KAN SINGH, J.—This bunch of 185 writ petitions before us raises identical questions about the vires of some provisions of the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 (Act No. 38 of 1961), hereinafter to be referred as the "Act", and of the rules and bye-laws made thereunder, and therefore it can conveniently be disposed of together. 2. The Act was passed by the Rajasthan State Legislature and came into force on 24.11.61, when it was first published in the Rajasthan Gazette. In exercise of its powers under sec. 36 of the Act, the State Government made the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Rules, 1963, hereinafter to be referred as the Rules which came into force on 6.2.64, on being published in the Gazette. The bye-laws were made by the various market committees in exercise of their powers under sec. 37 of the Act. In 1964, one Bhikamchand and other traders questioned the validity of the Act, the rules and the bye-laws by 9 writ petitions various grounds, such as, that the Act was unconstitutional being in contravention of the fundamental rights of the traders under Art.19 (1) (g) of the Constitution, that the notifications that were issued by the Government under sec. 3 of the Act for the establishment of the market areas were bad and that the bye-laws made by the market committees were invalid as they were not made with the previous sanction of the Director of Agriculture as required by sec. 37 of the Act. We came to the conclusion that the Act did not infringe the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Art. 19(1) (g) of the Constitution, and was, therefore, not unconstitutional on that account, but we found that the bye-laws framed by the various market committees, in the cases before us, were invalid as the requisite previous sanction for making them had not been obtained as required by sec. 37 of the Act. In the result we allowed the writ petitions and restrained the State and other respondents from giving effect to the bye-laws as framed. Our judgment is reported as Bhikam Chand vs. State of Rajasthan (1). We will advert to the relevant observations from that judgment at appropriate place in this judgment. 3. 37 of the Act. In the result we allowed the writ petitions and restrained the State and other respondents from giving effect to the bye-laws as framed. Our judgment is reported as Bhikam Chand vs. State of Rajasthan (1). We will advert to the relevant observations from that judgment at appropriate place in this judgment. 3. In order to rectify the defects in the law that came to light as a result of our judgment the Governor promulgated the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets (Amending and Validating Provisions) Ordinance, 1965, (Ordinance No. 4 of 1965), on 26.8.65. This Ordinance was later on replaced by an Act of the same caption (Act No. 16 of 1965), which came into force on 29.10.65. By this Act certain amendments were also made in the Act, besides validating the defects therein. We will be reproducing the relevant provisions of the Act, as well as those of Act No. 16 of 1965, at the appropriate place in dealing with the points raised by the petitioners. This time the attack is based on fresh grounds which we will notice hereinafter. Shri M B.L. Bhargava, appearing for Messrs Chandan Mal Beharilal of Padampur, led the arguments on the side of the petitioners and to start with we propose to deal with the points argued by him and then we will be dealing with the points raised by other learned counsel in respect of other writ petitions argued by them. 4. Shri Bhargava directed attention in his address to three sections in the Act, namely, secs.3, 17 and 40. He argued that sec. 3 of the Act was bad as it suffered from the vice of excessive delegation of its functions by the Legislature thereby making the Government free to pick and choose either the commodities or the areas for which it may like to declare market areas. According to Shri Bhargava, the discretion with which the Government was vested in the matter of establishment of market areas was unfettered and unguided. He points out that it was the duty of the Legislature to lay down some principle or policy for the exercise of its discretion by the Government. As regards the validity of sec. 17 of the Act, Shri Bhargava submitted that here also the Legislature had not laid down any principle which may guide the executive in the matter of prescribing the maximum by the rules. As regards the validity of sec. 17 of the Act, Shri Bhargava submitted that here also the Legislature had not laid down any principle which may guide the executive in the matter of prescribing the maximum by the rules. In the result, the Government is left with uncontrolled power to prescribe any maximum fee in exercise of its rule making power. Such a power, according to Shri Bhargava, amounted to abdication of its essential legislative functions by the Legislature in favour of the Government. As regards sec. 40, Shri Bhargava submitted that the State Government has been empowered by issuing a notification in the official gazette to add to, amend or cancel any of the items of agricultural produce specified in the schedule of the Act, and this according to him, is again excessive delegation which is open to objection. 5. The learned Advocate General contested the stand taken by Shri Bhargava and demurred that in view of our previous decision in Bhikamchands case (1), it was no longer open to anybody to question the constitutionality of the Act. According to him, once a judicial verdict was given on the constitutionality of a statute it was not, thereafter, open to anybody to question its constitutionality. We do not find any substance in this objection of the learned Advocate General. The constitutionality of the Act was questioned before us previously only on the basis of Art. 19 of the Constitution and in these writ petitions the traders, who were not parties to the earlier writ petitions, are challenging the vires of the Act on altogether different grounds which, in our opinion, they are not disentitled to do. The relevant sections, whose validity we are to consider, run as follows:— Sec.3. "Notification of intention of exercising control over purchase and sale of agricultural produce in specified area.—(1) The State Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, declare its intention of regulating the purchase and sale of such agricultural produce and in such area as may be specified in the notification; Provided that no area within the limits of a municipality shall be included in the area specified in such notification except after consultation with the municipal board or municipal council concerned, as the case may be. (2) A notification under sub-sec. (2) A notification under sub-sec. (1) shall state that any objection or suggestion which may be received by the State Government within a period of not less than one month, to be specified in the notification, shall be considered by the State Government." (Prior to Amendment) Sec 17 "Power to levy market fees—The market committee may, subject to the provisions of rules and subject to such maxima as may be prescribed, levy market fees on the agricultural produce bought and sold by the licensees in the market:" (As amended by Act No. 16 of 1965) Sec. 17 "Power to levy cess.—The market committee may, subject to the provisions of rules and subject to such maxima as may be prescribed, levy a cess on the agricultural produce bought and sold by the licensees in the market." Sec. 40. "Power of Government to amend the Schedule.—The State Government may by notification in the official Gazette add to, amend or cancel any of the items of agricultural produce specified in the Schedule." 6. In order to see whether the Act really affords any guidance in the matter of exercising the powers by the Government we may briefly refer to the historical background which persuaded the Legislature to pass this law. 7. In all advanced countries of the world regulation of markets and trade practices was long recognised. In Great Britain, a Royal Commission was appointed as early as 1837, to investigate into the markets and on the basis of the recommendations of the Commission, Markets and Fairs Act was passed in 1847. This was followed by more than two dozen Acts. The aim of these Acts was to improve the standard of marketing services, to provide fair trading in the markets and to safeguard the health and sanitation of the users of the market. Control of markets in the United States of America began in 1899. In India also a Royal Commission on Agriculture reported in 1928 that marketing legislation was necessary. As an incentive to increased agricultural production its importance in a planned economy of a country, according to the Commission, could not be over-emphasised. The matter also received the attention of the marketing committee of the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture held in October, 1945, at Quebec. Its observations were as follows: "Marketing is the crux of the whole food and agriculture problems. The matter also received the attention of the marketing committee of the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture held in October, 1945, at Quebec. Its observations were as follows: "Marketing is the crux of the whole food and agriculture problems. It would be useless to increase the output of food, and would be equally futile to set up optimum standards or nutrition, unless means could be found to move food from the producer to the consumer at a price which represents a fair remuneration to the producer and is within the consumers ability to pay. Similar consideration apply to other agricultural products and to fish and forest products." (Vide extract reproduced in a Government of India publication Agricultural Marketing in India — 1956 Edition, page-1) In various states of India several marketing laws have been enforced in the last 25 years or so. It appears that the State of Rajasthan wanted to come in line with other States of India and with this view enacted the Act. This will be evident from the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the bill which became the Act. They are as follows: "Without regulated markets it is difficult for Agriculturists to secure better and adequate prices for their produce. The Indian Central Committee has from its very inception attached great importance to the regulation and improvement of primary marketing in cotton and other agricultural produce. Legislation on the subject has already been enacted in the States of Bombay, Madras, Andhra, Punjab, Madhya Pradesh, Hyderabad, Madhya Bharat and Mysore. The Committee being convinced that there is no other single measure which could help the agriculturist in getting a better price for his produce than regulation of market, has at its meeting held in July, 1954 recommended the enactment of similar legislation in other States including Rajasthan. Government have considered the various aspects of the said recommendation and have arrived at the same conclusion." We are not unmindful of the legal position that the Statement of Objects and Reasons cannot be utilised for the purposes of interpreting any substantive provision of the Act, but it is certainly permissible to look to the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the limited purpose of understanding the back ground and the antecedents leading to the legislation in question. In Bhikamchands. In Bhikamchands. case (1), we made the following observations about the scheme underlying the Act, in the light of its various provisions which we then surveyed: "A survey of the relevant provisions of the Act, the Rules and bye-laws shows that scheme of marketing in agricultural commodities specified in the Act is sought to be operated for better regulation of the trade of buying and selling of agricultural commodities by introducing control of the various trading activities in specified areas and by in reduction of compulsory licencing of the trade in the commodities." 