JUDGMENT C. A. Vaidialingam, J. 1. In this appeal on behalf of the State, the first defendant appellant, the learned Government Pleader challenges the decree and judgment of the learned District Judge, Quilon accepting a claim made by the plaintiff respondent regarding the validity and legality of a purchase of property made by him on 26-7-54 from the second defendant in these proceedings. The second defendant appears to have been an Abkari contractor under the State and he obviously owed amounts to the Government. 2. On behalf of the State it is seen that a notice of demand was issued to the second defendant on 5-6-54 evidenced by Ext. P10, but that notice is under S.23A of the Travancore Revenue Recovery Act. The legality of that notice in considering, the claim now made by the State, under S.32 of the Travancore Cochin Revenue Recovery Act, will be considered by me later. It may be pointed out that the particular item, with which we are concerned in these proceedings, namely survey No. 13191, does not find a place in the said notice, though several other survey numbers are referred to. There is also no controversy that the said notice was personally served on the second defendant on 14-6-54. The plaintiff purchased the suit item on 26-7-54, by a registered document Ext. P1, executed by the second defendant in his favour for a consideration of Rs. 5000/-. 3. It is also seen that on 13-6-58 another notice was issued by the Tahsildar dated 7-6-58, Ext. P 6, under S.24 of the Travancore Cochin Revenue Recovery Act 1951 hereinafter to be referred to as the Act. That was a notice dated 13-6-58 issued to the Plaintiff calling upon him to pay the Abkari dues of the 2nd defendant and threatening to proceed to recover the same by way of attachment and sale, in default by proceeding as against the property mentioned therein. That notice there is no controversy specifically refers to only one item of property namely the suit item bearing Sy. No. 13191. There is nothing to show that this notice was served on the 2nd defendant, the defaulter. 4. That notice there is no controversy specifically refers to only one item of property namely the suit item bearing Sy. No. 13191. There is nothing to show that this notice was served on the 2nd defendant, the defaulter. 4. In pursuance of this notice, further action was contemplated; and the plaintiff filed objections before the Tahsildar on the ground that the property has ceased to be the property of the defaulter and therefore no action can be taken by the revenue, for proceeding to realise the dues payable by his transferor, namely the second defendant who have ceased to have any title or ownership of the properties. The plaintiff also raised objection to the effect that he is a bona fide purchaser for value of the properties; and that mutation of names has also been effected in the revenue registry in his name and he has been paying the tax ever since his purchase. On all these grounds, the plaintiff contested the claim of the State to proceed to recover the dues, payable by the second defendant from the property, in his possession which he has purchased under Ext. P1. These objections were overruled by the Tahsildar in the first instance, and also on appeal by the Collector. 5. The plaintiff has instituted the present suit, namely OS 3/59 in the District Court, Quilon challenging the right of the State to proceed as against the property in his possession and over which he has got title, to recover the dues payable by the second in the suit. According to the plaintiff, the proceedings initiated by the notice Ext. P6, as well as the further action contemplated to be taken, as against his properties, and the orders of the Tahsildar and the Collector overruling his objections challenging to the right of the State, to proceed as against his properties, are all illegal and void; and therefore he wanted the court to set aside all those proceedings and also to grant a declaration of his title and possession of the suit property. 6. This claim of the plaintiff was met by the State on several grounds. According to the State a valid notice has been issued under Ext. P10 on 5-6-54 to the defaulter namely the second defendant and it is after service of that notice and acceptance of the same by the defaulter that the plaintiff has purchased the property. 