Judgment :- 1. Appeal by plaintiffs. 2. The 1st plaintiff, a boy of 6 years sues, through his father and next friend the 2nd plaintiff, for damages for personal injuries sustained on noon, April 29,1956, when he was knocked down at Alwaye by the 1st defendant's lorry driven by the 2nd defendant. He was taken to the Alwaye Hospital and thence to the Bava Memorial Nursing Home, Ernakulam - he was unconscious even when he was taken to the Nursing Home - where he was treated for 56 days at a cost of Rs. 581 as 4 ps. 6. When at the Nursing Home a senior Doctor of the State Medical Service, Dr. A.K. Menon, was called in for consultation and was paid fee. Claiming Rs. 1000 also as general damages this suit is laid for Rs. 1681 as. 4 p. 6. The 2nd defendant remained ex parte. The 1st defendant denied liability attributing negligence of the 1st plaintiff as the sole cause of the accident. Though the lorry had been insured with the State Insurance Department against third party risks, no information of the accident was given to it or even to the police by the defendants. The evidence is that soon after 11.30 a. m. on the day of the accident, 20 to 25 boys from the nearby Arabic School gathered on the road-side to cross it. They waited to see a bus that was coming down from the south to pass. The 1st defendant's lorry was coming 75 to 100 yards behind the bus at a speed of 25 to 30 miles per hour. As soon as the bus passed the boys began to run across the road, and some had crossed the road when the accident took place. 3. Munsiff Mr. G. Kurien held, "Since the road was straight at that place by about a furlong distance and since the 2nd defendant was driving the lorry from south to north and there was a gap of about 75 to 100 yards in between the bus and the lorry, 2nd defendant, if he has exercised reasonable diligence or care, could have pulled up the lorry by applying the brakes and avoided the danger. At any rate, when he found that about 20 to 25 boys were waiting there to cross the road, as a driver he must have been put on the alert. At any rate, when he found that about 20 to 25 boys were waiting there to cross the road, as a driver he must have been put on the alert. He could have reduced the speed and driven the lorry in such a manner as to have it under control if any mishap is going to happen by the crossing of the boys across the road. In the peculiar circumstances of this case, it is clear that the 2nd defendant had omitted to do something which a reasonable man guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs would do. I find that 2nd defendant was negligent in driving the lorry and his negligent driving resulted in the accident ... in this case, the 1st plaintiff was less than 6 years of age on the date of the accident. As a general proposition, children are incapable of negligence and therefore equally of contributory negligence. The reason is that children could not be expected to take that care which the law expects of adults and act which in the case of adults might amount to negligence cannot be set down against the children so as to deny them redress. The law has necessarily to make allowance for their inexperience and infirmity of judgment... "An amount of Rs. 681 as 4 ps. 6 has been claimed by the plaintiff towards consulting fees for doctors and hospitalisation charges. So far as the consulting fee is concerned, there is no bill or any other evidence. Pw. 3, Dr. A.K. Menon, says that he was paid consulting fees. At any rate, the consulting fees must be included in the bill of the hospitalisation charges and so separate consulting fee is not allowable. Pw. 4 from whose institution Ext. P-1 series bills had been issued swears that the amount had been paid and for the treatment of the boy this was necessary. But in the bill, mixture given to the mother of the 1st plaintiff also is charged. That comes to Rs. 2 as. 10. The same has to be deducted. The balance comes to Rs. 578 as. 10 ps. 6. This the plaintiff is entitled to realise from defendants 1 and 2. The next claim is Rs. 1000 being for mental shock and shortened expectation of life. Pw. That comes to Rs. 2 as. 10. The same has to be deducted. The balance comes to Rs. 578 as. 10 ps. 6. This the plaintiff is entitled to realise from defendants 1 and 2. The next claim is Rs. 1000 being for mental shock and shortened expectation of life. Pw. 4 says that 1st plaintiff is not suffering from any of such infirmities due to accident. This amount is therefore not allowable. Since the accident took place when the 2nd defendant was driving the lorry of the 1st defendant for his purpose, 1st defendant is vicariously liable. I hold that defendants 1 and 2 are liable to the extent of Rs. 578 as. 10 ps. 6." On appeal by the 1st defendant, District Judge Mr. Balakrishna Menon accepted the assessment of damages but non-suited the plaintiff, holding: " .... Needless to point out that in an action of this nature where the claim is based on the negligence of the driver, the person putting forward that claim must affirmatively prove the negligence. Plaintiffs must also prove that the lorry was being driven in a rash manner and against Traffic Rules, which is the specific case in the plaint. This burden of the plaintiff is all the more, because the first defendant asserts that the