SINGHAL, J.—The plaintiffs, who are the appellants in this second appeal, raised their suit for the recovery of Rs. 2000/- on the basis of khata Ex. 1 alleging that it was executed in their favour by the defendant on Mangsir Sudi 4, Svt. 2008, corresponding to December 2, 1951, after setting the account. According to the plaintiffs, if was provided in the Khata that 201 maunds of grain would be delivered by the defendant by Jeth Sudi 15, Svt. 2009 i.e. by June 8, 1952. It was claimed that the defendant delivered one maund of grain on Jeth Sudi 12, Svt. 2012 (June 2, 1955) and so the suit was filed on June 30, 1958, for the recovery of Rs. 2000/- after giving up the remaining claim. As the courts were closed during the summer vacation, the plaintiffs pleaded that the suit was within limitation on account of the part payment dated June 2, 1955. The defendant denied the execution of the khata and the alleged part payment. He also took the plea that the Khata was without consideration. Issues were framed on October 16, 1958 on questions relating to the execution of the khata, the consideration, the alleged part payment, the rate of the grain and some other minor points of controversy. The evidence of the parties was recorded on these issues. The defendant then moved an application for leave to amend the written statement to raise the plea that the khata had been altered in material particulars. The application was allowed and an issue was framed on August 24, 1950, whether material alterations had been made in the khata. Thereafter the case proceeded further and the Munsiff of Jaitaran, who tried the suit, reached the conclusion that the khata had Deen executed by the defendant with consideration and that the defendant made part payment of the loan by delivering one maund of grain on Jeth Sudi 12, S. 2012, as claimed by the plaintiffs. The other material finding of the Munsiff was that the Khata had been materially altered after its execution, to bring the suit within limitation, and he therefore dismissed it. On appeal, the learned Civil Judge of Sojat also held that the khata had been materially altered and he therefore main-tained the trial courts decree by his judgment dated May 7, 1960. It is in these circumstances that the plaintiffs have preferred this second appeal. On appeal, the learned Civil Judge of Sojat also held that the khata had been materially altered and he therefore main-tained the trial courts decree by his judgment dated May 7, 1960. It is in these circumstances that the plaintiffs have preferred this second appeal. 2. There is: no controversy before me about the correctness of the findings regarding the execution of the Khata by the defendant, the consideration and the part payment of June 2, 1955. There is also no controversy about the price of the grain, or the quantum of the plaintiffs claim. The only dispute is whether the Khata was materially altered without the knowledge or consent of the defendant, and it is admitted that the fate of the appeal will depend on a decision of this point alone. 3. In order to appreciate the controversy, it would be desirable to reproduce the disputed Khata entry. It reads as follows— ^^201½ ghlkc tksMu ckdh ys.kk /kku nks; lks ,sd e.k v[kjs 201½ e.k idk rksy jks 2009 jk mukyh jh Hkknks lqnh rksdks yksVkesa rksy nslh g% [kqn 2009 jk tSB lqn 15 rkbZ nslh%** Thereafter there is a revenue stamp over which the thumb mark of defendant has been affixed and then there is the verification by the scribe Tejraj to that effect. 4. It is contended on behalf of the defendant respondent that while the words ^^2009 jk mukyh jh Hkknks lqnh rhdks ykVke rksy nslh** Were written out originally in the Khata as it stood on the date of its execution, the subsequent words ^^2009 jk tSB lqn 15 rkbZ nslh** marked A to B, were added later on, surreptitiously, without the defendants knowledge or consent by collusion between the plaintiffs and the scribe and that this addition was material as it affected the period of limitation for the tiling of the suit and so the whole decumbent was rendered void and could not sustain the plaintiffs claim. 5. The first question therefore is whether the alleged interlineation or addition of the words ^^2009 jk tSB lqn 15 rkbZ nslh** was made in the presence of the defendant and with his consent, at the time of the execution of the document, or whether it was made surreptitiously sometime later. 6. It has been argued by Mr. 5. The first question therefore is whether the alleged interlineation or addition of the words ^^2009 jk tSB lqn 15 rkbZ nslh** was made in the presence of the defendant and with his consent, at the time of the execution of the document, or whether it was made surreptitiously sometime later. 