JUDGMENT G.V. Oak, J. - This is a reference wider Section 5, Court Fees Act. There were proceedings in district Jhansi for the acquisition of certain land under t the provisions of the Requisitioning t and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 (Central Act No. XXX of 1952-hereafter referred to as the 1952 Act). The property so acquired included a certain well. One Ram Ratan filed a claim in respect of the property. When the Arbitra. tor proceeded to dispose of the claim, Ram Ratan did not appear before the Arbitrator. However, one Baghraj appeared, and claimed a sum of Rs. l700 as compensation for the well. The Arbitrator concluded that Baghraj had failed to prove his ownership of the well. The Arbitrator rejected the claims of Ram Ratan and Baghraj. Against that award, an appeal has been filed by Baghraj. The appellant paid a court-fee of Rs. 5 under Article 11 of Schedule II, Court Fees Act. The office raised an objection that advalorem court fee was payable on the memorandum of appeal under Section 8, Court Fees Act. When the matter was considered by the Taxing Officer, he found that the case raised two difficult questions of law. He, therefore, referred two questions to Court under Section 5. Court Fees Act. 2. When the matter was argued before the Taxing Officer, the appellant pressed four points in support of his contention that fixed court fee is payable under Article 11. of Schedule If, Court Fees Act. The Taxing Officer concluded that out of those four points two points had no force. The remaining two points have been referred to the Court under Section 5, Court Fees Act. Mrs. Raja Ram, appearing for the State of Uttar Pradesh, urged before me that the reference must now be confined to the two points expressly referred to the Court by the Taxing Officer. The remaining two points have been referred to the Court under Section 5, Court Fees Act. Mrs. Raja Ram, appearing for the State of Uttar Pradesh, urged before me that the reference must now be confined to the two points expressly referred to the Court by the Taxing Officer. Sec. 5, Court Fees Act states : "When any difference arises between the officer whose duty it is to see that any fee is paid under this chapter and any suitor or attorney, as to the necessity of paying a fee or the amount thereof, the question shall, when the difference arises in any or the said High Courts, be referred to the taxing officer, whose decision thereon shall be final, except when the question is, in his opinion, one of general importance, in which case he shall refer it to the final decision of the Chief Justice of such High Court, or of such Judge of the High Court as the Chief Justice shall appoint either generally or specially in this behalf........." 3. It will be noticed that under Section 5, Court Fees Act, a certain question comes up for consideration before the Taxing Officer. If the Taxing Officer considers that the question is complicated, the question is referred for the final decision of the Court. In each case the question is whether a certain suitor has to pay a court fee or additional court fee. The question has reference to the facts of a particular case. So, in such cases the question to be referred to the Court is whether a plaintiff or an appellant has to pay a certain court fee or additional court fee. In references under Section 5, Court Fees Act, the Taxing Officer should avoid referring abstract questions of law to the Court. The question to be referred to the Court should be whether the particular suitor has to pay a court fee or additional court fee. This can be done by referring the whole case of court fee arising in a particular case to the Court. Although two specific points have been referred to the Court, I do not think that the appellant can be confined to those two specific points. I think, the appellant is at liberty to raise all possible points, which will help him to bring the case under Article 11 of Schedule II, Court Fees Act. 4. According to Mr. Although two specific points have been referred to the Court, I do not think that the appellant can be confined to those two specific points. I think, the appellant is at liberty to raise all possible points, which will help him to bring the case under Article 11 of Schedule II, Court Fees Act. 4. According to Mr. Raja Ram, the case is governed by Section 8, Court Fees Act. Section 8, Court Fees Act states : "The amount of fee payable under this Act on a Memorandum of Appeal against an order relating to compensation under any Act for the time being in force for the acquisition of land for public purposes or against an award made by a tribunal constituted under the Uttar Pradesh Town Improvement