JUDGMENT : Misra, J. - Plaintiff purchased the disputed land from Defendant No. 4 on 28-5-1956 under a registered sale deed (Ext. 2). After his purchase, Defendant No. 1 who was a tenant under Defendant No. 4 in respect of the house constructed on the disputed land voluntarily left it. Defendant No. 1, however, allowed Defendants 2 and 3 to occupy the house without Plaintiff?s consent. He accordingly prayed for declaration of title, and recovery of possession by evicting Defendants 1 to 3. 2. Defendants Nos. 1 and 4 did not contest the suit. Defendants 2 and 3 assailed the title of the Plaintiff. Defendants 1 and 3 plead that they got the disputed land from the Raj Sarkar as tenants on permanent royati basis in 1947 and that since then they are in peaceful occupation of the same in their own right, title and interest under the Ex-State of Baramba which subsequently merged in the State of Orissa. 3. The learned trial court decreed the Plaintiff?s suit negativing the plea of Defendants 2 and 3 that they are permanent tenants. Before the lower appellate court Defendants 2 and 3 contended that the Administrator of Baramba had no power to grant lease in favour of Defendant No. 4 and that even if he had such power the lease is invalid under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act Both these contentions appealed to the learned Subordinate Judge who allowed the appeal. Against this reversing judgment, the second appeal has been filed. 4. In order to appreciate the contention raised by Mr. Das gupta that the Plaintiff has got no valid title, certain essential facts must be noticed. Defendant No. 4 made an application before the Administrator of Ex-State of Baramba for getting lease of the disputed land with an area of 0.03 acre in plot No. 295/2 out of Anabadi holding No. 1 in village Nijgarh. (sic) 15-7-1949, the Administrator passed the following order Applicant Giridhari Lal Bhut is present. He wants to take an area of 0.03 acre in plot No. 295/2 out of Anabadi holding No. 1 in village Nijgarh. Although as reported by the Amin the land is recorded as bagayat there is actually no tree in the area wanted by the Applicant as it appears from the Amin?s report. lstahar was duly served. No objection except one by Gobinda Chandra. Although as reported by the Amin the land is recorded as bagayat there is actually no tree in the area wanted by the Applicant as it appears from the Amin?s report. lstahar was duly served. No objection except one by Gobinda Chandra. Misra states as authorised agent of the Raja Saheb that the land adjoins their compound. But as reported by the Record Keeper, the area is not included in the inventory of the private properties. Actually there will be no inconvenience by the lease of the land to the Applicant. The area wanted is near the Hat and it is wanted for homestead only for business purpose. The Sarbarakar reports that there is no other objection. Under the circumstances plot No. 295 2(0.03) is leased out to the Applicant, who is to pay a Salami of Rs. 20 (Rupees twenty) and usual mutation fee and the rent at Re. 12-8-0 per acre. For 25-7-49.3-9-49 Slip delivered. Sd - M.C. Misra. 15-7-1949. Mr. Dasgupta fairly concedes that rules 14 to 17 of the Mutation Rules in the Ex. State of Baramba had been fully complied with in passing this order. As per the direction made in the order dated 15-7-1949 that the mutation slip would be delivered on 3-9-1949, Ext. 1 was delivered to Defendant No. 4. It was clearly directed therein that Defendant No. 4 was mutated as a rayat in respect of the disputed land in pursuance of the order dated 15-7-1949. From the second Kisti of 1949-50, the tenant was to pay rent and cess on temporary basis and from 1950-51, the demand would be a part of the Touzi demand permanently. After Defendant No. 4 was recognised as a tenant by the State he paid rent on 23-8-1954 as evidenced by rent receipt (Ext. 5). 5. It is contended by Mr. Das gupta on the basis of Rule 1 of the Mutation Rule?s that title in favour of Defendant No. 4 was not complete on the oasis of exhibits 6 and 1. The rule runs as follows: No transfer or mutation of names shall be valid unless it is sanctioned and recorded in the Register of mutation. 6. Mr. Dasgupta frankly concedes that he cannot take exception to the validity of the sanction as prescribed under the rule. The rule runs as follows: No transfer or mutation of names shall be valid unless it is sanctioned and recorded in the Register of mutation. 