S. K. Kapur, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an application under Articles 132 (1) and 133 (1) (a) (b) and (e) of the Constitution for a certificate. ( 2 ) DELHI Cloth and General Mills Ltd. floated debenture loan of Rs. 2. 5. crores and executed a debenture trust deed on 10th April, 1962, lnortigaging some of its properties for securing the repayment of the said loan. The Collector of Stamps, Delhi, assessed the stamp duty on the debenture trust deed at Rs. 2,50,300. 00 under the Indian Stamp Act. When the dabenture trust deed was presented before the Sub-Registrar, Delhi, on the 14tb May, 1962 for registration the Sub-Registrar demanded a sum of Rs. 1,25, 157. 50 np. as registration fee in pursuance of notification on No. F. 12 (20) /52-GAR, dated the 15th December, 1952, issued undar sections 78 and 79 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908. The respondents challenged the validity of the said notification on the ground that in reality the levy was a tax and not fee and it was consequently illegal, void and unconstitutional. A Bench of this Court allowed the writ petition by judgment dated the 7th of May 1964. ( 3 ) MR. Shankar the learned counsel for the applicants coatends that. the amount or value of the subject-matter of the dispute in this Court and appeal to the Supreme Court is far above Rs. 20. 000. 00 and therefore they are entitled to a certificate under Article 133 (1) (a ). Ha further submits that the case is also fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court and a certificate should be granted under Article 133 (1) (e ). ( 4 ) MR D. K. Kapur, the learned counsel for the respondent does not dispute that subject to his other submission the applicants are entitled to a certificate under Article 133 (1) (a) in view of the fact that the amount involved is more than Rs. 20. 000. 00 He does not, however agree that the case is fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. He further contends that the application should be rejected on the ground that the applicants have committed a breach of their undertaking to this Court to refund the amount. 20. 000. 00 He does not, however agree that the case is fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. He further contends that the application should be rejected on the ground that the applicants have committed a breach of their undertaking to this Court to refund the amount. During the pendency of the writ petition an interim order was passed by a Bench of this Court on the 31st of July 1962, reading at under- "the parties want time to put in some affidavits. With the consent of the parties, we pass the following interim order :- "the petitioners shall pay under protest an amount of Rs. 1,25, 157. 50 np. demanded by respondent No. 2 as registration fee and there Noticed in (1965) 67 P, L. R. 6 S. N upon the debenture trust deed shall be registered. The respondents undertake that in the event of the writ being decided in favour of the-petitioners, the aforesaid amount shall be refunded to the petitioners except such amount as may be payable as registration fees in accordance with the decision of the High Court. " Reling on this order Mr. Kapur submits that the petitioners have not yet refunded that amount and are, therefore, in contempt. He submits that a party in contempt cannot be heard or allowed to file an appeal. Mr. Kapur further invites our attention on the judgment dated the 7th of May, 1964 which is now sought to be appealed against and points out that a specific direction had been issued to the petitionsrs to refund the amount of Rs. 1,25,157. 00 50np. which direction has not been carried out. The judgment allowing the writ petition was delivered on the 7th of May 1964 and the petitioners obtained a stay order from this Court on the 7th of November 1964 staying the refund of the said amount. Mr. Kapur submita that the petitioners should have refunded this amount immediately after the 7th of May 1964 and were guilty of the breach of the undertaking from 7th of May, 1964 to 7th of November, 1964, when the stay order was granted. ( 5 ) MR. Shankar on the other hand submits that the direction ofthis Court was to refund the amount excepting such amount as may be payable on account of registration fee. ( 5 ) MR. Shankar on the other hand submits that the direction ofthis Court was to refund the amount excepting such amount as may be payable on account of registration fee. The question as to what i9 payable as registration fee will be determined only after the decision of this appeal because, if the appeal is decided in favour of the applicants then the amount would be payable under the impugned notification whereas if they lose in appeal a fee will have to be prescribed. According to Mr. Shankar no fee has been prescribed except by the impugned notification which ha been atruck down and though another schedule has been enacted prescribing registration fee but that is applicable only to documents presented for rogistrution after that date. In support of his argument Mr. Kapur relies on Hadkinson v Hadkinson. In that case a decree nisi was granted on a petition by a wife for dissolution of her marriage directing that the child of the marriage should remain in the custody of his mother, butthat he should not be removed out of the jurisdiction without the sanction of the Court. On the decree being made absolute, the mother remarried, and without the sanction of the Court she removed the child to Australia. On a summons by the father an order was made directing the mother to return the child within the jurisdiction. The mother preferred