8. The Act follows the model of similar laws in other States. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in examining the scheme underlying the Madras Commercial Crops Markets Act, in Arunachala Nadar vs. State of Madras(2) observed as follows: "There is a historical background for this Act. Marketing legislation is now a well-settled feature of all commercial countries. The object of- such legislation is to protect the producers of commercial crops from being exploited by the middlemen and profiteers and to enable them to secure a fair return for their produce. In Madras State, as in other parts of the country various Commissions and Committees have been appointed to investigate the problem, to suggest ways and means of providing a fair deal to the growers of crop, and find a market for selling their produce at proper rates. Several Committees, in their reports, considered this question and suggested that a satisfactory system of agricultural marketing should be introduced to achieve the object of helping the agriculturist to secure a proper return for the produce grown by them." "With a view to provide satisfactory conditions for the growers of commercial crops to sell their produce on equal terms and at reasonable prices, the Act was passed on 25th July, 1933. The preamble introduces the Act with the recital that it is expedient to provide for the better regulation of the buying and selling of commercial crops in the Presidency of Madras and for that purpose to establish markets and make rules for their proper administration, the Act, therefore, was the result of a long exploratory investigation by experts in the field, conceived and enacted to regulate the buying and selling of commercial crops by providing suitable and regulated market by eliminating middlemen and bringing face to face the producer and the buyer so that they may meet on equal terms, thereby eradicating or at any rate reducing the scope for exploitation in dealings. Such a statute cannot be said to create unreasonable restrictions on the citizens right to do business unless it is clearly established that the provisions are too drastic unnecessarily harsh and over-reach the scope of the object to achieve which it is enacted." Their Lordships had also extensively quoted from the Report of the Royal Commission of Agriculture in India, appointed in 1928. In Jan Mohammad Noor Mohammad Bagban vs. The State of Gujrat and another (Writ Petition No. 111 of 1964) decided on 18.8.65, appearing in the Blue Print, their Lordships of the Supreme Court made a survey of the Bombay and Gujarat Acts and observed as follows: "The Act was, as is clear from its Preamble and this review of its provisions, enacted with a view to provide satisfactory conditions for the growers of agricultural produce and to sell their produce on equal terms and at reasonable prices. The ordinary cultivator in our country suffers from many handicaps; he is generally illiterate, and often ignorant of the prevailing prices in the market of agricultural produce. Establishment of regulated markets is a welknown expedient for ameliorating the condition of the agricultural producers by eliminating the middle man and bringing the consumers in direct contact with the producers and thereby securing an ordered plan of agricultural development. The Legislature has, by the Act, attempted, with this object in view, to set up machinery for declaring certain areas as markets and for setting up market yards in which the business of selling and buying agricultural produce may be carried on." 9. The Act, therefore, has a clear cut policy in providing for the better regulation of buying and selling of agricultural produce in the State of Rajasthan. The Act, therefore, has a clear cut policy in providing for the better regulation of buying and selling of agricultural produce in the State of Rajasthan. The scheme permeates through the various provisions of the Act which are comprehensively designed to carry out that policy. 10. In Jan Mohammads case it was contended that the powers conferred by secs. 5 and 6 of the Gujrat Act were unfettered, wide and unguided, and on that account the fundamental rights of the petitioner under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution were infringed. Sec. 5 of the Gujarat Act empowered the Director to declare his intention to regulate the purchase and sale of agricultural produce in a specified area after inviting objections from local authorities and other persons and by sec. 6 the Director was empowered, after considering the objections and suggestions, to declare the area or part thereof a market area for the purposes of the Act in respect of all or any of kinds of produce specified in the notification. In repelling the argument that wide and arbitrary powers were conferred on the Director, their Lordships observed that the powers and performance of duties being for the regulation of buying and selling of agricultural produce and, as the preamble to the Act and the scheme of the Act clearly indicated this purpose, it could not be held that the Director acquired wide and arbitrary powers or that there was no guidance to him in exercising his powers. The following observations from Jan Mahammads case may be quoted with advantage: "Sec. 5 of the Gujarat Act authorises the Director to declare his intention to regulate purchase and sale of agricultural produce in a specified area after inviting objections or suggestions from the local authorities functioning in the area, and from other persons. By sec. 6 the Director, after considering the objections and suggestions received within the period specified in the notification, is authorised to declare the area or part thereof a market area for the purposes of the Act in respect of all or any of kinds of produce specified in the notification. By sec. 6 the Director, after considering the objections and suggestions received within the period specified in the notification, is authorised to declare the area or part thereof a market area for the purposes of the Act in respect of all or any of kinds of produce specified in the notification. The object of the Act being to ameliorate the condition of agriculturists and to do away with the middlemen, who it is a matter of common knowledge, make large and unconscionable profits out of the transactions carried out through them, declaration of intention to regulate trade in agricultural produce in a specified area, after hearing the objections and suggestions of interested parties, cannot be regarded as imposing unreasonable restrictions on the right to carry on trade." "The argument that the authority conferred upon the Director is wide and arbitrary, became no principles are indicated for guidance has no force. The Director is appointed by the State Government to exercise such powers and perform such functions and duties of the conferred or imposed on him by or under the Act, and the exercise of the powers and the performance of the duties is for the purpose of regulating the purchase and sale of agricultural produce and thereby doing away with malpractices in the trade. The preamble to the Act and the scheme of the Act clearly indicate that the powers conferred upon the Director are to be exercised for the purpose of regulating buying and selling of agricultural produce and for that purpose to establish markets for sale and purchase of agricultural produce. The powers under sec. 6 are to be exercised after giving an opportunity to persons interested to raise objections or to make suggestions to the proposed introduction of control on sale and purchase of agricultural produce. It is only after the objections and suggestions are received and considered by the Director in the light of the object and purpose of the Act, and he is satisfied that it is in the interest of the producer and the general public that there should be regulation of the trade in agricultural produce in the specified area that he may proceed to declare the market area." 11. Shri Bhargava, learned counsel for the petitioners invited our attention to Hamdard Dawakhana vs. Union of India (3), Vasanlal Maganbhai vs. State of Bombay (4), Virendra Kapur vs. University of Jodhpur (5), Thakur Madho Singh vs. The State of Rajasthan (6) and Thakur Shiv Kalyan Singh vs. Bhur Singh (7). The principle enunciated in all these cases is that the Legislature can delegate certain functions to its administrative agents, having laid down the broad principles of its policy in the legislation. It can then leave the details to be supplied by the Administrative Authority by delegated legislation and the delegate completes the legislation by supplying details within the limits prescribed by the statute. It has also been held that in dealing with the challenge to the vires of any statute, on the ground of excessive delegation, it is necessary to enquire whether the impugned delegation involves the delegation of an essential legislative function or power and whether the Legislature has enunciated its policy and principle and given guidance to the delegate or not (vide Vasanlal Maganbhai vs. State of Bombay (4). It has also been held in the last mentioned case that in every case it would be necessary to examine the relevant provisions of the statute with a view to seeing whether the delegation was intra vires or not. As to what is sufficient enunciation of policy by the Legislature will depend upon the language of each statute. Sometimes the statement contained in the preamble to the Act may itself afford a good basis for holding that the legislative policy has been sufficiently indicated as was held in Harishanker Bagla vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (8). 