Moideen Kutty Haji v. Abdul Rahiman Alias Bava Musaliar
1965-02-01
T.C.RAGHAVAN
body1965
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- 1. The second appeal is by the judgment-debtor against the appellate order in execution; and the civil revision petition is by the same party against the order of the primary court. They involve the same question; and the second appeal is filed by way of abundant caution. 2. There was a decree in 1953; and E.P. No. 77 of 1954 was filed to execute the same and recover possession. The execution petition was transferred to another court and renumbered as E.P. No. 3 of 1958. The judgment-debtor filed an appeal against the decree and the appeal was dismissed on 7th February 1956. Even after that the same execution petition was pursued; but ultimately, this Court in A.S. No. 519 of 1958 held that the decree to be executed was the decree of the appellate court and not the decree of the original court. In that view, this court remanded E.P. No. 3 of 1958 for making appropriate amendments. The executing court allowed to amend the petition by converting it into a petition to execute the appellate decree. The court also allowed the costs of the appeal to be included in the execution petition. In appeal the said decision was confirmed; and the second appeal is against that confirming decision. As already stated, the civil revision petition is against the order of the primary court allowing the amendment. 3. The learned counsel of the appellant relies on the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Collector of Customs, Calcutta v. East India Commercial Co. Ltd., Calcutta (A.I.R.1963 S.C.1124) for the position that the decree to be executed in a case, where the decree of .the trial court is confirmed by the appellate / court, is the appellate decree. He proceeds to contend that in view of this decision, the amendment allowed by the executing court to the pending execution petition is erroneous-. The counsel supplements that the amendment was actually made more than three years after the appellate decree was passed. 4. The learned counsel of the respondent brings to my notice Chauthilal v. Badri Prasad (A.I.R.1960 Raj. 249), Mannalal Balgovind Mishra v. Bhalchandrarao Ramchandrarao Bhuskute (A.I.R.1960 M. P. 41), and also the decision of this Court by Velu Pillai J. in Bhargavan v. Halima Beevi (1964 K.L.T. 532).
4. The learned counsel of the respondent brings to my notice Chauthilal v. Badri Prasad (A.I.R.1960 Raj. 249), Mannalal Balgovind Mishra v. Bhalchandrarao Ramchandrarao Bhuskute (A.I.R.1960 M. P. 41), and also the decision of this Court by Velu Pillai J. in Bhargavan v. Halima Beevi (1964 K.L.T. 532). The Rajasthan High Court has held that the dismissal of an appeal would not have the effect of wiping out the proceedings taken for execution of the decree passed by the trial court; and that in such a case, as soon as the appeal is decided, the executing court may amend the execution petition and proceed with it. The Madhya Pradesh High Court has also held that though the decree of the trial court merges in the decree of the appellate court even in a case of confirmation, the petition for executing the decree of the original court can be properly amended after the confirmation of the same by the appellate court & proceeded with. The decision of our Court has laid down that though the appellate decree alone is the decree to be executed, still, the execution petition for executing the decree of the trial court already pending does not cease to be pending. Velu Pillai J. has also observed that the pending execution petition becomes defective after the passing of the appellate decree, because it does not take note of the appellate decree; but, such a defect can be cured by appropriate amendments. I may also refer to the Division Bench ruling of the Calcutta High Court in Baburam Lal v. Debdas Lala (A.I.R.1959 Cal. 73). The Calcutta High Court has held that though the appellate decree supersedes the original decree, it does not necessarily follow that the execution proceedings already instituted to execute the original decree become dead. The High Court has also laid down that it is only reasonable to consider that on and from the passing of an appellate decree, the application, which was originally for execution of the decree of the trial court, becomes an application for the execution of the appellate decree. In a case like the one before me, where the decree of the appellate court has only confirmed the decree of the trial court, there is no reason why the principle of these decisions should not be followed. 5.
In a case like the one before me, where the decree of the appellate court has only confirmed the decree of the trial court, there is no reason why the principle of these decisions should not be followed. 5. Then it is pointed out that the costs incurred by the respondent in the appeal are also included in the amendment and that was done three years after the appellate decree. Put in that form, it may appear that the costs awarded by the appellate court became barred by limitation before they were included in the execution petition. But it is brought out that there was another execution petition for the costs, so that the costs were not barred at the time when they were included in the amendment. 6. The counsel of the appellant has also argued that the only provision in the Code of Civil Procedure for amending execution petitions is O.21 R.17 & that the present amendment may not come within that provision. If so, then S.151 will enable the court to allow such an amendment. Therefore, it does not very much matter whether the amendment falls within O.21 R.17 or not. 7. The second appeal and the civil revision petition are both dismissed. In the second appeal the appellant will pay the costs of the respondent; and in the civil revision petition the parties will suffer their respective costs.