Aribam Tuleshwar Sarma v. Irengbam Yaima Singh — 1965 DIGILAW 29 (GAU)

ORDER : This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the issue of a writ of mandamus or any other writ of appropriate nature commanding the respondent No. 5 to cancel the impugned order dated 11-8-1961 and 30-9-1961 and the respondents Nos. 6 to 10 to discharge their statutory duty of evicting the respondents 1 to 4 according to law. 2. The facts which give rise to this writ petition are briefly as follows : The petitioner is the owner and possessor of the northern portion of the homestead land covered by patta No. 87/27/4 I. W. T. as one of the co-pattadar abutting on the Kangchup Road which runs East to West. The said homestead land is situated a few yards beyond one mile stone of the said road, and the metalled portion of it near one mile is about 15 ft. broad. On both sides of the said road there are unmetalled road side lands which are reserved as forming part of the said road. The Government of Manipur by the Notification No. PW/CMN/4/53 dated 26th May, 1954 which was published in Manipur Gazette June 18, 1954, declared the said Kangchup Road as a District Road and maintained the width of the said road over all within actual limits at 40 ft. and at 60 ft. on its approach to Urban and Industrial area. By the said notification; it was further declared that the building, and control line in respect of class of district roads as measured from the central line the road would be maintained henceforth at 50 ft. and 80 ft. respectively. The area upto 80 ft. from the central line on both sides is as such reserved for the said road. 3. The said homestead land which is within Municipal area, lies within the Urban and Industrial area of Manipur. According to the said Notification the width of the said road over all has been maintained at 60 ft. being 30 ft. on both sides from the central line of road. 4. The said Imphal-Kangchup road is a public road maintained by the Government and is a part of State High way known as Imphal Kangchap-Tarnenglong Road as declared by the State Government and published in Manipur Gazette Extraordinary No. 71-E-53 dated 4-4-1962. 5. being 30 ft. on both sides from the central line of road. 4. The said Imphal-Kangchup road is a public road maintained by the Government and is a part of State High way known as Imphal Kangchap-Tarnenglong Road as declared by the State Government and published in Manipur Gazette Extraordinary No. 71-E-53 dated 4-4-1962. 5. That sometime in October, 1960 the petitioner constructed a building by north west boundary within his said homestead land intending it to be used as a shop. When the construction was in progress the respondents 1, 2, 3 and 4 made encroachment on the said reserved road side land of the public road by constructing shops. The encroached areas of respondents 1 to 4 are 32-4"X23-6,"19X7, 12-2"X19 and 8X17 respectively. 6. By these unauthorised constructions the petitioners right to tree access from the said public road to his homestead land and the newly constructed shop at all points along the whole length of his land which abuts the public road was seriously infringed, therefore, he presented an application to the Settlement Officer, Manipur to take action against them. The application was registered as R. 127 dated 21-10-1960. But the authority concerned did not take any action to evict them, therefore, the petitioner on 13-2-1961 sent a reminder to the Settlement Officer to take action against the encroachers according to law. 7. Thereupon the area within which the said public road, the encroached lands marked as 1, 2, 3 and 4, and the said homestead land are situated was surveyed in 1960-61. 8. Thereafter in the course of survey, cases of encroachment on the public road side land which caused obstruction to the public in their free enjoyment of the same were taken up. The, Settlement Officer by way of giving effect to. the general policy of evicting the encroaches on the public road side lands passed an order on 5-1-1961 to evict the encroachers, (the Respondents 1 to 4). In pursuance of the said order, notices were served under the Rule 18(11) of the Rules framed by the Chief Commissioner, under Assam Land and Revenue Regulation to respondents 1 to 4 directing them to vacate the encroached area forthwith. In pursuance of the said order, notices were served under the Rule 18(11) of the Rules framed by the Chief Commissioner, under Assam Land and Revenue Regulation to respondents 1 to 4 directing them to vacate the encroached area forthwith. The encroachers in spite of the notices neglected to remove the buildings from the said road side land, therefore Shri Roshan Ali, Assistant Settlement Officer(E) Settlement Office, Manipur on 24-4-1961 started eviction of the encroachers, the Respondents 1 to 4. He partly got demolished the walls on, the shops of Respondents 2,3, 4, and when the; wall of the shop of Gulamjat Singh was about to be demolished he came forward claiming himself to be the person who constructed the building and presented an application to the, Settlement