JUDGMENT CHAINANI C. J. -The facts in this application are briefly these: There was an open Government land in Ulhasnagar Township. In 1949 -50 portions of this land were given for temporary use to several displaced persons in order to enable them to carry on business. On January 23, 1950, the Administrator and Managing Officer, Ulhasnagar Township, authorised the petitioner to use a plot of land for the construction of a temporary structure, subject to certain conditions, two of which were that the grant was temporary and that the structure was subject to a short removal notice when required by the Government at owners cost. The petitioner, thereafter, put up a structure on the plot which he was authorised to occupy. We are informed that he is using this structure for a charcoal shop. In 1954 -55 the area was demarcated into several plots and the plot occupied by the petitioner now forms part of Plot No. 266. After the plots were demarcated, the plots including plot No. 266, have been reserved for residential purposes. According to the Regional Settlement Commissioner, these plots could not be allotted to the persons who were occupying them, as they were neither evacuee property nor Government built property. Under rule 39 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955, these plot were to be sold by public auction. In 1960 tenders were, therefore, invited for 8ale of plot No. 266. The petitioner then made an application that the plot should be allotted to him. On September 24, 1962, the Managing Officer informed the petitioner that his request had been rejected. The petitioner appealed to the Regional Settlement Commissioner, but his appeal was dismissed. He applied in revision to the Chief Settlement Commissioner. but his revision application was. rejected. Thereafter the petitioner applied to the Government of India under section 33 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, but his application was rejected. After respondent No. 1 had rejected the petitioners application for allotment of the plot to him, tenders were invited for the sale of this plot. The petitioner did not submit any tender. The highest tender submitted was that of respondent No.5. His tender was accepted on December 15, 1962, and a deed of conveyance was issued to him on December 20, 1962. Thereafter the petitioner filed the present Special Civil Application under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. Mr. Mulchandani. The petitioner did not submit any tender. The highest tender submitted was that of respondent No.5. His tender was accepted on December 15, 1962, and a deed of conveyance was issued to him on December 20, 1962. Thereafter the petitioner filed the present Special Civil Application under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. Mr. Mulchandani. the learned advocate of the petitioner, has first contended that the authorities were wrong in rejecting the petitioners application for the allotment of the plot to him. Chapter V of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules provides for allotment of acquired evacuee properties, while Chapter VI contains rules which provide for allotment of Government built properties. Rule 36 specifies the classes of Government built properties which may be allotted. The plot, which the petitioner is occupying, is neither evacuee property nor is it Government built property. No other rule has been pointed out to us, which provides for the payment of compensation by the allotment of an open plot belonging to Government. Rule 39 states that a Government plot forming part of the Compensation Pool may be sold by public auction. There bas been some argument before us as to whether the word "may" in this rule means "shall", Mr. Mulchandani has pointed out that while the word "may" has been used in this rule and some rules such as rules 25 and 42, the word "shall" has been used in some other rules. For instance, the relevant words in rule 41 (1) are "shall be paid compensation by transfer". In rules 22 and 36 the material words are "shall ordinarily be allotable". It has, therefore, been urged by him that whenever it was intended not to give a discretion to the authority concerned, the word "shall" has been used. Mr. Mulchandani has also referred to rule 43, which states that the provisions of rules 25 to 34 shall apply to the transfer of any Government built property or Government plot under this Chapter. Rules 25 to 34 lay down the mode in which the properties can be transferred. As these rules also apply to the transfer of a Government plot under Chapter VI, which contains rule 39, it necessarily follows that even though there is no specific rule providing for the allotment of a Government plot, the rules contemplate the transfer or allotment of a Government plot. As these rules also apply to the transfer of a Government plot under Chapter VI, which contains rule 39, it necessarily follows that even though there is no specific rule providing for the allotment of a Government plot, the rules contemplate the transfer or allotment of a Government plot. For, otherwise it would not have been necessary to apply the provisions of rules 25 to 34 to the transfer of a Government plot. We, therefore, accept Mr. Mulchandanis argument that the word "may" in rule 39 does not mean "shall". 3. The position, therefore, is that there is no obligation to sell an open plot by public auction. This is not the only mode in which such property can be disposed of and it is open to the appropriate authority to dispose of it in some other manner. He may allot it, if he 80 deems proper, and if he decides to do so, the provisions of rules 25 to 34 will become applicable. But a claimant cannot claim as a matter of right that an open plot must be allotted to him. The authority has a discretion in the matter and he may pay compensation by the allotment of a Government plot, but he is not bound to do so. Consequently we are unable to accept Mr. Mulchandanis contention that there was an obligation on the Regional Settlement Commissioner to allot to the petitioner the plot in his occupation. [The rest of the judgment is not material to this report.] Rule discharged.