6. This claim of the plaintiff was met by the State on several grounds. According to the State a valid notice has been issued under Ext. P10 on 5-6-54 to the defaulter namely the second defendant and it is after service of that notice and acceptance of the same by the defaulter that the plaintiff has purchased the property. According to the State, the plaintiff can get no title whatsoever to the suit properties, because any transfer effected by the defaulter the second defendant, in favour of the plaintiff, after the issue of the notice under Ext. P10, is absolutely null and void as against the State. Therefore they are entitled to ignore the transaction, on the basis of which the plaintiff seeks to establish his title and possession. The orders of the Tahsildar as well as the Collector, which were sought to be cancelled were also maintained, by the State as having been passed according to law. 7. The State took up another objection to the effect that the transaction Ext. P1 is vitiated by collusion, inasmuch as the defaulter namely the second defendant, has with a view to defeat the just claims of the State, and to screen the properties has made a show of parting with title and possession under Ext. P1 in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore on this ground also according to the State the transaction will have to be ignored. 8. During the course of the trial, the State attempted to sustain the pleas taken by them on the basis of the provisions contained in S.32 of the Act, particularly the latter part of that section. The State also attempted to establish its plea that the purchase made by the plaintiff cannot be considered to be that of a bona fide purchaser on the ground that it is a collusive transaction, brought into effect, by the second defendant for the purpose of screening the properties, from the reach of the State. 9. The plaintiff let in evidence to establish that the notice issued under Ext. P10 cannot be considered to be a notice valid in law so as to enable the State to treat Ext. P1 as void under S.32 of the Act. According to the plaintiff the only notice that has been issued under the Act as contemplated under S.32 is Ext. P6 dated 7-6-58. P10 cannot be considered to be a notice valid in law so as to enable the State to treat Ext. P1 as void under S.32 of the Act. According to the plaintiff the only notice that has been issued under the Act as contemplated under S.32 is Ext. P6 dated 7-6-58. That was nearly 4 years after the title has already vested in the plaintiff. Therefore the plaintiff attempted to satisfy the court that under the provisions of the Act, the State can, if at all only proceed to recover its dues as against the defaulter and his property and this suit item having ceased to be the property of the defaulter, on the material date, the State has no right to proceed as against that item. 10. The plaintiff also let in evidence to show that he is a bona fide transferee for value and that he has paid hard cash of Rs. 5000/- being consideration under Ext. P1 before the Sub Registrar at the time of the registration of the document namely the sale deed in his favour by the second defendant; and that he has also effected, after his purchase substantial improvements by spending large amounts of money. He also let in evidence to show that after the sale deed in his favour, Ext. P1 he has obtained mutation of names in the revenue registry, and that he has been paying the tax directly to the Government. All these circumstances were again relied upon by the plaintiff to support his contention that he is a bona fide purchaser for value. 11. The learned District Judge is of the view that the plaintiff must be considered to be a bona fide purchaser for value. The lower court does not accept the contention of the State that the purchase under Ext. P1 by the plaintiff is a collusive transaction. The learned Judge takes note of the fact that the plaintiff has paid the sale consideration under Ext. P1 at the time of the registration of the document and that immediately after purchase, he has also obtained mutation of names in the revenue registry and has been paying revenue due on the property directly to the State. 12. The learned Judge adverts to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 who are persons occupying a building constructed by the plaintiff at considerable expense immediately after the purchase. 13. 12. The learned Judge adverts to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 who are persons occupying a building constructed by the plaintiff at considerable expense immediately after the purchase. 13. The learned District Judge adverts to one circumstance namely that the property which has been purchased in 1950 for a sum of Rs. 7500/- has been sold to the plaintiff in 1954 for a lesser amount namely Rs. 5000/-. But in the absence of any evidence adduced by the State, regarding the market value of properties, in the area in question, at the time of the transaction, according to the lower court, this circumstance alone cannot be taken into account for accepting the claim of the State that Ext. P1 is a collusive transaction. That is the finding recorded by the learned Judge on fact in favour of the plaintiff. 