ORDER S.S. Dhavan, J. - This is a tenant's second appeal from a decision of the Second, Addl. Civil Judge of Meerut reversing that of the City Munsif, Meerut ana decreeing the landlord's suit for his ejectment. D.D. Jain and six others are the trustees of the Harbans Charitable Trust which is the owner of the property in dispute. One of the matters in controversy is whether this property is a piece of land or an accommodation as defined in Section 2 (a) of the UP Control of Rent and Eviction Act. The Plaintiff Respondents described it in the plaint as a plot of land and alleged that it was let out to the Defendant Appellant Ram Dalarey by the late Harbans Lal on Rs 6/-/- per month, the tenancy being from month to month, that the trust needed the land for its own use and terminated the tenancy by a notice dated 31.7.1959; that the Defendant had not vacated the land; hence the suit for ejectment. The Plaintiffs contended that as the leased property was a vacant piece of land it was not subject to the provisions of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act. They asked for the ejectment of the Defendant and recovery of Rs. 84.60 of which Rs 27/ were claimed as rent and Rs. 57.00 rest as compensation for use and occupation. The Defendant-Appellant resisted the suit and denied that the property leased to him was a piece of land. He alleged that there was a hut on the disputed land from the very beginning and, therefore, the property was an accommodation as defined in the Control of Rent and Eviction Act. He pleaded that the suit was barred by S. 3 of the Act. On the day of the hearing the trial court examined the Defendant Under Order X, Rule 2 CPC and recorded his statement which in view of the arguments advanced before me in this appeal, must be quoted verbatim: "I took the land from Sri Harbans Lai 20 years ago and built the shops of pucca bricks. There was only a Jhopri on the land when I took the land from him and the rate of rent was Rs. 2/-/-per month. Now the rate of rent is Rs. There was only a Jhopri on the land when I took the land from him and the rate of rent was Rs. 2/-/-per month. Now the rate of rent is Rs. 6/- p m. I was asked by him to remove the Jhopri which was at that time in a falling down condition and to have my own constructions and then I built accordingly. Harbans Lal died about 6 or 7 years ago. After his death I paid the rent to his son and then to his Munshi Ishwar Sahai and now I pay the rent to Sri R.S. Jain Plaintiff No. 3. The constructions that I built on the land in suit were erected with the permission of Harbans Lal at my own expense." 2. Both sides gave evidence which was entirely oral. One of the trustees, Gopi Nath appeared as a witness and tried to corroborate the version in the plaint, but admitted in cross examination that he was not present when the agreement of tenancy was made between the late Harbans Lal and the Defendant and could not say whether the hut was there at that time. No other witness appeared for the plain tiffs. The Defendant Ram Dularey also appeared and stated that he was admitted to the tenancy by Harbans Lal on a rent of Rs. 2/ per month, and at that time the hut had four walls 7-8 feet high and a thatched roof. He further deposed that he rented the property for setting up a shop, and that alter 2-3 years. Harbans Lal replaced the thatched roof with a pucca one. He further stated that Harbans Lal paid the costs and increased the rent to Rs. 6/- per month. He also produced another witness Sant Prasad who supported the Defendant's allegation that there was a hut with a thatched roof standing on the land which was sub sequently converted into a pucca one. 3. The trial court believed the Defendant's version that the land contained a hut at the time of the creation of the tenancy and, 'herefore, it came within the definition of an accommodtion u/s 2 (a) of the Act. Accordingly it held that the suit was barred by S. 3(1) of the Act and dismissed it. 3. The trial court believed the Defendant's version that the land contained a hut at the time of the creation of the tenancy and, 'herefore, it came within the definition of an accommodtion u/s 2 (a) of the Act. Accordingly it held that the suit was barred by S. 3(1) of the Act and dismissed it. On appeal the learned Civil Judge disagreed with the trial court and held that the land was not an accommodation under the Act but a vacant piece of land. He observed that the trial court in believing the Defendant's testimony had ignored the effect of the Defendant's own admission in his statement Under Order X, Rule 2 Code of Civil Procedure. Holding that the suit was not barred u/s 3, he allowed the appeal and ordered the ejectment of the Defendant who has come to this Court in second appeal. 4. I have heard Mr. S.S. Tyagi for the Defendant Appellant and Mr. Radha Krishna for the Plaintiff Respondents at some length, and examined the pleadings of the parties, the statement of the Defendant Appellant recorded Under Order X Rule 2 Code of Civil Procedure, and the evidence of the witnesses. In my opinion, the decision of the lower appellate court must be reversed. 5. The learned Judge treated the statement of the appellar.t Under Order X, Rule 2 as an admission "that he had taken only land from Sri Harbans Lal some 20 years ago and that the Jhopri that existed in that land was in a falling condition and that Sri Harbans Lal had allowed him to fell that Jhopri and to make his own constructions." From this alleged admission the Judge con eluded, " It does not mean that Sri Harbans Lal had let out land along with the Jhopri to the Defendant. It clearly meant that the Defendant had taken land on rent of Rs. 2/- p.m. from Sri Harbans Lal." This finding is vitiated on two grounds. First, the learned Judge made an improper use of the Appellant's statement Under Order X, Rule 2 Code of Civil Procedure. The object of examination under this rule is not to take evidence or ascertain what is to be evidenced in the case but to determine the matters in dispuie between the parties. Gunga v. Tiluck R.am (1) [ILR (1888) Gal 533 PC] Malla's CPC vol. 1, p. 661. The object of examination under this rule is not to take evidence or ascertain what is to be evidenced in the case but to determine the matters in dispuie between the parties. Gunga v. Tiluck R.am (1) [ILR (1888) Gal 533 PC] Malla's CPC vol. 1, p. 661. But the learned Judge used this statement as an admission-that is, evidence which in his opinion contradicted the Defendant's testimony in the witness box. He could have relied upon the statement for the purpose of clarifying