6. Mr. Dasgupta frankly concedes that he cannot take exception to the validity of the sanction as prescribed under the rule. He, however, contends that until the factum of mutation is evidenced by the entry in the Register of mutation, title would not be complete or the transfer shall not be valid. I find no substance in this contention. These Mutation Rules as prevalent in all the E-State areas had been inartistically drafted. All concepts involving questions of title and possession have been mixed up. Rule 1 must be construed in the context of accepted juristic theories. Read in that light there can be absolutely no doubt that the moment the sanction order was passed and Defendant No. 4 performed the conditions for getting the recognition, tenancy right was created in his favour. Ext. 1, the mutation slip and the rent receipt (Ext. 5) establish beyond any doubt the factum of recognition of tenancy right. No contention was advanced before the trial court that the entry as evidenced by Ext. 1 is not an entry in the Register of mutation as required under the rule. This is a pure question of fact which should have been specifically canvassed in the trial court. It would be fantastic to coincide that a mutation slip would be issued in Defendant No. 4?s favour and rent would be accepted from him four years after the sanction order unless his name had been recorded in the Register of mutation. This contention was advanced by Mr. Dasgupta, for the first time, in second appeal and was never raised in any of the courts below. To the extent it involves pure question of law, the contention is entertainable but in as much as it involves also some questions of fact, the contention is not permissible to be raised for the first time in second appeal. The contention has no merit even on facts. 7. Mr. Dasgupta frankly conceded that the view of the learned lower appellate court that the Administrator had no power to grant lease of the disputed land is not supportable. The contention has no merit even on facts. 7. Mr. Dasgupta frankly conceded that the view of the learned lower appellate court that the Administrator had no power to grant lease of the disputed land is not supportable. He attempted to faintly support the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge that the lease is invalid as the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act had not been complied with. Reliance has been placed by the lower appellate court on a judgment of this Court in Second Appeal No. 311 of 1956 decided on the 11th of December 1958. It is true that this decision lends some support to the view taken by the learned Subordinate Judge, but this decision is not binding on me in as much as it had not taken into consideration Section 2 of the Government Grants Act, 1895 (Act XV of 1895) which lays down in unequivocal terms that nothing in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, contained shall apply or be deemed ever to have applied to any grant or other transfer of land or of any interest therein heretofore made or hereafter to be made by or on behalf of the Government to, or in favour of, any person whomsoever but every such grant and transfer shall be construed and take effect as if the said Acthas not been passed. It is somewhat remarkable that the attention of the learned Subordinate Judge was not drawn to this section. The findings of the learned Subordinate Judge that the Administrator had no power to grant the lease and that the lease was otherwise hit by the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, are wholly contrary to law and cannot be supported. 8. The only other residuary contention advanced by Mr. Dasgupta is that even if the defence contentions are rejected, Plaintiff?s suit is bound to fail as no notice was served on Defendant No. 2 u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The learned trial court accepted Plaintiff?s case that subsequent to the purchase, Defendant No. 1 voluntarily left the house. This finding was not assailed before the lower appellate court. On this finding, the further argument that notice is necessary does not arise. If Defendant No. 1 had voluntarily left the house he had no authority to induct Defendants 2 and 3 as sub-tenants. This contention has no merit. 9. This finding was not assailed before the lower appellate court. On this finding, the further argument that notice is necessary does not arise. If Defendant No. 1 had voluntarily left the house he had no authority to induct Defendants 2 and 3 as sub-tenants. This contention has no merit. 9. In the result, the judgment of the lower appellate court is set aside and the Plaintiff?s suit is decreed in to Defendants 2 and 3 are to pay costs throughout. There would be no order for costs against Defendants Nos. 1 and 4.