14. Then coming to the claim made by the State that inasmuch as a notice of demand has been issued under Ext. P10, on 5 6 54, and inasmuch as the plaintiff admittedly purchases the property only after the issue of such a notice and therefore the transaction is void under S.32 of the Act, the learned Judge adverts to the matters mentioned in Ext. P10 and notes that apart from the fact that the suit survey number is not referred to therein, that notice has been issued not under the Act but under S.23A of the Travancore Revenue Recovery Act, which admittedly on the date, when it was issued, had been repealed long ago. Therefore according to the learned Judge that notice cannot be considered to be a valid one so as to attract the penal provisions contained in S.32 of the Act. 15. The second reason given by the learned Judge for ignoring Ext. P10 is what has been incidentally referred to by me earlier namely that while it refers to several other items of properties, it does not admittedly take in the suit survey number 13191. That also is a circumstance which will invalidate Ext. P10. Therefore Ext. P10 cannot be considered to be a notice of demand issued under S.24 of the Act so as to attract the provisions contained in S.32 of the Act. Therefore according to the learned Judge the transaction Ext. That also is a circumstance which will invalidate Ext. P10. Therefore Ext. P10 cannot be considered to be a notice of demand issued under S.24 of the Act so as to attract the provisions contained in S.32 of the Act. Therefore according to the learned Judge the transaction Ext. P1 cannot be considered to be void or not binding as against the State under S.32 of the Act unless the State is able to establish that the transaction is vitiated by other circumstances namely fraud, collusion or a conspiracy between the plaintiff and the second defendant to put the property out of reach of the State. So far as that aspect is concerned, I have already adverted to the finding recorded by the learned Judge in favour of the plaintiff and as against the State. 16. The learned Judge, no doubt, considers another aspect namely that in any event there is no question of the State having any prior claim treating the Abkari dues as a public revenue due on land. The learned Judge refers to certain decisions of the Travancore High Court wherein it has been held that Abkari dues do not constitute a first charge on the lands of the Abkari defaulter in the sense that the arrears of land revenue constitute a first charge and the view has also been expressed by the Travancore High Court that it is only the procedure that is indicated in the Revenue Recovery Act that can be applied for recovery of the dues. Ultimately the learned Judge takes the view that inasmuch as Ext. P10 is not a notice issued in accordance with S.24 of the Act the transaction in favour of the plaintiff is not hit by S.32 of the Act. The learned Judge also refers to the fact that Ext. P10 does not take in the suit survey number. 17. I do not find any reference or discussion about Ext. P6 which is a notice issued on 7-6-58 under S.24 of the Act. Obviously the reason must be, the State itself, in its written statement do not refer to the said notice, and probably it was only referred to during the course of arguments. But the plaintiff has specifically referred to only this notice Ext. P6 which is a notice issued on 7-6-58 under S.24 of the Act. Obviously the reason must be, the State itself, in its written statement do not refer to the said notice, and probably it was only referred to during the course of arguments. But the plaintiff has specifically referred to only this notice Ext. P6 as having been served on him on 13-6-58 calling upon him to pay the amounts due from the second defendant as Abkari does and threatening in default to attach the suit survey number and realise the amount by bringing to sale and to the orders passed by the Tahsildar and the Collector and they are challenged by the plaintiff in the suit. Ultimately the learned District Judge decreed the plaintiff's claim and granted the declaration asked for by him and also set aside the demand notice Ext. P6, as well as the orders of the Tahsildar and the Collector. 18. The learned Government Pleader urged two contentions namely, (1) that the view of the lower court that Ext. P10 is not a valid notice under S.24 of the Act is absolutely erroneous; and though issued under the Travancore Revenue Recovery Act, it must be considered to be a proper notice; and by issuing another notice Ext. P6 under the Act the State Government cannot be considered to have given the go by to the previous notice issued under Ext. P10 and (2) The purchase by the plaintiff, under the circumstances alleged by the State will show that it is vitiated by collusion and it is only an attempt by the second defendant to put the property out of reach of the State and disable the State from realising its legitimate dues to which arrangement the plaintiff also is a party. Therefore according to the learned Government Pleader, the finding recorded by the learned Judge upholding the validity of the transaction on facts also is erroneous. 