JUDGMENT D.S. Mathur, J. - This is a revision under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code by the Life Insurance Corporation of India plaintiff, against the order dated 6-1-1964 of the Additional Civil Judge of Agra, dismissing its application under Or. XXXIII, Rule 9, Civil Procedure Code for dispaupering the defendant, Gunwant Singh Nahar, who had been permitted to prosecute the counter claim as a pauper. 2. The trial court (Civil Judge) had directed the defendant to pay court fee on the counter claim put forward in the written statement. The defendant went up in appeal against that order, but after the stay order was vacated, the defendant made an application before the trial Court for permission to prosecute the counter claim as a pauper. When the Collector and also the plaintiff raised no objection, the permission was granted and it was at a subsequent stage that the plaintiff moved the present application for dispaupering the defendant on the ground that he had the means to pay the court-fee, and consequently did not deserve to continue to prosecute the counter claim as a pauper. The application was worded as if it was under Clause (a), but it shall fall under Clause (b) of Or. XXXIII, Rule 9, Civil Procedure Code also. 3. The learned Civil Judge relying upon the decision of the Orissa High Court in Ananga Dhusan v. Ghanshyam Patro, A.I.R. 1951 Orissa 349 held that the means contemplated by Cl. (b) of Order XXXIII, Rule 9, Civil Procedure Code had reference to the properties acquired subsequent to the grant of permission to sue or to prosecute the counter claim as a pauper, and consequently, while dispaupering a party under Cl. (b) the Court shall not take into consideration his means prior to his being declared a pauper. The learned Civil Judge also held that the share of the defendant in house No. 340 was ?th and the market value of his share in the house did not exceed Rs. 1,600/-. Keeping in mind that the house belonged jointly to the defendant and his father and also to other persons, it was further held that the defendant's share in the house could not be sold for even Rs. 1,000/and the assets were in sufficient for payment of the court fee on the counter claim. 1,600/-. Keeping in mind that the house belonged jointly to the defendant and his father and also to other persons, it was further held that the defendant's share in the house could not be sold for even Rs. 1,000/and the assets were in sufficient for payment of the court fee on the counter claim. It was thus held that the defendant could not be held guilty of intentional concealment of assets, nor was he guilty of vexatious or improper conduct in the course of the suit. Naturally, the finding also was that the defendant did not have the mean to pay the court-fee and hence he could continue to prosecute his counter claim as a. pauper. 4. Had the learned Civil Judge perused the whole of the partition deed on the record, he would have known that the whole of house No. 340 had been given to the defendant and his father, and also to Ajodhya Singh and his one son, who had all decided to live jointly and to have their properties in one lot. The other four smaller houses Nos. 340/1, 340/2, 340/3 and 273 were given in the lot of Durga Prasad and Madan Singh, another son of Ajodhya Singh, who was looking after Durga Prasad and wanted to live jointly with him. The share of all the co-sharers of the first lot, that is, of Kasturi Chand and others in all the joint properties, was 5/9, while the share of the remaining co-sharers of the other lot was 4/9. Consequently, when house No. 340 was given in the lot of Kasturi Chand and others, a reference was made to their share they had in all the properties taken together, and not the share which they would have in house No. 340 alone after partition. Thus, the share of the defendant and of his father in house No. 340 was one-third of 5/9, that is, 3/5. 5. When the order of the subordinate court is based upon wrong facts, the High Court can, in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction, quash that order and either pass a suitable order or remand the case for a fresh hearing. Two points shall deserve consideration: whether Kasturi Chand and his son, namely, the defendant, acquired an interest in the property allotted to them as members of a joint Hindu family or as individuals in which they had personal interest. Two points shall deserve consideration: whether Kasturi Chand and his son, namely, the defendant, acquired an interest in the property allotted to them as members of a joint Hindu family or as individuals in which they had personal interest. Kasturi Chand is said to be dead and his properties would, depending upon the circumstances of the case, be inherited by the defendant alone or by the defendant and his sons together. When these two points are material in determining the interest of the defendant in house No. 340, it shall be desirable to remand the matter for a fresh hearing so that justice may be done and a person may not be unnecessarily dispaupered. 6. It is, however, necessary to express an opinion on the scope of Cl.(b) of Order XXXIII, Rule 9, Civil Procedure Code so that the litigation may come to an end quickly. Cl. (b) of Order XXXIII, Rule 9, Civil Procedure Code provides that "The Court may, on the application of the defendant, or of the Government pleader, of which seven days' clear notice in writing has been given to the plaintiff, order the plaintiff to be dispaupered. (b) if it appears that his means are such that he ought not to continue to sue as a pauper." 7. It shall be found that this clause has been worded generally without restricting the meaning of the word "means." What the Courts of la-,k have to consider is whether the party ought or ought not to continue to sue as a pauper, and for determination of this point the means of that party have to be looked into. The means must, therefore, be as the) are on the date the application for dispaupering the party is made, and not merely the assets or properties he had acquired subsequent to the grant of permission to sue as a pauper. 8. The principle of res judicata is applicable to miscellaneous proceeding, and on the basis of this principle it was urged that it was not open to the plaintiff to challenge, directly or by implication at a later stage an order by which the defendant was permitted to prosecute the counter claim as a pauper. It cannot, however, be lost sight of that in pauper matters a party can ask for review. It cannot, however, be lost sight of that in pauper matters a party can ask for review. Where the litigation is between relations or friends, the plaintiff shall know the financial condition of the defendant and vice versa. But where the litigation is between strangers, the plaintiff shall not know which properties the defendant possesses, nor shall the defendant know the assets and liabilities of the plaintiff . In spite of due diligence the party may not be able to gather information as to the assets of the other. Where fresh facts come to the notice of the party, he can move an application for review. In other words, the order granting permission to sue as a pauper is not final in the sense that it cannot ordinarily be challenged at a later stage. Such an order can, without any difficulty, be challenged by way of review. 9. When, in the instant case, the plaintiff could, by moving a review application, challenge the order declaring the defendant a pauper. he can also challenge the order by other means, if permissible under the law. The taking of a broader view of Order XXXIII, Rule 9, C. P. C will thus not multiply the litigation. In fact, there shall be only one litigation irrespective of whether a review application is made or an application for dispaupering the party. 10. I am thus of opinion that while interpreting Order XXXIII, Rule 9, Civil Procedure Code we should merely consider the wording of the rule and not import other factors. As already mentioned above, Order XXXIII, Rule 9, Civil Procedure Code has been worded generally and there is no reason why the Courts of law should restrict the scope of the words when the legislature intentionally used general words. 11. To sum up, the means of the party, sought to be dispaupered, at the time of the making of the application have to be looked into, that is, whether he is or is not possessed of sufficient means to enable him to pay the court-fee prescribed by law. If it be found that he has the means to pay the court-fee, it would be a case where he can be dispaupered, that is, he ought not to continue to sue as a pauper. However, to avoid unnecessary applications under Or. If it be found that he has the means to pay the court-fee, it would be a case where he can be dispaupered, that is, he ought not to continue to sue as a pauper. However, to avoid unnecessary applications under Or. XXXIII, Rule 9, Civil Procedure Code the Courts would look into the past financial condition of the pauper in clear and exceptional cases only, that is, where some clear documentary evidence is available as to the properties owned and possessed by the pauper. 12. The revision is hereby allowed in the sense that the order under revision is set aside and the application under Order XXXIII, Rule 9, Civil Procedure Code is remanded for a fresh hearing after. recording additional evidence of the parties. Costs of this Court shall abide the result of the dispaupering application.