JUDGMENT S.S. Dhavan, J. - This is a landlord's appeal from the concurrent decisions of the courts below dismissing its suit for the ejectment of the tenant. The plaintiff appellant is a deity described in the plaint as Sri Ramchandra Ji Maharaj, Birajman Sri Ram Mandir Ram Nagar and the delfendant-respondents are Devendra Singh and his four brothers. It is the common case of the parties that a plot of land was leased by the plaintiff to one Prem Singh, the father of the defendants, who executed a rent note or kirayanama which was registered. The period of lease was 30 years, but the kirayanama contained three covenants or conditions by the lessee. These are as follows: (I have translated the original Hindi version into English): - (1) I shall start the construction of the house within three years, and if I do not do so, this kirayanama shall be considered as cancelled. (2) I shall pay the rent every month subject to a receipt to the managers (of the temple) and if I am unable to pay the rent for three months this kirayanama shall be considered as cancelled. (3) I shall not let out the land on the rent to any person other than a Hindu." 2. It is the first condition which is in controversy in this suit. It is common ground that the lessee did not start any constructions within three years of the commencement of the lease, and in fact no constructions were ever started by him and the land remains vacant even today. The plaintiff invoked the first condition which according to him gave him the right to forfeit the lease and eject the lessee. The defendants did not deny that neither their father nor they had started any constructions, but they contended that clause (1) of the condition was not enforceable as it was not intended to be acted upon and was included in the kirayanama at the request of the lessor who, however, assured the lessee that it would not be given effect to and was being inserted because it was usual to include such a condition. They also contended that the condition was vague and uncertain and, therefore, void, and its non-fulfilment did not give the plaintiff any right of re-entry. 3. They also contended that the condition was vague and uncertain and, therefore, void, and its non-fulfilment did not give the plaintiff any right of re-entry. 3. The trial court held that the condition was vague and not intended to be acted upon, and its breach did not entitle the plaintiff to sue for ejectment before the expiry of the full term of the lease. Accordingly it dismissed the suit. On appeal the learned Additional Civil Judge, Naini Tal observed that the condition requiring the construction of the house within three years was "merely ornamental", because the lessor had accepted rent in advance till the end of the year 1955, whereas the time limit of three years expired in 1949. He also held that the condition was vague and, therefore, void under Sec. 29 of the Contract Act because it merely fixed the time limit for starting the construction of the house but none for completing it. He further held that the condition was not intended to be acted upon, and relied on the statement of a witness for the defendants, one Lala Anand Kumar, who had deposed that this condition was not intended to be enforced but included only to induce the lessee to start the construction of the house at an early date. Accordingly he confirmed the dismissal of the suit. The plaintiff has come to this Court in second appeal. 4. I have heard Mr. Gopal Behari for the plaintiff appellant and Mr. Janardhan Swarup Gupta for the defendant-respondents at considerable length, and perused the judgments of the courts below as well as the material documents on the record. I am of the opinion that the decision for the court below is erroneous. 5. Mr. J.S. Gupta argued that it was not possible to enforce a condition so vaguely worded as this. He pointed out that the words were vague enough to permit the lessee to make a show of digging the foundations on the last day of the three years period and then discontinue the constructions indefinitely. I am not much impressed by this argument. A condition in a lease that the lessee shall start the construction of a house within three years is specific and certain enough to be enforced. Conditions requiring a lessee or licensee to start the construction within a specified period are not uncommon and may be imposed by agreement or by statute. I am not much impressed by this argument. A condition in a lease that the lessee shall start the construction of a house within three years is specific and certain enough to be enforced. Conditions requiring a lessee or licensee to start the construction within a specified period are not uncommon and may be imposed by agreement or by statute. For example, Sec. 181 of the U.P. Municipalities Act itself provides that a sanction for the construction of a building shall be available for one year or for such lesser period as may be prescribed by a bye-law, and that after the expiry of this period the work may not be commenced without a fresh sanction. It may be that a condition of this nature is easy to comply with, but easy does not mean vague. If the lessee does anything which in the opinion of the Court amounts to the starting of the construction, the condition is fulfilled; on the other hand, if he does nothing at all - as in the present case - the condition is violated or not fulfilled. The legal consequences of the violation or non-fulfilment depend upon the terms for the lease. 