Judgment :- 1. The revision petitioner is the wife of the respondent. She was man-handled and driven out of the house with her child and was neglected and refused to be maintained. On 4-8-1961 she secured an order of maintenance under S.488 of the Criminal Procedure Code whereby the respondent was directed to pay a monthly allowance at the rate of Rs. 15/- for her and Rs. 10/- for the child. On 10-9-1964 she filed an application for realising the arrears that had fallen due from 4-9-1963 to 4-9-1964. That application was resisted by the husband mainly on the ground that as the differences between them as also the litigations were settled due to the intervention of mediators and she had gone over to his house and was living there till 17-3-1964 the order of maintenance has become ineffectual and unenforceable. He had a further case that she had to leave the house since he found her in a compromising position with a blacksmith Padmanabhan. The learned Magistrate while not accepting the charge of unchastity dismissed the application for enforcement of the order on behalf of the wife on the ground that the re-union and cohabitation between the parties have effected a cancellation of the order for maintenance. The claim made on behalf of the child was accepted and she was allowed to enforce the order to that extent. 2. Though the learned counsel for the revision petitioner attempted to challenge the correctness of the finding that the wife was residing with the husband he was not able to bring out any permissible ground for interfering with that finding of fact in revision. However I am of the view that he is entitled to succeed on the question of law raised. 3. The question for consideration is whether the resumption of cohabitation after an order under S.488 had been passed will have the effect of cancelling the order or whether the order will only remain suspended for the duration of the reconciliation. There is a difference of judicial opinion on this matter. The Madras High Court has on more than one occasion taken the former view. In Venkayya v. Raghavamma - AIR. There is a difference of judicial opinion on this matter. The Madras High Court has on more than one occasion taken the former view. In Venkayya v. Raghavamma - AIR. 1942 Madras 1, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court gave its opinion that: "A decree obtained by a Hindu wife against her husband for maintenance differs in no important respect from an order for permanent alimony embodied in a decree for judicial separation, and therefore when the wife subsequent to the decree resumes co-habitation with her husband, the English principle can be applied viz., that the decree becomes ineffective and cannot be enforced. If she is compelled to leave him after resuming co-habitation she should apply for a fresh decree." In a later case Munuswami v. Doraikannu Ammal - AIR. 1946 Madras 222 this principle was extended to cover orders under S.488 Criminal Procedure Code also. It was held therein: "After a wife has lived with her husband as husband and wife, an order, whether a decree of a civil Court or an order of criminal court, for maintenance ceases to be operative...." I must say, with respect, I am unable to agree with this view. In the first place I do not think there is anything to gain in importing principles of English Law to interpret the provisions of self-contained sections of the Criminal Procedure Code, S.488 to 490 in Chapter XXXVI dealing with maintenance of wives and children. They are self-contained and exhaustive of the subject they deal with. The sections tell us who are liable to pay maintenance and to whom it may be granted; they enumerate the grounds on which an order of maintenance may be passed and the defences available to the husband; they prescribe the mode of enforcing the order as also the grounds and conditions on which an order can be altered or cancelled. There is nothing in these provisions to indicate that an order passed under it will automatically stand cancelled on the resumption of co-habitation. To hold that the order will be so cancelled is to add a new mode of cancellation not provided for in Chapter XXXVI of the Criminal Procedure Code. 4. There is nothing in these provisions to indicate that an order passed under it will automatically stand cancelled on the resumption of co-habitation. To hold that the order will be so cancelled is to add a new mode of cancellation not provided for in Chapter XXXVI of the Criminal Procedure Code. 4. It is true that the very reason for which the order of maintenance was passed viz., the inability of the discarded wife and child to maintain themselves, is removed when the husband takes them back but even so the order will become inoperative permanently only if cancelled under any of the relevant provisions in Chapter XXXVI. This seems to be clear from the words of S.489(2) which reads thus: "489 (2) Where it appears to the Magistrate that, in consequence of any decision of a competent civil court, any order made under S.488 should be cancelled or varied, he shall cancel the order or, as the case may be, vary the same accordingly." This shows that even if the reasons for continuing order of maintenance in force are removed by an order of competent civil Court, separate action under this section is necessary to cancel the order. The position, I think, would be the same if the basis of the order is removed by the conduct of the parties. 5. The provisions of S.488(5) also seem to indicate that reconciliation between husband and wife will not by itself bring about the cancellation of an order passed under S.488(1). S.488(5) reads thus: "488 (5) On proof that any wife in whose favour an order has been made under this section is living in adultery, or that without sufficient reason she refuses to live with her husband, or that they are living separately by mutual consent, the Magistrate shall cancel the order." Apparently the section contemplates reconciliation between husband and wife after an order of maintenance is passed and provides that if the wife once again leaves the husband and refuses to live with him without sufficient reason the order originally passed shall be cancelled. There would have been no reason to enact this provision to cancel the order if a temporary reconciliation could be taken to have terminated the order. 6. There would have been no reason to enact this provision to cancel the order if a temporary reconciliation could be taken to have terminated the order. 6. Such an interpretation will also be in keeping with the intention of the legislation which is, as accepted on all hands, to prevent vagrancy by providing wives and children thrown out on their own, an effective method of exacting maintenance from irresponsible husbands or fathers. If an order once acquired is to be lost by reconciliation an unscrupulous person can nullify the benefit of the enactment by cajoling the estranged wife to come back to him for a few days or weeks and sending her away once again. She would then have to undergo the strain and trouble of another court action. Fear of a repetition of the trouble and expense of acquiring a court order may also prevent the wife from seeking or agreeing to reconciliation leading to socially undesirable consequences. 7. I am therefore of the view that a temporary reconciliation between the husband and wife will not render the order unenforceable permanently; the liability to pay maintenance will only remain suspended during the resumed cohabitation and will be revived on separation unless cancelled by an order of court under the relevant provisions. This view gains support from a number of reported cases among which may be cited the recent decisions Kasinath v. Padmabati - AIR 1956 Orissa 199, Mukund Singh v. Kartar Kaur - AIR. 1958 Punjab 422 and Laxman Gajju v. Sitabai Laxman AIR. 1958 Bombay 14. The earlier decisions of the Allahabad High Court in Pearey Lal v. Mt. Naraini AIR. 1935 Allahabad 977, the Calcutta High Court in Parul Bala Debi v. Satish Chandra - AIR. 1923 Calcutta 456, the Lahore High Court in Mt. Zauhra Bi v. Md. Yusaf - AIR. 1930 Lahore 1043 and the Nagpur High Court in Coelho v. Coelho - AIR. 1936 Nagpur 228 have all taken the same view. 8. In the result the revision petition is allowed and the learned Magistrate is directed to restore the application to the file and dispose of it according to law and in the light of the above finding. Transmit the records promptly. Allowed.