Officer praying for one months time to enable him to remove the building himself. The Settlement Officer granted him 7 days time, as prayed for. 9. The respondents 1 to 4 thereafter preferred appeals to the Chief Commissioner against the order of eviction. The Appeals of the respondents 1 to 4 were registered as C.C. Rev. Appeals Nos. 28, 30, 31 and 32 of 1961 respectively. The petitioner was also made a party to oppose the appeals of Respondents 1, 2, 3 and 4 as his right was affected. On 1-8-1961 the Chief Commissioner heard the appeal of respondent No. 4 and dismissed it due to non-appearance. On 4-8-1961 the Chief Commissioner heard the appeals of the ether 3 respondents and ordered for settlement of the lands as shop sites after measurement of lands under the respective occupation of the respondents 1, 2, 3. The respondent No. 4 also prayed for rehearing of his appeal which was dismissed in, default and the Chief Commissioner after hearing it ordered for settlement of the land under the occupation of the respondent No. 4 as a shop site. 10. The lands encroached upon by the respondents 1 to 4 are situated in a line 25 ft. away from the centre of said load and as such, within the area of the road and road side land reserved for it. The encroached portion is also within 35 ft. from foot of the said public road, and even when measured from the edge of metalled portion of the said public road; therefore the orders of the Chief Commissioner dated 11-8-1961 and 30-9-1961 passed in C.C. Rev. The encroached portion is also within 35 ft. from foot of the said public road, and even when measured from the edge of metalled portion of the said public road; therefore the orders of the Chief Commissioner dated 11-8-1961 and 30-9-1961 passed in C.C. Rev. Appeals Nos. 28, 30 and 32 of 1961 and C.C. Rev. Case No. 31 of 1961 are void and illegal and hence they should be quashed and the respondents 1 to 4 be evicted. 11. The respondents in their reply traversed the allegations of the petitioner, and, inter alia pleaded that the petitioner has got no right over the area encroached upon by the respondents 1 to 4 as the road side lands are the properties of the Government and the C.C. was competent to allow it to them. In case the petitioner feels aggrieved he has got another remedy and he should seek it by approaching the Court of law. 12. The learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 4 raised certain preliminary objections, therefore, I shall first of all deal with them. 13. The first contention of the learned lawyer for the respondents was that the petitioner filed the writ petition on 14-9-1966 challenging the orders dated 11-8-1961 and 30-9-1961. He has filed this writ petition after a lapse of one year without assigning any reason for the condemnation of delay. The writ petition should, therefore, be rejected on the ground of unusual delay. 14. Although there is no period of limitation for an application under Article 226, an application under the Article may, in the discretion of the High Court, be rejected on the ground of inordinate delay and laches on the part of the applicant. But in the exercise of this discretion, the conduct of the applicant is one of the factors to be taken into consideration. 15. In this case from the facts it appears that in the year 1961 the petitioner filed a writ petition and it was withdrawn to file another writ petition. Thereafter the petitioner filed this writ petition. In view of these facts it cannot be said that there was inordinate delay in filing the Writ petition. 16. The second argument of the respondents was that the petitioner has not stated as under what law he claims the right of way. Thereafter the petitioner filed this writ petition. In view of these facts it cannot be said that there was inordinate delay in filing the Writ petition. 16. The second argument of the respondents was that the petitioner has not stated as under what law he claims the right of way. If the petitioner had any right as alleged it was barred by limitation under section 26 of the Indian Limitation Act, therefore, the Writ Petition must be dismissed. 17. There is no substance in this contention. From the facts of the case it is clear that the case of the petitioner is not about the right of easement, but it is about the public right over a public way, therefore, Section 26 of the Limitation Act is not applicable in this. case. 18. The 3rd contention of the respondents was that 4 persons are the owners of the land and out of them the petitioner alone has filed this writ petition due to jealousy and to harass the respondents as he was not granted settlement of this land. The intention of the petitioner is mala fide, therefore, the writ petition should be rejected on this score. 19. This argument is without any force. There is nothing on the record to show that the petitioner applied for the settlement of this land and his application was rejected. This is an admitted fact that the petitioner is a co-pattadar and he alleged that his right of public way was infringed, therefore he filed this writ petition. In view of these facts it cannot be said that the petitioner has filed this writ petition with a mala fide intention. 