19. Mr, Mathew Muricken, learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent pointed out that before the State can invoke to its advantage, the drastic and penal provisions contained in S.32 of the Act, they must establish the conditions precedent, the existence of which alone will vitiate the transaction. 19. Mr, Mathew Muricken, learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent pointed out that before the State can invoke to its advantage, the drastic and penal provisions contained in S.32 of the Act, they must establish the conditions precedent, the existence of which alone will vitiate the transaction. One of the very vital circumstance which must exist and which must have been properly complied with by the State, before seeking to have a transaction declared as void or before the State can ignore the same under the latter part of S.32 of the Act and the essential circumstance that should precede it is the issue of a valid and proper notice under S.24 of the Act. The notice issued on 5-6-54 Ext. P10, can in no sense be considered to be a notice issued under the Act. It was issued under the Travancore Revenue Recovery Act, which admittedly stood repealed by S.64 of the Act with effect from 22-5-51. Therefore the issue of a notice under a statute which was not existing, is devoid of any legal sanction and therefore Ext. P10 was rightly ignored by the Trial Court. Then the only other notice which can be taken into account and which according to the learned counsel has been issued by the State realising the defects attendant upon Ext. P10 is Ext. P6 dated 7-6-58. That is no doubt a notice issued under S.24 of the Act and which notice is issued to the plaintiff. But on the date when that notice was issued namely 7-6-58, the defaulter has ceased to be the owner of the property by virtue of the transfer which took place nearly 4 years ago which is on 26-7-54. Therefore the State has no further jurisdiction to initiate any action as against any property which has ceased to be the property of the defaulter. 20. The attempt made by the State for establishing that the transaction Ext. P1 has been entered into by the plaintiff with the second defendant collusively and with a view to defraud the State of its legitimate right of recovering the dues from the second defendant did not meet with any success at the hands of the lower court. 20. The attempt made by the State for establishing that the transaction Ext. P1 has been entered into by the plaintiff with the second defendant collusively and with a view to defraud the State of its legitimate right of recovering the dues from the second defendant did not meet with any success at the hands of the lower court. The learned counsel pointed out that if the conduct of the plaintiff which has been taken into account by the court is of any consequence the only result is that the finding of the lower court about the bona fide nature of the transaction stands thoroughly established on the evidence. The learned counsel also urged that the State does not have any priority in respect of Abkari dues and in this connection adverted to the decision referred to by the lower court, and urged that the findings recorded by the Trial Court as against the State on all points are fully justified and this appeal will have to be dismissed. 21. S.24 of the Act relates to the service of demand notice prior to attachment of immovable property and under sub-s.(1) of S.24, it is specifically provided that before proceeding to attach the immovable property of a defaulter, a written demand signed by the Tahsildar containing the various matters referred to therein is to be served on the defaulter. S.24(1) of the Act is as follows: "Before proceeding to attach the immovable property of a defaulter, a written demand signed by the Tahsildar, shall be served on the defaulter, specifying the amount of revenue due with interest, the land in respect of which it is claimed, and the date when it fell due, the batta due to the person who shall serve the demand and the time allowed for the payment." 22. S.32 of the Act is as follows : "All engagements entered into between the landholder and his tenant, except such as are hereinafter mentioned, shall be binding upon the Government during attachment, but all such engagements made collusively with a view to defeat or delay the effect of the attachment, and all leases of land at a rate lower than the usual rate of assessment, and not made bona fide for the purpose of erecting factories or buildings, or of bringing waste land into cultivation, and all engagements, such as private alienation of the property attached, whether by sale, mortgage, or gift or otherwise, or creation of any tenancy in respect of the said property made subsequent to the issue of demand notice under S.24, shall be null and void against the Government and any person who may purchase the property under this Act; and all charges or encumbrances upon such land shall be postponed to the payment of the public revenue due on land." The only aspect that requires to be noticed is that under S.32 in brief, any private alienation of a property attached by sale, mortgage or gift or otherwise etc., in respect of the said property made subsequent to the issue of a demand notice under S.24 shall be null and void against the Government. 