6. It has been argued by Mr. Lodha, learned counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants, that the finding that the alteration was made later on, without the defendants knowledge or consent, has been vitiated because the learned Judge of the lower appellate court has misread the statement of plaintiff Pannalal on an important point. The main reason why the learned Civil Judge disbelieved the plaintiffs version was that whereas Tejraj P. W. 3, the scribe of the Khata had stated that the addition of the words ^^2009 jk tSB lqn 15 rkbZ nslh** was made before the defendant affixed his thumb-mark on the . document plaintiff Pannalal has stated this was done later on. The learned counsel has pointed out that plaintiff Pannalal did not say anything of the kind because what he deposed was that he did not remember whether the addition was made before or after the defendants thumb mark was affixed on the Khata. This argument is quite correct and it is no doubt true that the learned Civil Judge has misread Pannalals statement. His finding of fact cannot therefore bind this Court as the evidence has been misread on an important point. Moreover, a perusal of the impugned judgment shows that the learned Civil judge committed a serious error when he misread sec. 78 of the Marwar Tenancy Act, 1949, in holding that the period for the delivery of the grain was upto May 30, and that the period of Lata commenced from Chait Bad 30 or March 30th. The reasoning adopted by the learned Judge is quite meaningless. He lost sight of the fact that the parties were in agreement that they had contracted for the redelivery of the grain in the Rabi Tata for which, according to the aforesaid sec. 78, the last date was May 30, or Jeth Sudi 15, whichever was later. So as the finding of fact has been vitiated by a misreading of Pannalals statement and the provisions of sec. 78, the last date was May 30, or Jeth Sudi 15, whichever was later. So as the finding of fact has been vitiated by a misreading of Pannalals statement and the provisions of sec. 78 of the Marwar Tenancy Act, 1949, it cannot be said to bind this Court and I am therefore driven to the necessity of reassessing the evidence myself. 7. As has been stated, the point for decision is whether the words ^^2009 jk tSB lqn 15 rkbZ nslh** were added in the Khata with the knowledge and consent of the defendant at the time of its execution, or whether they were inserted later on. It is important to remember in this connection that the plaintiffs disclosed in para 1 of the plaint that the defendant had executed the Khata on Mangsir Sud 4, Svt. 2008, and had undertaken to deliver the grain by Jeth Sud 15, Svt. 2009, corresponding to June 8, 1952. The plaintiffs also produced the original Khata along with the plaint. Its copy was compared with the original by a clerk of the court and was placed on the record. It was clearly brought out in that copy that the words ^^2009 jk tSB lqn 15 rkbZ nslh** occurred after the words ^^g% [kqn** . The defendant therefore knew from the very beginning that the plaintiffs relied on his agreement to deliver the grain by Jeth Sudi 15, Svt 2009. Even then be did not take the plea in his written statement, which was filed by him with the help of his counsel, that the words had been added surreptitiously and vitiated the document. The written statement was filed on August 27, 1958 and the issues were framed on October 16, 1958. The evidence of the plaintiffs was closed on December 19, 1958 and the defendants evidence was practically over when he made an application on May 23, 1959 for leave to amend the written statement for the purpose of raising the plea that the words ^^2009 jk tSB lqn 15 rkbZ nslh** had been added without his knowledge and consent and amounted to a material alteration of the document. This conduct of the defendant shows that plea of material alteration was taken as a last resort and I have no doubt that it was an after thought. This conduct of the defendant shows that plea of material alteration was taken as a last resort and I have no doubt that it was an after thought. If this had not been so the defendant would have taken the plea straight away when he filed the written statement. 8. So far as the direct evidence is concerned, plaintiff Pannalal has clearly stated that the words ^^2009 jk tSB lqn 15 rkbZ nslh** were written with the defendants consent, at the time of the execution of the document, although they were added after the Khata had been written out by the scribe, as it was then that the defendant agreed to that clarification. Tejraj P. W. 3 was the scribe of the document and he has stated that the additional words in question were added by him before the defendant affixed his thumb mark on the document. Nothing has been elicited in the cross-examination of these two witnesses to shake their testimony. As a matter of fact the defendant has not stated in his own deposition that the words in question were added later on, without his knowledge or consent, and he has not examined any other witness to rebut the evidence of the plaintiffs. It cannot therefore be held that the plaintiffs have not been able to prove that the words ^^2009 jk tSB lqn 15 rkbZ nslh** were added at the time of the execution of the Khata and with the knowledge and consent of the defendant. 