20. The fourth argument of the respondents was that the respondents have denied the distances given by the petitioner about the breadth of the road and the encroached area by the respondents. The area over which the respondents have constructed shops is beyond the road side area. These are the facts to be ascertained by a Civil Court. In view of these! disputed facts no writ lies. 21. The learned counsel for the petitioner in order to meet this argument urged that the said homestead land which is within Municipal area lies within the urban and industrial area of Manipur. According to the notifications issued from time to time the width of the said road over all has been maintained at 60 ft. 21. The learned counsel for the petitioner in order to meet this argument urged that the said homestead land which is within Municipal area lies within the urban and industrial area of Manipur. According to the notifications issued from time to time the width of the said road over all has been maintained at 60 ft. being 30 ft. on both sides from the control line of road. But the respondents 1 to 4 constructed shops within the reserved road-side land, i.e. within 25 ft. from the centre of the road side as is evident by the survey map prepared at the time of survey in the year 1960-61. As the encroached lands were within 35 ft. from the foot of the said road and even from the edge of the metalled portion of the road, so the Assistant Settlement Officer vide his order dated 24-4-1961 started eviction of these respondents. Moreover the respondents 5 to 10 have admitted this distance as correct, and the respondents 1 to 4 have not specifically denied this fact. Besides, they have also not mentioned the distance at which these shops are situated. The distance therefore, given by the petitioner be treated as correct. 22. After having given this matter my most earnest and careful consideration I find that the argument of the petitioner carries weight. 23. As regards the disputed question of facts it is a matter of discretion with the High Court to consider or not. It is a matter of convenience and not of jurisdiction. Moreover, it is obvious from the following facts that this laud is within the reserved road-side land. In the survey maps these shops have been shown, within road-side Shri Roshan Ali, Assistant Settlement Officer vide his order dated 24-4-1961 started eviction proceeding against these respondents as the encroachment was on the road-side land. In compliance with his order notices were served U/R 18(ii) on respondents 1 to 4 to evict the lands. The respondents 1 to 4 also failed to show that the encroached land was not within the public road-side land. The respondents 5 to 9 in reply have admitted that the encroached land is within the road-side land. I, therefore, find that the measurements given by the petitioner are correct and the encroached land is within road-side land. 24. The respondents 1 to 4 also failed to show that the encroached land was not within the public road-side land. The respondents 5 to 9 in reply have admitted that the encroached land is within the road-side land. I, therefore, find that the measurements given by the petitioner are correct and the encroached land is within road-side land. 24. The 5th contention of the respondents was that in this case the petitioner has suppressed the facts. According to the Government the encroachment by the respondents 1 to 4 started in the year, 1959, while the petitioner has stated that it started in the year 1961 in order to avoid the question of delay. The Writ petition, should, therefore, be rejected on this ground. 25. There does not appear any merit in it. From the facts it is clear that the settlement started in the year 1958 but the settlement off this area started in the year 1961, therefore, there does not arise any question regarding the Suppression of facts by the petitioner. 26. The sixth contention of the respondents was that the petitioner claims a private right of way, therefore he should go to the Civil Court for getting his right of way established. 27. This contention is not at all tenable. From the facts of the case it is obvious that the petitioner alleges that his right to enjoy the public road has been infringed, therefore he has rightly filed this petition. Moreover the existence of an alternative remedy is not per se a bar to the issue of a writ by the High Court which is a matter depending on its discretion to be judicially exercised on the facts and circumstances of each case. On this point I may refer to Collector of Monghyr v. Keshav Prasad Goenka, AIR 1962 SC 1694 wherein it has been observed by Ayyanger, J. that High Court has a discretion to grant relief under Article 226 even is there are other alternative statutory remedies. 28. The 7th contention of the learned counsel for the respondents was that the petitioner has no locus standi to bring the present writ petition as his fundamental right has not been infringed. The petitioner has a way to go from his land to the road, and it has not been obstructed, therefore he cannot file the writ. 29. 