JUDGMENT S.N. Katju, J. - This is an appeal preferred by the Municipal Board, Allahabad. Learned counsel for the respondent raised a preliminary objection that since the valuation of the appeal was only Rs. 169/- it was barred under Sec. 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The suit was for refund of excess of octroi tax realised from the plaintiff-respondent by the appellant. There was also a relief for "a declaration that the action of the defendant in exacting Rs. 160/0/6 in excess from the plaintiff was high handed, illegal, wrongful and ultra vires." The suit in substance was for recovery of the excess amount of octroi tax charged by the appellant from the respondent and the mere fact that a declaration was also sought that the aforesaid realisation was highhanded, illegal and wrongful, did not alter the nature of the suit which was in substance for recovery of the aforesaid excess amount charged from the respondent. The suit was, therefore, a suit of the nature cognizable by the court of small causes and the provisions of Sec. 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure were attracted. There is, therefore, force in the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the appeal was barred by Sec. 102 of the Code. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, prayes that the appeal should be treated as an application in revision. 2. One of the questions raised in the appeal is whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to try the suit or whether the jurisdiction of the Court was barred by Sec. 164 of the U.P. Municipalities Act. The court below expressed the view that the suit was cognizable by the civil court. Thus one of the questions raised in the appeal is of jurisdiction. I will be justified in treating the appeal as an application in revision. The learned counsel for the appellant (referred hereinafter as the applicant) contended that the proper remedy for the plaintiff was to prefer an appeal against the order of assessment to the District Magistrate under Sec. 160 of the U.P. Municipalities Act. He had failed to do so and the assessment could not be questioned by virtue of the provisions of Sec. 164 of the U.P. Municipalities Act and the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. He had failed to do so and the assessment could not be questioned by virtue of the provisions of Sec. 164 of the U.P. Municipalities Act and the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The court below placed reliance on District Board of Farrukhabad v. Prag Dutt, AIR 1948 Allahabad 382 F.B. and Devi Prasad v. Municipal Board Kannauj, AIR 1949 Allahabad 741 and expressed the view that the assessment complained of was beyond the competence of the Board and was, therefore an illegal imposition and thus the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. In the aforesaid decision it was conceded that if the assessment was made within the frame work of the Act but the assessment was wrong, the remedy of the assessee was confined to an appeal under Sec. 160 of the U.P. Municipalities Act. Learned counsel for the applicant relied on the case of Radha Kishan v. Municipal Committee Ludhiana, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1547. It was observed:- "The only dispute was as regards the rate of tax payable in respect of the salt brought by the appellant into the limits of the Municipal Committee. The rate depended upon the character of the salt. The ascertainment of the said fact is necessary step for fixing the rate and it is not possible to say that in ascertaining the said fact the authorities concerned travelled outside the provisions of the Act. The learned counsel contends that if a Municipal Committee levies terminal tax on an article not liable to tax under the Act, a suit would lie and, therefore, the same legal position should apply even to a case where the Municipal Committee levies the tax in respect of an article under an entry not applicable to it. We do not see any analogy between these two illustrations, in the former, the Municipal Committee does not act under the Act but in the latter it only commits a mistake or an error in fixing the rate of tax payable in respect of a particular commodity; one is outside the Act and the other is under the Act; one raises the question of jurisdiction and the other raises an objection to a matter of detail. We, therefore, hold that in the present case the mistake, if any, committed in imposing the terminal tax can only be corrected in the manner prescribed by the Act. We, therefore, hold that in the present case the mistake, if any, committed in imposing the terminal tax can only be corrected in the manner prescribed by the Act. The appellants have misconceived their remedy in filing the suit in the civil court." 3. In the present case, the octroi duty of Rs. 169/1/6 was realised with respect to 200 bags of groundnuts. The plaintiff contended that the applicant was entitled to charge octroi duty at the rate of -/1/- anna per maund and it had acted illegally in assessing the duty at the rate of -/-/9 pies per rupee. The plaintiff relied on a Government Order dated 12-6-42 in which it was laid down that the maximum tax on ground nut shall not exceed -/1/- per maund. The applicant stated that subsequently an octroi schedule was framed by the Allahabad Municipal Board, which was approved by the Government by its notification dated 6-7-1944 in which the octroi duty payable on grounds nut was to be calculated at -/-/9 per rupee. It was contended by the plaintiff that nuts would not include groundnuts The court below also expressed the view that nuts would not include groundnuts. In support of its view it referred to the fact that coconut had been mentioned as a separate item in the list of the aforesaid schedule. Websters New International Dictionary defines "nut" as follows- "A hard-shelled dry fruit or seed having a more or less distinct separable ring or shell and interior Kernel or meat-used to include various forms (as peanuts and Brazil nuts) not botanically true nuts." 4. Groundnut could be said to fall within the category of a "hard shelled dry seed." I am of the view that the expression nut would include "groundnut" and the court below was in error in holding to the contrary. The question in dispute between the parties was the proper rate on the basis of which octroi duty could be levied on the aforesaid bag of groundnuts. It could not be said that it was beyond the power of the applicant to levy the octroi duty on groundnuts. The question in dispute was whether the assessment was correct or it proceeded on a wrong basis. It could not be said that it was beyond the power of the applicant to levy the octroi duty on groundnuts. The question in dispute was whether the assessment was correct or it proceeded on a wrong basis. Even if the contention of the applicant was right, all that would mean would be that the applicant had committed "a mistake or an error in fixing the rate of tax payable" in respect of the aforesaid bags of groundnuts. Thus the question was such which could have been the subject matter of appeal under Sec. 160 of the U.P. Municipalities Act. Learned counsel.for the plaintiff contended that this was not a fit case in which I should exercise my revisional jurisdiction. He relied on Ramzal Ali v. Satul Bibi, 1948 ALJ 43 and Pooran Singh v. Additional Commissioner Agra, 1957 ALJ 193. The circumstances in the aforesaid cases were different and have no application to the case before me. In the present case, the plaintiff was not at all justified in circumventing the provisions of the U.P. Municipalities Act and seeking relief in a civil court which had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. There is no escape from the conclusion that the suit was not cognizable by the civil court and it must be dismissed. I, therefore, set aside the decree of the lower appellate court and direct that the suit be dismissed. The application in revision is allowed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs throughout. Revision allowed.