6. The next question is whether this condition was intended to be acted upon by the parties. The learned appellate Judge relied on the statement of a , witness that it was not so intended and overruled the objection of the appellants counsel that it was inadmissible under Sec. 92 of the Evidence Act. I am afraid he was in error. Sec. 92 enjoins in effect that no oral evidence is admissible for the purpose of contradicting, or changing, or adding to or subtracting from, the terms of a contract which have been reduced to writing. In this case the conditions of the lease were reduced to writing, and provided for the consequences not starting the constructions, here an agreement contains a written condition that the lease would be considered as cancelled if the lessee does not start constructions within three years, any oral evidence to prove that it was not meant to be acted upon is inadmissible for its purpose is to establish that the lease would not be considered as cancelled if the condition was not fulfilled, and thus contradict or alter or subtract from the terms of the lease. 7. 7. The third and the most important point is whether the non-fulfilment of this condition gave the lessor the right to eject the lessee, Mr. J. S. Gupta relied on the language of Sec. 111 (g) of the Transfer of property Act and argued that it lays own the conditions under which he lessor is entitled to forfeit the ease. Sec. 111 (g) runs thus:- "A lease of immovable property determines by forfeiture; that is to say, (1) in case lessee breaks an express condition which provides that, on breach thereof, the lessor may re-enter; or (2) in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself; or (3) the lessee is adjudicated an insolvent and the lease provides that the lessor may re-enter on the happening for such event and in (any of these cases) the lessor or his transferee (gives notice in writing to the lessee of) his intention to determine the lease." 8. Mr. Gupta argued that a lease is determined by forfeiture only if the following conditions are satisfied: - (1) There must be an express condition in the lease; (2) this condition must provide that on breach of it the lessor may re-enter; and (3) the lessor must give notice in writing to the lessee for his intention to determine the lease. Mr. Gupta further argued that if the second condition, namely, a provision conferring on the lessor, in so many words, the right to re-enter, is absent, the landlord cannot forfeit the lease even if the condition is broken. Counsel argued that the words "the lessor may-re-enter" must be construed strictly and literally, and therefore nothing less than the use of the words "may re-enter" or their equivalent will entitle the lessor to forfeit the lease even on the breach of an express condition. He contended that words like "the lease shall be considered as cancelled," "the lease shall become void" or "the tenants rights under the lease shall come to an end," cannot give the landlord the right to re-enter when the statute requires express words entitling the lessor to re-enter or resume possession. 9. Mr. He contended that words like "the lease shall be considered as cancelled," "the lease shall become void" or "the tenants rights under the lease shall come to an end," cannot give the landlord the right to re-enter when the statute requires express words entitling the lessor to re-enter or resume possession. 9. Mr. Gupta relied on a judgment of the Orissa High Court in Raja Sri Krishna Chandra Mansingh Hari Chandan Mardraj Bhramarbar Roy v. M/s Chemical & Salt Works Ltd. (India), Calcutta, A.I.R. 1957 Orissa 35. In which it was held that a clause in the lease deed that the lessees title will be extinguished on the violation or non-fulfilment for a condition is not sufficient for the purpose of enforcing forfeiture as contemplated under Cl. (g), and it must definitely be provided that the lessor will re-enter or resume possession. In that case a condition in the lease was as follows: - "In the lease-hold property the tenant - will not do any other business or manufacture of any other kind. Any other business or manufacture taken up without the written consent of the landlord - this lease stands cancelled." The learned Judges rejected the argument that when a lease stands cancelled, the lessee has no right to be on the lease-hold property, and therefore by necessary implication the landlord has the right of re-entry which need not be in so many words. They held that there was