Judgment.- This revision has been preferred by the defendant in a suit in ejectment, whose application under section 9(1) of the Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) has been dismissed by the learned District Judge of Salem on appeal. The plaintiff in the suit is a devasthanam represented by its managing trustee. The turstee had leased the property to the defendant under a registered instrument for a period of five years on 2nd August, 1950. The defendant (petitioner), the tenant, had been authorised to put up structures on the property and live therein during the lease period. After the expiry of the lease, the suit was instituted, and, while the suit was pending, the Act was extended to Salem on 29th January, 1958, and thereupon the present petitioner came out with the application under section 9(1) of the Act, and that has given rise to the present proceeding. The application of the petitioner was dismissed in the first instance by the trial Court on an erroneous view as to the scope of section 12 of the Act, and, on appeal therefrom by the petitioner, A.S. No. 294 of 1959 on the file of the District Court, Salem, the order of the trial Court rejecting the petitioner’s application under section 9(1) was set aside and the matter remanded to the learned District Munsif for disposal of the matter in accordance with the provisions of section 9 of the Act, the learned District Munsif to fix the price of the vacant site. This order had been passed on 27th February, 1960 and was not the subject of any revision or appeal. Pending the remand, the Act was amended by Madras Act XIII of 1960 on 27th July, 1960. Under the amendment, the Court, on an application under section 9(1) of the Act, has first to decide the minimum extent of the land which may be necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the tenant. There was a change also in the manner of -valuation of the site. Prior to the amendment of 1960, the value of the site should be determined at the lowest value within 7 years next preceding the date of the order. But under the amended provision the value should be the average for three years immediately before the date of the order. Prior to the amendment of 1960, the value of the site should be determined at the lowest value within 7 years next preceding the date of the order. But under the amended provision the value should be the average for three years immediately before the date of the order. Based on the provisions of the amendment, additional and reply statements were filed by the plaintiff and defendant, the plaintiff contending that only the minimum extent of land necessary for the convenient enjoyment by the tenant should be directed to be sold. A point was also raised for the plaintiff that as trustee the plaintiff had no right to convey or sell the suit land, and that, therefore, section 9 of the Act would not be applicable. The learned District Munsif held that the suit site was not attached to the temple or used for any purpose of the temple and as such inalienable property. It was not property which the trustee had no power to alienate at all even for purposes of necessity or benefit. The District Munsif overruled the contention on behalf of the tenant that under the terms of the remand order the Court was bound to direct conveyance of the entire site leased and could not go behind it and apply the provisions of the amended Act. He found that an extent of land of an area of 2,100 sq. ft. need alone be conveyed by the plaintiff to the defendant, and, as regards its price, he fixed at Re. 1 per sq. ft. Appropriate orders were passed on these findings, directing deposit by the tenant of a sum of Rs. 2,100 into Court within a period of 4 months. Against this order appeals were preferred both by the plaintiff and defendant-A.S. No. 155 of 1961 by plaintiff and A.S. No. 167 of 1961 by the tenant. The principal contention of the plaintiff-and it found acceptance at the hands of the learned District Judge-was that the land in question was not one coming within the meaning of section 9, as the trustee had no power to convey or sell the land leased to the tenant except for necessity or benefit. Incidentally the plaintiff also claimed a higher price than that fixed by the learned District Munsif and wanted also the extent of the land to be conveyed reduced. Incidentally the plaintiff also claimed a higher price than that fixed by the learned District Munsif and wanted also the extent of the land to be conveyed reduced. The tenant, by his appeal, contended that the rest of the site which had originally been leased should also be directed to be conveyed to him. He also contended that the price fixed was high. The learned District Judge, while holding that section 9 would not apply to the suit land and that therefore the tenant cannot have the benefit of the option for purchase provided therein, also held that the tenant, if he was entitled to a sale could have only the extent of 2,100 sq. ft. as decided by the trial Court. As regards the price, the learned District Judge, on examination of the evidence, found that the price could very well and justly be fixed at Rs. 2 per sq. ft. A commissioner was appointed by the lower Court to inspect the land and fix the needed extent. He had prepared a plan and submitted his report with reference to the plan. Before the learned District Judge, again it was contended for the tenant that the Court had no jurisdiction to go behind the remand order and reduce the extent of the land that should be conveyed. Also the applicability of the amended provision of the Act was questioned. The learned District Judge, however, while