Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal from an order dismissing in limine a petition filed by the appellant under Art.226 of the Constitution. The prayers in the petition were: "(a) That this Hon'ble Court be pleased to call for the records of the case and quash by the issue of writ of certiorari or other appropriate writ, order or direction Ext. P5 order. (b) That this Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus to the 1st respondent to assess the tarwad as such, as hitherto been assessed. (c) That this Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of prohibition or other appropriate writ, order or direction prohibiting the first respondent from taking further steps to make assessments on the members of the tarwad based on Ext. P. 5 order. (d) That this Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue an order of injunction restraining the first respondent from taking any steps pursuant to Ext. P5 order pending disposal of the Original Petition. (e) That this Hon'ble Court be pleased to pass such other appropriate orders and issue such other writs or directions as may be found necessary, expedient and just in the circumstances of the case." 2. The order, Ext. P-5, happened to be passed by the first respondent, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax (Special), Kozhikode in the following circumstances. The petitioner appellant and respondents 2 & 3 are members of a marumakkathayam tarwad consisting of eleven members of which the second respondent is the karnavan. The tarwad used to be assessed to agricultural income-tax in past years. In 1958, a partition deed (Ext. P-1) was executed by the members of the tarwad, and for the assessment years 1959-60 and 1960-61 respondents 2 and 3 filed returns in respect of their shares in the properties on the basis of the partition deed. The Agricultural Income-tax Officer assessed the second respondent on this basis and as the third respondent had no assessable income he was not assessed at all. Exts. P-2 and P-3 are the copies of the assessment orders dated 3-10-1962 for the years 1959-60 and 1960-61 respectively. The Agricultural Income-tax Officer assessed the second respondent on this basis and as the third respondent had no assessable income he was not assessed at all. Exts. P-2 and P-3 are the copies of the assessment orders dated 3-10-1962 for the years 1959-60 and 1960-61 respectively. The second respondent preferred appeals to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax, Cannanore, and the main point taken was that the order of assessment was bad in law, as the Agricultural income Tax Officer had not passed an order under S.29 of the Act, recognising the partition. It was argued in appeal that notwithstanding the execution of the partition deed, the tarwad remained undivided as the deed of partition had not come into effect. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner by order (Ext. P-4) set aside the orders of assessment & ordered fresh assessment after passing an order in accordance with law under S.29. Thereafter the cases were transferred to the first respondent who gave notice to all the members of the tarwad for an enquiry under S.29. The third respondent, a brother of the appellant, appeared and stated that notwithstanding the execution of the deed, the tarwad remained joint. Relying on the fact that respondents 2 and 3 had filed separate returns for two years and had produced the deed of partition claiming separate assessments and taking into consideration certain statements made by the second respondent, the first respondent held that the tarwad had become divided. It is this order which is sought to be quashed in this original petition. The petition was dismissed in limine, and the petitioner has preferred this appeal. 3. According to the appellant the first respondent had no jurisdiction to proceed with the enquiry under S.29 when the persons who claimed divided status withdrew the said claim. Another ground is that proceedings under S.29 are of a quasi-judicial nature and that the first respondent was not justified in relying on statements made by the second respondent before notices were issued to all the members of the tarwad. 4. A preliminary objection is taken on behalf of the first respondent that the original petition as well as the appeal are not maintainable, as the appellant has other effective remedies under the Agricultural income-tax Act and further that so far as the appellant is concerned, the question is only of academic interest as she may not have an assessable income. A preliminary objection is taken on behalf of the first respondent that the original petition as well as the appeal are not maintainable, as the appellant has other effective remedies under the Agricultural income-tax Act and further that so far as the appellant is concerned, the question is only of academic interest as she may not have an assessable income. It was also urged that even if an appeal did not lie against the order under S.29, it was open for a member of the tarwad to attack the order in an appeal against an order of assessment, in case she is assessed. 5. After hearing both sides I am satisfied that the preliminary objections have to be upheld. S.31 (1) provides: "31. Appeal against assessment: - (1) Any assessee objecting to the amount of income assessed or tax determined or loss computed under S.18 or denying his liability to be assessed under this Act or objecting to any order under any of the provisions of S.3A,19, 20, 21, 25, 29 and 41 made by the Agricultural Income-tax Officer or to the cancellation by him, of the registration of a firm or to the refusal to register a firm may appeal to the Assistant Commissioner against the assessment or against such order: Provided that no appeal shall lie in respect of an assessment made under sub-section (4) of SM." According to the appellant the expression "any order" means an order adverse to a person claiming divided status and not one overruling his contention that assessment should not be made on the basis of division. Reliance was placed on Form D which is prescribed by the Rules for preferring appeals from orders under S.29. Form D indicates that it is prescribed for an appeal from an order refusing to recognise the divided status of the tarwad or the joint family. It is therefore argued that an order in proceedings where a member claims joint status but the same is refused, is not appealable. I do not think this contention can be upheld. The words in S.29 are general; and an appeal is provided from any order under S.29. The form which is prescribed by the Rules cannot curtail a right conferred by the section. Take a case in which half the members of a tarwad want their individual status to be recognised and the other half oppose the same. The words in S.29 are general; and an appeal is provided from any order under S.29. The form which is prescribed by the Rules cannot curtail a right conferred by the section. Take a case in which half the members of a tarwad want their individual status to be recognised and the other half oppose the same. It cannot be taken that the right of appeal is provided only for the first group and not for the other. The Rules are made under the rule-making power conferred on the Government by S.67 of the Act, clause (1) of which provides: The Government may, after previous publication, make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act." The Rules are to be made for carrying out the purposes of the Act and not to defeat the same. If the section allows an appeal from any order and the Rule curtails that right by prescribing a certain form of appeal the section must override the rule. 6. Counsel for the appellant relied on the decision in I.T. Commissioner B. & O. v. Lachmi Narain (AIR. 1944 Pat. 339). This was a case under the Income-tax Act, 1922, S.25A of which corresponds with S.29 of the Agricultural Income-tax Act. The assessee in that case set up a division of the joint family on 9th November, 1939, but the Income-tax Officer held on the basis of the partition deed that division took place only on 25th October, 1940. He did not prefer an appeal under S.30 of the Income-tax Act, but when he preferred an appeal from the order of assessment and attacked the order under S.25A, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that he was precluded from questioning the correctness of the order under S.25A as he had not preferred a separate appeal therefrom. The High Court held that Form C-I prepared under R.27, which corresponds to Form D under the Agricultural Income-tax Act indicated that any appeal lay only when the Income-tax Officer refused to recognise the status of division. With great respect, I must express my dissent from this view. I am therefore of opinion that it was open for the appellant to have preferred an appeal against the order, Ext. P5. 7. Another consideration is that the appellant may not be assessed at all as an individual in which case she cannot be said to be aggrieved by the order. I am therefore of opinion that it was open for the appellant to have preferred an appeal against the order, Ext. P5. 7. Another consideration is that the appellant may not be assessed at all as an individual in which case she cannot be said to be aggrieved by the order. In case she is assessed, it is open for her to question the correctness of the order under S.29 in an appeal from the order of assessment. This is supported by the decision cited above. At this stage the question so far as the appellant is concerned is only of academic interest and there is no need to adjudicate on that. 8. Counsel for the appellant urged that the existence of another remedy is no bar to the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has laid down the principles governing interference under Art.226 by the High Courts. In Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. v. D.P. Dube: No. 2 (14 Sales Tax Cases 410) it was held: "The Legislature has set up an elaborate and self-contained machinery for investigating whether a transaction is liable to be taxed because it is of the nature of a retail sale within the meaning of the Act. The taxing officer is invested with authority to determine the nature of the transaction and its liability to tax, and against his decision there is an appeal to the appellate authority and a further right of revision to the Commissioner. It is true that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.226 is extensive, but normally the High Court does not exercise that jurisdiction by entertaining petitions against the order of taxing authorities. When the statute under which tax is sought to be levied provides a remedy by way of an appeal or other proceeding to a party aggrieved and thereby by-pass the statutory machinery. That is not to say that the High Court will never entertain a petition against the order of the taxing officer. When the statute under which tax is sought to be levied provides a remedy by way of an appeal or other proceeding to a party aggrieved and thereby by-pass the statutory machinery. That is not to say that the High Court will never entertain a petition against the order of the taxing officer. The High Court has undoubtedly jurisdiction to decide whether a statute under which a tax is sought to be levied is within the legislative competence of the Legislature enacting it or whether the statute defies constitutional restrictions or infringes any fundamental frights, or whether the taxing authority has abrogated to himself power which he does not possess, or has committed a serious error or procedure which has affected the validity of his conclusion or even where the taxing authority threatens to recover tax on an interpretation of the statute which is erroneous. The High Court may also in appropriate cases determine the exigibility to tax of transactions the nature of which is admitted, but the High Court normally does not proceed to ascertain the nature of a transaction which is alleged to be taxable. The High Court leaves it to the taxpayer to obtain an adjudication from the taxing authorities in the first instance." This view was reiterated in Than Singh Nethmal v. Superintendent of Taxes (15 Sales Tax Cases 468). 9. As stated earlier, the appellant has not been assessed to tax so far. If and when that is done it is open for her to appeal from the order of assessment and it cannot be said that such an appeal is too onerous to justify interference under Art.226. I am therefore of the view that this is not a fit case for the exercise of the discretionary power under Art.226. I would therefore dismiss the appeal with costs including Advocate's fee of Rs. 200/- to the first respondent. Raghavan, J. - I agree.