28. The 7th contention of the learned counsel for the respondents was that the petitioner has no locus standi to bring the present writ petition as his fundamental right has not been infringed. The petitioner has a way to go from his land to the road, and it has not been obstructed, therefore he cannot file the writ. 29. On the perusal of the facts of the case, I feel that this contention has no string in it. The powers of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and of the High Courts under Article 226 can normally be invoked only by one whose personal rights and interests are adversely affected by the impugned law or order. In the instant case the plea of absence of locus standi of the petitioner to approach this Court, it is sufficient to point out that if on the merits lies can establish that the impugned construction of shops is violative of the statutory provisions in that case he can have a cause of action and locus standi to invoke the Courts Writ jurisdiction. In the present case the petitioner alleges that his free access from the public road to his. homestead land has been, infringed by the unauthorised construction of shops by the respondents 1 to 4, therefore he has a right to file the writ petition. 30. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the land encroached by the respondents 1 to 4 lies within 35 ft. from the slope of the public road maintained by the Government, therefore, according to Rule 20 framed under Section 157 of the Land and Revenue Regulation no lease could be granted to any person. The grant of settlement of these lands to the respondents 1 to 4 by the Chief Commissioner was against this rule, therefore, the orders of Chief Commissioner dated 11-8-1961 and 30-9-1961 being ultra vires should be quashed. 31. The learned Government Advocate representing the respondents 5 to 10 contended that the orders dated 11-8-1961 and 30-9-1961 passed by Chief Commissioner are according to Law, therefore the petitioner has no right to challenge them. 32. The learned lawyer for the respondents 1 to 4 also urged that this is a road side land, therefore, it is a Government land and under Section 14(2a) the Administrator has power to allot such land. The petitioner has no right to question it. 33. 32. The learned lawyer for the respondents 1 to 4 also urged that this is a road side land, therefore, it is a Government land and under Section 14(2a) the Administrator has power to allot such land. The petitioner has no right to question it. 33. It was next urged that according to old Rule 20, settlement cannot be granted within 35 ft. of the road. But at the time of grant of settlement this rule was not in existence, therefore, the petitioner cannot take its shelter. His alternative argument was that at the time of encroachment, and the service of notice of eviction, the old rules were in force but at the time of settlement they were repealed and the new rules came into force, therefore, new rules shall apply to this case, and hence the question of violation of Rule 20 could not arise. 34. In this case the first point for consideration is whether the old Rule 20 applies to this case or not. 35. In this case the land fell within 35 ft. of the road, therefore, the Assistant Settlement Officer started eviction proceedings on 5-1-1961 under Rule 18(ii) of the Rules framed by the Chief Commissioner under Assam Land and Revenue Regulation. The new Act and Rules came into force on 1st June, 1961. By this it is clear that the proceeding started before the new Act came into force. The Chief Commissioner passed the order on 11-8-1961 when the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act and Rules were in force. But that does not make any difference in view of Section 170(2d) of the new Act. In view of this saving clause, it will be taken that the Chief Commissioner, passed the order according to the old Rules. On this point I may refer to a case reported in K.S. Shafeeq v. Mohammadi Begum, AIR 1961 Andh. Pra 398. In this case Ekbote, J. observed that although the 1954 Act has been, repealed and the 1960 Act came into force from, a reading of section 33 it is obvious that such a repeal does not affect the previous operation of the repealed enactment and anything duly done or suffered under it, and any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced in respect of rights, liabilities, penalties under the repealed Act, as if the repealing Act had not been passed. Another principle which must be borne in mind is that the appellate Court has to give effect to the same law as though it was in force on the date of the institution of the proceedings and in this case it is the 1954 Act which will have to be given effect to. In general, when the law is altered during the pendency of an action, the rights of the parties are decided according to law as it existed when the action was begun unless the new statute shows a clear intention to vary, such rights. Now it is