9. There is one more reason for this conclusion. As has been pointed out, thekhata is dated Mangsir Sud 4, Svt. 2008, corresponding to December 2, 1951. It has been proved, and is not now in dispute, that it was executed by the defendant. It has also been proved and is not disputed that the defendant delivered one maund of grain on Jeth Sud 12, Svt. 2012, corresponding to June 2, 1955. He affixed his thumb mark to the entry evidencing that part payment. If it had not been agreed between the parties that the delivery of the grain would be made by Jeth Sud 15, Svt. 2009, corresponding to June 8, 1952, the defendant would not have made the part delivery on June 2, 1955 as the suit would have been barred by that time owing to the expiry of the period of three years. 2009, corresponding to June 8, 1952, the defendant would not have made the part delivery on June 2, 1955 as the suit would have been barred by that time owing to the expiry of the period of three years. The fact that he made the delivery shows that it had been initially agreed between the parties that the delivery of 201 maunds of grain would be made upto Jeth Sud 15, Svt. 2009, and that the defendants plea that this was not so is an after thought. 10. However, even if it is assumed, for the sake of argument, that the words ^^2009 jk tSB lqn 15 rkbZ nslh** were added without the defendants knowledge and consent, the second question is whether the alteration was material. The law on the point has been lucidly brought out in Nathu Lal and others vs. Mt. Gomti Kuar and others (1). Their Lordships of the Privy Council, in that case, reproduced, with approval, the following passage from Halsburys Laws of England, Edn. 2, Vol. 10, page 227, para 287 — "If an alteration by erasure, inter lineation or otherwise) is made in a material part of a deed after its execution, by or with the consent of any party thereto or person entitled there under, but without the consent of the party or parties liable thereunder, the deed is thereby made void. [The avoidance however is not ab initio or so as to nullify any conveyancing effect which the deed has alredy had; but only operates as from the time of such alteration and so as to prevent the person who has made or authorised the alteration and those claiming under him, from putting the deed in suit to enforce, against any party bound thereby who did not consent to the alteration, any obligation, covenant or promise thereby undertaken or made. A material alteration is one which varies the rights, liabilities, or legal position of the parties ascertained by the deed in its original state or otherwise varies the legal effect of the instrument as originally expressed, or reduces to certainty some provision which was originally unascertained and as such void, or may otherwise prejudice the party bound by the deed as originally executed. The effect of making such an alteration without the consent of the party bound is exactly the same as that of cancelling the deed. The effect of making such an alteration without the consent of the party bound is exactly the same as that of cancelling the deed. The avoidance of the deed is not retrospective and does not revest or reconvey any estate or interest in property which passed under it. And the deed may be put in evidence to prove that such estate or interest so passed or for any other purpose than to maintain an action to enforce some agreement therein contained." This rule relating to the effect of a material alteration in a document has been evolved gradually as a result of English decisions but as it is based on "great good sense", and is dictated by public policy, and is "independent of considerations of clime or race", their Lordships made it applicable to India also. In fact, they noticed some decisions of the Indian High Courts in which the rule had already been applied and there can be little doubt it is this rule which will govern the persent case. 11. So it has to be seen whether the alteration in question (i) varies the rights, liabilities, or the legal position of the parties, or (ii) it otherwise varies the legal effect of the instrument, or (iii) it reduces to certainty some provision which was unascertained and as such void, or (iv) it otherwise prejudices the defendant. 