Act or any other similar Statute shall be computed according to the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant." 5. Mr. N. B. Nigam, appearing for the appellant, raised four points in support of his contention that Section 8 will not govern the present case. Firstly, he pointed out that Section 8 appears in Chapter III, Court Fees Act. The heading of Chapter III is: "Fees in other Courts and in Public Offices." The heading of Chapter II Mentions "Fees in the High Courts and in the Courts of Small Causes at the Presidency Towns." On reading the headings of the two chapters, it appears that the expression "other Courts" in the heading of Chapter III means Courts other than High Courts and Small Cause Courts. Mr. Nigam is right in his contention that the heading of Chapter III suggests that the chapter is not applicable to High Courts. There are, however, good grounds for supposing that some of the provisions of Chapter III must apply to High Courts as well as to subordinate Courts. 6. Section 8, Court Fees Act was applied to appeals in the High Court by Madras High Court in Kasturi Chetti v. Deputy Collector, Bellary, XXI I.L.R. Mad. 269, and by Calcutta High Court in Trinayani Dasi v. Krishna Lal De, XXXIX I.L.R. Cal. 906. 7. 6. Section 8, Court Fees Act was applied to appeals in the High Court by Madras High Court in Kasturi Chetti v. Deputy Collector, Bellary, XXI I.L.R. Mad. 269, and by Calcutta High Court in Trinayani Dasi v. Krishna Lal De, XXXIX I.L.R. Cal. 906. 7. "In re Anauda Lal" AIR 1932 Calcutta 346 Rankin, C. J. observed that the mere heading of a chapter is to be dealt with as though it were a preamble, and the heading cannot be used to cut down the clear words of the sections contained in the chapter. 8. Mr. Raja Ram pointed out that Sec, 6-A and Section 6-B also appear in Chapter III, Court Fees Act. Sec, 6-A provides for an appeal against an order to pay court fee. Section 6-B provides for an application by Chief Inspector of Stamps for revision of Court's order. These are proceedings before High Courts. It is not, there. fore, correct to say that no part of Chapter III is applicable to High Courts. Section 7 of the Court Fees Act contains detailed provisions for fixing court fee in different types of suits. It would be a serious matter, if it is held that Section 7, Court-Fees Act is not applicable to appeals in High Courts. If Section 7 applies to appeals before High Courts, there is no good reason why the provision of Section 8 should not apply to appeals before High Courts. Considering the subject-matter of Sec-8, it appears that the section should apply to all appeals of the nature described in the section. In Braja v. Madanlal, A.I.R. 1951 Patna 608, it was pointed out that one should not attach undue weight to the heading of Chapter III, Court Fees Act. In my opinion, section 8 is applicable to appeals before High Courts, although the sections appears in Chapter III, Court Fees Act. 9. Another Contention of Mr, Nigam is that the award under appeal is an order contemplated by Section 8, Court. Fees Act. It was contended that Section 8 governs only those orders, which are "orders" as defined by the Code of Civil Procedure. 10. In Hirji Virji v. Government of Bombay, AIR 1945 Bombay 348, it was held that the word "order" in Section 8, Court Fees Act means an order as defined in Set. Fees Act. It was contended that Section 8 governs only those orders, which are "orders" as defined by the Code of Civil Procedure. 10. In Hirji Virji v. Government of Bombay, AIR 1945 Bombay 348, it was held that the word "order" in Section 8, Court Fees Act means an order as defined in Set. 2 (14), C. P. C., namely, the formal expression of a decision of a Civil Court which is not a decree. That view was accepted by Punjab High Court in Kanwar Jagat v. The Punjab State, A.I.R. 1957 Punjab 32. 11. A different view was, however, taken by Calcutta High Court in Satya Charan v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1959 Calcutta 609. It was held that there was no reason why the expression "order" in Sec 8 must be treated as an order under Section 2(14), C. P. C. 12. I respectfully agree with the view taken by the Calcutta High Court in Satya Charan's case AIR 1959 Calcutta 609. The word "order" has been defined in the Code of Civil Procedure for that particular statute. The word "order" has not been defined in the Court Fees Act, The expression used in Section 8, Court Fees Act is : "an order relating to compensation." If we come across an order relating to compensation, Section 8, Court Fees Act will be attract. ed. We have, therefore, to consider whether the award under appeal D an order relating to compensation. 