giving his findings confirming the extent of the land that would have to be conveyed and fixing the price which should be paid therefor at Rs. 2 per sq. ft. having found that section 9 of the Act was not applicable, dismissed the petition filed under section 9 of the Act by the tenant and allowed the appeal of the plaintiff. In the present revision by the tenant, the learned Counsel for the petitioner rises three points. It is contended that the learned District Judge erred in his view that section 9 of the Act cannot apply to the land where the trustee’s power of alienation is limited to purposes of necessity or benefit. Secondly, it is submitted that it was not open to the plaintiff to raise this point, he being precluded by the earlier order of remand from challenging the applicability of section 9 of the Act to the land in question. Secondly, it is submitted that it was not open to the plaintiff to raise this point, he being precluded by the earlier order of remand from challenging the applicability of section 9 of the Act to the land in question. It is also argued that, in any event, no appeal was competent at the instance of the plaintiff at that stage of the proceedings. Thirdly, it is argued that the amendment in 1960 of the Act cannot have retrospective effect and affect pending proceedings. To take up the first point, the learned-District Judge, in deciding against the tenant, has followed a decision of this Court in Vasudeva Pillai Trust v. Neelavathiammal1, where Jagadisan, J., referring to section 9 of the Act, held that a tenant under a trust cannot exercise the statutory right to purchase the demised land if the trustee could not sell the land under a private sale, there being neither necessity nor benefit to the trust. But “ land” for the purpose of section is defined in Explanation to that section thus: “'Land' means the interest of the landlord in the land and all other interests which he can convey under any power and includes also the full interest which a trustee can convey under the power possessed by him to convey trust property when necessity exists for the same or the alienation of the property is for the benefit of the estate or trust.” A plain reading of the Explanation shows that the latter portion of the clause is only descriptive of the character of the land, that is it is land which could be sold for necessity or benefit. It merely excludes inalienable property like the site of the temple proper, property which a trustee could in no circumstances dispose of. To such property, section 9 would not apply. It is unnecessary to elaborate on this question further, as the matter is now concluded by a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Sundareswarar Devasthanam v. Marimuthu 2, overruling the above decision. Ramachandra Iyer, C.J., delivering judgment of the Bench observed: “In Sivananda Gramani v. Md. Ismail3, one of us had to consider the applicability of the section to the case where a tenant had put up a superstructure over a part of a Muslim burial ground. The property was ‘res extra commercium ‘under the common law. Ramachandra Iyer, C.J., delivering judgment of the Bench observed: “In Sivananda Gramani v. Md. Ismail3, one of us had to consider the applicability of the section to the case where a tenant had put up a superstructure over a part of a Muslim burial ground. The property was ‘res extra commercium ‘under the common law. Neither compelling necessity nor manifest benefit would justify any alienation of the property. It was held that the tenant would not be entitled to compel a sale of the land under section 9. This principle which we accept will apply to the site of the temple, mosque, church, etc., and properties appurtenant thereto......But the property in the present case is different. It is one which can be disposed of by a trustee of a Hindu temple in the context of justifying circumstances or if it were to belong to a Muslim wakf, by the Mutavalli after obtaining sanction of a Court. In regard to such properties, the first question to be considered will be whether the original lease of the property is valid. If the lease is not a valid one, so as to bind the institution the persons to whom the property has been let can hardly be said to be a tenant within the meaning of the Act. If, however, it is held that the lease of the trust property was one made in the ordinary course of management or for the benefit or necessity of the institution or with the sanction of Court the tenant will be a lawful tenant........” Proceeding, it is stated: “As we have pointed out, a sale under section 9 can never be regarded as one for the benefit of the institution, even if there is necessity, a provision which compels a sale at a price which might turn out to be less than the market price cannot be regarded as justified. Therefore the option to purchase conferred on the tenant must be irrespective of any benefit to the institution. The Legislature evidently thought there was a superior equity in favour of the tenant and he should be enabled to purchase the property where he comes within section 9 of the Act. To construe the section as authorising a sale only in cases of necessity would be practically to make it a dead letter so far as vacant lands balonging to religious institutions are concerned. To construe the section as authorising a sale only in cases of necessity would be practically to make it a dead letter so far as vacant lands balonging to religious institutions are concerned. We are therefore with great respect unable to share the view expressed by Jagadisan, J., in Vasudeva Pillai Trust v. Neelavathi Ammal1, that