a fundamental rule of an interpretation of statutes that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act or arises by necessary and distinct implication and no rule of construction is more firmly established than this that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair the existing right or obligation otherwise than as regards matter of procedure unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. If the enactment is express in language no question of any retrospective effect arises. But if it is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only and particularly when the enactment prejudicially affects vested rights, or the legality of the past transaction, or impair contracts, the question of retrospective effect will have to be looked into carefully. Every statute, it has been said, which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under the existing laws, or creates a new obligation or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions or considerations already past must be presumed out of respect to the Legislature, to be intended not to have a retrospective operation. 36. The instant case in view of the saving clause is therefore, governed by the old rules. The old Rule 20 runs as follows : "Nothing in these rules shall entitle any person to obtain a, lease in respect of land within 35 from the foot of the slope of a public road. 36. The instant case in view of the saving clause is therefore, governed by the old rules. The old Rule 20 runs as follows : "Nothing in these rules shall entitle any person to obtain a, lease in respect of land within 35 from the foot of the slope of a public road. Any person occupying or encroaching on such land shall be liable to ejectment under Rule 18 of these rules." By virtue of this rule the Government is prohibited from granting settlement of such road-side land. Therefore, in the presence of this rule, the Chief Commissioner had no power to grant settlement of such road-side land to any one. In this case the grant of settlement by Chief Commissioner to the respondents 1 to 4 being ultra vires has to be quashed. 37. The learned counsel for the petitioner urged that if for the sake of arguments if be taken that the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960 is applicable in this case even then under Section 14(1) of the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960, the Deputy Commissioner could allot land belonging to Government only for agricultural purposes or for construction of dwelling houses while the Administrator has only authority to allot land for purposes described in clause (1)(b) of Sub-Section 2 of Section 14 of the said Act. The Chief Commissioner or the Deputy. Commissioner under the said Act had no jurisdiction to allot Government Land as shop-sites for business purposes. The orders of Chief Commissioner dated 11-8-1961 and 30-9-1961 are, therefore illegal, void and without jurisdiction. 38. The learned counsel for the respondents urged that on proper construction of the expression "for the purpose of Industry" appearing in Sec. 14(2) of the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act 1950, allotment of Government land as shop-site for business purposes is also covered. Even if it was not covered u/S. 14(2) of the said Act, it does not affect the jurisdiction of the authority to allot Government land for such purposes. The road-side lands are the properties of the Government. It was within the competence of the C.C. to allot the area in question with the respondents Nos. 1 to 4. 39. In view of the arguments advanced on both sides it has to be seen whether C.C. can allot Government land for shop-site for business, purposes. The road-side lands are the properties of the Government. It was within the competence of the C.C. to allot the area in question with the respondents Nos. 1 to 4. 39. In view of the arguments advanced on both sides it has to be seen whether C.C. can allot Government land for shop-site for business, purposes. Under Section 14(2) of the new Act the C.C. can settle land only for the purpose of Industry. The word Industry or public utility has not been defined in the new Act. The word "Industry" has been defined in "Industrial! Disputes Act, and other Acts." According to the dictionary meaning the word Industry means business. Therefore, the C.C. had power to settle the land for shop-site. But this section does not give unfettered rights to the administrator to settle the land where it infringes the right of others. The administrator can grant settlement according to the rules framed by the Government. In this case by virtue of Rule 20 the Government is prohibited from granting settlement within 35 of the road, therefore, that settlement of the road-side land by C.C. was illegal. 40. The learned counsel for the petitioner next urged that the impugned order of the Chief Commissioner violated Rule 5 of the Settlement rules as he granted settlement in an appeal from order of eviction without there being an application seeking settlement in accordance with Rule 5 of the Settlement Rules. The impugned order, therefore, being illegal and void should be quashed. 