13. For this purpose, we have to examine the provisions of the 1952 Act, Section 8 of the Act lays down principles and method of determining compensation. The Arbitrator makes an award. Section 9 provides for payment of compensation. Section 9 states: "The amount of compensation payable under an award shall ... . be paid by the competent authority S Ito the person or persons entitled thereto ......." 14. When a private Arbitrator gives an award, such an award cannot be enforced except with the help of the Court. The Award has to be made a rule of the Court. That is not the position under the 1952 Act. As soon as the Arbitrator gives the award, the person in whose favour the award is made becomes entitled to receive compensation. The Award has to be made a rule of the Court. That is not the position under the 1952 Act. As soon as the Arbitrator gives the award, the person in whose favour the award is made becomes entitled to receive compensation. So, for all practical purposes, such an award amounts to an order to the competent authority to pay compensation to the person or persons entitled to compensation. Such an award is, therefore, an order relating to compensation. Section 8 is attracted, although it is not an order as defined by the Code of Civil Procedure. 15. In Devi Chand v. Secretary of State for India, 1939 I.L.R. Alld. 142, it was held that the court fee payable on a memorandum of appeal against an award by a Tribunal constituted under the U. P. town Improvement Act of 1919 comes under Section 8, Court Fees Act. In that case the Court examined the provisions of the U. P. Town Improvement Act, and came to the conclusion that an award under that Act amounted to an order under the Code of Civil Procedure. So, that case is of little help in deciding the question whether an order not amounting to an order as defined by the Code of Civil Procedure can still fall under Section 8, Court Fees Act. 16. The third point raised by Mr. Nigam was that Section 8 Court Fees Act is not applicable to a case in which there is dispute as to the title of land only, and not as to the amount of compensation. 17. Reliance was placed on Rash Behari v. Gosta Behari, AIR 1935 Calcutta 243. In that case certain property which had been sold by a widow was acquired compulsorily. The reversioner's and the purchasers claimed the compensation money. The president made a certain decision under Section 77, Calcutta Improvement Act. It was held that an appeal from the order was not an appeal against an order relating to compensation. So, Section 8, Court Fees Act was in applicable. That decision turned on the special provisions of the Calcutta Improvement Act. 18. In Hakim Martin De Silva v. Martin De Silva,II, A.I.R. 1957 Raj. 275, it was held that a case relating to apportionment of compensation does not fall under Section 8, Court Fees Act. 19. A different view was, however, taken in Braja v. Madan Lal,. That decision turned on the special provisions of the Calcutta Improvement Act. 18. In Hakim Martin De Silva v. Martin De Silva,II, A.I.R. 1957 Raj. 275, it was held that a case relating to apportionment of compensation does not fall under Section 8, Court Fees Act. 19. A different view was, however, taken in Braja v. Madan Lal,. It was held that Section 8, Court Fees Act applies not only to appeals, in which the correctness of the amount of compensation awarded is challenged, but also to appeals which concern questions of title. 20. I am in respectful agreement with the view taken by Patna High Court. The expression used in Section 8 Court Fees Act is : "An order relating to compensation." An order refusing compensation is as much as order relating to compensation as an order allowing compensation is. So, whenever the Arbitrator refuses to allow any compensation to a party on the ground that it has no title to the property acquired, that is an order relating to compensation. So Section 8, Court Fees Act is attracted. 21. The fourth point raised by Mr. Nigam is that Section 8, Court Fees Act is applicable in the case of acquisition of land, and not in the case of some other immovable property like a well. For this contention, reliance is placed on the expression "for the acquisition of land" appearing in Section 8, Court Fees Act, It must, however, be borne in mind that the whole expression "for the time being in force for the acquisition of land for public purposes", governs the preceding word 'Act' and not the remote word 'compensation.' If compensation has been awarded or refused tinder a statute dealing with acquisition of land for public purposes, Section 8, Court Fees Act is attracted. According to the preamble of Act No. XXX of 1952, the statute is meant to provide for the requisitioning and acquisition of immovable property for the purposes of the Union. Immovable property includes land. So, the 1952 statute is an Act for the acquisition of land for public purposes. It makes no difference whether the property acquired is bare land or some construction like a well. In either case Section 8, Court Fees Act is applicable. 