12. We had already surveyed the various provisions of the Act in Bhikam Chands case (1), and had observed that the enactment adumbrated a scheme of marketing in agricultural commodities for better regulation of the trade of buying and selling of the agricultural commodities by providing for the control of the various trading activities in specified areas by introduction of the system of compulsory licensing of the trade. We have also referred above the conclusions reached by their Lordships of the Supreme Court regarding the scheme underlying the Madras and the Bombay Acts which are prototypes of our legislation. That being so it cannot be postulated that sec. We have also referred above the conclusions reached by their Lordships of the Supreme Court regarding the scheme underlying the Madras and the Bombay Acts which are prototypes of our legislation. That being so it cannot be postulated that sec. 3 of the Act gives uncontrolled discretion to the Government in the matter of specifying marketing areas or the agricultural commodities. The discretion will always be guided by the policy underlying the Act. Sec. 3 of the Act, therefore, does not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation as the discretion of the Government is not unguided. In Jan Mohammads case their Lordships were considering delegation of powers in favour of the Director and they upheld the validity of the section on the ground that the Director was to exercise his powers according to the scheme of the Act. In Rajasthan, the Government itself is the repository of the power. As observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Matajog Dubey vs. H. C. Bhari(9) a discretionary power is not necessarily a discriminatory power and abuse of power is not to be easily assumed where the discretion is vested in the Government and not in a minor official. 13. Viewed in the light of the above observations, the power given to the State Government by sec. 3 in the matter of selecting particular areas or particular agricultural produce is not arbitrary and unbridled. Even though this is a progressive piece of legislation, it may not be possible for the Government to apply it to the entire State all atonce. It was in order to enable the Government to introduce the scheme gradually that the discretion to select particular areas has ben given to it. Similarly, the discretion to select particular agricultural produce had to be left to the Government because it could not be possible for the State Legislature to specify it for particular areas without necessary inquiry into details. It is common knowledge that different varieties of cereals and commercial agricultural crops are grown in different areas. The State Government is in the best position to select particular agricultural produce for a particular area. There is, therefore, no substance in the argument that sec.3 gives unbridled powers to the State Government in the choice of the area of agricultural produce. 14. The State Government is in the best position to select particular agricultural produce for a particular area. There is, therefore, no substance in the argument that sec.3 gives unbridled powers to the State Government in the choice of the area of agricultural produce. 14. Regarding the vires of sec.17 of the Act it was submitted that the Legis-lature had not laid down any principle which may guide the Executive in the matter of prescribing the maximum fee in the rules that may be framed under sec.36 of the Act. It was thus pointed out that this amounted to abdication of an essential legislative function by the Legislature in favour of the Government. In elaboration of his argument the learned counsel urged that though the exaction has been termed as fee and not as tax, yet in reality it was nothing but tax. In inviting attention to secs.18 and 19 of the Act, it was pointed out that a fund was to be created for the market committee under sec. 18 and under sec.19 the fund could be expended for the various objects set out thereunder. The combined effect of these two sections, according to the learned counsel, was that the fee was not necessarily to be utilise for rendering service to those who were to pay the fee. Secs.18 and 19 of the Act are as follows: Sec. 18. Market committee fund—(1) All moneys received by a market committee shall be paid into a fund to be called "the market committee fund" and all expenditure incurred by the market committee under or for the purposes of this Act shall be defrayed out of the said fund. (2) Any surplus remaining with the market committee after such expenditure has been met shall be invested as may be prescribed in this behalf. (3) Every market committee shall pay to the State Government the cost of any additional or special staff employed by the State Government in consultation with such market committee for giving effect to the provisions of this Act in the market area for which such market committee is established. (4) The Director shall determine the cost of such additional or special staff and shall, when the staff is employed for the purposes of more than one market committee, apportion such cost among the committees concerned in such manner as he thinks fit. (4) The Director shall determine the cost of such additional or special staff and shall, when the staff is employed for the purposes of more than one market committee, apportion such cost among the committees concerned in such manner as he thinks fit. (5) The decision of the Director, determinating the amount payable by any market committee, shall be final." Sec.19. "Purposes for which the fund shall be expended.—Subject to the provisions of sec. 18, the market committee fund shall be expended for the following purposes, namely: (1) the acquisition of a site or sites for the market; (2) the maintenance and improvement of the market; (3) the construction and repair of buildings necessary for the purposes of such market and for the health, convenience and safety of the persons using it; (4) the provision and maintenance of standard weights and measures; (5) the pay, pensions, leave allowances, gratuties, compensation for injuries resulting from accident, compassionate allowance and contributions towards leave allowances, pensions or provident funds of the officers and servants employed by it; (6) the expenses of and incidental to elections; (7) the payment of interest on the loans that may be raised for the purposes of the market committee and the provision of sinking fund in respect of such loans; (8) the collection and dissemination of information regarding matters relating to crop statistics and marketing respect of agricultural produce notified under sec. 4; (9) the payment of the cost referred to in sub-sees (3) and (4) of sec. 18, (10) any propaganda in favour of agricultural improvement; and (11) the carrying out of the purposes and provisions of this Act and the rules and bye-laws made thereunder." 15. Learned counsel for the petitioners invited our attention to Hingir-Rampur Goal Company vs. State of Orissa (10), The Corporation of Calcutta vs. Liberty Cinema (11), The Maharaja Kishangarh Mills Ltd., vs. Municipal Board Kishangarh (12), Ram Sahai vs. Commissioner S.T. (13) and Dhaniram vs. The Janapad Sabha, Jajgir (14). These decisions pointed out the essential distinction between a tax and fee. It has been held that in order to constitute an imposition a fee, one of the essential requisite is that there must be corelation between the fee collected and the service intended to be rendered. These decisions pointed out the essential distinction between a tax and fee. It has been held that in order to constitute an imposition a fee, one of the essential requisite is that there must be corelation between the fee collected and the service intended to be rendered. This is because, a fee is levied essentially for services rendered and as such there is an element of quid pro quo between the person who pays the fee and the public authority which imposes it. Where this co-relation is wanting the imposition in substance will be a tax and not a fee. This Court had occasion to deal with the essentia] distinction between a fee and a tax at a great length in The Maharaja Kishangarh Mills Ltd., vs. Municipal Board Kishangarh (12). It was pointed out therein that in legislative enactments the distinction is not always kept in mind and what is called a fee is really a tax meant for raising revenues. It was pointed out that constitutionally speaking a fee was also a tax for the purposes of Art. 265 of the Constitution, for no fee could be levied without the authority of law. So far as taxes were concerned, they were always for raising the revenue. But in so far as fees were concerned they have to be divided in two parts. Some fees are really taxes though they are called fees in name, such as, court-fees etc. There are other fees which are really fees properly so-called as they are coreleted to the services to be rendered. It was also pointed out as to what should be the criteria for seeing whether a particular levy is a tax or a fee. It was observed in Maharaja Shri Umaid Mills Ltd., vs. State of Rajasthan(15), that it should be seen whether the law under which the fees are charged is one for raising revenue primarily. The following passages from this judgment may be quoted with advantage: "authorities on public finance recognize the distinction between a tax and a fee. Generally speaking, a tax is an impost levied by the State for purposes of raising revenue. The following passages from this judgment may be quoted with advantage: "authorities on public finance recognize the distinction between a tax and a fee. Generally speaking, a tax is an impost levied by the State for purposes of raising revenue. The person, who has to pay the tax, has no option but to do so provided the tax is validly imposed, and cannot object to it on the ground that the State does not render him any particular service in lieu of the tax. A fee, on the other hand, is not generally meant to augment general revenues. It is levied