S. K. K. apnr, J. ( 1 ) THIS criminal revision whicharises out of proceedings under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, wasreferred TO a Division Bench, because our learned brother Gurdev Singh J. was not inclined to agree with what His Lordship termed as a wide proposition laid down in Sayed Salahuddin Ahmed v. Janki Mahton andothers. ( 2 ) BRIEFLY stated the facts of the case are that there was somedispute regarding possession of 14 plots of land measuring in all 39 bighas14 biswas which were at one time evacuee property. Proceedings undersection 145, Criminal Procedure Code, were initated at the instance ofthe police. By his order dated the 25th of July, 1963 the learned Magistrate held that it was the first party, namely, Prabhu, Data Ram, Munshi,ramu, Bhartu, Mohan, Roop Chand, Udmi, Budha Amar Singh, Teka andbhima who were in actual possesssion of the land in dispute on Ist ofdecember, 1962, he date of preliminary order. The Magistrate accordinglyordered the possession to be delivered to first party and directed thesecond party, namely, Partap Singh not to interfere with the peaceful possession of the first party unless the first party was evicted in accordance withlaw. The case set up by Partap Singh, the second party was, that the saidplots of land were allotted to him and Mohan Lal on 5th of January 1961by the Ministry of Rehabilitation and the possession thereof was deliveredto them by the Managing Officer on the spot on 3rd of June 1962. Itwas further contended by Partap Singe that intimation about delivery ofpossession was sent to the Tahsildar on 4th of June 1962 and entryregarding transfer of possession was made in Roznamcha on 12th of June1962. Preliminary order was passed under section 145 (1), Criminal. Procedure Code. on 1st of December 1962. The learned Magistrate aftergoing through the material on record held that the second party had failedto establish beyond doubt that possession over all the 14 plots was delivered to him. He further held that even if the possession of all the 14plots had been delivered on 3rd of June 1962 it was of no avail to thesecond party since the actual possession on the date of preliminary orderalone had to be taken into consideration under section 145, Criminalprocedure Code. In the end the learned Magistrate concluded that on 1/12/1962 the actual possession of the disputed plots was with partyno. 1. In the end the learned Magistrate concluded that on 1/12/1962 the actual possession of the disputed plots was with partyno. 1. Aggrieved by this order Partap Singh filed a revision petitionbefore the Additional Sessions Judge. The learned Additional Sessionsjudge following the decision of Sayed Salahuddin Ahmad s case held thatsince the property was evacuee property the provision of section 145,criminal Procedure Code, did not apply. In this view learned Additionalsessions Judge recommended to this Court that the proceedings taken bythe trial Court under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, and the orderof the learned Magistrate made in this behalf be queashed. When thematter came before Gurdev Singh J. His Lordship expressed some doubtas to the correctness of the rule laid down in the Patna decision and asstated above the case was REFERRED TO a Division Bench. This is how thematter has come before us. ( 3 ) IT is not disputed before us that the property in dispute was atone time evacuee property but was later acquired by the Central Government under section 12 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation)Act, 1954, and became part of the compensation pool, constituted under section 14 of the said Act. In view of this it is not necessary toexpress our views directly regarding the Patna decision which turns on theprovisions of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act. We say"directly" because we have been asked to hold that the same principleapplies to properties vesting in the Central Government under section 12of Displaced Persons (Comensation and Rehabitation) Act 1954. thelearned Magistrate rightly held that he had for the purposes of section 145,cnminal Procedure Code, to decide as to which of the parties was in actualpossession on the date of preliminary order made under section 145 (1),that is, the 1st of December 1962. No doubt by virtue of second proviso to. sub-section (4) of section 145, Criminal Procedrre Code, if it apeared tothe Magistrate that any party had within two months next before thedate of the preliminary harder been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed,he could treat the party so dispossessed as if he had been in possessionon the date of the preliminary order, but that also could at the most,require determination of the position only on a day two months next beforethe date of the preliminary order. The allegation of the second party,namely, Partap Singh that the actual possession was obtained by theallotteel from the Managing Officer on 3rd of June 1962 would, therefore,be not decisive of the issue. The learned Magistrate, therefore, rightlywent into the question of actual possession on the date of the preliminaryorder. ( 4 ) IT has been contended by the learned counsel for Partap Singhthat the principle laid down in the Patna Judgment would be applicableto property acquired under the Displaced Persons (Compensation andrehabilitation) Act, 1954. The contention is that under section 12 (2)the evacuee property acquired under section 12 (1) vests absolutely in thecentral Goverment free from all encumbrances and under section 15 noproperty forming part of the compensation pool and vesting in the Centralgovernment under the said Act can be proceeded against for any claim inany manner whatsoever in execution of any decree or order or by anyother process of any Court or other authority. We are, however, of theview that section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, was applicable and themagistrate was entitled to take proceedings under the said provision. Theobject of section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, is to bring to an end bya summary process disputes relating to properties which are in theirnature, likely, if not suppressed, to end in breaches of the peace. Thesection was enacted for the maintenance of public peace, law and orderand the facts that the property vests in the Central Government wouldnot have the effects of abrogating the provision of section 145, Criminalproceduue Code. Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, is designed toprotect deprivation of possession by persons taking law into their ownhands and has no concern with determination of any legal right topossession. It does not seek to perpetuate illegal possession but merelydirects the subjects to assert their rights in accordance with law. Thesection itself is indicative of the difference between actual possession andright to possession maintained there in. The dictionary meaning of theword "actual" is real or existing in fact. The word, therefore connotespossession as a fact. "possession" has two meanings namely mediatepossession and immediate possession. The distinction between to categories of possession is that possession held by a person through another maybe termed as mediate while that which is acquired or retained directlyor personally may be distinguished as immediate or direct. The word, therefore connotespossession as a fact. "possession" has two meanings namely mediatepossession and immediate possession. The distinction between to categories of possession is that possession held by a person through another maybe termed as mediate while that which is acquired or retained directlyor personally may be distinguished as immediate or direct. We need notgo into the question as to what is the precise meaning to be attributedto the term "actual possession" in section 145, Criminal Procedure Codefor it admits of no doubt that immediate or direct possession is onany interpretation actual possession within the meaning of thesaid provision. We will also assume that mediate possession of thegovernment through an allottee is actual possession within the contemplation of the said provision. Does that then destroy the jurisdiction ofthe Magistrate to act under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code. Our answer is in the negative. The basis of action under section 145 is the likelihoodof breach of peace. Even when an allottee, who had once been put inpossession and dislocated seeks to recover possession, such allottee cannot,in our opinion, be allowed to take law in his own hands and if the burden. of his act falls on peace. Magistrate of the first class can certainly step in. Such an allottee is as much bound to assert his right to recover possessionin accordance with law as any other person. He must also recoverpossession through channels of law and the mere fact of his being anallottee does not confer any such privilege as to enable him to break thelaw. Party No. 1 claimed to be in possession on 1st of December, 1962. That being so, section 145 could be invoked by the police in case thesecond party attempted to take forcible possession and likelihood of abreach of the peace arose. The fact that property vesting in Centralgovernment under Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation)Act 1954 enjoys an exemption from process of courts does not in our viewdeprive a Magistrate of the jurisdiction to take proceedings under section145, Criminal Procedure Code, if other conditions are satisfied. In makingan order under section 145, the Magistrate is not proceeding against anyproperty vesting in the Central Government but is merely acting in aid ofmaintenance of peace till possession is delivered to the person entitled tothe same, in accordance with law. Even where a statute prescribes a Codefor recovery of possession from wrongful holders of property any attempt. In makingan order under section 145, the Magistrate is not proceeding against anyproperty vesting in the Central Government but is merely acting in aid ofmaintenance of peace till possession is delivered to the person entitled tothe same, in accordance with law. Even where a statute prescribes a Codefor recovery of possession from wrongful holders of property any attempt. to dislocate the person, in possession, save in accordance with law, maygive rise to likelihood of breach of peace entitling a Magistrate to actunder section 145. If we were to accept the argument of the learned counselfor Partap Singh, the whole object of section 145, Criminal Procedurecode, would be frustrated and the maintenance of law and order seriouslyimpeded. No right of any one to the property vesting in the Centralgovernment is affected or prejudiced in any manner by an order undersection 145. The temporary measures taken under section 145, Criminalprocedure Code, do net in any way destroy the sanctity of section 15of the Act or as a matter of that any other provisions of the Displacedpersons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, In this view section145 was clearly applicable and the recommendation of the- learned Additional Sessions Judge cannot be accepted. In view of the fact, however,that the learned Additional Sessions Judge has not decided the revisionon merits the matter will have to go back for the determination of theissues on merits. The pa ties agree that it may now be sent back toshric. G. Suri, Additional Session Judge, Delhi. We accordingly directthat the matter will go back to the Court of Shri C. G. Suri, Additionalsessions Judge, who will go into the merits and decide the same in accordance with law. The parties will appear before the learned Additionalessions Judge on the 28th of April, 1965.