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1965 DIGILAW 255 (ALL)

Durab Singh v. Chet Singh

1965-08-02

S.N.KATJU

body1965
JUDGMENT S.N. Katju, J. - This is an appeal by the first defendant arising out of a suit for ejectment of the defendants from plots Nos. 703 and 765 situate in village Urla Tahsil Aonla district Bareilly. The plaintiff also claimed Rs. 100/- as damages on the allegation that the defendants had cut his crop and appropriated it. It was alleged that the land in suit was formerly "banjar" and "chhuyya" which had been obtained by the plaintiff by virtue of a patta executed by Lambardar Bhagwan Singh on a yearly rent of Rs. 10/-. The plaintiff contended that he had become a sirdar of the land in suit and the defendants were denying his title to the land in suit. The defendants contended that the plaintiff was not a tenant of the land in suit nor was he in possession thereof. The first defendant alleged that he was a cosharer in the Mohal and was in exclusive possession of the land in suit. The second defendant supported the first defendant's case. The trial court decreed the suit and its decision was affirmed on appeal by the lower appellate court. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant has urged three points: (1) The plaint was wrongly allowed to be amended by the lower appellate court; (2) The patta was a maurosi patta and it was beyond the powers of the lumberdar to execute it in favour of the plaintiff; (3) The plaintiff had no valid title to the land in suit and therefore he had no right to continue in its possession. 3. The date of the lease mentioned in the plaint was 10-4-1951'. There after the plaintiff made an application before the trial court stating that the aforesaid date had been, wrongly given and the correct date was 5-8-1950'. The trial court allowed the application for the amendment of the plaint but the plaintiff did not take steps to incorporate the aforesaid amendment in his plaint. he lower appellate court proceeded on the assumption that the date of the lease was 5-8-1950'. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that there could be no proper amendment of the plaint unless the amendment was incorporated in the plaint. he lower appellate court proceeded on the assumption that the date of the lease was 5-8-1950'. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that there could be no proper amendment of the plaint unless the amendment was incorporated in the plaint. Since that was not done, the elate of the lease was 10-4-1951 as it was initially mentioned in the plaint, It was alleged that the lower appellate court was not right in proceeding on the basis that the date of the lease was 5-8-1950'. All the evidence that was led by the plaintiff was given to support the lease dated 5-8-1950, while the date of the lease as given initially in the plaint was 10-4-1951'. Learned counsel contended that if the lower appellate court had decided that the amendment prayed for should be treated as having been incorporated in the plaint, though no much incorporation was made, then in that case the defendants should have been allowed an opportunity to make additional written statements no such opportunity was given 1 o them. It was contended that unless the amendment was incorporated in the plaint, the amended date could not be taken into consideration and the court below had erred in taking the date of the lease as "5-8-1950" without the amendment being incorporated in the plaint it. self. Assuming that the lower appellate court was right in treating the elate of the lease as "5-8-1950" then in any case, the appellant and the other defendants should have been allowed to file additional written statements and produce such evidence as they could give in order to rebut the case of the plaintiff that the date of the lease was 5-8-1950. The lower appellate court was obviously in error's proceeding on the basis that of the lease was 5-8-1950' wit I out giving an opportunity to the defendants to meet the allegation than the date of the lease was 5-8-1950'. 4. The lease executed in favour of the plaintiff was of plot No. 703 having an area of 1 Bigha 12 Biswas and 1 Biswansi and plot No. 765 having an area of 1 Bigha 8 Biswas and 3 Biswansis. The annual rent fixed in the lease was Rs. 10/- only and the lease was maurosi from generation to generation. It, therefore, amounted ed to a permanent lease. The annual rent fixed in the lease was Rs. 10/- only and the lease was maurosi from generation to generation. It, therefore, amounted ed to a permanent lease. Under Section 245(2) of the U. P. Tenancy Act, a lumberdar is entitled "to do all acts incidental to the proper management of the estate with a view to common benefit." It may be open to him to settle land on short term leases for proper management of the estate with a view to common benefit of all the co-sharers but it is beyond his power to execute a permanent lease on behalf of the other co-sharers without their written con sent. In the, present case, there is nothing to show that the other co-sharers had given their consent in writing empowering Bhagwan Singh lumberdar to execute the lease in favour of the plaintiff. Furthermore, the annual rent was only Rs. 10/- and it could not be said that the lease was for the common benefit of the co-sharers. Even if the land was banjar and uncultivated it could be utilised for pasturage and the benefit accruing to the co-sharers would be much more than the annual rent of Rs. 10/- fetched by the lease. I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the lumbardar had acted beyond his power in executing the lease in favour of the plaintiff respondent. 5. Lastly it was contended that Section 19 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act did not give any right to the plaintiff to continue in possession of the land in dispute. When it is found that the lease executed in favour of the plaintiff was invalid then there is no escape from the conclusion that the plaintiff had no title to the land in suit and he was no better than a trespasser. could not be said that under Section 19 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the land in suit was held by the plaintiff. It was observed in a Full Bench decision of this Court in Buddhan Singh v. Nabi Bux, 1961 ALJ 536 at p. 544 "Sec. 19 also used the word "held" and also "deemed to have been held" and it cannot be said that the word "held" in the section can apply to a trespasser..........................." 6. It was observed in a Full Bench decision of this Court in Buddhan Singh v. Nabi Bux, 1961 ALJ 536 at p. 544 "Sec. 19 also used the word "held" and also "deemed to have been held" and it cannot be said that the word "held" in the section can apply to a trespasser..........................." 6. The court, therefore, was in error in decreeing the plaintiff's suit for possession of the land in dispute. The plaintiff has also no right to claim any amount by way of damages. The decree of the court below is set aside an e suit is dismissed with costs.