for some service rendered by the State to the particular person concerned, and the levy generally takes place when the particular person ask for permission to do something for which regulations exist. As the levy is not meant to augment the general revenue of the State, it is fixed generally at such a level as to meet the expenses of the services rendered by the State in connection with the matter for which the fee is levied." "This distinction, however, is not always kept in mind rigorously in legislative enactments, and many a time what is called a fee is really a tax meant for raising revenues. Further, constitutionally speaking, a fee is also a tax for the purposes of Art. 265 of the Constitution for no fee can be levied without the authority of law. So far, therefore, as a tax is concerned, there is no difficulty, for it is meant for raising revenue, and must be governed by the authority of law as provided in Art. 265. So far as fees are concerned, they have to be divided into two parts. There are some fees which are really taxes though they are called fees. In their case, all the incidents of a tax apply, and the limitations to which fees are subject do not apply. As an example of this kind, mention may be made of court-fees under the Court-fees Act. Though, it may be. There are some fees which are really taxes though they are called fees. In their case, all the incidents of a tax apply, and the limitations to which fees are subject do not apply. As an example of this kind, mention may be made of court-fees under the Court-fees Act. Though, it may be. said that court-fees are charged from parties who come to court, it is still true that the Court-fees Act, generally speaking, is a measure for raising revenue for the State Then there are fees strictly so called, which are not meant for raising revenue, but for meeting the expenses of the departments of the Government created for regulating professions, trades, callings and employments from which licence fees are levied." "In order to see whether the licence fees levied under the Factories Act are a tax or fees strictly so called, and if the latter whether the State of Rajasthan is entitled to make a charge according to the schedule prescribed in the rules, it has to be seen whether the law, under which the fees are charged, is a law for raising revenue primarily. The Indian Factories Act under sec. 6 of which these fees are charged is not a law primarily for raising revenue. It is law for regulation of factories, and incidentally, in one section out of 120, it mentions levy of fees for purposes of licensing and registration and renewal of licences. Considering the Act as a whole, the intention of the framers of the Act was to levy certain fees under sec. 6 in order to meet the expenses of supervision, which became necessary in view of the various regulatory provisions of the Act, and the Rules framed thereunder. It cannot be said, therefore, that the fee levied under sec. 6 is a tax meant for purposes of raising revenue." 16. Now, if we keep in view the scheme of the present Act, the kind of service that will be rendered in implementation of the Act, will be the provision for better facilities of marketing. The objects enumerated in sec. 19 are primary for advancement of the under-lying purposes of the Act from which those using the market including the licensees are to benefit. It has not been pleaded that the probable income that would accrue will not have a reasonable relations with the expenditure incurred for the purposes of the Act. The objects enumerated in sec. 19 are primary for advancement of the under-lying purposes of the Act from which those using the market including the licensees are to benefit. It has not been pleaded that the probable income that would accrue will not have a reasonable relations with the expenditure incurred for the purposes of the Act. It cannot, by any means, be said that the Act is meant for raising the revenues primarily. Thus, we are unable to hold that the fee contemplated in sec. 17 of the Act will be anything but a fee properly so-called. Moreover, a clear direction has been laid down by the Legislature that the market committee has to prescribe the fee subject to a maximum to be prescribed by the Government under the rules and the Government will necessarily be keeping in view the purposes of the Act in laying down the maxima in the rules, because the rules making power could be exercised by the Government only for the purpose of carrying out of the provisions of the Act. Therefore, in laying down the maxima the Government will have to see that the exaction retains the essential feature of a fee, that is, it must have a corelation with the services to be rendered by the market committee to those who participate in buying and selling of the commodities in the market regulated by the market committee. Fees that have to be prescribed by the rules are prima facie not to be excessive. Therefore, in our view section 17 does not suffer from the infirmity of excessive delegation of any essential legislative function and is consequently not bad. 17. Coming now to the attack against the validity of sec. 40. Provisins of sec. 40 of the Act are in pari materia with the provisions of sec. 29 of the Bombay Agricultural Marketing Act. Sec. 29 of the Bombay Act was challenged before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mohammad Hussain vs. State of Bombay (15-a), on the ground that it gave a completely unregulated power to the State Government to include any error within the schedule without any guidance or control whatsoever. Their Lordships said that, though sec. Sec. 29 of the Bombay Act was challenged before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mohammad Hussain vs. State of Bombay (15-a), on the ground that it gave a completely unregulated power to the State Government to include any error within the schedule without any guidance or control whatsoever. Their Lordships said that, though sec. 29 itself did not lay down any criteria for determining which crop shall be put into the schedule or which shall be taken out therefrom, yet in the words of their Lordships the guidance was writ large in the various provisions of the Act itself. Their Lordships referred an earlier case of Edward Mills Co, Ltd. Beawar vs. State of Ajmer (16), in which sec. 29 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, gave power to the Government to add to either part of the schedule any employment in respect of which it was of the opinion that minimum wages should be fixed. It was held in that case that the legislative policy being apparent on the face of the enactment, the power has been given to the Government to carry out effectively the purposes of the Act and the Government were to decide with reference to local conditions. The same reasoning applies to sec. 40 of the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner attempted to distinguish these cases by pointing out some difference in the definition of the verm "agricultural produce." He emphasised that in Rajasthan the term "agricultural produce" has been defined to include all produce, whether of agriculture, horticulture, animal husbandry or otherwise as specified in the schedule. The words "otherwise as specified in the schedule" no doubt tend to widen the scope of the definition, but sec. 40 has to be utilised only in keeping with the underlying purposes of the Act. If anything which is wholly unconnected with agricultural produce is sought to be included, then it may be a ground for striking down the item to be so included, but thereby we cannot strike down the section itself. To repeat the words of their Lordships in Mohammad Hussains case (15), the policy of the Legislature is writ large on the Act and there is no reason to think that the powers under sec. 40 would be abused. Thus, the contention of the learned counsel about the vires of sec, 40 also fails. 18. To repeat the words of their Lordships in Mohammad Hussains case (15), the policy of the Legislature is writ large on the Act and there is no reason to think that the powers under sec. 40 would be abused. Thus, the contention of the learned counsel about the vires of sec, 40 also fails. 18. Now we take up the contention of the learned counsel which was directed against the validity of the rules. At the fore-front of his arguments, on this breach of the case, learned counsel submitted that the rules which were required to be placed by the Government before the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly in accordance with sec. 36(5) of the Act having not been so placed, the same have become invalid. Sec. 36(5) runs as follows— "Sec.36(5)—All rules finally made under this Act snail be laid, as soon as maybe after they are so made, before the House of the State Legislature, while it is in session, for a period of not less than fourteen days which may be comprised in one session or in two successive sessions and it, before the expiry of the session in which they are so laid or of the session immediately following the house of the State Legislature makes any modification if any of such rules or resolves that any such rule should not be made, such rule shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be, so however that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done thereunder." 19. According to the learned counsel this section was mandatory and when the delegate did not carry out the mandate its act was rendered null and void. He placed reliance on Narendra Kumar vs. The Union of India (17), R.V. Sheer Metalcraft, Ltd., (18) and Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. Rampur vs. The Municipal Board Rampur (19). In the first case, in exercise of the powers under Essential Commodities Act, 1955, the Central Government were required first to determine certain principles and specify them by a notified order and also to lay them before both Houses of Parliament. This having not been done the Supreme Court held that the restrictions were not in the saving clause of Art.19 of the Constitution. This having not been done the Supreme Court held that the restrictions were not in the saving clause of Art.19 of the Constitution. This was a case of double default and we are unable to take any guidance as to what would happen if properly framed rules have not been placed before the house of the Legislature. In other words, there is nothing to show in this judgment as to whether such provisions for placing the rules before the house of the Legislature are mandatory or only directory. 