ORDER D.S. Mathur, J. - This is an appeal by P.V. Dehadrai, Defendant, against the order dated 16-11-1962 of the Additional Civil Judge of Dehradun dismissing his application for substitution of the names of the legal representative of the deceased decree-holder (Plaintiff) and for condonation of delay in moving the application. At the same time it was ordered that the appeal preferred by the present Appellant had become infructuous and was consequently dismissed; 2. The suit of Smt. Rani Nanda for recovery of arrears of rent and for ejectment was decreed on 30-11-1961 and the Appellant preferred an appeal on 27-2-1962. Smt. Rani Nanda was impleaded as the Respondent but she had died in the month of January 1962. It was on 28-3-1962 that the Appellant moved an application for substitution of the name of Navin Kumar Nanda in place of the Respondent and also for the condonation of delay in moving the application. Strictly speaking, substitution application is necessary when a party to the suit or appeal dies; in other' words, a suit or appeal has been properly presented and it is necessary to substitute the names of legal representatives of a party duly impleaded. But where the Respondent died before the filing of the appeal, there is no proper appeal and no question of substitution arises. In such a case, the Appellant should implead the legal representatives in the memo of appeal at the same time, requesting the court that permission be granted to proceed against the legal representatives. 3. If the legal representatives are impleaded or a request for permission to prefer appeal against them is made within the period of limitation, no difficulty shall arise as the appeal shall be properly presented within time. 4. In the instant case the appeal would have been within time upto 4-3-1962 but the application for proceeding against the legal representative was made on 28-3-1962. Unless this delay is condoned, the appeal could not proceed against the legal representative. 5. The courts of law have, therefore, to consider whether the delay could be condoned u/s 5 of the Limitation Act. Even if Section 5 was not directly applicable, the court would have considered the matter from the same angle in deciding whether to exercise or not to exercise the inherent jurisdiction. 5. The courts of law have, therefore, to consider whether the delay could be condoned u/s 5 of the Limitation Act. Even if Section 5 was not directly applicable, the court would have considered the matter from the same angle in deciding whether to exercise or not to exercise the inherent jurisdiction. What had to be seen was whether there was sufficient cause for not making the application to bring on record the legal representatives within the period prescribed for filing the appeal. 6. What the Appellant says is that he had come to know of the death of Smt. Rani Nanda early in February, 1962, but he being ignorent of the law did not inform his counsel that Smt. Rani Nanda was dead; and that it was in the end of March 1962 that he gave the information to his counsel when the present applications were made. Ignorance of law is no excuse. Further, if the Appellant did not know the law it was necessary for him to communicate all the facts to his counsel so that he may take all the legal steps. When Smt. Rani Nanda was the sole Respondent, it should have struck the Appellant how could he proceed against a dead person? Considered from one angle it can be said that delay on the part of the Appellant in taking steps was the result of ignorance of law. If the matter is considered from another angle, it can also be said that the Appellant was guilty of negligence. In no case is the Appellant entitled to the benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 7. The order passed is thus proper and cannot be interfered with by this Court. 8. The F.A.F.O. has thus no force and it is hereby dismissed. Costs on parties. Stay order is vacated.