section 9 could be invoked by the tenant only if there is to be either necessity or benefit to the institution by the sale. In our opinion none of these circumstances need exist ; it would be enough if the tenant of the land had put up a superstructure prior to the date of the Act in the cases where the land is no; part of the temple or mosque, etc. But where it is shown that the original lease was beyond the trustee’s powers, section 9 cannot obviously apply.” Mr. R. Gopalaswami Iyengar, learned Counsel for the plaintiff, contends that this decision postulates that the original lease must be valid and binding on the trust for the applicability of section 9, and that it has not been established in this case that the original lease was a valid one. In answer to this, learned Counsel for the defendant points out that it was at no time contended for the plaintiff that the lease in question was beyond the power of the trustee. It is a lease in the ordinary course of management of the trust property. The suit for eviction itself was instituted on the basis of a valid lease. The question whether the original lease was beyond the power of the trustee was never raised at any time in the Courts below, and being a question of fact, should not be allowed to be raised in this revision. I do not think that the plaintiff can be permitted to raise this point now at this stage. He had every opportunity of challenging and questioning the lease itself and contending that the: petitioner was not at all a tenant. On the contrary, the plaintiff himself has proceeded on the basis of the validity of the original lease. I do not think that the plaintiff can be permitted to raise this point now at this stage. He had every opportunity of challenging and questioning the lease itself and contending that the: petitioner was not at all a tenant. On the contrary, the plaintiff himself has proceeded on the basis of the validity of the original lease. The learned District Munsif had considered whether the suit site was property that was alienable by the trustee, and has held that it was not property attached to the temple or being used for any purpose of the temple as to make it beyond the powers of the trustee to alienate even for the purpose of compelling necessity or benefit. This finding has not been upset by the learned District Judge in appeal. It follows that the petitioner would be entitled to claim the option to purchase under section 9 of the Act, and that the order of the trial Court in this regard is correct. To take up the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the appeal by the plaintiff was not competent and that there could not have been any modification of the order in favour of the tenant by the appellate Court, I may immediately refer to section 9-A of the Act, which has been introduced by the amendment in 1960. It is not the contention of either party that the provision for appeal under section 9-A would not apply to orders in proceedings that were pending at the time of the amendment. Section 9-A runs thus: "9-A An appeal shall lie from an order passed by a Court under section 6, section 7, section 7-A or section 9, to the Court to which an appeal would lie from any decree passed by the former Court and the decision in such appeal shall be final: Provided that from an order passed-(i) by Chief Judge of the Presidency Small Causes Court, an appeal shall lie to the High Court, and (ii)by any other Judge of the Presidency Small Causes Court, an appeal shall He to the Chief Judge. " The contention on behalf of the petitioner is that an order in question to be appealable must be a final order and not any interlocutory order. " The contention on behalf of the petitioner is that an order in question to be appealable must be a final order and not any interlocutory order. It is contended that what all the trial Court has decided is to fix up the price of the site, and that this would not amount to a final order. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that, under sub-section (3) of section 9, on payment of the price fixed, the Court would have to pass an order directing the conveyance by the landlord to the tenant of the extent of the land for which price was fixed, and that this would be the final order which would give the plaintiff right of appeal. It is stated that, in default of payment by the tenant of the price or instalment of the price where instalment is ordered the application itself would stand dismissed, and that then it will be unnecessary for the plaintiff to pursue the matter further. In support of his argument, learned Counsel placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Arunachala Naicker v. Ghulam Md Sahib1That was a case before section 9-A was inserted in the Act and the question before the Court was whether the tenant, whose application under section 9 of the Act had been dismissed, had a right of appeal and therefore could not maintain a revision petition under section 115 Civil Procedure Code It was held therein that, in regard to orders passed on applications under the City Tenants Protection Act, an appeal would lie if the adjudication amounted to a decree or if the adjudication had the effect of deciding a question in execution in regard to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. In the course of the judgment it is observed: " A case under section 9 of the Act presents some difficulty. Various orders are contemplated under that section. If the application for the purchases of land is dismissed on the ground that the tenant is not entitled to the benefit of the Act, the principle of the decision in Adaikappa Chettiar