23. It is this aspect that will have to be borne in mind in considering the contention of the learned Government Pleader that there has been a proper demand notice issued under S.24 and in consequence the provisions contained in S.32 making certain transactions by way of sale in this case after the issue of a demand notice is to be considered as null and void against the Government. No doubt if the State is able to establish that a valid demand notice under S.24 has been issued to this case and a transaction by way of sale has taken place subsequent to the issue of the said demand notice there can be no controversy, that so far as the State is concerned, that sale shall be null and void. 24. But the essential condition precedent for invoking this part of the provisions contained in S.32 is the issue of a demand notice under S.24. Therefore the question quite naturally assumes importance in this case as to whether the notice Ext. 24. But the essential condition precedent for invoking this part of the provisions contained in S.32 is the issue of a demand notice under S.24. Therefore the question quite naturally assumes importance in this case as to whether the notice Ext. P10 issued on 5-6-54 is a notice issued under S.24 of the Act. If it is such a notice, the State automatically succeeds because that notice is dated 5-6-54 and served on the defaulter on 14-6-54. The sale by the defaulter of the suit item in favour of the plaintiff, takes place subsequent to Ext. P10 on 26-7-54. Therefore on this simple statement of facts, if Ext. P10 is valid, the transaction under Ext. P1 must be declared to be void as against the State. While according to the State Ext. P10 is such a valid notice, according to the plaintiff it has absolutely no legal effect. 25. Ext. P10, there is no controversy is a notice issued under S.23A of the Travancore Revenue Recovery Act -- Act 1/1068 as amended by various other enactments. S.23A no doubt deals with a demand to be served prior to attachment of immovable property and I am also prepared to agree with the contention of the learned Government Pleader that the provisions of sub-s.(1) of S.23A of the Travancore Act are substantially in accordance with the provisions of S.24(1) of the Act. It may also be stated that in that notice various other survey numbers are referred to but the suit survey number does not find a place; and according to the learned Government Pleader the non mention of the suit survey number or for the matter of that any survey number is of no consequence whatsoever. According to the learned Government Pleader on the date when Ext. P10 was issued, though it has been issued under the Travancore Act, admittedly the Travancore Act stood repealed by the Act with effect from 22 5 51 as per S.64 of the Act. Therefore any notice of demand under the Revenue Recovery Act could have been issued by the authorities only under the Travancore Cochin Act. So long as there is power or jurisdiction vested in an authority to issue a notice of demand, as has been done in this case under Ext. Therefore any notice of demand under the Revenue Recovery Act could have been issued by the authorities only under the Travancore Cochin Act. So long as there is power or jurisdiction vested in an authority to issue a notice of demand, as has been done in this case under Ext. P10 under S.24 of the Travancore - Cochin Act which was in force at the material time, the mere fact that it is purported to be issued under S.23A of the Travancore Revenue Recovery Act will not invalidate that notice. The learned Government Pleader in this connection referred me to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in L. Hazari Mal v. L. T. Officer ( AIR 1961 SC 200 ) wherein the learned judges upheld the action taken by the commissioner of Income Tax by way of transferring a proceeding under the Indian Income Tax Act whereas he should have normally taken that action under the Paliala Income Tax Act. Therefore the revenue authorities should have taken action by issuing a notice under S.24 of the Act. Instead of that, by some inadvertence or mistake they have issued a notice under S.23A of the repealed Act namely the Travancore Act. That notice, though issued under the Travancore Act which is in compliance with the matters mentioned in S.24(1) of the Act, must be treated as a notice issued under S.24 of the Act. The question is whether this contention of the learned Government Pleader can be accepted. 