41. The Government Advocate conceded that in view of Rule 5 there must be written or verbal application for the settlement of the land, but in this case there was no such application, therefore, Chief Commissioner was not justified to grant settlement of his own accord. 42. The learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 4 contended that oral application was made to the Chief Commissioner, therefore, he granted the settlement. 43. There is merit in the. contention of petitioner. In view of Rule 5 it was necessary for the respondents 1 to 4 to make verbal or written application, but there is nothing on the record to infer that an oral request was made to Chief Commissioner to grant the settlement of the land. I, therefore, find that the Chief Commissioner was not justified in granting the settlement without an application on behalf of the respondents 1 to 4. I, therefore, find that the Chief Commissioner was not justified in granting the settlement without an application on behalf of the respondents 1 to 4. 44. The learned lawyer for respondents contended that the petitioner has alleged that his land abuts on the road but the annexure-5 shows that it does not abut on the road, but there is a nala in between his land and the shops of the respondents, therefore the petitioners contention that he has right to go by that side to the road is against the facts. 45. This argument is without any force. From the facts it is clear that this nala is nothing but a drain and therefore, it is not separable. from the land of the petitioner. 46. The learned counsel for the petitioner further urged that there is no statutory provision in the Assam Land Revenue Regulation and in Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960 for restoration of an appeal dismissed in default. The C.C., therefore, by restoring the appeal dismissed in default vide his order dated 30-9-1961 assumed the jurisdiction of a Civil Court. The order of the C.C., therefore, being illegal should be set aside. 47. The Government Advocate in order to meet this argument contended that C.C. had restored the appeal under the inherent power, therefore, the order dated 30-9-1961 is not illegal. 48. The order of C.C. dated 30-9-1961 does not appear erroneous. In exercise of the inherent power he could restore the appeal dismissed in default. Besides that he was clothed with the jurisdiction to review his order u/S. 96 of the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960. 49. The last contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, was that the Government declared this road as a Highway and the land settled with the respondents Nos. 1 to 4 lies within the area of road-side land i.e. within 35 from the foot of the public road, therefore, according to Rule 20 of the old rules the settlement of this land by the C.C. is illegal, and, hence his orders dated 11-8-1961 and 30-9-1961 which infringe the right of the petitioner should be quashed. 1 to 4 lies within the area of road-side land i.e. within 35 from the foot of the public road, therefore, according to Rule 20 of the old rules the settlement of this land by the C.C. is illegal, and, hence his orders dated 11-8-1961 and 30-9-1961 which infringe the right of the petitioner should be quashed. It was further averred that by this settlement of the land the petitioners right of free access from the public road to his homestead land at all points has been seriously infringed, therefore, to protect his fundamental rights the writ of mandamus should be issued. He also pointed out that in such a case the issue of writ should be a rule and the refusal an exception. In support of his contention he referred to Dwarka Prasad Sinha v. Patna City Municipality, AIR 1938 Pat 423. In this case Dhavle, J. observed that - "Road-side land vests in and belongs to the Municipality in the same manner as the road itself, and the Municipality can exercise no rights over it except such as are authorised by law and must otherwise leave it as it is. It is not competent to the Municipality to make an income by putting up substantial buildings on road-side lands through lessees while largely destroying the value of the abutting properties to private owners". He also cited the case Talakchand Dhanji v. Dhoraji Municipality, AIR 1955 Sau. 63. In this case Shah C.J. held as follows : "The owner of an adjoining property has a right of access to the highway on all points on his boundary and the access is not to be restricted to any particular point. Therefore, if there is an obstruction to the access at any point he has a right to have the obstruction removed irrespective of the fact that he has an ingress and egress on the road from other places in his property. The fact that the owner has not yet constructed a building does not affect his rights and even, as an owner of a plot he can claim the same right of access to the public roads. The Municipality is not entitled to put up a pucca structure on a foot-path merely on the strength of