JUDGMENT S. Vellu Pillai, J. 1. The suit property belonged in jenmom to the plaintiff's tarwad and was leased to one Devaki under a marupat Ex. A-1, in the year 1937. She surrendered the lease-hold by Ex. A-2, in the year 1938. Afterwards, in the Same year, the property was leased under a marupat Ex. A.-3, to one Sankaran, who assigned his rights to Kunhikrishna Kurup by Ex. A-4, also in the same year. Under a partition. decree, O.S. 51 of 1941, the jenmom right in the property was allotted to the share of the plaintiff's tavazhi. The property to the east of the suit property also belonged the plaintiff's tarwad and was outstanding on lease with one Venkitasubban Patter under Ex. B-1 or Ex. B-2 of the year 1906. Under a partition of the year 1941, Ex. A-8, in the latter's family, the leasehold was allotted to Seshan Patter, who assigned his right to the first defendant 3 in the same year. The first defendant sued Kunhikrishna Kurup for recovery of possession of the suit property in O.S. 577 of 1948, on the allegation that he trespassed into it. Although the suit was dismissed by the trial court, it was decreed in appeal by judgment Ex. B-9, dated the 30th September, 1954. The first defendant petitioned in execution for recovery of possession on the 9th April, 1955, but Kunhikrishna Kurup executed Ex. A-5, a deed of surrender of possession of the property to the plaintiff, on the 17th April, 1955. This notwithstanding, the first defendant recovered possession of the suit property in execution, on the 7th June, 1955. The plaintiff commenced the present suit on the 31st October, 1955, alleging inter alia, that he is in possession of the property pursuant to Ex. A-5 and praying for recovery of possession which the first defendant may be deemed to have under or in pursuance of the court delivery. The first defendant contended, that the suit property was not covered by any of the dealings, Exx.A-1 to A-4, that these documents were not acted upon, and that the property was included and dealt with as part of the leasehold in Exx. B-1 to B-3. The first court accepted these contentions, holding that Exx. A-1 to A-4 did not include the suit property and were not acted upon, but in appeal, the Additional District Judge repelled them, holding that Exx. B-1 to B-3. The first court accepted these contentions, holding that Exx. A-1 to A-4 did not include the suit property and were not acted upon, but in appeal, the Additional District Judge repelled them, holding that Exx. A-1 to A-4 related to and included the suit property and that possession of it passed under them. 2. In second appeal by the first defendant, learned counsel challenged the findings of the Additional Judge and relied on the reasoning of the Munsiff at pages 4 and 5 of the judgment, that Exx. A-1 to A-4 had not taken effect. But the Judge has gone into the evidence in detail regarding identification of the property and come to the conclusion that the suit property was included in Exx. A-1 to A-4 ; if so, there is no reason to think that possession did not pass according to their apparent tenor. The Judge also weighed the oral evidence on the issue of possession and held that the lessees from time to time have been in possession of the suit property. Nothing that was urged by learned counsel for the first defendant, is sufficient to induce me to differ from the Judge on this aspect of the case. 3. For the first defendant, learned counsel took the further point, that Ex. A-5 having been executed during the pendency of the execution proceedings, is hit by the rule of lis pendens and so the plaintiff is precluded from seeking to recover possession of the property. This point has been specifically taken in the written statement; but the plaintiff had averred in the plaint, that the suit in which Ex. B-9 judgment was rendered, was a collusive one. Apparently, the plaintiff did not press for an issue of fact as to this, though of course no issue of law as to lis pendens was raised either. At the hearing of the appeal before the Judge, the first defendant's counsel did not advance this contention. But all this does not preclude the first defendant from raising the point in this Court, as a point of law. If the plaintiff was at all serious about the plea of collusion, it was up to him to have pressed for an issue or adduced evidence upon it. The point now taken for the first defendant cannot be ruled out. 4. Clearly, Ex. If the plaintiff was at all serious about the plea of collusion, it was up to him to have pressed for an issue or adduced evidence upon it. The point now taken for the first defendant cannot be ruled out. 4. Clearly, Ex. A-5 having come into existence during the pendency of the execution proceedings, it is subject to the decree Ex. B-9. It was contended for the plaintiff that Ex. A-5 was made in recognition of the plaintiff's antecedent right to the suit property under the tarwad partition and that therefore the rule of lis pendens has no application. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on the decision of the Full Bench in Mool Chand y. Ganga Jal A.I.R. 1930 Lahore 356 in which, during the pendency of a pre-emption suit, the defendant transferred the property sold to him in favour of two persons, whose claims for pre-emption were preferential to that of the plaintiff. The court held that the transfer being in recognition of the antecedent right was not affected by the rule of lis pendens. The following reasoning of Johnstone, J. in Muhammad Khan v. Sardar 5 Indian Cases 249 was also relied on: "Such a purchaser can claim that the sale to "him does not occasion any detriment to the rights that were already his. He can therefore defend his title on the ground of his pre-existing right and the result would be that if that right was inferior to the plaintiff pre-emptor's the suit would be decreed, if it was superior the suit would be dismissed ". Laxmi Narain Gododia v. Mohammad Shafi Bari A.I.R. 1949 East Punjab 141 also cited before me, is a similar case. In Sheikh Bikala v. Sheik Ali A.I.R. 1950 Orissa 210 while negativing the application of the rule of lis pendens to two mortgage suits and proceedings pursuant to them, the court in effect stated the principle to be, that the sale in execution of a mortgage decree is but the logical conclusion of a transaction which had taken place anterior to the other proceeding. These cases do no more than establish, that an antecedent right is not affected, by a transfer which the holder of the right may take pending a litigation. These cases do no more than establish, that an antecedent right is not affected, by a transfer which the holder of the right may take pending a litigation. This is the substance of the observations of Johnstone, J. But under the cloak of such a transfer, any and every right which does not pertain to the antecedent right or form part and parcel of it, cannot be transferred. Such a transfer will be hit to the extent, of the new right transferred. In the present case, the anterior right of the plaintiff as landlord did not carry with it the right to be in actual possession despite the lease Ex. A-3, under which Kunhikrishna Kurup was holding the property. The plaintiff's right under it, is to realise rent and in certain circumstances, perhaps also to seek eviction, but not a right to be in immediate possession of the property. Such a right was not part and parcel of his antecedent right, and therefore the transfer of actual possession under Ex. A-5 is not saved from the vice in section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. It has no doubt been held in Julam Missir v. Pradip Missir A.I.R. 1958 Patna 115 that a surrender of a widow's estate by the widow in favour ot the reversioner, is not a transfer or a dealing with the property, but this is on the principle, which is well-established, that it amounts only to a self-effacement of the widow in relation to the property. As stated in 34 American Jurisprudence, page 370, note 11, " A landlord resuming possession of land during the pendency of a suit against his tenant involving the land has ,been held subject to the rules applicable to a purchaser pendente lite ". It cannot therefore be doubted that Ex. A-5 as a transfer of possession, is vitiated by section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. 5. Learned counsel for the plaintiff also contended for the position, that the finding in a litigation between the lessee and a third party is not binding on the lessor 5 even if the lessor takes a deed of transfer pendente lite. A-5 as a transfer of possession, is vitiated by section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. 5. Learned counsel for the plaintiff also contended for the position, that the finding in a litigation between the lessee and a third party is not binding on the lessor 5 even if the lessor takes a deed of transfer pendente lite. This is so, for the reason, that the rule of lis pendens, though an extension of the rule of res judicatat, is not the rule of res judicatat itself, and the findings in the suit, as distinguished from the effect of the resuiting decree, have no binding effect. This principle will only assist the plaintiff in his contention, that despite the finding in the earlier litigation, that the suit property was not included in Exx. A-1 to A-4, he can still maintain that it was included, and that the 1st defendant cannot as against the plaintiff, claim to be more than his lessee under Ex. A-3. 6. Learned counsel then contended, that as the lessor, the plaintiff is entitled to evict the first defendant who, so far as he is concerned, is no more than a trespasser. A lessor may no doubt sue, even after the lease to evict a trespasser and to recover possession, but that is a suit On behalf of the lessee and is in effect to put the lessee in possession of the leasehold of which he had been deprived by trespass. There is no such thing in the present case. Learned counsel stated, that the plaintiff himself had come into the position of the tenant, but that is by virtue of Ex. A-5, which has been impugned and cannot stand as a transfer of the leasehold. This is quite apart from the frame of the suit itself. The 1st defendant may have various defences open to him in such a suit. 7. Ex. A-5 being pendente lite, the plaintiff cannot contend, that the order for delivery of possession to the 1st defendant did not bind him; this order was followed by actual delivery of possession. The prayer in the suit for recovery of property from the first defendant is misconceived. 7. Ex. A-5 being pendente lite, the plaintiff cannot contend, that the order for delivery of possession to the 1st defendant did not bind him; this order was followed by actual delivery of possession. The prayer in the suit for recovery of property from the first defendant is misconceived. All that can be declared in favour of the plaintiff is, that the suit property belongs to the plaintiff, that it was held on lease by Kunhikrishna Kurup, and that now the first defendant has stepped into the shoes of Kunhikrishna Kurup by decree of court. On the finding that Exx. A-1 to A-4 comprise the suit property, he cannot be heard to contend as against the plaintiff, that he has by Ex. B-9 obtained a larger right than what Kunhikrishna Kurup had. So, as between the plaintiff and the first defendant it must be held, that the latter is the tenant of the former under Ex. A-3. It may be, that according to the case of the first defendant, he is a lessee of the property under Exx. B-1 and B-2 of another member of the tarwad, but that has nothing to do with the legal relationship between the plaintiff and the first defendant which is, as stated above. The plaintiff may work out his rights as landlord, if necessary in appropriate proceedings. 8, The result is, that subject to the observations made above, the prayer in the suit for recovery of possession of the property is dismissed. The first defendant had unsuccessfully contended that the suit property is not included in Exx. A-1 to A-4 and he had pressed the point of lis pendens only in this Court. For these reasons, the plaintiff is allowed his costs in the courts below against the first defendant; but in this Court, the parties shall bear their costs. The second appeal is allowed to the above extent.