22. Section 8 originally related to orders relating to compensation. By a U. P. amendment the scope of Section 8 has been enlarged. It makes no difference whether the property acquired is bare land or some construction like a well. In either case Section 8, Court Fees Act is applicable. 22. Section 8 originally related to orders relating to compensation. By a U. P. amendment the scope of Section 8 has been enlarged. In the second part of Section 8, Court Fees Act certain awards are contemplated. It is true that in the instant case the decision under appeal is an award. But there may be some difficulty in bringing tile present case under the second part of Section 8, Court Fees Act. However, since the first part of Section 8 is applicable, it is not necessary to decide whether the case also falls under the second part of Section 8, Court Fees Act. 23. According to Mr. Nigam, the present case is really governed by Article 11 of the Second Schedule to the Court Fees Act. Art. II of Schedule II is : "Memorandum of appeal when the appeal is not from a decree, or order having the force of a decree 24. In the present case the appeal is from an award. The award is neither a decree, nor an order having the force of a decree. At first sight it may appear that the case is governed by Article 11 of Schedule II, Court Fees Act. But if the matter is examined carefully, it will be seen that the case cannot be governed by Article 11 of Schedule II. We have seen that the case is governed by Section 8, Court Fees Act. Article 11 of Schedule II is of general nature. That article provides for appeals from decisions, which do not amount to decrees or orders having the force of decrees. On the other hand, Section 8 is confined to orders relating to compensation. There is a general principle that, if there is a conflict between a general provision and a special provision, the special provision will prevail against the general provision. Section 8 containing a special provision provides for advalore in court fee. Article 11 of Schedule II containing a general provision provides for a fixed court fee. Under the circumstances, Section 8 of the Act will prevail against Article 11 of Schedule II. 25. The First Schedule of the Court Fees Act provides for advalorem fee in certain types of cases. Article 11 of Schedule II containing a general provision provides for a fixed court fee. Under the circumstances, Section 8 of the Act will prevail against Article 11 of Schedule II. 25. The First Schedule of the Court Fees Act provides for advalorem fee in certain types of cases. These two Schedules have to be read with the various sections of the Act. In each case the Court should try to ascertain whether the case is governed by the advalorem rule. If advalorem court fee is payable in any case, the case will fall under Schedule I, and not under Schedule II. We have seen that the present case is governed by Section 8 of the Act. So, we have to search for an appropriate Article in Schedule I, and not in Schedule II. The general Article in Schedule I is Article 1. Art, 1 is : "Plaint, written statement pleading a set off or a counter-claim or memorandum of appeal (not otherwise provided for in this Act) presented to any Civil or Revenue Court except those mentioned in Section 3." 26. Mr. Nigam relied on the expression not otherwise provided for in this Act" appearing in Art. I of Schedule I. Relying on that expression, Mr. Nigam contended that the case is governed by Article 11 of Schedule II. So Art. I of Schedule I cannot apply. Now, the First Schedule contains a number of Articles. Some of these Articles deal with special cases where advalorem court fee is payable. Art 1 of the First Schedule is the general provision for advalorem court fee. If no specific provision is to be found in the First Schedule, advalorem court fee is payable under the general provision contained in Art, I of Schedule I. That is the significance of the expression "not otherwise provided for in this Act." There is no specific provision in Schedule I for dealing with cases of compensation. So, advalorem court fee is payable under the general provision contained in Art. I of Schedule I. 27. In the present case advalorem court fee is payable under Section 8, Court Fees Act read with Art 1 of Schedule 1, Court Fees Act.