20. In the English case (18), which was referred to by the learned counsel the matter fell to be governed by Statutory Instruments Act; which provided for the requirement of placing of pieces of subsidiary legislation before the houses of Parliament. This case too will not afford any help as there is no law analogous to Statutory Instruments Act in force here. 21. The third case only deals with the question as to when the word "shall" occurring in a statute is to be taken as merely directory and when it is to be taken as mandatory. It was observed by the majority of the learned Judges in Raza Buland Sugar Companys case (19) as follows:— The question whether a particular provision of a statute which on the face of it appears mandatory inasmuch as it uses the word "shall" or is merely directory cannot be resolved by laying down any general rule and depends upon the facts of each case and for that purpose the object of the statute in making the provision is the determining factor. The purpose for which the provision has been made and its nature, the intention of the legislature in making the provision, the serious general inconvenience or in justice to persons resulting from whether the provision is read one way or the other, the relation of the particular provision to other provisions dealing with the same subject and other considerations which may arise on the facts of a particular case including the language of the provision, have all to be taken into account in arriving at the conclusion whether a particular provision is mandatory or directory." 22. In Jan Mohammeds case a similar question did come up for consideration and their Lordships were pleased to observe as follows:— "Finally, the validity of the rules framed under the Bombay Act 22 of 1939 was canvassed. In Jan Mohammeds case a similar question did come up for consideration and their Lordships were pleased to observe as follows:— "Finally, the validity of the rules framed under the Bombay Act 22 of 1939 was canvassed. By sec. 26(1) of the Bombay Act the State Government was authorised to make rules for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Act. It was provided by sub-sec. (5) that the rules made under sec. 26 shall be laid before each of the Houses of the Provincial Legislature at the session thereof next following and shall be liable to be modified or rescinded by a resolution in which both Houses concur and such rules shall, after notification in the Official Gazette, be deemed to have been modified or rescinded accordingly. It was urged by the petitioner that the rule framed under the Bombay Act 22 of 1939 were not placed before the Legislative Assembly or the Legislative Council at the first session and therefore they had no legal validity. The rules under Act 22 of 1939 were framed by the Provincial Government of Bombay in 1941. At that time there was no Legislature in session, the Legislature having been suspended during the emergency arising out of World War II. The session of the Bombay Legislative Assembly was convened for the first time after 1941 on May 20, 1946 and that session was prorogued on May 24, 1946. The second session of the Bombay Legislative Council on September 3, 1946 and the rules were placed on the Assembly Table in the second session before the Legislative Assembly on September 2, 1946 and before the Legislative Council on September 13, 1946. Sec. 26(5) of Bombay Act 22 of 1939 does not prescribe that the rules acquired validity only from the date on which they were placed before the Houses of Legislature. The rules are valid from the date on which they are made under sec. 26(1). It is true that the Legislature has prescribed that the rules shall be placed before the Houses of Legislature, but failure to place the rules before the Houses of Legislature, does not affect the validity of the rules, merely because they have not been placed before the Houses of the Legislature. Granting that the provisions of sub-sec. (5) of sec. It is true that the Legislature has prescribed that the rules shall be placed before the Houses of Legislature, but failure to place the rules before the Houses of Legislature, does not affect the validity of the rules, merely because they have not been placed before the Houses of the Legislature. Granting that the provisions of sub-sec. (5) of sec. 26 by reason of the failure to place the rules before the Houses of Legislature were violated, we are of the view that sub-sec. (5) of sec. 26 having regard to the purposes for which it is made, and in the context in which it occurs, cannot be regarded as mandatory. The rules have been in operation sines the year 1941 and by virtue of sec. 64 of the Gujrat Act 20 of 1964 they continue to remain in operation." 23. There is, however, one point of distinction between Jan Mohammads case and the case in hand. Here the rules were not placed before the house of the Legislature for the last 6 sessions. In considering the applicability of sec. 36(5) of the Act, two allied questions call attention; firstly, whether by non-compliance of this provision the rules which by non-compliance of this provision the rules which have once come into operation will be rendered void when the provision regarding placing the rules before the house of the Legislature is not carried out; secondly, whether there is any mandate for the Government to place the rules before the house of the Legislature apart from the question of the continued validity of the rules. 24. So far as the commencement of the rules is concerned, they come into force as soon as they are made and continue to be in force till they are modified or annulled by the house of the Legislature. Therefore, in the absence of any statutory provision to that effect there will be no sound basis for holding that the rules become null and void, merely because they are not placed before the house of the Legislature. The second question admits of only one answer and it is, that the law contains a clear mandate for the Government to place the rules before the house of the Legislature. Democratic institutions function on the principle of checks and balances and there is distribution of powers between them. The second question admits of only one answer and it is, that the law contains a clear mandate for the Government to place the rules before the house of the Legislature. Democratic institutions function on the principle of checks and balances and there is distribution of powers between them. While the authority to make the rules has been vested in the Government, the ultimate control has been kept with the house of the Legislature and this can only be effectively exercised when the rules are placed before the house. Therefore, though we do not hold the rules to be invalid, yet in the circumstances, we feel it will be our duty to direct the Government to place the rules before the house of the Legislature. At the fag-end of the argument the learned Advocate General made a statement at the Bar that now the Government has sent on 9.12.65, these rules to the Legislative Assembly for being placed before it. The importance of placing the rules before the Assembly, where the statute so requires, cannot be under-rated as it enables the elected representatives of the people to deal with the matter as they think best. In a case where we find that a clear mandate of the law has been dis-obeyed for a considerable period we could have thought of giving a direction not to enforce the rules till they are placed before the house. But, as we are persuaded to hold some of the material rules to be null and void, we do not consider such a direction to be necessary in the present case, particularly when the learned Advocate General has informed us that the rules have already been sent to the Assembly Office for being placed before the house at the next session which is likely to take place in a couple of months. We hope, the needful shall be done at the next session of the Assembly. 25. The learned Advocate General invited our attention to D. K. Krishnan vs. Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Chittor (20), for seeing that failure to place the rules before the Assembly by the Minister should not be made to affect the validity of the rules. A perusal of the judgment, however, reveals that the learned Judges recognised that there was much to be said for the view expressed by Dr. A perusal of the judgment, however, reveals that the learned Judges recognised that there was much to be said for the view expressed by Dr. Allen that the object of such a provision is to have an effective legislative control over delegated legislation and this object may be defeated if the non-observance of the condition has not the effect of invalidating the rules. In our view, both the considerations namely, that the non-observance of the rules should not invalidate the rules and, at the same time, the house of the Legislature be enabled to have effective control, can properly be harmonised by holding the rules to be valid and, at the same time, giving a mandate to the Government to place the rules before the house of the Legislature in a stated period. Where the Government have neglected this plain duty, then in an appropriate case we can give a writ or direction to restrain it from enforcing the rules till such time that they are laid on the table of the house. This decision is, therefore, of not much help to the learned Advocate General. 26. Learned counsel for the petitioners then addressed arguments about the validity of rules 69 to 74, 76, 77, 97 and 58(4) of the Rules. These rules are reproduced hereunder: "Rule 69. Licenced Traders and A class brokers. (1) No person shall do business as a trader or an A class broker in agricultural produce except under a licence granted by the market committee under this rule. (2) Any person desiring to hold such licence shall make a written application, for a licence to the market committee and shall pay such a fee as may be specified in the bye-laws subject to the maximum of Rs. 1001. (3) On receipt of such application together with the proper amount of the fee the market committee may, after making such enquiries as may be considered necessary for the efficient conduct of the market grant him the licence applied for. On the grant of such licence the applicant shall execute an agreement in such form as the market committee may determine in accordance with the rules and bye-laws and such other conditions as may be laid down by the market committee for holding the licence. On the grant of such licence the applicant shall execute an agreement in such form as the market committee may determine in accordance with the rules and bye-laws and such other conditions as may be laid down by the market committee for holding the licence. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (3), the market committee may refuse to grant a licence to any person, who in its opinion, is not solvent or in the case of renewal of licence whose operations in the market area are not likely to further efficient working of a market under the control of the market committee or who directly or indirectly participated in strikes and boycotts. (5) The licence shall remain in force from the date on which it is granted until the 31st of March following and may be renewed for each succeeding year on a written application and after such enquiries as are referred to in sub-rule (3), as may be considered necessary and on payment of fees specified in the byelaws. (6) The names of all such traders and A class brokers shall be entered in a register to be maintained for the purpose. (7) Whoever does business a trader or an A class broker in agricultural produce in any market without a licence granted under this rule or otherwise contravenes any of the provisions of this rule shall on conviction he punishable with fine, which may extend to Rs. 200/- and in case of a continued contravention with a further fine which may extend to Rs. 50/- for every day during which the contravention continues after the date of the first conviction. R. 70. Powers of the market committee to suspend or cancel the licence granted to traders and A class brokers. The market committee, may, by a resolution passed by a majority consisting of not less than two-third of its members present cancel or suspend for a fixed period, upto a maximum of one year the licence granted to any trader or A class broker, if he contravenes any of the conditions of his agreement or licence or of the rules or bye-laws or who, in the opinion of the market committee, is not solvent: Provided that no order cancelling a licence or suspending it for a period of more than six months shall be passed without the previous approval of the Director. R. 71. R. 71. Procedure to be adopted before taking a decision to cancel or suspend a licence. (1) The Secretary of the committee shall first enquire into the matter and submit his report to the committee. (2) The Committee shall on the basis of the Secretarys report frame a charge sheet. (3) The Chairman shall then call upon the person concerned to submit his explanation within a week. (4) If the person concerned fails to submit his explanation within the aforesaid time of a week giving reasons for his misconduct or producing evidence in support of the denial of an alleged offence, the view that a prima-facie case has been established should be accepted. (5) The market committee shall take the decision regarding cancellation or suspension of a licence on the basis of Secretarys report the charge-sheet and the explanation of the person who is alleged to have committed the offence and record the reasons of cancelling or suspending the licence. R.72. Licenced B class brokers, weighmen, measurers, surveyors, warehousemen and such other operators as may be determined by the Director.—(1) No person shall do business as B class broker or weigh man or measurer or surveyor or warehouseman or operator in any other manner in any market area except under a licence granted by the market committee. (2) Any person desiring to hold such licence shall make a written application for a licence to the market committee and shall pay such a fee as may be specified in the bye-laws, subject to the maximum of Rs. 40/- if he is a B class broker; Rs. 15/- if he is a warehouseman, Rs. 10/-if he is a weighman, surveyor, measurer or any other operator. (3) On receipt of such application together with the proper amount of the fixed fee the market committee may after making the following enquiries grant him the licence applied for: (i) on obtaining a solvency certificate; (ii) on obtaining cash security or bank or third persons guarantee; (iii) on considering the conduct of person; (iv) on considering the work done in the market area in case of the person whose licence is to be renewed. On the grant of such licence, the applicant shall sign an agreement in such form as the market committee may determine, in accordance with the rules and byelaws and on such conditions as may be laid down by the committee for holding the licence. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (3), the committee may refuse to grant a licence to any person who in its opinion, is not solvent or in the case of a renewal of licence, if the conduct of the person is found to be detrimental to the efficient functioning of the market, or if the person has not worked in the market area for more than a week without a valid reason or who had directly or indirectly participated in strikes or boycotts. (5) The licence shall remain in force from the date on which it is granted till 31st of March following and may be renewed for each succeeding year thereafter on a written application and after such enquiries as are referred to in sub-rule (3), as may be considered necessary and on payment of fees prescribed in the bye-laws. (6) The market committee, may, by a resolution cancel or suspend licence granted to any B class broker, weighman, measurer or surveyor or warehouseman if he contravenes any of the conditions of his agreement, of licence or of the provisions of rules or bye-laws or if in the opinion of the market committee his continuance as a licence holder is likely to be detrimental to the working of the market: Provided that no order cancelling the licence or suspending it for a period exceeding six months shall be passed without the previous approval of the Director." R. 73. "Refusal, cancellation or suspension of licence to be communicated to persons concerned. — (1) Whenever a market committee (a) refuses to grant a licence under sub-rule (4) of rule 69 of rule72; or (b) cancels or suspends a licence under rule70 or sub-rule (6) of rule 72; the market committee shall communicate its decision or order, as the case may be, to the person concerned— (i) by delivering or tendering to him personally a copy of such decision or order, as the case may be, or (ii) by sending the same to him by registered post. (2) Such decision or order, as the case may be, shall be deemed to have been communicated to the person concerned on the date on which a copy of it was delivered, or tendered to him personally or sent to him by registered post as required by sub-rule (1)." R. 74. "Appeal against refusal, cancellation or suspension of licence.—(1) Any person aggrieved— (a) by the decision of a market committee refusing to grant a licence under sub-rule (4) of rule 69 or of rule 72;or (b) by order of market committee cancelling or suspending a licence under rule 70 or sub-rule (6) or rule 72; may appeal to the Director or any officer authorised by him in this behalf: Provided that any such appeal shall be made within 30 days from the date on which such decision or order, as the case may be, was communicated to him: Provided further that the decision of the market committee shall remain in force till orders in the appeal are passed by the Director or the authorised officer. (2) The order passed by the Director or the authorised officer, as the case may be, in the appeal shall be final." R. 76. Keeping of books by trader, broker weighman, measurer surveyor etc.—Every trader, broker, weighman, measurer and surveyor and such other operator as may be determined by the Director, licenced under these rules shall keep such books in such form and render such periodical returns and at such time and in such form as the market committee may from time to time direct and shall render such assistance in the collection and prevention of the evasion of fees due under these rules and bye-laws and in the prevention of the breach of the rules and bye-laws as may be required by the market committee." R. 77 Equipment for weighmen, measurers and surveyors. — Every weighman, measurer shall possess such equipment as may be laid down in the bye-laws." R. 97 "Regulation of advances to agriculturists.— A licenced broker may give advance either in cash or in kind to agriculturists, but such advances shall be made subject to the following conditions:— (1) If any agreement is entered into between the lender and the borrower, the lender shall supply a copy of the agreement to the borrower. (2) When the advances are given from time to time, an account book of the advances given, and repayments made shall be kept in the manner laid down in the bye-laws. The lender shall give a copy of such account book to the borrower and attest with his signature every individual transaction of lending and recovery in the copy of the account book so given." Rule 58(4) "No cess shall be levied on agricultural produce brought from out site the market into the market for use therein by the industrial concerns situated in the market or for export and in respect of which a declaration has been made and a certificate has been obtained in Form-V: Provided that if such agricultural produce brought into the market for export is not exported or removed therefrom before the expiry of twenty days from the date on which it was so brought, the market committee shall levy and collect cess on such agricultural produce from the person bringing the produce into the market at such rates as may be specified in the bye-laws. Provided further that if the industrial concerns that brought the agricultural produce from outside the market into the market for the purpose of use by them, and who do not make any declaration and do not obtain a certificate in Form-V as prescribed above, shall be deemed to be responsible for the contravention of this rule, and shall, on conviction be punished under sub-sec. (3) of sec. 36 of the Act with a fine which may extend to rupees two hundred." 27. At the outset the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that while sec. 17 of the Act has been amended by substituting the words "market fees for the word "cess", the consequential changes in the rules have not been made with the result that the market committees are realising cess for which there is no authority and they are not able to realise the fees as the same has not been prescribed by the rules. The other ground of attack of the learned counsel was that the rules went beyond the powers conferred by the Act. While under sec. The other ground of attack of the learned counsel was that the rules went beyond the powers conferred by the Act. While under sec. 14 of the Act a market committee could issue licences to traders brokers, weighmen, measurers, surveyors and whare housemen and other persons to operate in the market on payment of the committee with the power of issuing licences for the market area. Both these terms "market" and "market area" have been defined by the Act, as follows: "Sec. 2 (vii) "market" means a regulated market established under and for the purposes of this Act for a market area and includes a market proper as well as a principal market yard or a sub-market yard." "S.2 (viii) "market area" means any area declared to be a market area under sec. 4." 