Judgment :- 1. The revision petitioner has been ordered by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Hosdrug; to pay maintenance to the respondent at the rate of Rs. 50/- per month. 2. The respondent alleged that the revision petitioner had married her on 26-8-1961 and after a married-life lasting but some nine months left her on 16-5-1962 and had since then refused to maintain her. She further alleged that he last resided with her at the house of her aunt at Morazha within the jurisdiction of the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Hosdrug. Among the objections raised by the revision petitioner was one regarding the jurisdiction of that court to try the case and this is the main point now urged before us. 3. The respondent Kamalakshi examined as Pw.1 gave evidence that her marriage with the revision petitioner Radhakrishna Menon was solemnised at the Katalai Temple on 26-8-1961. He was at the time the Agricultural Extension Officer with head Quarters at Edapal in Palghat District. After the marriage, the couple went to live at the house of the wife's maternal aunt at Morazha. The husband who was employed at Edapal could not stay with her permanently but used to visit her for week-ends. After some months she was taken to the house of her husband's sister at Palghat where she was put up for some three months. Here also her husband used to visit her off and on while having his official residence at Edapal. She was then taken back to Morazha where also her husband used to visit her. His last visit was during the first week of February 1962. Since then he had not gone to her house. That her husband used to go to her house for weekends is also shown by Ext P-5 one of his letters to her. In it he writes that he is unable to visit her on the following Saturday but will positively do so the next Saturday. Her evidence on the point is also corroborated by the testimony of Pw. 4, a trader, whose shop is near the house of Pw.1's aunt. He says that Radhakrishna Menon used to come to visit Pw.1 off and on and that the last of such visits was in February 1962. He is an independent witness having no motive whatever to swear to a false story. The husband's case is that he never visited the respondent. Ext. He says that Radhakrishna Menon used to come to visit Pw.1 off and on and that the last of such visits was in February 1962. He is an independent witness having no motive whatever to swear to a false story. The husband's case is that he never visited the respondent. Ext. D-1 his fortnightly work journal is produced to show that he could not have visited Pw.1 in February as he was engaged in his official work in other places. This record has failed to impress the learned Magistrate. It is seen that according to it the officer had worked on every single day in February even during Sundays. This is extremely unlikely and it appears to be, as found by the learned Magistrate, only a device to help the Officer to take the week-ends off without obtaining permission from his superiors. The finding of the lower court that the revision petitioner last stayed with the respondent at Morazha has therefore to be upheld. 4. The learned defence counsel argues that even granting the correctness of the above finding these 'flying visits' by the husband to his wife to Morazha cannot constitute residence at Morazha as contemplated in S.488 Criminal Procedure Code. The Section reads as follows: "Proceedings under this section may be taken against any person in any district where he resides or is or where he last resided with his wife or as the case may be the mother of the illegitimate child." 5. The question therefore is whether these 'visits' to his wife can be taken to mean that he 'resided' with her at Morazha. The implications of the phrase 'last resided' has been considered by the Supreme Court in Jagir Kaur v. Jaswant Singh - AIR. 1963 Supreme Court 1521. The court was of the opinion that the expression 'last resided' takes colour from the word 'resides' used earlier in the sub-section and that the same meaning should be given to both the expressions; the word 'resides' was interpreted thus: "....a person resides in a place if he through choice makes it his abode permanently or even temporarily; whether a person has chosen to make a particular place his abode depends upon the facts of each case. Some illustrations may make our meaning clear: (1) A, living in a village goes to a nearby town B to attend a marriage or to make purchases and stays there in a hotel for a day or two. (2) A, a tourist, goes from place to place during his peregrinations and stays for a few days in each of the places he visits. (3) A, a resident of a village, who is suffering from a chronic disease, goes along with his wife to a town for medical treatment, takes a house and lives there for about 6 months. (4) A, a permanent resident of a town goes to a city for higher education, takes a house and lives there, alone or with his wife, to complete his studies. In the first two cases, A makes only a flying visit and he has no intention to live either permanently or temporarily in the places he visits. It cannot, therefore, be said that he "resides" in the places he visits. In the last two illustrations though A has a permanent house elsewhere, he has a clear intention or animus manendi to make the places where he has gone for medical relief in one and studies in the other his temporary abode or residence. In the last two cases it can be said that though he is not a domicile of those places, he "resides" in those places." 6. The intention of the petitioner can only be determined in the context of the peculiar circumstances of this case. The entire married life was only of a few months' duration and during this period the wife was not taken to live with the husband at his place of work. The only occasions they lived together were when the husband could take advantage of holidays to go and stay with his wife at the place where she was put up. Even though he could stay with her only for a few days at a time it is quite clear that these were not casual visits. He did not casually drop in at her house during his peregrinations nor did he visit her as he would have visited a friend or a relation; he went to her house to live or reside with her even though the duration of his stay would perforce have to be brief. He did not casually drop in at her house during his peregrinations nor did he visit her as he would have visited a friend or a relation; he went to her house to live or reside with her even though the duration of his stay would perforce have to be brief. In the circumstances of this case the lower court's finding that the petitioner last resided with his wife at Morazha has therefore to be upheld. 7. Even if there had been any lack of territorial jurisdiction the order of the lower court is not liable to be set aside as we think this is a case to which the provisions of S.531 of the Criminal Procedure Code will apply. S.531 provides that: "No finding, sentence or order of any Criminal Court shall be set aside merely on the ground that the inquiry, trial or other proceeding in the course of which it was arrived at or passed, took place in a wrong sessions division, district, sub-division or other local area, unless it appears that such error has in fact occasioned a failure of justice." It is clear that the lower court order will stand unless it is shown that the revision petitioner has been prejudiced by the court's lack of territorial jurisdiction. No ground of prejudice due to the lack of jurisdiction has been taken in the revision memo. However it is argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that prejudice can be presumed from the fact that the objection regarding jurisdiction was taken even at the outset. In this connection the learned counsel pointed out the explanation to S.537 Criminal Procedure Code which provides that: "In determining whether any error, omission or irregularity in any proceeding under this Code has occasioned a failure of justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings." True the raising of the objection at an early stage would suggest that the petitioner was prejudiced, but as pointed out in Kali Charan Kundu v. King Emperor - AIR. 1921 Calcutta 114 "the fact that such an objection was taken is not conclusive proof that the accused has been prejudiced by the irregularity." The question whether prejudice was caused or not is a question of fact which has to be decided with regard to the circumstances of each case. Here the only circumstance that could be pointed out by the learned counsel was that the petitioner could not appear at the trial. It is a case in which all the witnesses for the petitioner were cross-examined and the only witness cited for the counter-petitioner was also examined. If he could go to visit his wife even without taking leave from his office it would certainly have not been too difficult for him to have attended the court with permission. It is true that he may have found it inconvenient to attend every posting but the fact that he did not care to put in even one appearance would seem to indicate that the reason for staying away was not the difficulty of travelling. 8. The revision petition has only to be dismissed.