12. It is not disputed that the original khata contained the words ^^2009 jk mukyh jh Hkknks rhdks ykVke rksy nslh** meaning that the defendant would deliver the grain on the threshing floor (or lata) in the summer of Svt. 2009. What then was the last date for the lata of the summer of Svt. 2009? The plaintiffs have led evidence to show that the lata of the summer continued upto Jeth Sud 15 and I find that some of the defendants witnesses have also admitted that this was so. His witnesses Natha and Dhula have stated that lata used to continue upto Jeth Sud 15 and there is no reason whv it should not be held that this was so. His witnesses Natha and Dhula have stated that lata used to continue upto Jeth Sud 15 and there is no reason whv it should not be held that this was so. As a matter of fact, the defendant has not even taken the plea, in his written statement, that the ^^mukyw** or summer lata did not expire on Jeth Sud 15 and I have no doubt that the contention that this was not so and that the lata expired earlier on Chet Sud 15, is an argument of despair. It must therefore be held that in village Bar, where the defendant carried on his cultivation and was to deliver the grain under the khata, the lata of the summer continued upto Jeth Sud 15. It may be pointed out that sec. 78 of the Marwar Tenancy Act, 1949, also made it clear that the "proper time" for the lata was to be determined by custom or practice in the local area concerned, else the rabi lata was to continue upto "30th May or Jeth Sud 15 whichever of the two comes last". This also shows that on the basis of the undisputed claim in the khata for the delivery of the grain in the lata of summer, the plaintiffs were entitled to ask for delivery upto Jeth sud 15, Smt. 2009, corresponding to June 8, 1952. The plaintiffs had therefore nothing to gain by adding the words ^^2009 jk tSB lqn 15 rkbZ nslh** 13. The addition which is claimed to be an alteration by interlineation did not therefore vary the rights, liabilities or the legal position of the parties. So also it did not vary the legal effect of the khata as originally expressed and it cannot be said that it reduced to certainty some provision which was void on account of uncertainty. As a matter of fact, it did not at all prejudice the defendant. It was not therefore a material alteration in the eye of the law. The most that can be said is that the addition was meant to explain, or to bring out more specifically, what had been written out earlier, in order that the parties may know beyond doubt that the delivery of the grain was to be made by Jeth Sud 15, Smt. 2009. This could not, however, have the effect of destroying the document. This could not, however, have the effect of destroying the document. I am fortified in this view by the decisions in Anand Mohan Saha vs. Anand Chandra Saha(2), Ganga Prasad vs. Motiram(3), Shivarama Konar vs. Thiruvadinatha Pillai(4), and L. Ram Sukhdas vs. Hafiz-ul-Rehman(5). 14. Mr. Parakh, learned counsel for the defendant-respondent, has argued that any variation of the date of a document is always a material alteration and that as the plaintiffs varied the date of delivery from Chet Sud 15, Svt. 2009, it destroyed the document. Reliance for this submission has been placed on Govindasami vs. Kuppusami (6) and K. M. Basappa vs. Patel Marule Gowda (7). The argument is incorrect. Their Lordships of the Privy Council also repelled it in Nathulals case(l) to which reference has been made above, for it may well be that even the alteration of the date may not be material in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. In Govindasamis case (6) it appeared that the date of the document was altered from the 11th to the 25th September and that materially affected the liability of the defendant, for it extended the time within which the plaintiff was entitled to sue. So that case was quite different. K.M. Basappas case (7) was governed by sec. 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and the date of the execution of the instrument was found to be altered. The promissory note remained in the custody of the plaintiffs and the alteration served to help them, if at all, by enlarging the period of time for the filing of the suit. This is why the alteration was held to be material in the facts and circumstances of that case, but the decision has no relevance for purposes of the present controversy. 15. The result therefore is that as the plaintiffs suit has been wrongly dismissed under the mistaken impression that the suit khata was materially altered in the manner alleged by the defendant, there is no reason why it should not be decreed. The appeal is therefore allowed and the suit is decreed for Rs. 2000/-with pendente lite and future interest at 4 per cent per annum, and costs throughout.