v. Chandrasekhara Thevar1, would apply and the order would be appealable as a decree. Various orders are contemplated under that section. If the application for the purchases of land is dismissed on the ground that the tenant is not entitled to the benefit of the Act, the principle of the decision in Adaikappa Chettiar v. Chandrasekhara Thevar1, would apply and the order would be appealable as a decree. If, on the other ‘hand, the Court passes an order fixing the price for the building, that order as such may not amount to a decree within the meaning of section 2(2), Civil Procedure Code; in certain cases it may amount to an order under section 47, Civil Procedure Code. Under section 9(3) of the City Tenants’ pro-tectionAct, final order dismissing the suit is contemplated. That undoubtedly would amount to a decree and be appealable as such. Therefore where the right to apply is negatived or where the application is granted, the conditions complied with and the suit is dismissed an appeal would lie under section 96, Civil Procedure Code. But if an order is one merely fixing compensation or the value of property, that would only be an interlocutory order but in certain cases the effect of the order would amount to an adjudication that the decree-holder would not be entitled to execute the decree according to its tenor. Such an order would in my opinion come within the terms of section 47, Civil Procedure Code, and an appeal would lie as a decree. Therefore, in a case where there is an order under the Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act which does not of its own force amount to a decree, namely, adjudicating on the rights of the parties the question would arise whether it is an order within the meaning of section 47, Civil Procedure Code. " In my opinion, this decision cannot conclude as to the appealability of orders under the Act after the introduction of section 9-A. It should be appreciated that no appeals had been provided previously from the orders passed under the Act, and this Court had to apply the general principles of law as to in what circumstances an appeal would lie against orders passed under the Act. This Court applied the well-recognised rule that, if a right is granted by a statute and jurisdiction is given to an ordinary Court to give effect to such a right, the procedure, including right of appeal that is applicable to proceedings in such Courts, would also apply for enforcement of such rights. It was, therefore, held that appeals would lie even if they were not specifically provided for by the statute creating the right, if in respect of those orders an appeal would lie if they were treated as a part of the ordinary jurisdiction of that Court. Applying that principle competency of appeal had to be decided with reference to section 96, Civil Procedure Code, providing appeals from •decrees and section 104, Civil Procedure Code, providing appeals from orders. But section 104, Civil Procedure Code limited the appeals from orders to the orders specified in that section itself, to appeals from orders provided elsewhere in the body of the Code and to orders made appealable by any law for the time being in force. Hence the appealability under the Act was confined to orders which amounted to -decrees or to orders which amounted to decrees or to orders within the meaning of section 47, Civil Procedure Code. Now, after the insertion of section 9-A in the Act, the only question for consideration is what are the orders under section 9 that have been made appealable. Learned Counsel contended that it must be a final order, an order finally disposing of the matter so far as the Court is concerned. Arguing thus, it was contended that the order in this case fixing the price so far as the plaintiff was concerned should be deemed to be an interlocutory order and not capable of appeal. The Act has not defined the orders that are capable of being appealed against. The Civil Procedure Code defines an " order " as the formal expression of any decision of a civil Court which is not a decree. It is not contended before me that merely pro-cessual orders would be appealable under section 9-A. Where orders are made appealable generally it has never been held that interlocutory or incidental orders regulating procedure but not deciding any of the matters in controversy in the proceeding or affecting the rights and liabilities of the parties are appealable. It is not contended before me that merely pro-cessual orders would be appealable under section 9-A. Where orders are made appealable generally it has never been held that interlocutory or incidental orders regulating procedure but not deciding any of the matters in controversy in the proceeding or affecting the rights and liabilities of the parties are appealable. My attention was drawn in this connection to cases under section 202 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, where the words " order ", " decision " though wide, were held to exclude merely procedural orders or those which do not affect the rights and liabilities of the parties. A clue to what orders under section 9, have been made appealable, can be got by reference to the amended section 9 of the Act. Section 9(1)(a) enables the tenant to apply to the Court for an order that the landlord shall Joe directed to sell for a price fixed by the Court, the whole or part of the extent of lands specified in the application. On that application, under sub-clause (b) of section 9(1), the Court decides the minimum extent of land that has to be conveyed, fixes the price of the minimum extent of the land and then passes an order that, within a period to