26. I had occasion to deal rather elaborately with the scheme of the Act as well as the right of the State, to proceed to recover dues from a defaulter under the provisions of the Act, from transferees who have obtained title to the property long before a notice of demand under S.24 was issued. That decision is contained in OP Nos. 1440 and 1557 of 1961. After a fairly elaborate consideration of the scheme of the statute and various other matters, I had expressed the view that when the property has passed from the hands of the defaulter and title has been obtained by third parties long before the issue of a demand notice under S.24 of the Act, the State has no jurisdiction to proceed as against those properties under the Act for recovery of dues from the defaulter. No doubt I have also stated that if the case of the State is that the transaction is vitiated by fraud or collusion, those are matters which have to be separately agitated by the State in a regular suit to which the defaulter as well as the alienees are to be made parties. But the only aspect that is to be adverted to is that I had emphasised in the judgment rendered in those two O. Ps. that the essential condition precedent for applying the provisions of S.32 of the Act to declare a transaction as void is the issue of a notice under S.24 of the Act. I am not inclined to accept the contention of the learned Government Pleader that the notice Ext. P10 issued under S.23A of the Travancore Act, which admittedly stood repealed as early as 22 5 51, can under any circumstances be considered to be a notice issued under S.24 of the Act. 27. It must be remembered that the State is attempting to enforce the penal provisions contained in S.32 of the Act. If that is so, before penal provisions can be invoked in favour of the State, the conditions necessary for enforcing those penal provisions must be established by the State to exist. Unless the State is able to establish that there has been a demand notice issued under S.24 of the Act, the State will not get the benefit of the provisions contained in S.32 of the Act. Now coming to the decision of the Supreme Court relied upon by the learned Government Pleader, it will be seen that at the material time in the Patiala State, the Patiala Income Tax Act was kept in force for the purpose of levy, assessment, collection of income tax and super tax for the periods specified in the Finance Act of 1950. The Indian Income Tax Act was also applied to the Patiala State by virtue of the Finance Act of 1950. In that case, the commissioner of Income Tax was taking action under the provisions of the Patiala Act in respect of the period for which that Act was preserved. But he transferred a proceeding, not by referring to the Patiala Act, but by referring to the provisions contained in the Indian Income Tax Act. In that case, the commissioner of Income Tax was taking action under the provisions of the Patiala Act in respect of the period for which that Act was preserved. But he transferred a proceeding, not by referring to the Patiala Act, but by referring to the provisions contained in the Indian Income Tax Act. That action of the commissioner was challenged on the ground, that if at all, action should have been taken not under the Indian Act, but under the Patiala Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court referred to the fact that both the statutes were in force and that both the statues contained provisions giving jurisdiction to the commissioner to take action as he did. It is in that contest, that the Supreme Court observes that the exercise of a power will be referable to a jurisdiction which confers validity upon it, and not to a jurisdiction under which it will be nugatory. 28. In this connection the Supreme Court approved of the principle laid down by the Bombay High Court in Pitamber Vajirshet v. Dhondu Naylapa (ILR 12 Bombay 486). Based upon these observations of the Supreme Court, the learned Government Pleader urged that inasmuch as the State, had jurisdiction to issue a notice of demand on the material date under S.24 of the Act, the mere fact that they have issued the notice under the repealed Act, will not made it invalid because this Court will have to accept the said notice as a valid one so long as there is jurisdiction in the State to issue that notice. 29. In my opinion, the observations of the Supreme Court relied upon by the learned Government Pleader do not apply to the facts of this case. In the Supreme Court decision, I have already indicated that both the statutes were in force and the commissioner had jurisdiction under both the statutes to transfer a proceeding, and it is in that context the Supreme Court, while upholding the Commissioner's right to take action under the Patiala Act, sustain the action taken by him under the Indian Act because the Supreme Court is of the view that the commissioner had jurisdiction to transfer a case and the fact that he purported to act under one enactment instead of the other will not make the order invalid. 30. 