28. Thirdly, it was contended that the Government had not framed rules properly in accordance with sec. 36(2)(e) and (f) of the Act. Then lastly it was urged that cess has been prescribed even in respect of certain essential commodities declared to be so by the Central Sales Tax Act, where under a limit of sales-tax by the State Legislature has been fixed at 2 per cent and as 2 per cent sales-tax is already being realised by the State, the levy of 20 naye paise per cent being over and above the 2 per cent sales-tax is illegal. 29. Both the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Advocate General debated as to what is comprehended by the term "cess" in contradistinction to the term "fee". The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that cess was a tax and not a fee and for realisation of cess there was no requirement of any service to be rendered by the public authority. He also submitted that in empowering the market committees to realise cess the Government had gone beyond the scope of the Act. In other words, more powers have come in the hands of the market committees than what the parent provisions of the Act contemplated. The learned Advocate General, on the other hand, submitted that in legal parlance the term "cess" and the term "fee" were inter-changeable and a cess also partook the character of the fee and thus, the amendment in the law was of no consequence. The learned Advocate General, on the other hand, submitted that in legal parlance the term "cess" and the term "fee" were inter-changeable and a cess also partook the character of the fee and thus, the amendment in the law was of no consequence. According to him, it was made only with a view to making the description of the levy more appropriate. 30. Learned counsel for the petitioners invited our attention to Shanumugha Oil Mill vs. Market Committee (21). V. Malaipettai vs. State of Madras (22) and some passages from Basus Commentary on the Constitution of India (Fourth Edition page-242). 31. In Shanmugha Oil Mills case (21), the learned Judge had to consider the term "cess" as used in the Madras Commercial Crops Markets Act and he observed as follows: "The word "cess" has a definite legal connotation indicating tax allocated to a particular thing, not forming part of the general fund. Art. 277 of the Constitution refers to "cess" as a special category of the taxes. According to its import, the word "cess" is only tax and not a mere fee. It is, therefore, not necessary for the purpose of levy of cess that there should be quid pro quo between the service actually rendered and the amount of tax levied." 32. The second Madras case (22), only follows the earlier case. 33. Basu has observed in his commentary that according to Art. 366(28) of the Constitution the word tax is generically used to include any impost or compulsory levy, such as a duty, cess or fee. But in the Entries in the Legislative Lists, the word tax is technically used to distinguish it from duties, fees etc, which are dealt with in separate entries. In dealing with the various kinds of taxes about cesses he says that a cess is a tax imposed for some specific purpose, with reference to some goods. It is a tax on the entries of goods into local areas for the purposes of sale and consumption. As the term "cess" has not been defined by the statute, we may refer to the dictionary meaning of the term "cess." 34. In Oxfords English dictionary (Volume II, page 238) "cess" has been stated to mean tax or levy. 35. In Whartons Law Lexicon, "cess" has been used in the same sense (vide Whartons Law Lexicon 14th Edition page 173). 36. In Oxfords English dictionary (Volume II, page 238) "cess" has been stated to mean tax or levy. 35. In Whartons Law Lexicon, "cess" has been used in the same sense (vide Whartons Law Lexicon 14th Edition page 173). 36. The distinction assumes importance because for the levy of cess it may not be necessary that it should be commensurate with the services to be rendered by the public authority and when the law has enabled the Government and the market committees only to prescribe fees and not cess, the taking of cess will be one without the authority of law Learned Advocate General invited our attention to Hingir Rampur Coal Companys case (10). He submitted that where a cess was imposed and it was found to be in consideration of services rendered, it assumed the character of the fee. He also relied on the earlier case of the Supreme Court, namely, Gyarsi Bai vs. Dhansukhlal (23), which was followed in this case. That case is, however, distinguishable. A cess was imposed by the Orissa Legislature on persons carrying on business of coal in a certain area by an Act and the argument was that the Orissa Legislature was not competent to make the law as the subject matter or such levy being nature of a duty of excise was not covered by the state list or the concurrent list. This argument was repelled and the levy of cess was upheld as a fee which the State Legislature could impose. 37. In the present case, we are not dealing with the powers of the State Legislature vis-a-vis those of the Central Legislature. The short question is whether the cess could be levied by an administrative authority when it has not been empowered by the statute. Consequently these cases are of no help and, in our view, cess having not been authorised by sec. 17 of the Act, the same cannot be levied by the market committees. The difficulty has obviously arisen because the rule making authority has not taken note of the amendments made in the parent Act and it has failed to bring the rules in conformity with the Act. 38. Now coming to the second ground of attack the matter stands conclu-ed by the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mohammad Hussains case (15). 38. Now coming to the second ground of attack the matter stands conclu-ed by the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mohammad Hussains case (15). The rule that came up for consideration before their Lordships was rule 65 of the Bombay Rules. That rule authorised the market committee to grant licences in any market area when the Act did not authorise it to do so and it could grant licences only for the market. Sec. 14 of the Act enabled a market committee to issue licences only in a market as distinguished from a market area. Rules 69 to 74 thus go beyond the powers of the rule making authority inasmuch as the powers of the market committee had been made exercisable in a market area. The learned Advocate General, seeing the force of the argument, submitted that we should only strike down the word "area" in the words "market area" occurring in these rules. We have to make our pronouncement on the validity of the rules as they exist and if we were to strike down one word only out of the expression "market area" that will be a kind of making an amendment in the rule, which is not our function. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court struck down the rule in its entirety on the ground that it was in excess of the powers of the rule making authority. Following that decision, therefore, we are induced to hold that consequently Rules 69 to 74 are bad. 39. About Rules 76, 77 and 97, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that these rules impose unnecessary burden on the traders, brokers, weigh-men, measurers and others mentioned therein and this was in excess of the powers given to the rule making authority. We are not impressed by this argument. The source of authority for the Government to make rules is sub-sec. (1) of sec. 36 and sub-sec. (2) thereof, is more or less illustrative in nature. In interpreting sec. 2 of the Defence of India Act, 1939, the frame of which was more or less like sec. 36 of the Act, their Lordships of the Privy Council observed that the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) would not be cut down or curtailed by what is mentioned in sub-sec. (2). In interpreting sec. 2 of the Defence of India Act, 1939, the frame of which was more or less like sec. 36 of the Act, their Lordships of the Privy Council observed that the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) would not be cut down or curtailed by what is mentioned in sub-sec. (2). In the circumstances, we are not persuaded to hold that these rules are either in excess of the Governments powers in the matter of rule making or that the restrictions imposed therein are unreasonable and not in public interest. The entire argument of the learned counsel was based on the postulate that the source of rule making authority was sub-sec. (2) of sec. 36, and consequently he discussed bach rule in the light of the language of the various sub-clauses of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 36, but as we have observed, this is not a correct approach according to the principles laid down by the Privy Council in Emperor vs. Sibnath Banerji (24). Thus, we are not satisfied that the Government did not have the competence to make the rules in the manner it did. 40. We may now deal with rule 58(4). In challenging the proviso to this sub-rule it is submitted that though no cess or fee is leviable on agricultural produce brought from outside the market into the market for use by the industrial concerns situated therein or for export, yet according to the proviso the cess is leviable if the agricultural produce is not exported or removed before the expiry of 20 days and in that event cess is leviable without there being any sale or purchase of the commodity. The proviso, in our opinion, is enacted with a view to preventing the abuse of the exemption. Since the period of 20 days is not an unreasonable period during which the produce could be exported, we do not think this rule is bad. 41. Now we deal with the last point urged by Shri Bhargava. His submission is that sec. 15 of the Central Sales Tax, 1956, debars the State from enacting any Sales Tax Law in so far as it imposes or authorises the imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase of declared goods over and above the permissible limit of 2% on the price thereof. His submission is that sec. 15 of the Central Sales Tax, 1956, debars the State from enacting any Sales Tax Law in so far as it imposes or authorises the imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase of declared goods over and above the permissible limit of 2% on the price thereof. It is argued that since a cess is a tax on sale or purchase of agricultural produce brought into the market it is in the nature of a sales tax. We have already held that cess is in the nature of a tax which could not have been prescribed by the rules. In view of the plain language of sec. 17 of the Act, we are not disposed to examine this argument further otherwise, allied question whether cess levied was really in the nature of sales tax would have demanded consideration. We also express no opinion on the scope of sec. 15 of the Central Sales Tax, 1956, whether a fee property so-called could be levied by the market committee in respect of the declared goods over and above the sales tax imposed under the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954. 