ORDER S.N. Singh, J. - The short point involved in this appeal is the interpretation of Section 15 of the UPZA and LR. Act which herein after will be referred as "the Act". 2. This is a Defendant's appeal in a suit for declaration of bhumidhari right. The Plaintiff came to court on the allegation that Plaintiff along with Defendants were the joint bhumidhars of the plots in suit but the Patwari had wrongly removed the name of the Plaintiff from the revenue records, hence the suit for declaration. 3. This suit of the Plaintiff was contested by the Defendants Nos. 8 and 9 on the ground that they were joint bhumidhars of some of the plots but in respect of some they claimed to be exclusive bhumidhars. Defendants Nos. 1 to 4 who were Defendants first set claimed certain plots as their exclusive bhumidhari. Defendants Nos. 5 to 7 who were Defendants second set in the case claimed yet another set of plots as their exclusive bhumidhari. All the Defendants denied to be joint with the Plaintiff and asserted that they had their separate cultivation and were in exclusive possession over their respective plots. Defendants Nos. 8 and 9 further advanced the claim of adhivasi right over some of the plots. Pleas based on limitation and estoppel were also taken. 4. The trial court on a consideration of oral and documentary evidence came to the conclusion that there was private partition between the co-sharers inter se which disproved the joint ownership of the parties. On this finding dismissed the suit. 5. On appeal the lower appellate court reversed this judgment, came to a definite finding that partition had not been proved and that parties were joint sir and Khudkashtholders of the holdings in suit. Consequently the Plaintiff was held to be co bhurnidhar along with the Defendants and his suit for the declaration as prayed was decreed. Defendants first set who are Defendants Nos. 1 to 4 alone have come up in appeal to this Court. The others have acquiesced in the judgment of the lower appellate court. 6. Learned Counsel for the Appellants has based his argument only on Section 15 of the Act. His cotentiun is that even on the finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate court, the Plaintiff could not be declared to be co bhurnidhar of the plots in suit. The others have acquiesced in the judgment of the lower appellate court. 6. Learned Counsel for the Appellants has based his argument only on Section 15 of the Act. His cotentiun is that even on the finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate court, the Plaintiff could not be declared to be co bhurnidhar of the plots in suit. He submitted that even if parties are held to be joint sir holders or khudkashtholders in view of Section 15 of the Act the Defendants who are in exclusive possession over the joint sir or khudkasht holding will become bhumidhars of the area, in ' proportion to their shares and will become sirdars in respect of the excess area in their possession, as such in no case a declaration about co bhumidhari right could be granted to the Plaintiff who according to the findings of the lower appellate court was on inimical terms with the Defendants for the last 20 years and it could not be said that the Defendants Appellants were in possession on their behalf. 7. I have considered this submission of the learned Counsel but in my opinion it cannot be accepted- Firstly, no plea based on Section 15 of the Act had been taken before any of the two courts below. Secondly, on the findings of fact recorded by the lower appellate court which could not be challenged before me the parties were joint sir holders or khudkasht holdders. To such a case in my opinion Section 15 of the Act does not apply. Section 15 of the Act reads as follows: Demarcation of sir, khudkasht, etc. in joint estates: (1) Where, on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting, an intermediary other than a the kedar held land in his personal cultivation or as sir, khudkasht, or intermediary's grove (other than land in which hereditary rights accrue u/s 10 or 16 and land held on patta swami or istamararil in any estate or estates belonging to him jointly with others in excess of his proportionate share in the estate or estates concerned, the prescribed authority shall, as soon as may be, proceed to demarcate the land proportionate to the share of such intermediary. (2)(a) The land so demarcated shall alone, for purposes of Section 18, be deemed to be his sir, Khudkasht or intermediary's grove; and (b) the land held in excess of his share shall, for purpose of Section 19, be deemed to have been held by him as an exproprietary tenant thereof liable to pay rent at ex proprietary rates applicable on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting. 8. This is not the case of the Appellant before me that any demarcation as contemplated by Section 15 of the Act has taken place. Section 15 of the Act to my mind applies to a case of intermediary who holds sir, khudk asht and the land in his personal cultivation taken together in excess of his share which he would have got at the time of partition amongst the cosharers. It does not contemplate a case of joint sir holders and khudkasht holders. The words "jointly with others" occurring in the section govern the words "Estate" or "Estates". This matter is further clarified by Rule 22 which has been framed in pursuance of this Act. At the foot of Rule 22 there is a note appended in the Government Edition of the Land Reforms Rules which is as follows: Note: This statement shall not include land in personal cultivation of an intermediary or sir or khudkasht or intermediary's grove which is held jointly by all the co-sharers in the estate. This note clearly shows that if all the cosharers in a estate are joint sirholders or Khudkasht hoders or have land in their personal cultivation there would be no need for the preparation of any statement as contemplated by Section 15 the Act. 9. Thus we find that this section has no applicability to the facts of this case and in this view of the matter the contention of the learned Counsel has no force. On the findings of fact recorded by the lower appellate court this appeal must fail and accordingly I dismiss it with costs.