occurrence was as a result of an inevitable accident as the first plaintiff suddenly ran across the road when the lorry was coming ".... In a straight road, a speed of 25 to 30 miles for a lorry is not dangerous. It was argued on behalf of the respondent that when the driver saw a group of children by the side, he should have slowed down the vehicle. Even if he had slowed down the vehicle and the boy suddenly jumped on to the road when it reached near him, it will not be possible to avert an accident. It is true that Pw. 2 says that the lorry was going at a high speed, but at what approximate speed it was going, he has not been asked. Pw. 5 has given the speed to be only 25 to 30 miles per hour which in the circumstances of the case cannot be considered to be a high speed. Whether the vehicle was driven at a dangerous speed or not will depend upon the circumstances of the case. Pw. 5 has given the speed to be only 25 to 30 miles per hour which in the circumstances of the case cannot be considered to be a high speed. Whether the vehicle was driven at a dangerous speed or not will depend upon the circumstances of the case. In a narrow congested road even a speed of 10 miles per hour will be dangerous. In a straight open road with no obstruction, or traffic, even a speed of 40 miles per hour will not be dangerous. Here the road is proved to have a width of 30ft. as seen from the evidence of Pw. 5. It was a straight road except for a slight bent. So the driver had good visibility. He could not have been going at a high speed, because within 8 ft. of the impact, he has stopped the lorry as proved by Pw. 5. That means the lorry was going at a low speed at not even 20 miles per hour. And the brakes of the lorry were exceedingly effective. In such circumstances I am unable to conclude on the evidence available that the plaintiffs have proved that the 2nd defendant was driving the lorry in a rash or negligent manner. "If it were a case where the plaintiff is entitled to claim damages. I agree with the learned Munsiff that the amount should be fixed at Rs. 578-10-6 as has been done by the learned Munsiff. "But since the basis of the plaintiffs' claim is not proved, no liability can be fastened either on defendant 1 or defendant 2. So the decree of the lower Court has to beset aside. It is accordingly set aside and the plaintiffs' suit is dismissed. They will pay the costs of the first defendant." 4. That the 1st plaintiff has suffered personal injuries by a knock of the 1st defendant's lorry driven by the 2nd defendant is not in dispute. It is also conceded that if the 2nd defendant is liable for the accident the 1st defendant would equally be liable on the principle that the master is answerable for the acts or defaults of the servant in the course of his employment. It is also conceded that if the 2nd defendant is liable for the accident the 1st defendant would equally be liable on the principle that the master is answerable for the acts or defaults of the servant in the course of his employment. The law is well-settled that a master is responsible not merely for what he authorises his servant to do, but also for the way in which he does it and that if a servant does negligently that which he was authorised to do carefully, or if he does fraudulently that which he was authorised to do honestly, or if he does mistakenly that which he was authorised to do correctly, his master will answer for that negligence, fraud or mistake (See Salmond on Torts, 13th Edn. p. 122). So, the question here is whether the 2nd defendant is liable for the accident. It is conceded on both sides - I think rightly - that the defendants' liability must depend on whether the 2nd defendant was guilty of negligence in driving the lorry at the time of the accident. 5. Winfield defines negligence as "the breach of a legal duty to take care which results in damage, undesired by the defendant, to the plaintiff". It involves three ingredients - a legal duty to take care, breach of that duty, and consequential damage to the plaintiff. The accident and the injuries to the 1st plaintiff are not in dispute. Only the first two ingredients are disputed. Duty to take care is defined by Winfield as a restriction of the defendant's freedom of conduct, obliging him to behave as a reasonably careful man would behave in the like circumstances. In Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932 App. Cas 562, 580) Lord Atkin defined it thus: "You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? In Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932 App. Cas 562, 580) Lord Atkin defined it thus: "You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be - persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question." The test of neighbourship in this definition is, Winfield pointed out, "not one of physical proximity but of foresight,...the fact that the defendant ought reasonably to have the plaintiff in contemplation when directing his mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question, i. e. the alleged acts of negligence themselves... This does not mean, of course, that the plaintiff must be a person identifiable by the defendant. What is required is that he should be one of a class within the area of foreseeable injury." After many discussions as to whether the test of liability should be whether the accident was the natural or necessary or probable consequences of the defendant's act (this is called the test of probability) or whether the accident was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of his act (this is called the test of foreseeability), it has now been settled by the supreme tribunals in England, the Privy Council and the House of Lords, that the real and effective test is the foreseeability of the accident - foreseeability not of the manner in which the accident happened but of the occurrence of an accident of the kind. In the Wagon Mound case (1961 App. Cas. 388, 422) the Judicial Committee speaking through Viscount Simonds, observed thus: "It is a principle of civil liability.... that a man must be considered to be responsible for the probable consequences of his act. To demand more of him is too harsh a rule, to demand less is to ignore that civilised order requires the observance of a minimum standard of behaviour. that a man must be considered to be responsible for the probable consequences of his act. To demand more of him is too harsh a rule, to demand less is to ignore that civilised order requires the observance of a minimum standard of behaviour. (After referring to the test of probability the judgment continued) But if it would be wrong that a man should be held liable for damage unpredictable by a reasonable man because it was 'direct' or 'natural', equally it would be wrong that he should escape liability, however 'indirect' the damage, if he foresaw or could reasonably foresee the intervening events which led to its being done. Thus foreseeability becomes the effective test. In reasserting this principle their Lordships conceive that they do not depart from, but follow and develop, the law of negligence as laid down by Baron Alderson in Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. (1856) 11 Exch. 781, 784)." 6. To determine breach of duty, the test, says Winfield, is laid down in the oft-cited dictum of Baron Alderson: "Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do." (Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. (1856) 11 Ex. 781, 784)." "Duty to take care", spoke Lord Macmillan in Bourhill v. Young (1943 App. Cas. 92,104), "is the duty to avoid doing or omitting to do anything the doing or omitting to do which may have as its reasonable and probable consequence injury to others, and the duty is owed to those to whom injury may reasonably and probably be anticipated if the duty is not observed." The noble Lord reiterated the same in Glasgow Corporation v. Muir (1943 App. Cas. 448, 457) and added, "The standard of foresight of the reasonable man is, in one sense, an impersonal test. It eliminates the personal equation and is independent of the idiosyncrasies of the particular person whose conduct is in question. Some persons are by nature unduly timerous and imagine every path be set with lions. Others, of more robust temperament, fail to foresee or nonchalantly disregard even the most obvious dangers. It eliminates the personal equation and is independent of the idiosyncrasies of the particular person whose conduct is in question. Some persons are by nature unduly timerous and imagine every path be set with lions. Others, of more robust temperament, fail to foresee or nonchalantly disregard even the most obvious dangers. The reasonable man is presumed to be free both from over-apprehension and from over-confidence, but there is a sense in which the standard of care of the reasonable man involves in its application a subjective element. It is still left to the judge to decide what, in the circumstances of the particular case, the reasonable man would have had in contemplation, and what, accordingly, the party sought to be made liable ought to have foreseen." To decide culpability we have to determine what a reasonable man would have foreseen and thus form an idea of how he would have behaved in the circumstances. Lord Dunedin said in Fardon v. Harcourt-Rivington (1932) 146 L. T. 391) and Lord du Parcq repeated in London Passenger Transport Board v. Upson (1939 App. Cas. 155,176), "If the possibility of danger emerging is reasonably apparent, then to take no precautions is negligence; but if the possibility of danger emerging is only a mere possibility which would never occur to the mind of a reasonable man, then there is no negligence in not having taxen extraordinary precautions." As I have already said what is material here is foreseeability of danger and not of the manner in which the danger materialised in fact. 7. A reasonable man would so regulate his conduct as to avoid producing any undesirable consequences which he foresees as probable. That is the normal standard of careful conduct. If the conduct in question falls short of that standard it is negligent. Here, the question is not whether the defendant did actually foresee the consequences that happened as probable. The question is only whether he, as a reasonable man, ought to have foreseen them. If the circumstances of the act are such that a reasonable man would have foreseen the probability of the accident, then the defendant, who failed to do likewise or who envisaged it and rejected it as too remote a chance, has to be regarded as having been negligent. It