an appeal against the order and the father objected that she was not entitled to be heard as she was in contempt. It was held that the mother was not entitled to prosecute or be heard in support of her plea until she had taken the first and essential step towards purging her contempt of returning the child within the jurisdiction. We are of the opinion that the principle laid down in that case would not be applicable to the present application. In that case Denning L. J. traced out the history of the rule and pointed out that it was applied by ecclesiastical Courts and later inherited by the divorce Courts. The divorce courts adpoted the rule of not hearing the party in contempt but as observed by Denning L. J. "it is a step which a court will only take when the contempt itself impedes the course of justice and there is no other effective means of securing his compliance. The divorce courts adpoted the rule of not hearing the party in contempt but as observed by Denning L. J. "it is a step which a court will only take when the contempt itself impedes the course of justice and there is no other effective means of securing his compliance. " He relied on the observation of Sir George Jessel, Master of the Rolls, in Re Clements and Costa Rica Republic v. Erlanger, to the following effect :- "i have myself had on many occcasions to consider this jurisdiction, and I have always thought that necessary though it be, it is necessary only in the sense in which extreme measures are some times necessary to preserve men s rights, that is, if no other pertinent remedy can be found. Probably that will be discovered after consideration to be the true measure of the exercise of the jurisdiction. !!. It may also be pointed out that the rule invoked by ecclesiasticalcourts was not tied to the issue of an attachment or committal because those courts did not issue attachment or committals It is also of significance to note that the question there involved was about the protection of the child and the court felt that it could not exercise its quasi-parental powers in relation to a child unless effect could be given to its orders and that its orders could not be enfored if the child was taken outside their jurisdiction. As is apparent from the judgment cited at the bar the principle has a very restricted application and is invoked only in such cases where the contempt impedes the course of justice in the cause,by making it more difficult for the court to ascertain the truth or to enforce. its orders which it may make. In fact it was in terms pointed out by Denning L. J. that that the fact that a party to a cause has disobeyed the order of the Court is not by itself always a bar to its. being heard. " May be that in a case where disobedience of the party impedes the course of Justice and makes it impossible for the courts to enforce its order the Court may say "you will not be heard till you purge the contempt", but that principle can hardly be invoked in the present case. being heard. " May be that in a case where disobedience of the party impedes the course of Justice and makes it impossible for the courts to enforce its order the Court may say "you will not be heard till you purge the contempt", but that principle can hardly be invoked in the present case. This is not a case where the contempt it self would impede the course of justice or where there are no effective means of securing compliance. If there has been a broach of the undertaking it is open to the respondents to move this Court for appropriate action. Moreover if the amount is not refunded the disobedience does not impede the course of justice in as much as neither the determination of issues in dipute nor the enforcement of orders is prejudiced. The point arising in this case is regarding the validity of the notification and the question of refund of the amount arises only as a consequence. In Hadkinson s case the mother had appealed against an order made in favour of the father directing the mother to return the child with in the jurisdiction. Unless the order was carried out the contempt would be such as would be directly impede the course of justice for even if the mother failed in appeal the court would be powerless to direct obedience of its order unless the child was within its jurisdiction. Again in Hadkison s case the Court merely kept the appeal in abeyance. That is different from saying that the party should be deprived of the right of appeal or even filing an appeal with which we are at present concerned. We are also extermely doubtful whether a right of appeal. conferred on a party by the Constitution may be fettered by reason of disobedience when the law provides appropriate remedy for securing the obedience of the order and prescribes the punishment to the contumacious. This objection of the respondents has, therefore, no force. ( 6 ) WE are of the view that the applicants are entitled to a Certificate under Article 133 (1) (a) and that the case is also fit one for appeal under Article 133 (l) (c) of the Constitution. We accordingly grant this application but there would be no order as to costs. ( 6 ) WE are of the view that the applicants are entitled to a Certificate under Article 133 (1) (a) and that the case is also fit one for appeal under Article 133 (l) (c) of the Constitution. We accordingly grant this application but there would be no order as to costs. We would like to observe that the stay order granted by this Court on the 7th of November 1964 expires with the disposal of this application and we see no reason to continue the stay order granted by this Court on the 7th November, 1964.