a distinction between a clause affecting the title of the lessee and one conferring the right of possession on the landlord, and held that a clause providing that on the violation of a condition the lessees title will be extinguished is not sufficient for conferring on the lessor the right to re-enter or resume possession. They held that there was a distinction between a clause affecting the title of the lessee and one conferring the right of possession on the landlord, and held that a clause providing that on the violation of a condition the lessees title will be extinguished is not sufficient for conferring on the lessor the right to re-enter or resume possession. The Orissa Judges relied on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Mahomed Reajuddin v. Basuda Sundari, AIR 1918 Calcutta 164 (2) in which Sanderson, C.J. had observed that he was very doubtful whether a right of reentry was reserved by the following words of a clause in the lease: "God forbid, if the suit land and bari be not used for dwelling purposes the right under the patta shall be void." Sanderson, C.J. remarked that in the lease before him the right of re-entry was not reserved by these words because they did not use the form in which the right for re-entry is usually inserted, "and it might have been inserted, if it was intended." 10. On the other hand Mr. Gopal Behari argued that the cases cited by Mr. Gupta do not state the law correctly. He pointed out that the observations of the Judges in the Orissa case cited by Mr. Gupta were obiter as the Court had found that the lessor had failed to prove any violation of the conditions of the lease by the lessee and the question of interpreting the controversial clause did not arise; and the observation of Sanderson, C.J. in the Calcutta case was merely an expression for doubt and contained no clear enunciation of the law. Learned counsel pointed out that there is no decision of this court accepting the principle of law laid down in the Orissa case. 11. In my opinion and I say this with the utmost respect - the view taken by the Orissa High Court in the case cited by Mr. Gupta does not appear to be correct. They seem to have held that the lessors right to forfeit the lease on the violation of an express condition has been circumscribed by clause (g) of Sec. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act which requires that the condition violated by the lessee must provide that, on its violation the lessor may re-enter. They seem to have held that the lessors right to forfeit the lease on the violation of an express condition has been circumscribed by clause (g) of Sec. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act which requires that the condition violated by the lessee must provide that, on its violation the lessor may re-enter. I am afraid it is not possible for me to accept this view. Sec. 111 enumerates a number of reasons for which a lease is determined. One of them is forfeiture which is explained in Cl. (g). It provides in effect that if there is a condition providing for re-entry, and on its violation the landlord gives notice to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease, the lease is determined by forfeiture. But Sec. 111 is not exhaustive and does not exclude any other lawful mode of determining the lease, for it does not take away the right of the parties to the lease to include any lawful condition providing that the lease shall become void and the lessees rights terminate if certain conditions are violated or not fulfilled. This right is conferred by the law of Contract and has not been taken away by the Transfer for Property Act. It is important to note that the Transfer of Property Act is not exhaustive and does not profess to be a complete Code. Its preamble says, "Whereas it is expedient to define and amend certain parts of the law relating to the transfer of property by act of parties; it is hereby enacted as follows: "Thus it is not a consolidating Act like the Evidence Act - Mulla, Transfer of Property Act, 9th edition, p. 2. A consolidating Act is ordinarily a complete Code and repeals the existing law other than paras which are saved by any saving section, but not so an Act which merely defines and amends certain parts of the existing law. The Privy Council in a case involving the interpretation of the Contract Act held that its preamble showed that it was not exhaustive. Irawady Flotilla Company v. Bhagwan Das, 18 I.A. p. 121 at p. 129. As the preambles of the two Acts are identical, the observations of the Privy Council apply equally to the Transfer of Property Act which cannot be regarded as exhaustive. Irawady Flotilla Company v. Bhagwan Das, 18 I.A. p. 121 at p. 129. As the preambles of the two Acts are identical, the observations of the Privy Council apply equally to the Transfer of Property Act which cannot be regarded as exhaustive. Therefore, the ordinary law of contract shall apply to every agreement of lease-except to the extent that it is inconsistent with any provision of the Transfer of Property Act. Now, under the law of contract the parties can make any agreement provided it is not illegal or expressly declared void by the Act, and the Court must give effect to and enforce it. It follows that if a lease contains an express provision that it shall become void and the rights of the lessee terminate on the violation or non-fulfilment of any condition, it is effective and enforceable at law. 12. The lessees right to occupy and use the lessors land is derived from the agreement of tenancy, and does not exist apart from it. No one has a right to occupy anothers property except by the authority of the law or under a right acquired by agreement with the owner. Such an agreement, to be enforceable at law, must be valid and continue to be valid throughout its life. If the agreement for tenancy itself is void for any of the grounds specified in the Contract Act - for example if the lease is for an illegal purpose - it confers no rights on the tenant, and the owner has the right to recover possession regardless of the provisions of Sec. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. Or, if the agreement subsequently becomes void, the lessees right to occupy the land will come to an end and the owner can eject him. Or, if the agreement itself provides that it shall become void on the violation or non fulfilment of certain conditions then if the conditions are violated or not fulfilled the agreement becomes void and the lessees right to occupy the land terminates and he can be ejected. 13. The English Law is the same. "Upon the breach of any condition the lessor may re-enter or maintain an ejectment without any express proviso for re-entry" - Woodfall on Landlord and Tenant, 26th Ed. Vol. 1. 13. The English Law is the same. "Upon the breach of any condition the lessor may re-enter or maintain an ejectment without any express proviso for re-entry" - Woodfall on Landlord and Tenant, 26th Ed. Vol. 1. "Where there is a proviso in the lease that on the non-performance of any of the lessees covenants the term shall cease, the lessor and not the lessee has the option of terminating a lease. For the lease to determine upon such a proviso, the lessor must either actually enter or issue a writ for recovery of possession which is in law equivalent to re-entry," - ibid. "Where in an agreement amounting to an actual demise there was a clause in the following form, it stipulated a condition that the lessee shall not under let; it was held that these words created condition, and being such, upon breach of it the lessor might maintain ejectment, without any express clause of re-entry" - ibid p. 392. 14. For these reasons, I am of opinion that Sec. 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act is not exhaustive of the rights of the lessor to forfeit the lease and it does not take away his right under the law of contract to impose any condition that the lease shall become void on the breach or non-fulfilment of the conditions specified in the agreement - provided the conditions are valid and enforceable at law. With respect I must dissent from the view taken by the Orissa High Court as it is based on the assumption that the Transfer of Property Act is a complete Code and Sec. 111 (g) is exhaustive of the right of the landlord as regards re-entry or ejectment of the tenant. 15. I shall now consider whether in the present case, condition No. 1 of the lease permits the plaintiff-appellant to terminate the lease and eject the lessee in case of non-fulfilment. It says "I shall start, construction of the house within three years, and if I do not do so, this kirayanama shall be considered as cancelled." Under this condition, as I understand it, the landlord undertook to start the construction of the house within three years and stipulated that in case of his failure to do so the lease would stand as cancelled. It is common ground that the lessee made no constructions within three years or afterwards - and the landlord invoked his rights under this condition, terminated the lease, and asked the lessee to quit. In these circumstances it is immaterial whether the case comes within Cl. (g) of Sec. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act or not. If it is a valid agreement, it is enforceable. There is no other way of enforcing it except by terminating the lease and ejecting the lessee. If the lessor has the right to terminate the lease, it follows that the lessees rights to occupy the land automatically comes to an end and he can be ejected. Mr. Gupta had to concede in the end that this condition is not invalid under the Contract Act and therefore enforceable, but he found it difficult to explain, in spite of repeated questions by me, how else it can be enforced if not by the ejectment of the lessee. 16. For these reasons, I allow this appeal with costs, reverse the decree of the court below, and decree the appellants suit for ejectment of the respondents. Appeal allowed.