42. Shri Mridul argued in writ petition No. 529 of 1965 that while according to the preliminary notification issued under sec. 3 of the Act (Ex-1), the Government intended to regulate the sale or purchase of wool, but in the final notification that was issued (Ex-2), in place of wool, gur has been substituted. He, therefore, contended that wool could not be objected to regulation, because it was not included in the final notification and gur could not be included in the notification, because it was not so mentioned in the preliminary notification. He, therefore, prayed that notification (Ex-2) be struck down in so far as gur was concerned, and the market committee be restrained from exercising regulatory powers in respect of wool or gur. The learned Advocate General and Shri Singhvi, appearing for the market committee, frankly conceded that the defect pointed out by the learned counsel has crept in on account of mistake. Shri Mridul next contended that the bye-laws were never framed by the market committee and it only approved the model laws that were sent to it by the Director of Agriculture. We propose to deal with the bye-laws after we have done with the rules and notification. 43. Shri Mridul next contended that the bye-laws were never framed by the market committee and it only approved the model laws that were sent to it by the Director of Agriculture. We propose to deal with the bye-laws after we have done with the rules and notification. 43. Shri G.M. Lodha appearing in writ petitions Nos. 728 of 1956, 606 of 1965, 731 of 1965, and 746 to 776 of 1965, submitted that the bye-laws were not made by the respective committees, but they only adopted the model bye-laws that were sent to them by the Director. At the time of hearing learned Advocate General submitted affidavits of marketing officer that the bye-laws were in fact framed by the market committees. Thus, there is no substance in the objection raised by the learned counsel. Shri Lodha next urged that cl. (4) of R. 72 was bad inasmuch as it authorised the market committee to refuse licence to a person who had directly or indirectly participated in strikes or boycotts. He submits that such a provision could not have been made as the parent Act did not authorise the Government to make such a rule. It is not specified as to what particular strikes and boycotts would disentitle a person from getting a licence. We, however, do not propose to make any pronouncement, as we have already held this rule to be bad on account of other infirmities discussed in the earlier part of our judgment. We have mentioned this argument so that the rule making authority may go into it while framing new rules. Shri Lodha further submitted in respect of writ petition No. 506 of 1965 (from Kishangarh) that the market area was not properly constituted because the municipal committee was consulted only about the area to be included in the market area and not about the commodities to be regulated. This contention has no force as the proviso in sec. 3 of the Act only requires consultation about the area to be included and not about the commodities to be regulated. 44. Shri Arora, appearing in writ petition No. 240 of 1965, submitted that sec. 3 of the Act introduced discrimination between municipalities and other local bodies, such as Panchayat Samitis, inasmuch as while the necessity of consultation was provided for municipalities, it was not so for other local bodies like Panchayat Samitis. 44. Shri Arora, appearing in writ petition No. 240 of 1965, submitted that sec. 3 of the Act introduced discrimination between municipalities and other local bodies, such as Panchayat Samitis, inasmuch as while the necessity of consultation was provided for municipalities, it was not so for other local bodies like Panchayat Samitis. We are not prepared to entertain this argument. In the first place the writ petition has not been filed by any of the local bodies and secondly, we are satisfied that there is a reasonable basis for differentiation between a municipality and other local areas. Municipalities are generally established in towns where there are established markets governed by the provisions of the Municipal Act. The necessity of consultation was felt because the market area that the Government may establish would affect the existing markets. Such consideration may not have been thought necessary in respect of other local bodies, but, at any rate, since any person was free to file objections, the Panchayat Samitis or local bodies could have pressed their point of view, if any, without any such formal consultation on the part of the Government. 45. Shri Khejriwal, appearing in writ petition No. 823 of 1965, submitted that Municipal Board, Annopgarh, falling in the market area had not been consulted before the establishment of the market area. But this position has been controverted today by an affidavit and we are satisfied that the necessary consultation was there. 46. Shri Jain, appearing in writ petition No. 412 of 1965, and other cases from Kota submitted that the cess had been wrongly realised in respect of oil seeds in contravention of sec. 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act and that we should order the refund of the cess already realised. As regards the validity of the cess we have already made our observations in dealing with the arguments of Shri Bhargava and on account of rules not being in conformity with sec. 17 of the Act, cess cannot be realised as already observed by us. 47. Shri G.M. Lodha, appearing in writ petition No. 571 of 1965 from Dabli Rathan, submitted that the respondents had not exercised their powers properly inasmuch as they did not establish a market in that village which was already having an established market from before the commencement of the Act. 47. Shri G.M. Lodha, appearing in writ petition No. 571 of 1965 from Dabli Rathan, submitted that the respondents had not exercised their powers properly inasmuch as they did not establish a market in that village which was already having an established market from before the commencement of the Act. He submits that quite a large number of dealers would be uprooted from that market. The learned Advocate General submitted that it was true that no market had been established for village Debli Rathan and since no market or sub-market had been established in that village, the trade there is bound to be dislocated. He has assured the learned counsel for the petitioner that he would be bringing this to the notice of the Government who would certainly consider the advisability of establishing a sub-market at this village. In view of this assurance of the learned Advocate General, Shri G. M. Lodha did not press his point any further. 48. What remains to be considered is the challenge about the validity of the bye-laws. Learned Advocate General, as well as the learned counsel for the petitioners having made their respective assessments about the validity of the rules about compulsory licensing and the levy of cess, submitted before us that we should leave this question open. The learned Advocate General felt that the bye-laws needed simplification and the department would give further thought to this matter. In view of this, we do not propose to go into the question of the validity of the bye-laws particularly when we have already come to the conclusion that some of the rules discussed above are bad. 49. To summarise, we do not find that secs. 3, 17 and 40 of the Act violated Art. 14 of the Constitution or they otherwise suffered from the vice of the excessive delegation. Rule 69 to 74 are bad inasmuch as the Government has exceeded its powers in providing for licences and for the levy of cess by the market committees in market areas instead of the markets as contemplated by sec. 14 of the Act. These rules are also bad because a provision for cess could not have been made when the amended sec. 17 of the Act enabled only the levy of market fee. Rules 76, 77 and 97 are not bad. Rule 58(4) is also not bad. 14 of the Act. These rules are also bad because a provision for cess could not have been made when the amended sec. 17 of the Act enabled only the levy of market fee. Rules 76, 77 and 97 are not bad. Rule 58(4) is also not bad. The rules do not become invalid merely because they were not placed on the table of the house of Legislature. The Government had to carry out the mandate of law by placing the rules on the table of the house of the Legislature as soon as it was possible. Since the Government have now sent them on 9.12.65, for being placed on the table of the house at the next session, we do not propose to issue any direction to the Government in this behalf. Our additional consideration is that as some of the rules are found to be bad, it is not necessary to give any such direction to the Government. 50. We make no pronouncement about the validity of the bye-laws. 51. In view of what we have discussed above, we hereby allow all the writ petitions and forbid the respondents from giving effect to Rules 69 to 74 of the Rules and to levy any cess in accordance with the rules from the petitioners. We also restrain the respondents in writ petition No. 529 of 1965, from subjecting the sale or purchase of wool and gur in the market area of Vijaynagar to any regulation under the Act. 52. In the circumstances of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs.