Judgment :- 1. The petitioner had filed a criminal complaint against respondents 1 and 2 (accused for having committed offences under S.196 and 471 IPC. in respect of certain proceedings in O.S. 27/60 on the file of the Subordinate Judge of Kottarakara. It was alleged that a certain document was forged and fraudulently got up by the accused with the intention of producing and making use of the same in the said proceedings. On receipt of the summons the first accused presented a petition raising the preliminary objection that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint or take cognisance of the alleged offence having regard to the provisions of S.195 Cr. P.C., and that in the absence of a complaint by the Subordinate Judge of Kottarakara the complaint filed in court by the petitioner cannot be entertained and has to be dismissed. Learned Additional First Class Magistrate of Kottarakara upheld the objection and discharged the accused, under S.253(2) Cr. P.C. This revision has been filed challenging the correctness of the order. 2. It cannot be denied that if at any stage of the proceedings the court found a legal bar to the prosecution of the accused, it is open to the court to discharge the accused. What is stated in this case is that there is a bar created by the terms of S.195(1)(b) and therefore the court cannot proceed with the trial without a proper complaint before him. Under S.195(1)(b) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under certain sections of the Penal Code including S.193: "When such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any court, except on the complaint in writing of such court or of some other court to which such court is subordinate." The contention is that although the complaint alleged an offence of forgery and using as genuine a forged document and although the circumstances adduced in support of that allegation might if proved substantiate an offence under S.471, yet they would also substantiate nothing more and nothing less than the offence of fabrication of false evidence in relation to the proceedings in the Kottarakara Sub Court, so that under Cl. (b) the only complaint upon which a criminal case could be founded would be that of the Subordinate Judge of Kottarakara. 3. (b) the only complaint upon which a criminal case could be founded would be that of the Subordinate Judge of Kottarakara. 3. That the terms of the petitioner's complaint do bear the constructions sought to be placed upon it by the learned counsel for the respondents is clear, I think from a reading of the complaint and it is the allegation in the complaint which would attract the mischief of S.195(1)(b). In Para.2 of the complaint it is stated that the petitioner did not send any 'mercy petition' as stated in the affidavit of the accused, that it is a forged one and that both the first and the second accused together concocted such a document and knowing that it is a forged document, they with dishonest and fraudulent intention produced it before court to persuade the court against the complainant. And at the end of the complaint it is stated that the document was got up by the accused with the dishonest and fraudulent intention of using it in court and that necessary mens rea is evident from these facts. It is a clear assertion that the document was forged for the express purpose of affording evidence in the case and so it is evident that the offence complained of is really one under S.193 IPC. 4. In Perianna Muthirian v. Vengu Iyer (AIR. 1929 Mad. 21), Curgenven, J., in dealing with a case where the facts stated in the complaint disclosed an offence under S.193 I.P.C., committed in relation to a proceeding in court, has laid down that no court can take cognisance of such an offence otherwise than in the manner prescribed by S.195 Cr. P.C., and it would make no difference that the complainant in order to evade that provision elects to name the offence as one for which no complaint by the court or public officer was necessary. The specific offence should be given preference over the more general offence. In that case a complaint was filed against two individuals for the alleged offence of abetment of forgery in relation to a document filed before a court where proceedings under S.145 Cr. P.C., were pending; and even before the culmination of such proceedings, a complaint was filed alleging the abetment of forgery against two persons. In that case a complaint was filed against two individuals for the alleged offence of abetment of forgery in relation to a document filed before a court where proceedings under S.145 Cr. P.C., were pending; and even before the culmination of such proceedings, a complaint was filed alleging the abetment of forgery against two persons. This complaint was rejected on the ground that it was not instituted by the court in which the document was produced in relation to the proceeding pending therein. On revision Curgenven, J., held that though it was sought to be made out by the complainant therein, that the persons who were alleged to have abetted the offence of forgery should be proceeded against under S.465 read with S.109 I.P.C., still it was not open to the party to evade the specific offence of fabricating false evidence in relation to a judicial proceeding by giving preference to the more general offence of forgery. The reasoning of the learned judge was that the gravamen of the charge was the fabrication of false evidence in relation to a judicial proceeding and therefore the complaint ought not to be permitted to circumvent the provisions of S.195 Cr. P.C. by putting forward a general offence of forgery. 5. A similar case is the one in Ravanappa Reddi v. Emperor (AIR. 1932 Mad. 253), where Jackson and Curgenven, JJ., held that where a complaint was filed against the accused by a private complainant alleging that the accused had fabricated a promissory note on which a suit was filed against the complainant, and a fraudulent decree obtained the court when confronted with a complaint like this by a private person, must refuse to take cognizance of it and could not even examine the complainant on oath. A Division Bench consisting of Madhavan Nair and Burn, JJ., in Appadurai v. Emperor (AIR. 1936 Mad. 89) have remarked that parties should not be allowed to evade the provisions of S.195 Cr. P.C. by filing a complaint under another provision of the Penal Code if clearly an offence for which a prior complaint by the court or the public officer is necessary. In Antarvadi Sarma v. Emperor (AIR. 1946 Mad. 489), Happell, J., after exhaustively analysing the previous cases held that where the facts disclosed an offence under S.193 and 471 I.P.C. the complainant could not be allowed to evade the provisions of S.195 Cr. In Antarvadi Sarma v. Emperor (AIR. 1946 Mad. 489), Happell, J., after exhaustively analysing the previous cases held that where the facts disclosed an offence under S.193 and 471 I.P.C. the complainant could not be allowed to evade the provisions of S.195 Cr. P.C. by filing a complaint only for forgery or for using the forged document as genuine, 6. The same view has been taken by Govinda Menon, J., in In re Chinnayya Goundan (AIR. 1948 Mad. 474) where it was held that: "When a complaint is made to a court the facts should be considered as a whole and there should be no splitting up of the facts. Therefore the court is not entitled to disregard some of the facts and try an accused person for an offence which the remaining facts disclose. Considering the facts as a whole, if they disclose an offence for which a special complaint is necessary under the provisions of S.195 Cr. P. C. a court cannot take cognizance of the case at all unless that special complaint has been filed." 7. The principles laid down in these decisions have been affirmed by the decision of the Supreme Court in Basir-ul-Hug v. The State of West Bengal (AIR. 1953 SC. 293). That was a case where one Nurul Huda lodged a false information at the police station to the effect that the complainant Dhirendra Nath had belaboured and throttled his mother to death. When the funeral pyre was in flames, Nurul Huda along with the police arrived at the cremation ground. The fire was extinguished and the dead body was taken down from the pyre and when postmortem was conducted there were no marks of injury. The Sub Inspector of Police after investigation came to the conclusion that the complaint filed was false. Dhirendra Nath thereupon filed a criminal complaint against Nurul Huda and others for offences under S.297 and 500 I.P.C. It will be seen that none of these charges relate to the falsity of the report made to the police or contains facts or allegations which disclose an offence under S.182 I.P.C. The charge under S.297 I.P.C. is committing trespass upon the cremation ground to wound the religious feelings and it was a distinct offence concerning an act of the accused committed after the filing of the report. The charge under S.500 related to defamatory and libellous allegations contained in the first information report itself. The Magistrate held the charges proved and convicted the appellants. In appeal it was contended that the only offence that could be said to have been committed is one under S.182 or 211, I.P.C. and that the court was not competent to take cognizance of the offence except on a complaint by a proper authority under S.195 Cr. P.C. Learned Sessions Judge accepted the contention and acquitted the accused. Against the acquittal, an application in revision was preferred to the High Court. The petition came up for hearing before a Division Bench who referred the following question for decision to the Full Bench: "If the facts alleged in a petition of complaint, or in an information received by the Magistrate on which a Magistrate can ordinarily take cognizance of an offence under S.190 Cr. P. C., disclose an offence on which cognizance cannot be taken by the Magistrate, because of the special provisions of S.195 or 196 or 196A or 197 or 199 Cr. P. C, is the Magistrate also debarred because of this from" taking cognizance of other offences disclosed by the facts alleged, which are not in any way affected by the provisions of S.195 or !96 or 196A or 197 or 199 Cr. P.C." The Full Bench answered the question referred to in the negative. In respect of the conviction under S.297 I.P.C. the learned judges said that there was nothing in S.195 to 199 Cr. P.C., which could in any way bar the prosecution of the appellants under that section as it could in no way be said that it arose out of the facts which would constitute an offence under S.182 or 211 IPC., and that it arose from an entirely different set of facts, namely, the trespass by the opposite parties in the burial ground and the removal of the corpse from the lighted funeral pyre. With regard to the offence under S.500 it was observed that though the prosecution for defamation was based on the false information given to a public officer, that circumstance, however was no bar for the prosecution of the appellants under that section, and the revision was therefore allowed. The matter was taken up to the Supreme Court and the order of the High Court was upheld. The matter was taken up to the Supreme Court and the order of the High Court was upheld. Mahajan, J., speaking for the Bench stated: "Though, in our judgment, S.195 does not bar the trial of an accused person for a distinct offence disclosed by the same facts and which is not included within the ambit of that section, it has also to be borne in mind that the provisions of that section cannot be evaded by resorting to devices or camouflages. The test whether there is evasion of the section or not is whether the facts disclose primarily and essentially an offence for which a complaint of the court or of the public servant is required. In other words, the provisions of the section cannot be evaded by the device of charging a person with an offence to which that section does not apply and then convicting him of an offence to which it does, upon the ground that such latter offence is a minor offence of the same character, or by describing the offence as being one punishable under some other section of the Indian Penal Code, though in truth and substance the offence falls in the category of sections mentioned in S.195 Cr. P.C. Merely by changing the garb or label of an offence which is essentially an offence covered by the provisions of S.195 prosecution for such an offence cannot be taken cognizance of by misdescribing it or by putting a wrong label on it." So what has to be seen is whether the facts here disclose primarily and essentially an offence for which a complaint of the court or public servant is required. Judged in the light of the principles laid down in the decisions cited supra, we entertain no doubt that the facts disclose primarily and essentially an offence under S.193 IPC., for which a complaint of the court is necessary under S.195(1)(b). The order of the learned Additional First Class Magistrate is, therefore, correct. The revision petition is dismissed. Dismissed.