be determined by the Court, not being less than three months and not more than three years from the date of the order, the tenant shall pay into Court or otherwise as directed the price so fixed in one or more instalments with or without interest. Learned Counsel for the petitioner (tenant) contends that, whereas the tenant could appeal against such an order, the plaintiff-landlord cannot do so. I fail to appreciate the reason for the distinction. Learned Counsel relies, in support of this distinction, on the observations in Arunachala Naicker v. Ghulam Mohamed Sahib1, extracted above. That decision, as already pointed out, has no application where an appeal could be filed under section 9-A. It must be appreciated that the landlord may be aggrieved by the extent which is directed to be conveyed. He may also be equally aggrieved by the price fixed. The tenant also may be aggrieved by the extent he will get or the price which has been fixed. He may also be equally aggrieved by the price fixed. The tenant also may be aggrieved by the extent he will get or the price which has been fixed. Under subsection (3), after the price fixed has been paid by the tenant, the Court has to direct the tenant to put the landlord into possession of the remaining extent of the land. The contention of Counsel for the tenant that the plaintiff could appeal after the final order for conveyance is made, does not appeal to me, as the landlord may properly feel aggrieved even by a provision for payment of the price in instalments. The Court has discretion to spread the payment of the price in instalments over a period of three years. The Court has also discretion to award or not to award interest. The landlord may be aggrieved by the order directing the payment in instalments spread over three years and providing for no interest or as regards the rate of interest. These are the decisions which do affect the rights of the plaintiff. A right of appeal is valuable and substantial right and the Court must be anxious not in any way to cut down or impair the right where the language of the statute admits of it. Where the effect of an order under section 9 of the Act is such as in any way to deprive or affect the right of a party which could make the party aggrieved by the order, it must be held that the order is an appealable one. It is significant also to notice that, while in the unamended sub-section (3) of section 9 the order that the Court had to pass on payment of the price was referred to as final order, the word “ final” is not found in the present amended section. In my view all orders under the sections referred to in section 9-A which are not merely processual are appealable under section 9-A. It will be seen that orders under section 9(1)(b) are in effect preliminary orders determining the rights and liabilities of the parties and the orders under sub-sections (2) and (3) are in effect orders finally giving effect to and working out the rights and liabilities declared under sub-section (1). Viewed thus also orders under section 9(1)(b) would be appealable both at the instance of the plaintiff as well as of the defendant. I would also record that the question of appealability was not mooted in the lower appellate Court. Both the plaintiff and the tenant had preferred appeals. It has assumed importance to the tenant only in this Court, and learned Counsel for the petitioner obtained leave to raise grounds regarding appealability. For the reasons stated above, I see no substance in the contention that the appeal by the plaintiff before the learned District Judge was not competent, and that, therefore, the order of the learned District Judge raising the price payable by the tenant was bad. Learned Counsel for the petitioner then contended that the Courts below erred in applying the provisions of the amended Act, limiting the extent of the land that the landlord has to convey and in fixing the price in terms of the amended provisions of section 9 of the Act. It is contended that the tenant had a vested right by the order of remand for conveyance to him of the entirety of the land leased and for the price in terms of the unamended section 9, that is, at the lowest market value prevalent within 7 years preceding the date of the order. Learned Counsel would contend that the date of the order in this case would be the date of remand which directed a conveyance in favour of the tenant under section 9 of the Act. I am unable to accede to this contention. It cannot be said that the tenant has acquired any vested right in the matter. The tenant had no right under the common law to purchase the land at any price. Under the common law as well as under the Transfer of Property Act, the only right of a tenant who had put up structure on leasehold land taken on terminable lease is only to remove the structure at the time of delivery of possession on the termination of the lease. The right to exercise an option of purchase of the land is given to the tenant only under the Act. It is a privilage conferred on him by the Act. The right to exercise an option of purchase of the land is given to the tenant only under the Act. It is a privilage conferred on him by the Act. By the order of remand directing the District Munsif to fix a price and dispose of the matter in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the tenant docs not get any vested right. It will be seen that, if he does not pay the price within the time fixed, his application gets dismissed. It is only on payment an order for conveyance in his favour is made. If the tenant does not desire, the landlord cannot compel the tenant to purchase the land. In