is unnecessary in law to prove that he actually foresaw the event or the consequences. It is unnecessary in law to prove that he actually foresaw the event or the consequences. It is enough if the circumstances are such that he, as a reasonable man, ought to have foreseen them. When the circumstances of the act indicate that certain consequences might ensue, the person must be held to have foreseen the consequences or at least ought to have foreseen them. 8. In Hughes v. Lord Advocate (1963 App. Cas. 837) the facts were thus: On November 8,1958, some Post Office employees opened a manhole in Russel Road, Edinburgh, to do some repairs to a telephone cable under the roadway. They erected a canvas tent over the open manhole and at about 3.30 p.m. put four red warning lamps in position outside the tent. The lamps were of the normal pattern and lit by paraffin. Soon after 5 p. m., when it was dark in Edinburgh, the workmen left the site for their tea break, leaving the open manhole unattended, and were absent for about a quarter of an hour. The appellant, a boy of 8 years, with his companion another boy of 10 years, came along the road, picked up one of the red lamps, swung it at the end of a rope and went into the manhole. After they emerged from the manhole, the lamp was either knocked or dropped into the manhole and a violent explosion took place causing severe burns to the appellant. The House of Lords were unanimous in holding that it was negligence on the part of the post office employees to have left unattended the open manhole and the paraffin lamps in a place were children would be tempted to explore and play with. All the noble Lords concurred to observe it to be reasonably foreseeable that the tent, the open cavernous manhole and the red paraffin lamps were allurements to inquisitive or mischievous boys and that by mishandling the lamps boys were likely to sustain burns. Though the plea of contributory negligence was taken, it was ultimately accepted that having regard to the children's tender years they were not to be blamed for meddling with the allurements on the road-side having no watchman to guard them and no fence to keep children away. Though the plea of contributory negligence was taken, it was ultimately accepted that having regard to the children's tender years they were not to be blamed for meddling with the allurements on the road-side having no watchman to guard them and no fence to keep children away. The above decision shows that, if the possibility of danger is reasonably apparent, then to take no precautions would be negligence and that in judging the duty of care and its breach the status of the person injured has also to be taken into account. 9. In Bourhill v. Young (1943 App. Cas. 92,116 & 117) Lord Porter observed: "In the case of a civil action there is no such thing as negligence in the abstract. There must be neglect of the use of care towards a person towards whom the defendant owes the duty of observing care The duty is not to the world at large. It must be tested by asking with reference to each several complainant: Was a duty owed to him or her?" The position is explained in Salmond on Torts thus : "'The ideas of negligence and duty are strictly correlative', said Bowen L.J., and there is no such thing as negligence in the abstract; negligence is simply neglect of some care which we are bound to exercise towards somebody'. This duty of carefulness is not universal; it does not extend to all occasions, and all persons, and all modes of activity. So Lord Esher M. R. once uttered the characteristic remark that'If a man is driving on Salisbury Plain, and no other person is near him, he is at liberty to drive as fast and as recklessly as he pleases.' So a man may be under a duty of care towards one person, and yet in the same matter and on the same occasion under no duty of care towards another." (13th Edn., pages 423 & 424). 10. Of course every workman constantly, and justifiably, takes risks relying on others to do their duty and trusting that they have done it. But that is far from saying that everyone is entitled to assume, in all circumstances, that other persons will be careful. 10. Of course every workman constantly, and justifiably, takes risks relying on others to do their duty and trusting that they have done it. But that is far from saying that everyone is entitled to assume, in all circumstances, that other persons will be careful. In the case of an adult person, an amount of care on his part attributable to a reasonable man in the circumstances may be expected and correspondingly the duty of care owed to him may be reduced. In the case of a child, having regard to its age, its mental development and other attendant circumstances, not much of care can be expected and accordingly the duty of care owed to it must then be of a higher standard. As Lord du Parcq said in Grant v. Sun Shipping Co., Ltd. (1948 App. Cas. 549, 567) and iterated in London Passenger Transport Board v. Upson (1949 App. Cas. 155,176) "a prudent man will guard against the possible negligence of others when experience shows such negligence to be common." The latter was a case of collision of a motor-bus with a pedestrian who emerged suddenly from cover of a stationary taxi-cab on a side of the road and was crossing road when the light signal was not in her favour. The House of Lords were unanimous to hold "a driver fails to exercise due care if he proceeds on the assumption that pedestrians will refrain from crossing the road until the lights change and drives his vehicle in such a way that he cannot avoid an accident if a pedestrian emerges suddenly from behind the obstruction." It has been settled time out of mind that men must use care in driving vehicles on highways. A special care is called for when pedestrains are likely to cross the road and a much greater care if the pedestrians assembled on the side of the road for crossing are school-boys of young age. The evidence is clear that the 2nd defendant, when he was about 75 to 100 yards away from the spot could well see the boys about to cross the road. The evidence further shows that as soon as the bus passed, when there was a space of 75 to 100 yards in front of the lorry, the boys began to cross the road. There were 20 to 25 boys of tender age to cross the road. The evidence further shows that as soon as the bus passed, when there was a space of 75 to 100 yards in front of the lorry, the boys began to cross the road. There were 20 to 25 boys of tender age to cross the road. The boy in question was only less than six years and the road was 30 ft. wide. The accident that happened in the circumstances must have been foreseen or ought to have been foreseen by the 2nd defendant. As observed by Lord du Parcq in London Passenger Transport Board v. Upson (1949 App. Cas 155,178) "no speed is reasonable which is not adjusted to the circumstances of the moment, including the fact that the driver is approaching a pedestrian crossing and may have to pull up quickly and within a very short distance. " Having seen the school-boys about to cross the road, it was the 2nd defendant's duty to have proceeded at such a speed as to be able, if necessary, to stop before he reached the crossing place Proof here is that the lorry could be stopped only after it went 8 feet beyond the place of accident. There is no merit in saying that the boys were at fault in crossing the road after seeing the lorry coming down at a distance of 75 to 100 yards. It is common experience that boys, in crossing a road, do not often behave with ‘reasonable care'. "A driver is not, of course, bound to anticipate folly in all its forms", observed Lord Uthwatt in Upson's case (1949 App. Cas. 155,173), "but he is not entitled to put out of consideration the teachings of experience as to the form those follies commonly take". Had the 2nd defendant been driving at such a pace as to enable him to stop short of the place at which the boys stood to cross the road or of the line they were crossing the road - both mean the same thing - the accident would not have happened. He had obviously gone at a much higher speed. A lorry proceeding at 30 m. p. h. could well be stopped within 15 yards. The evidence, accepted by the Courts below, is that when the assemblage of boys began to cross the road, the lorry was at a distance of 75 to 100 yards. He had obviously gone at a much higher speed. A lorry proceeding at 30 m. p. h. could well be stopped within 15 yards. The evidence, accepted by the Courts below, is that when the assemblage of boys began to cross the road, the lorry was at a distance of 75 to 100 yards. In the circumstances, the collision with the 1st plaintiff was obviously the result of negligence on the part of the 2nd defendant vis-à-vis the 1st plaintiff and he is answerable in damages to the injuries caused by that accident. The decree of the District Judge has therefore to be and is reversed. 11. As regards the measure of damages: Damages for personal injury are assessed under two distinct heads. In British Transport Commission v. Gourley (1956 App. Cas.185, 206) Lord Goddard has explained them thus : "First, there is what is referred to as special damage which has to be specially pleaded and proved. This consists of out-of-pocket expenses and loss of earnings incurred down to the date of trial, and is generally capable of substantially exact calculation. Secondly, there is general damage which the law implies and is not specially pleaded. This includes compensation for pain and suffering and the like and, if the injuries suffered are such as to lead to continuing or permanent disability, compensation for loss of earning power in the future." Lord Tucker observed in The Hebridean Coast Case (1961 App. Cas. 545,580): it... any specific damage which could be assessed in pounds, shillings and pence ... seems to be generally referred to as special damage in contradistinction to general damages which cannot be accurately quantified but fall to be computed on what is often referred to us 'a jury basis' or a 'judicial guess'." 12. The plaintiff has claimed two items of special damage - medical expenses of the Nursing Home, Rs. 581 as. 4 ps. 6, as per Ext. P1 series of bills and consultation fees, Rs. 100, paid to doctors outside the Nursing Home - and general damages in the sum of Rs. 1000. 13. The plaintiff has claimed two items of special damage - medical expenses of the Nursing Home, Rs. 581 as. 4 ps. 6, as per Ext. P1 series of bills and consultation fees, Rs. 100, paid to doctors outside the Nursing Home - and general damages in the sum of Rs. 1000. 