any ambiguity in the written statement or any other legitimate purpose, but not to use it as evidence. Secondly, the learned Judge wrongly thought that the statement amounted to an admission. This erroneous impression was due to the fact that he picked three sentences from a long statement and ignored the rest. But a statement Under Order X, Rule 2, after being recorded, has to be interpreted as a whole to ascertain the intention of the party which made it. I have read this statement and am of the opinion that it contains no such admission as interpreted by the learned Judge. The Appellant stated clearly in his statement that at the time when he took the property on lease a hut was. standing on it and his purpose for leasing it was to use it for a shop. Obviously, he meant that he intended to use the hut as a shop. 6. As the finding of the learned Judge is based almost entirely on the Statement of the Appellant Under Order X, Rule 2 and the Judge made an improper use of this statement, this finding cannot stand. I think the view of the trial court that the Defendant's story is worthy of belief is correct. He had stated in the witness box that the initial rent was Rs. 2/ per month but after the construction of the pucca hut it was increased to Rs. 6/ per month. It is common ground that the present rent is Rs. 6/ and has been so, tor a long time. No attempt was made to challenge the Defendant's statement that the rent was increased from Rs. 2/-to Rs. 6/-. The Plaintiff Gopi Nath gave a vague reply in cross-examination that he did not know what the initial rent was. He was careful not to say that the Defendant's statement that the initial rent was Rs. 2/- was incorrect. No attempt was made to challenge the Defendant's statement that the rent was increased from Rs. 2/-to Rs. 6/-. The Plaintiff Gopi Nath gave a vague reply in cross-examination that he did not know what the initial rent was. He was careful not to say that the Defendant's statement that the initial rent was Rs. 2/- was incorrect. I think the Defendant was telling the truth. Now if the rent was increased from Rs. 2/- to Rs. 6/, there must have been a good reason for it. Usually a landlord increase the rent if he makes an improvement in the accommodation fit his own expense. It is likelymat this must have happened. I, therefore, hold, agreeing with the trial court, that the Defendant Appellant rented a hut with a thatched roof on Rs. 2/- per month and that this hut was subsequently made a pucca one by the landlord, who increased the rent to Rs. 6/ per month. Finally Mr. Radha Krishna argued that even assuming that the land with the hut was let out to the Appellant, this would not bring it within the definition of accommodation u/s 2 (a) of the Act. I cannot agree. That section defines "accommodation" as "residential and non-residential accommodation in any building or part of a building and includes gardens, grounds and out-houses, if any, appurtenant to such building or /part of a building "This definition does not carry us very far as neither of the two vital words "accommodation" and "building" has been defined. The question what is an accommodation u/s 2 (a) was considered by me in two cases Abdul Sami v. Mohd NOOR (2) (S A. No. 3742 of 1962) and Mawasi Rata v. Sheikh Kannoo(3) ( 1965 AWR 78 ). It. Abdul Sami's case (2) it was observed that it was neither possible nor desirable to give the word 'building' a rigid meaning which will cover every conceivable case, and that the question whether a particular structure amounts to a building, and therefore accommodation within the meaning of Section 2 (a) depends upon the circumstances of each case. The word "accommodation" is derived from the verb 'accommodate' which means to provide shelter. Therefore any buliding which provides shelter for those who live in it or carry on business in it or work in it or provides shelter for goods and articles is an accommodation. The word "accommodation" is derived from the verb 'accommodate' which means to provide shelter. Therefore any buliding which provides shelter for those who live in it or carry on business in it or work in it or provides shelter for goods and articles is an accommodation. A house, a shop, a garage, or a god own would be an accommodation for the purpose of Section 2 (a if it provides shelter lor those who live or carry on business or work in it or if it is used for storing goods". Applying this general principle to the present case, the hut staining on the land provided shelter for the Appellant who wanted to use it as a shop. Mr. Radha Krishna contended that the definition of 'accommodation' was not intended to apply to such flimsy structures like a Jhopari with a thatched roof. I must disagree. If accepted, this argument will deprive lakhs of tenants in the State, who are living in hovels, slums, and flimsy structures but paying rent, of the protection of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act. This Act was intended to protect all tenants within certain areas and not merely those who are living or carrying on business in pucca houses and comfortable buildings. The Act has not given a restricted meaning to the word "accommodation" which is defined as "residential and nonresidential accommodation in any building......". The words "any building" indicate that the definition of the accommodation was advisably made wide, because the policy underlying the Act was to protect every tenant, rich or poor, who is living in a rented building giving him shelter. A poor tenant can not be deprived of this protection merely because he can only afford a flimsy structure for shelter. I am therefore of the opinion that the hut rented by the Appellant was an accommodation u/s 2 (a) of the Act. 8. In any case, if the Defendant's story is true-and I think it is-the hut was subsequently converted into a pucca shop by the landlord who increased the rent. Therefore, the pucca shop breams an accommodation u/s 2 (a). It is common ground that the suit was filed without the permission of the D.M. and, therefore, barred u/s 3 of the Act. 9. I allow this appeal with costs, reverse the decree of the lower appellate court, and restore that of the trial court. Therefore, the pucca shop breams an accommodation u/s 2 (a). It is common ground that the suit was filed without the permission of the D.M. and, therefore, barred u/s 3 of the Act. 9. I allow this appeal with costs, reverse the decree of the lower appellate court, and restore that of the trial court. The Plaintiff Respondents suit for the ejectment of the Appellant stands dismissed with costs throughout.