S.M. Transports (P.) Ltd. v. Sankaraswamigal Mutt1. Subba Rao, J., delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court, observed: "The question that falls to be considered is whether the second right, namely, the right of a tenant to apply to the Court for an order directing the landlord to sell the land to him for a price to be fixed by it under section 9 of the principal Act (the Madras City Tenants Protection Act) is a right to property. The law of India does not recognise equitable status. No authority has been cited in support of the contention that a statutory right to purchase land is, or confers an interest or a right in property. The fact that the right is created not by contract but by a statute cannot make a difference in the content or the incidents of the right; that depends upon the nature and scope of the right conferred. The right conferred is a right to purchase land. If such a right conferred under a contract is not a right of property, the fact that such a right stems from a statute cannot obviously expand its content or mike it any the less a non-proprietary right. In our view, a statutory right to apply for the purchase of land is not a right of property." The question as to the applicability of the amended provision of section 9 to pending proceedings has been the subject of consideration by Srinivasan, J., in Gnanaprakasa v. Mahboob Bi2,-In that case while the landlord wanted the new provision to be applied, the tenant objected to the application of it, contending that it could not be regarded as retrospective. It was argued that valuable rights had been created in the tenant under the old Act, and that could not be taken away by the amendment of the Act before the termination of the proceedings which had commenced under the old Act. Discussing the question of retrospectively the learned Judge observes: "Since the policy underlying the Act was only the protection of the tenant from eviction, the right that was conferred upon him was only to that limited extent and of the Act as amended defined that right only in relation to such extent of land that would be necessary for his convenient enjoyment it is difficult to see what valuable right of the tenant was taken away by the amendment. It is true that under the unamended Act, the tenant could ask for a sale of the entire extent of land that he was in possession of and notwithstanding that hardship might be caused to the landlord, the old Act made it possible for the tenant to secure the sale of the entire extent to him. It is common knolwedge that during the recent years the value of immovable properties have appreciated to a great extent and there would appear to be no reason why the tenant should be given a considerable extent of land at the expense of the landlord and at a considerably lower price than the prevailing price, if what all the Act intended to do was to protect the tenant from eviction. The restriction of the right of the tenant to secure a conveyance of only such portion of the holding as would be necessary for his convenient enioyment does not to my mind affect the right that was created in the tenant, that right being only a protection against the eviction. It was not and could not have been the intention of the Legislature to enrich the tenant at the expense of the landlord over and above what was required for carrying out the policy of the Act." This judgment has been followed by Anantanarayanan, J. (as he then was) in Govindammal v. Duraiswami3. It, therefore, follows that the Courts below properly applied the provisions of section 9 as amended in 1960. It, therefore, follows that the Courts below properly applied the provisions of section 9 as amended in 1960. Nor do I see any substance in the point that the order of remand limited the scope of the further enquiry and the full extent must be conveyed to the tenant In the first instance, the tenant’s application under section 9 of the Act, was dismissed on an erroneous view as to the scope of section 12 of the Act. The appellate Court on a correct interpretation of section 12 of the Act, directed further enquiry on the application under section 9 of the Act. There was no final judicial adjudication or determination of the rights of the tenant under the Act in the remand order and it could not be, in the very nature of things. The amended provisions being retrospective have been properly applied to the tenancy in question. Within the limited scope of this revision petition, learned Counsel for the petitioner cannot attack either the findings of the Courts below as to the extent of the land that need be conveyed to the tenant for his convenient enjoyment or the price. As already pointed out, these matters were determined on substantial evidence which was available before the Courts below. The appellate Court differed from the trial Court with regard to the price on relevant and material grounds, In the result, the revision is allowed and the order of the trial Court directing conveyance to the defendant of the specified extent of 2,100 sq.ft. is restored, subject to the modification that the defendant-tenant will have to pay a sum of Rs. 4,200 for the price instead of the sum of Rs. 2,100 which the trial Court directed the tenant to deposit. The tenant is given time till 25th October, 1965, for deposit of this amount of Rs. 4,200 into the trial Court. If the tenant has already deposited the sum of Rs. 2,100 in terms of the decree of the trial Court and has not withdrawn the same he shall deposit the balance within the aforesaid time. The parties will bear their respective costs in this revision. V.K. ----- Petition allowed.