the fact that the street vests in and belongs to the Municipality. The Municipality is not entitled to put up a pucca structure on a foot-path merely on the strength of the fact that the street vests in and belongs to the Municipality. The Municipality in Saurashtra is to exercise the rights over the street in the manner and to the extent authorised by the Bombay District Municipal Act 1901, (as adapted and applied to the State of Saurashtra) and in the absence of anything in the Act to empower the Municipality to cover up a portion of the street by putting up a permanent structure thereon, may be for carrying out a duty permitted by the Act, viz. the collection of octroi duty, the action of the Municipality cannot be justified. The construction of a permanent structure by the Municipality on a portion of the public street is an invasion of a valuable right of the, owner of land adjoining the street. The invasion would be continuous one and it can be remedied only by a mandatory injunction ordering the removal of the structure itself and not mere damages. 50. The learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 4 in order to meet this argument; averred that this is a Government land and therefore, the C.C. is entitled to grant settlement to anyone and his orders cannot be questioned. He further stressed that the only party who can feel aggrieved by the construction of the shops on the road-side land in question in violation of the Rules is the administrator and, no one else; and if he does not choose to take any action, then, this court cannot interfere with the construction in question at the instruction of the petitioner. 51. I must, however, confess my inability, to appreciate the argument that the only aggrieved party in the present case can be the Chief Commissioner and that the petitioner can have absolutely no grievance. It may be pointed out that the petitioner is complaining against the very action of the C.C. himself which has been described by him to be in excess of his, statutory powers and in violation of the Rules and the road plan. It may be pointed out that the petitioner is complaining against the very action of the C.C. himself which has been described by him to be in excess of his, statutory powers and in violation of the Rules and the road plan. Besides, dealing with the contention that the land in question belongs to the Government and, therefore, the capital authorities can do whatever they like without any control or limitation need not detain us because the C.C. is a creation of statute and he must act within the statutory limitation imposed indeed this contention was not persisted in by the learned counsel for the respondents and was soon dropped, by him, and in my opinion rightly. It may in this connection be pointed out that an administrative agency, which is purely a creative of statute, has no powers except those given by the statute itself read as a whole by discovering the legislative intent. In this Republic, as indeed, in any decent society governed by the rule of law of our responsible democratic pattern, it is unthinkable that any officer of the Government or even the Government itself can be contended to possess arbitrary and uncontrolled power over the person, property or interests of the individual citizen, which can be claimed to be exercised to the citizens prejudice without the author being called upon to justify his action, on the basis of a valid law. 52. After considering all the circumstances of the case in the light of the statutory provisions, in my opinion the respondent No. 5 has acted outside the statute in settling the roadside land for construction of shops, which ha? prejudicially affected the petitioners right. 53. The petitioner being the owner of the adjoining land has a right of access to the highway on all points on his boundary and the access is not to be restricted to any particular point. Therefore, if there is an obstruction to the access at any point he has a right to have the obstruction removed irrespective of the fact that he has an ingress and egress on the road from other places in his property. 54. For all these reasons, this is a fit case where the writ of mandamus should be issued. Therefore, if there is an obstruction to the access at any point he has a right to have the obstruction removed irrespective of the fact that he has an ingress and egress on the road from other places in his property. 54. For all these reasons, this is a fit case where the writ of mandamus should be issued. I, therefore, accept the writ petition and order that a writ in the nature of mandamus be issued quashing the orders of respondent No. 5 dated 11-8-1961 and 30-9-1961 and directing him to act in accordance with law. There will also be a writ issued in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents 6 to 9 to discharge their statutory duties in evicting the encroachers (respondents 1 to 4) according to law. The respondents will pay the costs of the petitioner. The advocates fee Rs. 100/-. Let the order be drawn up as stated above. Writ petition accepted.