30. In the case before me, it will be seen that on 5-6-54 when Ext. P10, was issued, two enactments were not in force; and in fact could not have been in force. The only enactment that was in force on that date, and under which action must be taken is the Act of 1951. The Travancore Act had been repealed with effect from 22-5-51. Therefore in my opinion there is absolutely no comparison with the case, which the Supreme Court had to deal with, and the one which this court has now to consider. Therefore Ext. P10 must be considered to be no notice at all issued under S.24 of the Act; and unless a notice under S.24 of the Act has been issued, S.32 does not stand attracted at all. Therefore the contention of the learned Government Pleader that Ext. P10, by very indirect line of reasoning, must be considered to be or deemed to be a notice issued under S.24 of the Act cannot certainly be accepted. If that is so, it follows that the view of the learned Judge that there has been no notice issued under S.24 of the Act, so as to make the transaction Ext. P1 void, under S.32 of the Act is perfectly justified. 31. In the view that I have taken about the invalidity of Ext. P10 it is not really necessary for me to very seriously consider as to whether a notice issued under S.24 should contain also particulars regarding the land which is sought to be attached and proceeded with. Admittedly Ext. P10 does not take in the suit survey number and it is only when we come to 7-6- 58 when a very orthodox notice under S.24 of the Act Ext. P6 was sent that the suit item is referred to. That is the first notice that has been issued by the State under S.24 of the Act and if there has been any sale subsequent to the issue of the notice, such a sale will certainly be void under S.32 of the Act. But in this case the issue of the notice Ext. P6 does not assist the State because that is dated 7-6-58 and served on 13-6-58 on the plaintiff whereas Ext. P1 the sale in his favour is nearly 4 years earlier namely 26-7-54. But in this case the issue of the notice Ext. P6 does not assist the State because that is dated 7-6-58 and served on 13-6-58 on the plaintiff whereas Ext. P1 the sale in his favour is nearly 4 years earlier namely 26-7-54. There is nothing to show that it was served on the defaulter, 2nd defendant, as it mandatory under S.24(1) of the Act. 32. The contention of the learned Government Pleader that by issuing Ext. P6, the State cannot be considered to have given the go by to Ext. P10, in my opinion cannot be accepted. Ext. P10 does not take in the suit property and it has not been issued under the Act. Obviously realising these weak points attendant upon Ext. P10, the State probably woke up and became vigilant by issuing Ext. P6 so as to enable them to proceed against the suit property. That S.32 will not ipso facto enable the State to ignore Ext. P1, is an aspect which I have discussed earlier. But in this case the State raised the contention that the transaction Ext. P1 has been entered into with a view to defraud the State of its legitimate dues. They alleged collusion between the plaintiff and the defaulter the second defendant. So far as that is concerned, the learned Judge has considered the circumstance that the plaintiff has paid hard cash of Rs. 5000/- being the sale consideration before the Registrar. The learned Judge has also referred to the fact that the plaintiff after his purchase has obtained mutation of names in the revenue registry and was paying the tax directly to the Government. The lower court has also held accepting the evidence of the plaintiff and the other witnesses that after purchasing the property the plaintiff has spent considerable amounts by putting up buildings which have been let on rent. 33. These circumstances in my opinion, have been rightly taken into account by the lower court for holding that the plaintiff cannot be considered to have purchased the property in collusion with the second defendant. 33. These circumstances in my opinion, have been rightly taken into account by the lower court for holding that the plaintiff cannot be considered to have purchased the property in collusion with the second defendant. On the other hand though the finding of the learned Judge recorded in favour of the plaintiff that he is a bona fide purchaser for value is attacked by the learned Government Pleader, in my opinion in the circumstances adverted to by the lower court and accepted by me, will show that contention cannot certainly be accepted; and the circumstances pointed out above will only be quite consistent only with a purchaser bona fide for value. If the plaintiff is colluding with the second defendant, it is highly improbable that he would have paid the full consideration for the sale deed before the Sub Registrar; nor would he have spent considerable amount for putting up buildings on this property if he was aware that his title will be attacked by the State. 34. I am in full agreement with the findings recorded by the lower court on all aspects and the result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs of the plaintiff respondent.