JUDGMENT : Misra, J. - Jasodhara (Plaintiff), widow of Dileswar, obtained a decree for declaration of title and recovery of possession of some properties and for partition of other properties. As it was a preliminary decree in respect of the properties involved in partition, she filed an application to make the decree final. The Petitioner filed objection alleging that as she remarried subsequent to the decree, she forfeited her interest in the properties of her husband and therefore she had no further right to continue the final decree proceedings. The objection was dismissed and against the order of dismissal the civil revision has been filed. 2. A deed of gift (Ext. 1) was executed on 17-6-1963 by Dileswar in favour of the Plaintiff. The date of marriage, as found' by the trial Court, is 22-6-1963. As the marriage is subsequent to the deed of gift, Mr. Mahapatra contended that the deed of gift was in favour of the Plaintiff while she was unmarried. In the deed of gift there was the provision for maintenance of the Plaintiff during her lifetime. The Plaintiff was prohibited from effecting any alienation of the property in any manner even for necessity without taking the consent of her husband. There was no transfer of the corpus of the estate in favour of the wife. If the Plaintiff's title obtained in the decree were the same as conveyed under the deed of gift, the character of the interest acquired by the Plaintiff would be limited and not absolute. Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act (Act XXX) of 195) (hereinafter referred to as the Act), this interest would continue to be limited. The decree, however, shows that the Plaintiff's title to the land did not flow from the deed of gift but was based on inheritance from her husband (see paragraph 28 and 29 of the judgment). Under the law, as it obtained on the date of the institution of the suit in 1954, she had a limited interest in the property. She acquired an absolute title therein u/s 14(1) of the Act as admittedly she was in possession of the property on the date of the passing of the Act. 3. Mr. Under the law, as it obtained on the date of the institution of the suit in 1954, she had a limited interest in the property. She acquired an absolute title therein u/s 14(1) of the Act as admittedly she was in possession of the property on the date of the passing of the Act. 3. Mr. Das contended that under the Hindu Widows Remarriage Act (Act XV) of 1856 (hereinafter referred to as the former Act), rights and interests of the Plaintiff shall, upon her remarriage, cease and determine as if she had then died. To appreciate this contention, it is necessary, in the first instance, to examine the position of law regarding disinheritance of widows under the former Act prior to the coming into force of the Act. Section 2 of the former Act enacts the circumstances under which the rights of a widow in her deceased husband's property cease on her remarriage. The section is as follows AB rights and interests which any widow may have in her deceased husband's property by way of maintenance, or by inheritance to her husband or to his lineal successors, or by virtue of any will or testamentary disposition conferring upon her, without express permission to remarry, only a limited interest in such property, with no power of alienating the same shall upon her remarriage cease and determine as if she had then died and the next heirs of her deceased husband, or other persons entitled to the property or her death, shall thereupon succeed to the same. Section 5 of the former Act says that except as in the three) preceding sections is provided, a widow shall not, by reason of her remarriage, forfeit any' property or any right to which she would otherwise be entitled and every widow who has remarried shall have the same rights of inheritance as she would have had, had such marriage been her first marriage. A combined reading of both the sections shows that forfeiture of the property by a widow upon remarriage is confined to the classes of cases mentioned in Section 2. The three classes of properties in which she would cease to have interest on remarriage are the properties obtained (i) by way of maintenance, (ii) by way of inheritance, and (iii) by virtue of any will. The three classes of properties in which she would cease to have interest on remarriage are the properties obtained (i) by way of maintenance, (ii) by way of inheritance, and (iii) by virtue of any will. In the case of will, she does not forfeit it if she is authorised therein to remarry, or if an absolute interest is conferred upon her. Thus the properties in which the widow shall cease to have interest are confined to those in which she had a limited interest during her lifetime Section 2 of the former Act has no application to the properties in which the widow has acquired an ab lute interest on the date of her remarriage (see Lakshmi Ammal and Others Vs. Thangavel Asari, confirmed in Thangavelu Asari (died) and Others Vs. Lakshmi Ammal and Others, . 4. The further question for consideration is whether the aforesaid position of law was affected by the Act. Section 31 of the Act, in terms repeals the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment Act), 1929 and the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937. Section 4 of the Act provides for the over riding effect of the Act. It lays down Section 4(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided- (a) any text, rule of interpretation of Hindu law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act, shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in this Act. (b) any other Jaw in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to apply to Hindus in so far as it is inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in this Act. Thus if there is anything in the former Act which is inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in the Act, then those provisions of the former Act would stand repealed to the extent of the repugnancy. 5. It thus becomes necessary to examine as to what extent the repugnancy is incident in any of the provisions of the two Acts. u/s 2 of the former Act, a widow shall cease to have interest in the property in which she has limited interest on the date of her remarriage. 5. It thus becomes necessary to examine as to what extent the repugnancy is incident in any of the provisions of the two Acts. u/s 2 of the former Act, a widow shall cease to have interest in the property in which she has limited interest on the date of her remarriage. By Section 14(1) of the Act, in respect of those properties, the widow would have absolute interest if she is possessed of the property on the date of the passing of the Act. Both the provisions, read together, lead to the irresistible conclusion that if the widow acquires an absolute interest u/s 14(1) of the Act in respect of which she held a limited interest prior to that date and her remarriage is subsequent to the acquisition of absolute interest, she would not be divested of that property even on remarriage. 6. On the aforesaid analysis, Plaintiff acquired an absolute title in the properties she obtained by the decree. She was in possession of those properties on the date of the passing of the Act and had acquired absolute title therein. Her interest in those properties would not cease and determine even on her remarriage The final decree proceedings must accordingly I. continue. 7. In the result the revision fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances, parties to bear their own costs. Final Result : Dismissed