JUDGMENT K.B Asthana, J. - By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the Petitioners seek quashing of the revisional order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation and the appellate order of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation passed in proceedings under the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter called the Act) by a writ of certiorari. 2. The dispute in this petition is in respect of seven agricultural plots numbers 23, 72, 73, 82, 185, 187 and 188. Admittedly Dulichand, husband of Smt. Jamuna, Petitioner No. 1, was The tenant in chief of the said plots, in 1932, as alleged by the Petitioner, Dulichand leased out plots numbers 23, (sic)2 and 82 along with certain other plots with which we are not concerned to this writ petition, to Suraj Narain, a brother of the opposite party not a Sheo Narain and uncle of opposite party No. 5 Ram Sarowar. Dulichand died in 1936. Thereafter Smt. Jamuna Petitioner No. 1, as the widow of Dulichand, came in possession of the disputed plots. According to her the lease rights of Suraj Narain under lease of 1932 executed by her husband were extinguished and she executed a fresh lease for ten years of the disputed plots in favour of opposite parties numbers 4 and 5. It was further the case of the, Petitioner that after the expiry of the lease when the opposite parties members 4 and 5 who were sub tenants did not vacate she filed a suit u/s (sic). of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act for possession Which, suit, however, was stayed when the village in which the disputed plots were situate came under consolidation operations under the Act. It is alleged by the Petitioner that in the statements of tenure holders published u/s 11 of the Act the names of opposite parties numbers 4 and 5 were wrongly shown as Sirdars of the disputed plots She thereupon filed an objection u/s 12 of the Act for correction of the entries by expunging the names of the opposite parties Nos. 4 and 5 and by entering her name in their place. This objection u/s 12 of the Act, in alleged by the Petitioner, could not be finally decided as the Statement of Proposals u/s 19 were published. 4 and 5 and by entering her name in their place. This objection u/s 12 of the Act, in alleged by the Petitioner, could not be finally decided as the Statement of Proposals u/s 19 were published. Then an objection Under Sub-section (2) of Section 20 was field by the Petitioner challenging the correctness of the entries in the name of the opposite parties. The Petitioner numbers 2 and 3 Raghubir and Munni Lal respectively, also joined the Petitioner in preferring he said objection as the Petitioner No. I had talked them to joint tenants with her. The Petitioner's case was that the opposite parties numbers 4 and 5 could not acquire a; status better than of an Asami inasmuch as they were the sub tenants of a land holder under a disability, she being a widow, and they were wrongly treated as Sirdars. In reply to the objection raised by the Petitioner the opposite party No. 4 Sheo Narain pleaded that he along with others was the sub tenant from the life time of Dulichand being an Adhivasi, became Sirdar by operation of law, It was further pleaded by the opposite party that the statement of compensation under Ch, IXA of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act in which he was held to be Sirdar having become final it was not open to the Petitioner to reagitate the matter of Sirdari rights in the consolidation proceedings. It was also pleaded that the Petitioner not having filed any objection u/s 12 of the Act, her objection under Sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act was barred by Sub-section (7) of Section 12 of the Act. 3. The Consolidation Officer upheld the above said pleas raised on behalf of the opposite parties and dismissed the objection of the Petitioner. The Petitioner preferred an appeal which was dismissed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation merely on the ground that it was not open to the Petitioner to agitate the matter of Sirdari rights, the proceeding u/s 1240G of, Chapter IXA of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act having become final against her. A revision by the Petitioner against the appellate order of Settlement Officer was dismissed by the Deputy Director, Consolidation; The sub lease granted by Dulichand to Sura] Narain covered plots numbers 22, 72 and 82 only from amongst the disputed plots. A revision by the Petitioner against the appellate order of Settlement Officer was dismissed by the Deputy Director, Consolidation; The sub lease granted by Dulichand to Sura] Narain covered plots numbers 22, 72 and 82 only from amongst the disputed plots. The finding of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, has been endorsed by the Dy. Director In his revisional order. It is thus clear that so far as the said three plots are concerned, the opposite, parties as brothers of Suraj Narain and as his successors would acquire Adhivasi rights for they cannot be said sub tenants of a person under disability. The decision of the. Consolidation authorities in respect of the said three plots does not, therefore, require any interference as Petitioners being sub tenants and having acquired adhivasi rights would become Sirdars under the law. 4. However, in so far as the other four plots in dispute are concerned, that is, plots numbers 73, 158, l87 and 188, the matter rests on a different footing. The impugned orders of the Consolidation authorities show that no definite finding has been recorded in regard to the said four plots as to how the opposite parties came into possession and how they were recorded as sub tenants. It would be recalled that the case of the Petitioner was that after the death of her husband Dulichand she sub leased all the disputed plots including the said four plots to the opposite parties 4 and 5 for a term of ten years. On ' this question there is a definite finding of fact by the consolidation authorities that the Petitioner had not been able to establish the sub lease set up by her. From the impugned order of the Deputy Director it appears that the opposite parties claimed to be sub tenants of the said four plots as having taken them from Dulichand on Batal. Thus the ease as set up on behalf of the opposite parties before the consolidation authorities was that the said four plots were taken by them under a separate transaction from Dulichand. The consolidation authorities have not recorded, any finding on this part of the case of the opposite parties. Thus the ease as set up on behalf of the opposite parties before the consolidation authorities was that the said four plots were taken by them under a separate transaction from Dulichand. The consolidation authorities have not recorded, any finding on this part of the case of the opposite parties. The Deputy Director seemed to be of the view that in any view since the provisions of Section 240 J of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act were attracted, the Petitioner was not entitled to reopen the question as to her rights in the said plots and her objection in respect of those plots was incompetent. Neither the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, in appeal nor the Deputy Director, Consolidation, in revision rested their decision on the plea that the objection of the Petitioner under Sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the. Act was barred by Sub-section (7) of Section 12 of the Act. There is absolutely no discussion of that question in their judgments. Obviously it was not necessary for both the said authorities were of the view that the proceedings carried on under Chapter IX A of the Act in which the opposite parties were found to be Sirdars were final and conclusive against the Petitioner. This finding was enough for completely disposing of the case. 5. Sri Cyan Prakash, learned Counsel for the Petitioners, submitted that the view of the consolidation authorities that it was not open to the Petitioner to agitate the question of Sirdari rights on the above said four plots was manifestly erroneous. Though the learned Counsel had first tried to attack the validity of the judgment of the. consolidation authorities in respect of all the seven plots under the suit put having been faced with the finding of fact lecoided against the Petitioner that three plots out of the seven plots were sub leased by Dulichand to the opposite parties numbers 4 and 5, confined the case of the Petitioners to the remaining four plots mentioned above in this writ petition. The question, therefore, which falls for determination is. The question, therefore, which falls for determination is. whether the provisions of Section 240 T of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act would be attracted to the facts and circumstances of the case and it was not open to the Petitioner to reopen the matter of Sirdari rights claimed by her in respect of the above said four plots, namely, numbers ?3, 158, 187 and 188. 6. Sri L. P. Naithani, appearing for the opposite parties, in the fore front of his arguments submitted that a finding of fact having been recorded by the Consolidation Officer that the Petitioner had not filed any objection under S- 12 of the Act and that finding of fact not having been reversed by the higher authorities, the decision of those authorities, though not based on Section 12 of the Act could be supported for that reason and this Court ought not to interfere. In the affidavit filed On behalf of the Petitioners in support of the petition it has been categorically averred that she filed an objection u/s 12 of the Act which could not be finally decided as the statement of proposals u/s 19 had been published. In the counter affidavit sworn by opposite party No. 4 Sheo Narain, the averment of the Petitioner is denied and it is asserted that no objections u/s 12 of the Act were ever filed by the Petitioner to the statement of tenure holders. In