13. Damages under the head of medical expenses may, the learned editors of Winfield on Tort, 7th edition, observe, cover both past and prospective expenses and include not only the cost of medical treatment and attendance but also such matters as increased living expenses, if, e. g., the plaintiff has to live in a special institution because of his injuries, transport costs to and from hospital and charges of nursing attendance. In Schneider v. Eisovitch (1960, 2 Q.B. 430) Mrs. Schneider was injured and her husband killed in a motor accident in France. When Taylor heard that his brother had been killed and his sister-in-law was lying in a French hospital apparently seriously injured, he and Mrs. Taylor at once flew to her assistance. Mrs. Schneider's claim to recover their out-of-pocket expenses in order to reimburse them was allowed by Paull, J. as their services became reasonably necessary as a consequence of the accident and the expenses were reasonable. In the present case, one of the bills of the Nursing Home included Rs. 2 odd as cost of mixture given to the mother of the 1st plaintiff who was nursing him. Nobody will say that the mother's services were unnecessary to the boy at the Nursing Home or that the expense of Rs. 2 odd for mixture given to her when she felt uneasy was not reasonable. Counsel for the respondents stated that that item was not impugned before the Munsiff. It is rather surprising why the Munsiff struck it down and awarded only the remainder of the bills as special damages to the plaintiff. 14. The second item of special damage has been rightly disallowed by the Munsiff as been not proved. Though P.w. 3, Dr. A.K. Menon, has sworn that he was called to the Nursing Home for consultation and been paid fee he did not remember the amount paid, not was it put to him. Even the 2nd plaintiff did not testify to the amount of fee paid. 15. The claim for general damages has been disallowed by the Munsiff under an obvious misconception of law. Even the 2nd plaintiff did not testify to the amount of fee paid. 15. The claim for general damages has been disallowed by the Munsiff under an obvious misconception of law. General damages represents the pecuniary reparation or solatium to the plaintiff for the injuries sustained by him. As has been said already, general damage is to be presumed by the Court and therefore needs no specific pleading for grant of relief. In practice, a mere general allegation that the plaintiff has suffered damage or injury or a mere statement of facts about the accident with a prayer for award of damages is sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to a decree for general damages. (See the Law of Damages and Compensation by Kameswara Rao, Chapter XXXIII para 3 and Law of Pleadings by Mogha,10th Edn. Pages 24-25.) Even in valuing the claim, it is open to the plaintiff to put an estimate of the general damages paying court-fee thereon and offering to pay before decree is passed additional court-fee on the fixation of damages due to him. (See Ragavaji Sait v. Annamalai Mudali -17 MLJ. 625). A plaintiff, claiming damages but failing to prove any special damage, may be entitled to general damages. In The Hebredian Coast (1961 App. Cas. 545) where the plaintiffs' ship had sustained damage in a collison with the defendants' vessel and the plaintiffs claimed f 1525 as special damages for loss of use of the ship for the period of detention for repairs and general damages in unspecified sum but failed to prove special damage, the House of Lords held them entitled to general damages on the basis of interest on the value of the ship and depreciation for the period of detention. The relief of general damages must necessarily be more imperative in a case of collision causing personal injuries with concomitant pain and suffering - physical and/or mental. The Munsiff has disallowed general damages on the ground that the 1st plaintiff is not suffering from any infirmity after the medical treatment received by him. The reason is fallacious. What about the pain and suffering undergone by the 1st plaintiff? They are material items for which the 1st plaintiff is entitled to pecuniary compensation by way of general damages. The Munsiff has disallowed general damages on the ground that the 1st plaintiff is not suffering from any infirmity after the medical treatment received by him. The reason is fallacious. What about the pain and suffering undergone by the 1st plaintiff? They are material items for which the 1st plaintiff is entitled to pecuniary compensation by way of general damages. The Munsiff's disallowance of any general damages in the circumstances of this case, was most unwarranted; but it has been acquiesced by the plaintiffs, who did not appeal against it in the first appellate Court. Even in this second appeal, the claim is confined by them to the sum of Rs. 578.66 p. that was awarded by the Munsiff. 16. In the circumstances, all that can be done here is to reverse the District Judge and restore the Munsiff 's award. The Munsiff has awarded proportionate costs to both the parties. In the circumstances of this suit, the plaintiffs have to be given their full costs throughout (inclusive of the costs incurred in the trial Court on the claim for general damages). Judgment accordingly. Allowed.