order should not make it an unspeaking or unintelligible order but should state upon the face of the order the elements which had led to the decision". In R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal (1951-1 K.B. 711) where the court had to deal with the regulations which the Court of Appeal described as of great complexity giving rise to difficult questions of law and interpretation, the Court said: "The tribunal have told us what they have taken into account what they have disregarded and the contentions which they accepted. They have told us their view of the law, and we are of opinion that the construction which they placed on this very complicated set of - regulations was wrong." These observations may indicate that the supervisory jurisdiction is attracted whenever there is an error of law which can be detected from the record and that the jurisdiction does not depend upon the nebulous test whether an elaborate argument is required to detect it, and that an error which it is difficult to make out is still an error of law when made out and that the tribunal has failed to observe the law. 4. Mr. Easwara Iyer, appearing for the counter-petitioners submitted that the jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution, is supervisory and not appellate, and therefore mere errors of law cannot be corrected by certiorari as that is the function of an appellate court. 4. Mr. Easwara Iyer, appearing for the counter-petitioners submitted that the jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution, is supervisory and not appellate, and therefore mere errors of law cannot be corrected by certiorari as that is the function of an appellate court. But it must be noted that even though there is the distinction between the supervisory jurisdiction and the appellate jurisdiction the distinction does not turn upon the nature of the error of law to be corrected. The most important difference between the supervisory jurisdiction by certiorari and the appellate jurisdiction is that the former is directly concerned only with the conduct of the inferior court or Tribunal and the latter with the merits of the claim put forward before the Tribunal. Certiorari is confined to what appears on the record and is concerned only to ascertain whether the Tribunal has kept within the bounds of its jurisdiction and has observed the law. An unspeaking order cannot be interfered with under the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court, even though the Tribunal has committed an error of law in passing it. But there is no bar to the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction in such a case, for, the appellate court can rehear the whole matter and form its own conclusion not only of the evidence let in but also of the point of law involved in dispute between the parties before the Tribunal. Certiorari by quashing the order, clears an obstruction in the path of a party seeking justice. It is iconoclastic in character. It demolishes. It does not substitute its own order in the place of the order which has been quashed. But an appellate court does it. It passes the appropriate order disposing of the case. It may affirm, reverse or modify the order passed by the Tribunal. In Walsall Overseers' Case (1878-4 A.C. 30, 40) Lord Cairns said: "The jurisdiction of the Court of Queen's Bench was merely to leave the order standing or to remove it out of the way. It was not a jurisdiction to substitute for it another or different order; that would be making the Court of Queen's Bench, in the ordinary sense of the term, a court of rehearing or appeal". It was not a jurisdiction to substitute for it another or different order; that would be making the Court of Queen's Bench, in the ordinary sense of the term, a court of rehearing or appeal". In R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal (1952-1 K.B. 338, 347) Denning, L.J., said: "This control extends not only to seeing that the inferior tribunals keep within their jurisdiction, but also to seeing that they observe the law. The control is exercised by means of a power to quash any determination by the tribunal which, on the face of it, offends against the law. The King's Bench does not substitute its own views for those of the tribunal, as a Court of appeal would do. It leaves it to the tribunal to hear the case again, and in a proper case may command to do so". It would appear from the English decisions that an error of law appearing or apparent on the record means only that there is a proposition of law expressed in the order of the Tribunal, which is the basis of the order and which on examination is found to be wrong, and that the supervisory jurisdiction of certiorari extends to quashing of such an order. 5. The argument of Mr. Velayudhan Nair seems to be fortified by the observation of the Privy Council in Champsey Bhara v. Jivraj Balloo Spg. & Wg. Co. (1923 A.C. 480, 487). In dealing with the question as what wilt constitute an error of law apparent on the face of an award, the Privy Council said: "An error in law on the face of the award means, in their Lordships' view, that you can find in the award or a document actually incorporated thereto, as for instance a note appended by the arbitrator stating the reasons for his judgment, some legal proposition which is the basis of the award and which you can then say is erroneous But they (i.e., the arbitrators) were entitled to give their own interpretation to R.52 or any other article, and the award will stand unless, on the face of it, they have tied themselves down to some special legal proposition which than, when examined, appears to be unsound". 6. 6. Whatever be the position in England we are bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court wherein the Supreme Court has said that the major test to decide whether an error is an error of law apparent on the face of the record is whether it is self-evident or whether it requires a long argument to make out the error. See the rulings of the Supreme Court reported in Sakhawot Ali v. The State of Orissa (1955-1 S.C.R. 1004), Satyanarayanan Laxminarayanan Hedge v. Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale (1960-1 S. C. R.890), Shri Ambica Mills Co. v. S.B. Bhatt (AIR. 1961 SC. 970) and Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR. 1962 SC. 1621). No doubt this test would depend upon the intellectual calibre of the judge who hears the case and is not of universal application. But, nevertheless, this is the only test which has been propounded, and I must follow it. Adopting this test, I find that there is no error of law apparent on the face of the record which can be corrected in certiorari. 7. It was submitted by Mr. Velayudhan Nair that affixing of the marks on the back of the ballot papers was intended to reveal the identity of the voter and as such the votes were invalid. In support of this he referred me to R.57 of the Rules referred to above. I am not satisfied that from the affixing of marks on the back of the ballot papers it can be inferred that the voters intended to reveal their identity. Unless there is some proof of a previous arrangement, I am not in a position to say that because the marks were affixed on the back of the ballot papers, there was an agreement to that effect. I overrule this contention. 8. The writ petition fails, and it is dismissed. No costs. Dismissed.