the rejoinder affidavit on behalf of the Petitioner the averment in the main affidavit has been reiterated and a certified copy of the report of the Assistant Consolidation Officer dated 30.9.1958 (the year is not legibly written in the certified copy) submitted to the Consolidation Officer has been filed relating to the disputed plots which supports the averment of the Petitioner that objection u/s 12 was filed by her. Thus it would appear from the affidavits filed before me that there is a Serious controversy of (act between the parties whether any objection Was filed by the Petitioner u/s 12 of the Act to the entire of the name of the opposite parties in the statement of tenure holders. I do not think I am salied upon in this petition to record any finding on that question of fact. I do not think I am salied upon in this petition to record any finding on that question of fact. It was pointed out by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that since the dispute between the parties involved only a question of Sirdari rights no question of title arose within the meaning of Section 12 and Sub-section (7) of that Act could not stand in the way of the Petitioner even if no objection was filed by her. That is again a question on which I prefer not to express any opinion. 7. It was next contended by Sri L.P. Naithani for the opposite parties that this petition as filed is incompetent for all the necessary parties have not been impleaded. A persual of paragraph 12 of the counter affidavit would show that while plots numbers 72, 73 and 158 were recorded in the name of Sheo Narain, plots numbers 82 and 188 were recorded in the name of Suraj Narain and plots numbers (sic) and 87 in the name of Prayag Narain. It is not clear whether Suraj Narain and Prayag Narain were parties to the proceedings before the Consolidation authorities which have given rise to this petition. The affidavit of the Petitioner shows that she was challenging the entry in the name of Sheo Narain opposite party No. 4 and Ram Sarowar, opposite party No. 5. Though there is an averment in the counter affidavit in paragraph 12 that the opposite parties numbers 4 and 5 were joint tenants in the disputed holdings along with their brothers but on their own showing it appears that the names of their brothers were not entered in. the revenue papers. The learned Counsel for the opposite parties has not been able to make a clear statement before, me as to which of the parties were necessary to be impleaded. I can now therefore, on the Vague assertion of the opposite parties contained in paregraph 12 of the affidavit hold that the petition is defective as the necessary parties have not been impleaded. 8. Having noted the arguments on behalf of the opposite parties and the reply of the Petitioner on the question of filing or non filing of objections u/s 12 of the Act and its effect and having disposed of the objection oh behalf of. 8. Having noted the arguments on behalf of the opposite parties and the reply of the Petitioner on the question of filing or non filing of objections u/s 12 of the Act and its effect and having disposed of the objection oh behalf of. the opposite parties to the effect that the petition Was defective, I now proceed to consider the main point in the case whether the claim of the Petitioner that she was the Sirdar of the four disputed plots numbers 73, 158, 187 and 188 was barred on account of the proceedings under Chapter IX A of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act held in respect of the said plots. 9. It appears from the record that the Petitioner had filed an objection u/s 240G of Chapter IX A of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act to the provisional compensation statement prepared u/s 240D of that Chapter showing the opposite parties to be the Sirdar and awarding compensation to the Petitioner who was the land holder. The Petitioner in her objection raised the question that the opposite parties were Asamis and not Adhivasis and the pro-visional compensation statement in their favour was wrong inasmuch as the apposite parties had not become Sirdar, under the provisions of Section 240B of that Chapter, This objection of the Petitioner u/s 240G was dismissed by the Compensation Officer by an order dated 28.5.1956 in the following terms: The objector is absent inspite of information. It seems that she does not want to proceed into the matter. The application is dismissed in default". The above quoted order of the Compensation Officer would show that the case of the Petitioner contained in her objection u/s 240G was not decided on merits. It was dismissed fox default. It appears from the impugned order of the Deputy Director that he, relied on the provisions of Section 240J which show that where no objection had been filed to the compensation statement or where objections are filed and have been finally disposed of, the Compensation Officer shall sign the statement and affix a seal and when this has been done the statement shall become final. For the Petitioner it was strenuously contended that the pro visions of Section 240J were not attracted on the facts and circumstances of the present case inasmuch as the Petitioner had filed an objection in regard to the compensation statement published in pursuance of Section 240F, but that objection was not finally disposed of. It is difficult for me to agree with this contention of the learned Counsel. The dismissal, of the objection for, default, would amount to final disposal of the objection. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner then contended that even if finality be attached to the statement that could not bar raising of a question of title by the Petitioner in the consolidation proceedings for the reason that no finding on merits was recorded by the compensation officer as to the Sirdari rights of the Petitioner and the statement, though final, would not operate as res judicata in the sub sequent proceedings. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner also submitted that in any view of the matter the Compensation Officer would have no jurisdiction to decide the objection of the Petitioner filed u/s 240G for the objection filed was that the land was not land referred to in sub Section (1) of Section 240A and the Compensation Officer was bound to frame an issue on the question of Sirdari and refer it for, disposal to the court which could have, jurisdiction to decide a suit in respect of the land u/s 229B read with Section 234A of the UPZA and LR Act. I think both the submissions mentioned above have force. It is well established that a decree in a suit for dismissal in default where the controversy involved in the suit is not decided on merits and no findings are recorded would not operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit raising the same controversy or issues. See Chand Kour v. Partab Singh (1) (ILR 16 Cal, 98 PC.). Since there was no decision on the question of Sirdari in the proceedings under Chapter IXA of the UP ZA and LR Act, and no findings were recorded the finality of the statement of compensation would not operate as res judicata between the parties. See Chand Kour v. Partab Singh (1) (ILR 16 Cal, 98 PC.). Since there was no decision on the question of Sirdari in the proceedings under Chapter IXA of the UP ZA and LR Act, and no findings were recorded the finality of the statement of compensation would not operate as res judicata between the parties. Moreover, it is clear that the Petitioner's case before the Compenstion Officer being that the opposite parties being the; sub tenants of a land holder under a disability would be Asamis and not Adhivasis on the date immediately preceding the date declared by the State Government by notification in the official gazettee after the commencement of the UP Land Reforms (Amendment) Act 1954 they would not be deemed to be Adhivasis so as to become Sirdar of the land as provided by Sections 240A and 240B. The objection of the Petitioner, therefore, was that the land was not land referred to in sob Section (1) of Section 240A for the latter section contemplates a land on which the tenure holder is an Adhivasi on the relevant date mentioned in the said section; thus the Compensation Officer himself had no jurisdiction to decide the objection of the Petitioner. He was bound to refer to the proper court as required by the relevant provisions. When the Compensation Officer himself had no jurisdiction to decide the question of Sirdari in the case any order passed by him dismissing the objection for default cannot be deemed to be conclusive on that question. I am, therefore, of the view that it was open to the Petitioner to agitate her claim of Sirdari on the above said four plots in her objection under Sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act and the finality of the statement of compensation under Chapter IX A: of the UPZA and LR Act would not operate as res judicata. In this view of the matter the impugned orders of the Consolidation authorities are manifestly erroneous as they proceed on a misapplication of the law. 10. As a result of the discussion above I allow this petition partly. The impugned orders of the Consolidation authorities in so far as plots numbers 79, 158, 187 and 188 are concerned stands quashed. In so far as plots Nos. 10. As a result of the discussion above I allow this petition partly. The impugned orders of the Consolidation authorities in so far as plots numbers 79, 158, 187 and 188 are concerned stands quashed. In so far as plots Nos. 23, 72 and 82 are concerned, there will be no interference and the impugned orders shall stand' It' is further directed that the case of the Petitioner in respect of plots numbers 74, 158, 187 and 188 will be reconsidered by the consolidation officer and decided in accordance with law in the light of this judgment. It would be open to the parties to raise all such questions of law and fact which I have not finally determined in this writ. The parties will bear their own costs.